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I 
INTRODUCTION 
A. THE PROBLEM OF THE DISSERTATION 
The problem of this dissertation is to contribute to the 
drafting of a more precise definition of the term 11 neo-li beralism." 
The definition sought is not an ideal one, but an empirical 
one. The question put is not what should be the nature of nee-
liberalism, but what is the nature of nee-liberalism. 
A complete definition would, therefore, be formulated on 
the basis of the actual thought of all the important theolo-
gians who are generally acknowledged to be "post-liberal" or 
nee-liberal theologians. However, an adequate investigation 
of the thought of all the leading nee-liberals would be be-
yond the scope of a single dissertation. Therefore, the thought 
of only one important nee-liberal theologian will be thoroughly 
investigated, though brief attention will be given to the sys-
temsof other like-minded theologians in order to help estab-
lish the classification. 
Dr. Walter Marshall Horton, of the Oberlin College Graduate 
School of Theology, has for many years been very active in con-
tributing to the development of just such a theology. It is he 
who appears first to have adopted and defended a self-styled 
1 
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"neo-liberal11 theology. Accordingly, his theological thought 
has been made the object of research in this dissertation. 
Therefore, the definition constructed in this dissertation 
concerns only nee-liberalism as it appears in the thought of 
Walter M. Horton. 
This investigation will attempt to answer the following 
questions: 
1. In what respect and to what degree does Horton's new 
liberalism remain a liberal theology? 
2. What has been the effect, if any, of non-liberal 
elements upon his thinking? 
3· Vfuat is the precise nature of the elements and trends 
that can properly be called nee-liberal and how do 
they compare with the major themes evident in the 
thought of other theologians whom Horton regards as 
nee-liberals? 
Furthermore, it will be necessary ; to answer two pairs of 
questions regarding the term nee-liberal: 
1. Are the elements in Horton's later thought "new" only 
to him, or are they 11 new 11 to theological thought in 
general? 
2. If the latter proves to be true, is the new orientation 
only re-appearance, in new guise, of previously known 
concepts, or does it, in fact, contain ·some original 
insight? 
B. PROVISIONAL DEFINITION 
1. Liberalism 
Religious liberalism of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries was a theological orientation that had a 
high regard for the method and findings of the natural, his-
torical, sociological, and psychological sciences. Its high 
regard for human reason was related to a doctrine of man which 
emphasized ·man's rational and moral capacities as a child of 
God. The liberalism of that period acknowledged God's trans-
cendence, but accorded greater recognition to divine immanence. 
Christological problems were resolved more by reference to the 
historical Jesus than to the Christ of faith. A pervading sense 
of social optimism and a belief in "gradualism" resulted in 
liberal preoccupation with the idea of the earthly realization 
of God's Kingdom which largely ignored the reality of the Church 
as a redeeming divine-human community. 
2. The Prefix "New" or "Neo" 
The prefix "neo," when added to the term "liberal," refers 
3 
to a type of theology that is basically liberal in both content 
and temper, but is being continually enriched by ideas and sit-
uations that were either unknown to, or insufficiently appreciated 
by, the theologians of the older liberalism. In this continuing 
process of growth, significant modifications, emphases, and 
original insights are supplementing and permeating the older 
liberalism to such a pronounced degree, that a distinctive type 
of theology is being produced which may well merit the label, 
"nee-liberalism." 
C. LIMITATIONS 
1. The background study of the older liberalism is 
limited to a consideration of only the most signifi-
cant writings of the outstanding American liberal 
theologians1 whose thought was current from the late 
nineteenth through the early twentieth century ·. , 
2. The study of nee-liberal theology is largely limited 
to the form it has taken in the published works of 
Walter M. Horton. However, in Section D. PREVIOUS 
RESEARCH IN TEE F'IELD, there is a brief presentation 
of the central ideas of two other nee-liberal theo-
logians, viz., John C. Bennett and L. Harold DeWolf. 
Though limited, the survey of the thoughts of these 
4 
two theologians will provide a working or provisional 
criterion of the nature of nee-liberalism that will 
help locate Horton's thought vis-a-vis the thought of 
Bennettand DeWolf. 
This limitation means that the definition of nee-liberalism 
which results from this study refers specifically to nee-liberal-
ism as it appears in the thought of Walter M. Horton. Addi-
tional research into the thought of other like-minded theolo-
gians will~ needed so that the definition contained herein 
can be supplemented and a comprehensive, empirical definition 
of nee-liberalism can be written. 
1. In view of Borden P. Bowne's many important contributions 
to the development of liberal theology, his views will be 
included even though he was primarily a philosopher. 
5 
D. ~REVIOUS RESEARCH IN THE FIELD 
1. Nee-liberalism Expressed in the Writings of its Exponents 
a. Christian Realism (1941), by John C. Bennett 
Bennett does not adopt the label "neo-liberal." In fact, 
he begins by saying that his position would be difficult to 
label because radical liberals would accuse him of capitulating 
to nee-orthodoxy, and the neo-orthodox would refer to his work 
as simply another version of liberalism. Bennett refers to him-
self as a liberal who takes seriously the ideas of Barth, Brun-
ner, and Reinhold Niebuhr. 1 To his thinking, both the liberal 
optimism of the past and the contemporary pessimism about man 
appear incorrect. He adopts the term "realism" to describe his 
thinking to indicate that he is attempting to avoid the erroneous 
extremes and also to indicate that he believes that "the given 
aspects of the world" are of greater importance than "the 
-
contribution of the mind to experience." This latter is intended 
to make clear his rejection of philosophical idealism.2 
In developing his doctrine of God, Bennett forsakes all 
attempts to construct an image of deity that would be pleasing 
to modern man and goes straight to the revelational events that 
are recorded in the Biblical narratives. The topic headings 
which result from this approach are as follows: God as (l) 
1. John C. Bennett, Christian ~eligion (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1941), p. r.x. 
2. Ibid., pp. x, xi. 
6 
Creator, (2) Righteousness, (3) Lord of History, and (4) 
Redeemer. 
Bennett continues the liberal emphasis upon man as a child 
of God -- "a responsible being called by God to free obedience 
but capable of resisting the call. 111 But this idea he balances 
with the certain conviction that man is also a fallen creature. 
He accepts the neo-orthodox interpretation that the fall was 
not an event which involved one man in prehistorical times, but 
is an ever-present psychological reality in the life of every 
man. 2 
Though Bennett accepts important ideas from nee-orthodoxy 
in regard to the doctrines of God and man, he remains staunchly 
liberal in his views concerning the value of the historical 
Jesus. He condemns skepticism about the Jesus of history in 
five areas: (1) Though scholars cannot write Jesus• biography, 
they can "draw his portrait." (2) The tendency to neglect the 
Jesus of history is not compatible with the New Testament as a 
whole, e.g., I Corinthians could not have been written if Paul 
had not known the mind and spirit of Jesus. (3) Theological 
affirmations about Christ can never supplant Jesus' ethical 
teachings. "The theologian who likes to reel te his formulas 
concerning salvation by grace needs to be reminded that Jesus 
used as his teat of discipleship responsiveness to human need." 
(4) The Cross and the Resurrection would lose much of their 
1. Ibid., p. 52. 
2. Ibid • , p. 55. 
7 
significance apart from the life and personality of the his-
torical Jesus. The Atonement is efficacious because of the 
spotless moral character of the victim and the Resurrection is 
the triumph of Jesus and all that he represents. (5) The 
historical Jesus provides Christians with the norm whereby they 
may test their experiences of the contemporary Christ. "Without 
reference to the norm in the gospels it is far too easy to 
imagine a Christ in our own image. nl 
Bennett devotes much more space to a consideration of the 
Church than was usual for theologians with a liberal orienta-
tion. He believes that the Church is in a period of reformation 
and revitalization and lists five phenomena to illustrate that 
contention: (1) The hardships and persecution heaped upon the 
Church by totalitarian regimes in recent years have revealed 
"that there is iron within the church. 
• • • It has been 
purged and kindled with a new flame." (2) The social conscience 
of the Church has developed to an extraordinary degree within 
the past few years. (3) Since World War I there has been a 
theological revival embracing positions as different as those 
held by Barth and Wieman. (4) The new reformation is most 
dramatically evident in the trend toward unity that is mani-
fested in the ecumenical movement. (5) "The Church is now 
present as an indigenous movement in every region of the 
1. ~·' pp. 127-132. 
world." This is to say that the Church is truly a world 
Church for the first time in her history. 1 
8 
b. "The Christian Conception of Man" (1942), 2 by John Bennett 
Bennett begins his article by summarizing the most impor-
tant emphases characteristic of liberalism which must not be 
lost: (1) There is an essential goodness in man that is cor-
rupted but not destroyed. (2) Because man is a finite child of 
nature, he is often driven to sin by the nonmoral sources of 
evil which are present in his human nature. Thus man is a 
"victim of nature" as well as a sinner. (3) Man's reason is a 
priceless endowment, for "rational living in the widest eon-
text is good li ving11 and with reason man can criticize his 
pretensions and false revelations which are a greater danger 
than the misuse of reason. (4) "Man is a free, creative, res-
ponsible self." (5) Though the individual self is real, it 
cannot exist in isolation or, to put the matter positively, 
"Man can come to himself only in social relations." 3 
As a "post-liberal" or "neo-liberal" theologian, Bennett 
next lists "the insights which many liberals have learned to 
accept under the tutelage of iugustinian theologians and of 
the harrowing experiences of our generation."4 Under this 
second section, Bennett includes four lessons: Sin is more 
1. Ibid., pp. 145-152. 
2. John C. Bennett, "The Christian Conception of Man," Liberal 
Theology, An !E£raisal, ed. by David E. Roberts and Henry 
Pitney Van-nllsen (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942). 
3. Ibid., pp. 191-198. 
4. Ibid., p. 191. 
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than a conscious disobedience of God's unknown will; it also 
includes the self-deception that we practice when we convince 
ourselves that what we have done is really good. (2) There is 
sin at every level of moral and spiritual growth. Because 
every human good can be corrupted, it is impossible that any in-
dividual will attain to ethical perfection in this life. (3) 
The essential problem of human sinfulness cannot be completely 
solved by any utopian scheme, i.e., by a change in the insti-
tutions of society. (4) Repentance is · continually necessary. 
This includes repentance for evils with which man is related 
because of his social solidarity with the nation, though not 
necessarily caused by him personall y. 1 
Even this brief survey of Bennett's thought reveals that 
he has supplemented his liberal thinking with many significant 
insights that bad heretofore been partially neglected by 
liberal thinking. It would appear that his thought is in 
accord with the provisional definition of nee-liberalism stated 
above, and can be broadly classified as at least inclining 
toward the growing nee-liberal position. 
c. A Theology of ~ Living Church ( 1953), by L. Harold DeWolf2 
DeWolf has long been recognized as one of the able theo-
logians in the liberal camp. In recent years, he has attracted 
attention as a leader in the growing nee-liberal school of 
thought. He was so recognized by Horton, who was the first 
1. Ibid., pp. 199-202. 
2. t::Harold DeWolf, A Theology of the Living Church (New York: 
Harper & Bros • , 19'53) • -
10 
to call for the development of a neo-liberal theology. On 
the book jacket of DeWolf's! Theology of the Living ~2£ 
appears the following statement by Bennett: "This book is 
written on the basis of theological •liberalism' by a theologian 
who has kept his mind open to the 'post-liberal' developments 
of theology." 
DeWolf makes it clear that he has moved beyond the liberal 
thinking of the early twentieth century when, in treating the 
doctrine of man, he wri tea: "When we are fully aware of the 
whole breadth and subtlety of sin, we find it hard to escape 
the conviction that the Scriptures speak truly to the condi-
tion of us all in portraying us as sinners, every one." 1 Though 
DeWolf readily accepts those neo-orthodox insights which he 
regards as valid he resolutely holds to the liberal clatm that 
man is not totally depraved. If man were really completely 
depraved, he writes, "men would simply call evil good and be 
content." In actuality, they cannot quite do this, though 
they often try.n2 DeWolf cites four respects in which man is 
God-like: (1) Man has a spiritual nature. (2) Man's power of 
moral discrimination and even his feelings of guilt are signs 
of his Godlikeness. (3) Man is blessed with a persistent 
"inward yearning for God." (4) Even the most primitive of human 
societies reflect man's aspiration to the good and his con-
demnation of evil.3 
1. Ibid., p. 189. 
2. Ibid., p. 205. 
3. Ibid., pp. 205-207. 
11 . 
The liberal emphasis upon the value of the historical 
Jesus is continued by DeWolf, but it is supplemented by a 
careful appraisal of the factors that constitute Jesus' unique-
ness. Of Jesus, DeWolf writes that there are "several factors 
not associated with any other human being."1 They are listed 
as followac (1) The unique moral authority of Jesus, (2) Jesus' 
filial God-consciousness, (3) Jesus' wisdom and power, (4) the 
fact that men continue to find God in him.2 
DeWolf goes beyond the purely subjective theory of the 
Atonement, first formulated by Abelard and accepted by most 
liberals. The moral significance of Jesus' death on the Cross 
is proclaimed by DeWolf, to be sure, and he emphasizes the re-
vealing of God's heartbroken love and the repentance of the 
sinner, but he vigorously denies that this is a mere subjective 
doctrine. 3 
The reconciled sinner not only feels different; 
he is different. His attitude toward his own 
sin-rs new. The dominant purpose of his life is 
new. • • • Reconciliation is a glorious objective 
reality.4 
Perhaps one of DeWolf's most significant contributions to 
neo-liberal theology lies in his definition of Christian love. 
He breaks with the Eros-Agape dispute and points to the Chris-
tian concept of ideal community which he calls koinonia, as 
best exemplifying the spirit of Christian love. It is in this 
"sharing fellowship" that Christian love is found, which DeWolf 
1. L. Harold DeWolf, A Theology of the Living Church, p. 246. 
2. Ibid., pp. 246-247. 
3. Ibid., p. 268. 
4. Ibid., p. 269. 
l 
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defines as "the longing for and delight in that fellowship in 
which the treasures of God's own life, 'the unsearchable riches 
of Christ,' are shared."l 
DeWolf, like Bennett, has been strongly impressed by the 
signs of increasing vitality in the Church. Whereas few of the 
older liberals gave much attention to the doctrine of the Church, 
DeWolf devotes a large section of his book to a discussion of 
matters relating to the Church. He expresses high interest in 
the ecumenical movement and states that "all Christians are 
called to participate in the effort to reach ecumenical unity."2 
Moreover he calls his book ! Theology of the Living Church. 
d. Trends and Frontiers of Religious Thought (1955), by 
L. Harold DeWolf3 
In this survey of current theological systems, DeWolf ex-
presses his appreciation for several of the outstanding charac-
teristics of liberalism.4 In the first place, DeWolf appreciates 
the liberal effort to put the Christian message into language 
understandable to modern man. Secondly, he appreciates the 
liberal spirit of open-mindedness which is always alert to 
the appearance of new data and new interpretations of old data. 
Thirdly, he regards as sound the critical literary and 
historical method of Bible study. Finally, DeWolf credits liberal-
ism with stimulating social concern among the churches. 
1. Ibid., p. 301. 
2. !Sid., p. 336. 
3. ~arold DeWolf, Trends and Frontiers of Religious Thought 
{Nashville, Tennessee: NatiOnal MethodiSt Student Movement,l955). 
4. ~-· pp. 46-48. 
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While DeWolf recognizes the virtues inherent in liberalism, 
he is clearly aware of serious defects in and unfortunate con-
sequences of that movement which he lists as follows: (1) 
Liberalism tended to discourage the use of the Bible when it 
declared the fallibility of Scriptures, revealed the effort 
needed properly to understand the Bible, emphasized modern 
scientific books, and discouraged the memorization of Biblical 
passages. (2) Liberalism was predisposed to a gradualism in 
human affairs which, declares DeWolf, must be supplemented with 
a recognition of those "revolutionary and decisive moments of 
abrupt and transcendent importance." {3) Liberalism displayed 
a "tendency to substitute a this-worldly trust in human achieve-
ment for a world-transcending confidence in God.nl 
In expressing his own personal beliefs regarding the path 
theology ought to take, DeWolf makes the following suggestions: 
(1) Philosophy and science must continue to be used by theology, 
but in a discriminating fashion. (2) Both faith and reason must 
be held "in a constant, intimate working relationship." (3) 
The continuing discovery by science of the mechanisms in the 
cosmos must be balanced by a firm faith in divine providence. 
(4) There is a need to recognize the objective existence of 
divine moral norms. (5) The liberal method of critical inter-
pretation of the Bible must not be surrendered. (6) The Church 
1. Ibid., pp. 51-52. 
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must transcend both denominational a.nd secular barriers. "Only 
an ecumenical church can serve as spiritual basis for an in-
elusive, responsible society." (7) The frightful dimensions 
of human sin must continually be recognized by theology if any 
realistic doctrine of man is to be written. (8) Our final trust 
can never be put in human reason, but only in God himself who, 
alone, is "the one absolute object, the only ground of lasting 
security. "1 
This cursory examination of DeWolf's thought reveals him 
to be a liberal, sensitive to contemporary non-liberal and 
post-liberal trends, and continually exploring new theological 
frontiers. Certainly he deserves to be included, along with 
Bennett, in the neo-liberal category. 
a. 
2. Critical Studies of Nee-Liberalism 
Christian Realism in Contemporary American Theology (1940), 
a dissertation by George HammarZ 
Hammar's thesis is that American liberal theology is dis-
solving into a non-Christian, secular philosophy of religion. 
Some theologians who are not able to accept this are fleeing 
to the camp of neo-supernaturalism.3 11Yet," writes Hammar, 
11another group of theologians is re-thinking liberal theology 
1. Ibid., pp. 119-138. 
2. George Hammar, Christian Realism in Contemporary American 
Theology (Uwsala, Sweden~ X·.B. Liindiquistka Bokhandeln, 1940). 
3. Ibid., p. 26. 
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in a way which may justify the statement that American theology 
is at a transition period."1 In referring to this new 
theological orientation, which is essentially liberal, Hammar 
does not use the term "nee-liberal," but prefers the term 
"realism" which Bennett also uses in describing his theology. 
It was Horton who had first proposed the use of this term to 
describe the post-liberal movement in his book Realistic Theology 
(1934). However, in 1952, twelve years after Hammar's disser-
tation was published, Horton called for the development of a 
"nee-liberal" theology which, subsequent investigation will show 
was, in Horton's mind, essentially the same as his previously 
announced "realistic" theology.2 
In this new movement, Hammar includes W. M. Horton, H. P. 
VanDusen, John C. Bennett, and R. L. Calhoun. His dissertation 
consists of a study of the thought of Horton and Van Dusen in 
relation to Reinhold Niebuhr's thinking. His purpose is to show 
the degree to which Niebuhr's nee-orthodox ideas have affected 
Horton and Van Dusen. 
The present dissertation will differ from Hammar's study 
in the following respects: (1) The investigation will center 
on Horton's thought instead of encompassing the thought of 
several theologians. (2) Influences upon Horton's thought other 
than Niebuhr's will be considered; e.g., humanist, naturalist, 
Anglican, Catholic, and fundamentalist. (3) The background 
1. Ibid., pp. 4, 5. 
2. Walter M. Horton, Liberalism Old and New (Sweet Briar, 
Virginia: Sweet Briar College;-1952):-P. 4. 
chapter on liberalism will be less extensive and more 
intensive, thus providing a more exact picture of the 
American liberalism in and from which Horton's new liberal 
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thought grew. (4) Hammar's dissertation was published in 
1940, before Horton had begun to make his latest and perhaps 
most important contribution to neo-liberal thought, i.e., his 
ecumenical studies. The present investigation will examine 
Horton's thought up to, and including, the year 1957. (5) Ham-
mar's dissertation revealed that a new theological movement was 
growing in America and that Horton was associated with it. He 
defined this new type of theology as "a queer crossing between 
liberal theology and neo-supernaturalism.nl FUrthermore, Hammar 
never regarded the new theology as more than a "transition 
period.n2 It is the premise of the present study that the 
neo-liberal orientation, which continues to thrive and grow 
eighteen years after Hammar's prediction, is now an established 
theological position that is different from both the older 
liberalism and nee-orthodoxy. It i~ the intent of this disser-
tation to contribute to the formulation of a more precise 
definition of neo-liberalism by means of a careful study of 
Horton's thought. 
b. A Layman's Guide to Protestant Theology (1955), by 
William Hordern3 
In this study of contemporary types of theology, which is 
1. George Hammar, 2£· £1i., p. 316. 
2. Ibid., p. 5. 
3. WIIIiam Hordern, A Layman's Guide to Protestant Theology (New 
York: The Macmillan Co., 1955). 
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similar to DeWolf's Trends and Frontiers in Religious Thought, 
also published in 1955, Hordern includes a section on nee-lib-
eralism. Therein ~ordern recognizes that in 1934 Horton . himself 
a liberal, had proclaimed the demise of theological liberalism 
while,at the same time, insisting that certain values inherent 
in that theology be salvaged and incorporated into a remade 
liberalism. Because "liberalism was able to change itself" 
tl~ough the continua l and continuing rethinking of its position, 
Hordern concludes that it cannot be "ignored as bankrupt. 111 
Hordern accepts the term 11 neo-liberal'' as the best label 
for the new movement and defines it as ''the attempt to preserve 
the values of liberalism while reinterpreting them for a new 
age and new conditions." 2 In the neo-liberal camp, Hordern 
includes such widely differing thinkers as Fosdick, Bennett, 
Horton, Van Dusen, Trueblood and Harkness. Yet, at another 
point he seems to imply that the true neo-liberals (viz. Horton, 
Bennett, and Van Dusen) are the '' realists" who have abandoned 
philosophical idealism and "are looking outside man, not within, 
for the clue to God." 3 However, in the address delivered at 
Sweet Briar College in 1952 Horton proclaimed DeWolf as one of 
the important neo~liberal theologians.4 The fact that DeWolf 
professedly adheres to personalistic idealism as a philosophical 
system makes it clear that an accurate definition of 
1. Ibid., p .99. 
2. Ibid., p. 100 
J. Ibid., p. 111. 
4. Walter M. Horton, Liberalism Old and New, p. 12. 
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neo-liberalism must not be limited to, or even emphasize, those 
who hold to a realistic metaphysics. In this respect, the pres-
ent investigation will move beyond Hordern's important contribu-
tion to the understanding of nee-liberalism. 
Hordern explains that the great depression and the two 
world wars broke Christendom's faith in the utopian liberal 
promises which were based largely on the widespread belief in 
1 human goodness. He states that one of the chief characteris-
tics of neo-liberal thinking is that it is ready to face the 
worst facts about the human situation, and has even come to ac-
cept certain aspects of the Augustinian view of man. 2 
Another important facet of nee-liberal belief, Hordern 
adds, · is to be found in the doctrine of the Church. Nee-lib-
erals reveal a new-found appreciation of the importance o:f -the 
Church as a divine institution founded by God. This interest 
is most strikingly expressed in the neo-liberal devotion to the 
ecumenical movement.3 
Hordern concludes his study with a reference to Hammar's 
prediction that the new liberalism would never be more than a 
brief transitional movement. Hammar, he writes, appears to have 
been mistaken.4 Hordern, however, does not give a systematic 
dei'inition .oi' nee-liberalism because the exponents of the new 
orientation "have not found agreement upon any set of belief's. 
1. William Hordern, A Lalman's Guide to Protestant Theology, 
PP• 100, 101. 
2. Ibid., PP• 113, 114. 
3· Ib!a., P• 115. 4· Ibid., p. 117. 
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They are still on the march, searching for a camping ground.nl 
Vlhile the present study will not attempt to formulate a final 
definition of nee-liberalism, because of the growing and di-
versified nature of the problem, it will seek to take a first 
step toward this goal. 
E. METHOD 
1. There will be presented a brief theological biography 
of Horton which will outline the major periods in his life and 
emphasize the character of the changes which mark his thought. 
This introductory survey, by illuminating the social and theo-
logical matrix of Horton's life, will add the dimension of 
personal-historical reality to this study of nee-liberalism. 
2. The Introduction contains a brief survey of the more 
important recent expressions of nee-liberal thought (aside 
from Horton's) in order to establish a working criterion of 
the essentials of nee-liberalism. 
3. A criterion for the meaning of the term "liberalism" 
will be established by means of a systematic study of the 
thoughts expressed by the leading American theological liberals 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
4. A more extensive and intensive study of Horton's theo-
logical thought, from his earliest to his most recently pub-
lished writings will be made. 
1. ~-, p. 116. 
5. All non-liberal and post-liberal factors that appear 
in Horton's thought will be identified, as well as extreme 
liberal elements such as might derive from humanism and na-
turalism. 
6. During the course of the investigation, Horton's de-
veloping thought will be continually related to the liberal 
and neo-liberal criteria in order to determine the precise 
relation of Horton's thought to the old and new liberalism. 
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7. The investigation will be concluded with a definition 
of nee-liberalism in terms of its liberal, non-liberal and 
post-liberal elements, and an estimate of the degree of origi-
nality inherent in it. 
CHAPTER I 
THEOLOGICAL BIOGRAPHY OF WALTER MARSHALL HORTON 
A. HIS GROUNDING IN THE LIBERAL TRADITION 
1. The Legacy of Home and Church 
Walter Marshall Horton was born in Somerville, Massachu-
setts, on April 7, 1895. The home in which he was reared was 
completely free from religious authoritarianism because of the 
firm conviction of both of his parents. His mother had reacted 
against the strictness of her Baptist upbringing, and his 
father had been repelled by Christian Science which he felt 
was contrary to scientific facts and common sense. Conse-
quently, Horton was hever subjected, by his parents, to any 
form of forcible religious indoctrination. His father's strong 
interest in the natural sciences resulted in Horton becoming 
familiar with the, then controversial, theory of evolution, 
of which he wrote: 
I made the acquaintance of the dinosaur and 
the cave man before I had ever .seen the ac-
count of the Creation in the book of Genesis. 
This has probably saved me a great deal of 
mental anguish. Since I have never, at any 
time in my life, been tempted to believe in 
the literal infallibility of the Bible, nor 
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associated the Christian religion with a 
prescientific view of the universe, I have 
never been troubled with doubts on these 
vexatious issues .1 
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At the First Baptist Church of Arlington, Massachusetts, 
Horton came in contact with a man who was to exercise a great 
influence over his life--the pastor, Dr. Nathan E. Wood. 
Horton was much impressed with Dr. Wood's genuine Christian 
concern about the individuals in the church and later wrote 
that he was '"the embodiment of the Evangelical spirit at its 
very best." 2 It was this association that awakened in him his 
genuine and lasting appreciation of the winning power of the 
evangelical spirit possessed by so many fundamentalist 
Christians. 
Nevertheless, he soon became increasingly aware that 
there was a distinction to be made between the warm evangeli-
cal spirit and the conservative theology or the fundamentalist. 
He admired and adopted the first, but knew he could never ac-
cept the latter. He called the conservative theology "salva-
tion by opinion,"3 i.e., subscribing to the "correct" theory 
of Christology in order to be saved. But even at this easy 
stage in his life, he believed that a person could have evan-
gelical reli~ion without believing in fundamentalist theology, 
and he began to search for a theology that would support 
1 •. 
2. 
3. 
Walter M. Horton, "Rough Sketch 
Contemporary American Theologf, 
Round Table Press, Inc., 1932 , 
Ibid., p. 166. 
Ib 1 d • , p • 168 • 
of a Half Formed Mind," 
(ed.) Ferm (New York: 
Vol. I., p. 163. 
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evangelical reli gion without violating his intelligence. It 
was during this quest that he encountered the writings of Henry 
Drummond. In these writings, which dealt with the relations be-
tween science and theology, Horton believed he had found proof 
that evangelical fervor can be combined with liberal open-
mindedness. 1 
2. Formal Education at Home and Abroad 
In 1913, Horton entered Harvard College where he was active 
in the Cosmopolitan Club and the Christian Association. The 
Cosmopolitan Club awakened his interest in international reali-
ties, while through the Christian Association he found vent 
for his evangelical energies in the form of Temperance rallies 
2 
and personal evangelism in the Billy Sunday style. During his 
studies at Harvard, the absolute idealism of J. Royce appealed 
to him because it offered a bulwark against the encroaching 
naturalism he so opposed.3 Two books by H. E. Fosdick, The 
Meaning of Prayer and The ~anhood of the Master, inspired him 
in the writing of his Credo during his senior year.4 
The great intellectual, emotional, and religious crisis 
for him came in 1917, in the form of the question of militarism 
vs. pacifism. Jesus' teachings of non-resistance in the Gospel 
were largely responsible for Horton's acceptance of Jesus as 
1. Ibid., p. 169. 
2. Ibid., pp. 169-170. 
3· Ibid., p. 171. 
4. Ibid. 
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the greatest of ethical teachers. He found theoretical support 
for his belief in Tolstoy's MI Reli gion, of which he wrote: "So 
wedded was I to the Tolstoyan philosophy that it seemed to me 
that I should cease to live if I ceased to believe in it; my 
whole nature was expressed by it." 1 
After a real intellectual struggle and much anguish of the 
soul, he was led by Dean Fenn, of Harvard ·Divinity School, to 
see that no ethical principle can be realized absolutely in our 
world of the "best possible." He decided that though the 
"method of love" was ideal and capable of expression by sensi-
tive and disciplined Christians, it was, unfortunately, inap-
plicable to political states and most individuals at their 
present level of development. 
Therefore, if tyranny was to be avoided and destroyed, 
the only practical thing to do was to execute the 11 method .of 
1 a '>.' " which was, at least, moral and not a craven surrender to 
evil. But while Horton was thus able to condone his country's 
participation in the Tt war to end wars," he determined that he 
was personally called to 11 save himself" and his intellectual 
gifts for the crucial post-war period. 2 Of this solemn decision 
he wrote many years later: 
I have continued to feel, to this day, that 
since I deliberately refused to give my life 
in the war, my life is: now forfeit; and every-
thing I do or think must somehow be related to 
1. Ibid., p. 173. 
2. Ibid., pp. 175-176. 
the cause for which so many of my classmates 
died, the creation of a 'warless world' and 
'world-wide social democracy•.l 
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After receiving his A.B. degree from Harvard in 1917, he 
decided to pursue theological studies at Union Theological Sem-
inary, and it was then that he really came to grips with the 
basic theological issues of his day. There were many influential 
teachers at Union then, and he singles some of them out as 
having been especially inspiring to him. A. C. McGiffert l~d 
him above provincialism and gave him an historical perspective. 
Harry Ward lifted him out of his New England individualism and 
gave him a concern for society. G. A. Coe introduced him to the 
field of psychology of religion. W. A. Brown impressed Horton 
with his spirit, method, and attitude which reflected his deep 
sympathy and sense of the human importance of theology. It was 
Brown who introduced Horton to Rauschenbusch's Theology for the 
social Gospel which Horton eagerly accepted. Lyman impressed him 
with his intellectual integrity and his eagerness to apprehend 
new truth. It was in one of Lyman's classes that he became fully 
convinced that it was possible t0 be a Christian and be intel-
lectually honest at the same time.2 
Horton recalls 1917 as a landmark in his personal history, 
for in that year he was graduated from Harvard, ordained, mar-
ried, and published his first theological paper. His article, 
1. 
2. 
Walter M. Horton, "Rough Sketch of a Half Formed Mind," 
Contemporart American Theology, (ed.) Ferm, Vol. I., p. 177. 1£1£., pp. 78-179. 
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entitled, "Shall We Discard the Living Christ?",l was an 
analysis of the conflict between the fundamentalist thesis of 
individual regeneration by the power of the living Christ and 
the liberal emphasis upon the ethical teachings of Jesus, seen 
in the context of modern social problems • . He was intellectually 
sympathetic with liberal theology, but he found more religious 
power in evangelicalism. He wrote of his Christological study: 
"I hoped to find, through a critical examination of this doc-
trine, the key to evangelicalism's religious power, and assimi-
late it as part of a more liberal creed. 11 2 The credo which he 
presented as an ordination requirement also tried to combine 
the evangelical spirit of fundamentalism with the scientific 
method, psychology of religion, and social gospel of 
liberalism.3 
In 1920, Horton was awarded the B.D. degree from Union 
and the M.A. degree from Columbia. He determined to continue 
his studies in both institutions with the intention of secur-
ing the s.T.M. degree from Union and the Ph.D. from Columbia. 
During this period of graduate studies, he gained valuable 
experience as teaching assistant at both schools and became 
convinced that teaching and writing were his calling.4 While 
1. Biblical World, Vol. LIII, (1917), No. 3, pp. 276-282. 
2. Walter M. Horton, ££• £!!., p. 180. 
3. Ibid., p. 180. 
4. Lefferts A. Loetscher (ed.), Twentieth Century Encyclopedia 
of ~e~~~ious Knowledge, (Grand Rapids, Mich: Baker Book 
House, 955), Vol. I, p. 532. 
See also Walter M. Horton, "Rough Sketch of a Half Formed 
Mind," Contemporar•y American Theology, (ed.) Farm, Vol. I., 
pp. 181-182. 
he was doing residence work at Columbia, he came into contact 
with a naturalistic philosophy which, as the reigning ortho-
doxy, subjected his theological beliefs to the most hostile 
criticism of that day. Faculty and students alike sincerely 
believed that philosophy had finally d 'I3posed of religion, 
which, he wrote, they regarded 11 as an interesting survival of 
1 the naive longings and poetic imagination of primitive man." 
Horton was awarded a traveling fellowship which made it 
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possible for him to continue his studies in Paris, Strasbourg, 
and Marburg. \~ile he was abroad, his theological beliefs were 
subjected to more intensely anti-reli gious attitudes in the 
positivism and anti-clericalism of the French university cir-
cles.2 But he recalls that there were positive influences as 
well among his European teachers. Pierre Janet, of the College 
de France, strengthened his interest in psychology of religion 
and Fernand M6n6goz, of Strasbourg, and Georg Wtinsch, of Mar-
burg, introduced him to the French and German Protestant the-
ology. Rudolph Otto's Idea of the Holy reinforced his belief 
in an empirical approach to God, while Friedrich Heiler led 
him to an appreciation of Catholicism. In fact, Horton chose 
to investigate Catholic thought for his dissertation and wrote 
on "The Philosophy of Abbe Bautain." 3 These encounters with 
the naturalism at Columbia and the positivism of France had 
'made him so skeptical that he felt compelled to take stock of 
1. Walter M. Horton, ££· cit., pp. 182-183. 
2. Ibid., p. 18). 
3· Ibid., p. 185. 
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his Christian beliefs to see if he really could still honestly 
belong to any church. His soul searching was rewarded, for he 
wrote: 
On examining myself ••• I found burning at 
the bottom of my soul a profound and ineradi-
cable conviction of Christian love; and with 
this to build on I was confident that the 
structure of my thought would grow with time, 
into very presentable proportions .1 
He returned to Union where he became assistant in Theology 
and Philosophy of Religion. His renewed association with his 
former teachers there helped to revive his more orthodox theolo-
gical convictions. He continued to work toward the Ph.D. degree 
at Columbia and the s.T.M. degree at Union and in 1923 he 
received the S.T.M. and in 1926 he received the Ph.D. The pre-
vious year, 1925, he had accepted a call to teach Systematic 
Theology at Oberlin, where he has remained to this day. 2 
3. The Essence of Horton's Early Liberal Thinking 
From the first article in 1919 until 1934, Horton's writings 
tended to revolve around the theme expressed in his Theism ~ 
the Modern Mood, which was published in 1930. During this 
period, he was attempting to define the Christian faith in God 
so that it could stand the scrutiny of modern science.3 But he 
did not advocate that theology surrender completely to pure 
1. Ibid., p. 184. 
2. Ibid. 
3. waiter M. Horton, Theology in Transition (New York: 
Harper & Bros., 1943), p. ix. 
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logic, for he believed that would lead to the godless creeds 
of humanism and naturalism and eventually to . loss of faith in 
man as well. Instead, he indicated a middle way between empiri-
cism as the natural sciences understood it and the dogmatism 
of fundamentalism. This middle way was the employment of a 
"richer logic" which, though empirical, would establish faith 
in God more firmly than ever. 1 
His theology was not doctrinaire, and he wanted to avoid 
becoming a partisan of any theological school. 2 He maintained 
a fair-minded attitude and was always ready to modify his ideas 
about what constituted an adequate theological system. He wrote: 
I am intere:sted in contributing well-hewn 
building stones to the structure of a theology 
that no one man can create--a theology that 
shall be neither denominational, nor evangel-
ical, nor liberal, nor even Christian alone, 
but that shall be truly universally, as 
astronomy and biology are true universally.3 
He summed up the central ideas of his early liberal period 
as follows: (1) Souls can be redeemed with the aid of divine 
power, and psychology of religion is the best clue to this in 
our age. (2) Christian love can be successfully applied to the 
social sphere, proving that human brotherhood can be more than 
just a dream. (3) Neither materialism (in its naturalistic or 
humanistic guises) nor absolute idealism are completely adequate 
as a philosophy of religion. (4) The empirical method used by 
1 • Ibid • , pp • ix , x • 
2. Walter M. Horton, "Rough Sketch of 8 Half Formed Mind," 
Contemporarx American Theology, (ed.) Ferm, Vol. I., p. 185. 
3. Ibid., p. l86. 
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Wieman and Macintosh is the best approach in theology. 1 
B. BETiNEEN LIBERALISM AND NEO -ORTHODOXY 
1. Idealistic Illusions of Liberalism Rejected 
As Horton's thinking matured, it became increasingly clear 
to him that not only humanism, but liberalism as well needed to 
be re-examined. Though he remained a liberal in attitude, he be-
lieved that liberalism needed to be purged of its idealistic 
2 illusions. He even began to wonder if there might be some 
truth in what Barth and Brunner were saying -- that, perhaps, 
they might be more than representatives of "a kind of weird 
post-war psychosis."3 So anxious was he to make it clear that 
liberalism was making a fresh start, that he proposed a new 
name for it realistic theology.4 Indeed, this was the title 
of his book which was published in 1934· 
This book marked a turning point in his theological career 
and he notes that all his friends and critics agreed that a 
fundamental change had taken place in his thinking. His radical 
friends mourned him as lost, and his liberal friends regarded 
him as something of a traitor to the causet5 Nevertheless , he 
felt compelled to continue in this vein, and for the next five 
1. Ibid., PP• 187-7-
2. Walter M. Horton, Theolog;y in Transition, P• x. 
3· Ibid., P • x. 
4- Ibid. 5. Ib!l:d., P • ix. 
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years, his writing s reflected this critical re-appraisal of 
liberal theology. He wanted to preserve what he believed were 
enduring values in liberal Protestant theology, but, at the 
same time, he wanted to supplement them with the truths which 
he believed nee-orthodoxy was proclaiming. Toward this end, he 
wrote two books: Contemporary English Theology (1936) and Con-
temporarz Continental Theology (1938), in which he tried to in-
troduce liberal thought to " the vital forces which are creating 
a new orthodoxy, both Catholic and Protestant, in Great Britain 
and on the Continent today." 1 
2. The "Forgotten Segment" of Augustinianism 
Prior to 1934, Horton had been extremely critical of the 
orthodox views of man. In Theology and the Modern Mood, he had 
referred to the "barbarously cruel" teachings of Augustine and 
Calvin. Then he heard from Prof. A. K. Rule, of Louisville Pres-
byterian Seminary, challenging him to expend the same effort 
toward understanding conservative theology as he had upon hu-
manism. Prof. Rule suggested that in orthodoxy, Horton might 
find, however grim and disagreeable, some real truth about hu-
man nature. 2 
True to the liberal spirit of inquiry and open-mindedness, 
he began to study both the classical Augustinian doctrines and 
the nee-orthodox theology of Barth and Brunner. As he studied, 
old phrases like " the wrath of God, 11 "original sin,'' and ''perdi-
tion and judgment" began to take on new significance, particularly 
1. Ibid., p. xi. 
2. Ibid., p. xii. 
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in the light of contemporary tragic events. Gradually, he 
became convinced that the Augustinian theology expressed truth 
about the human predicament. "Not that the Augustinians ever 
.found the .formula for the dark mysteries," he wrote, 11but at 
least they recognized them and wrestled with them. 11 1 
Horton, however, stopped short of becoming an actual part1-
san for nee-orthodoxy. Though he readily admitted to the truth 
in the orthodox doctrine of man's depravity, he could not regard 
it as more than a segment of the total body of Christian truth. 
"It is," he wrote, "a forgotten segment of Christian truth, need-
ing to be powerfully asserted in just such times as these, but 
still only a segment."2 He knew that such theologies always 
emerge in periods of crisis. In such dark times, theologians 
are called to free the transcendent values of the Christian 
faith from the dying culture, so that the faith may be saved 
from going down with the wreckage of civilization.3 Western 
culture is foundering, he reasoned, and Barth is trying to 
salvage the eternal Word of God from its human and temporal 
embodiment. Horton knew very well, however, that human history 
is not all shadow and crisis, just as it is not all sunshine 
and progress. Admittedly, he reasoned, in times of peace.ful 
construction, it is necessary to warn our Schleiermachers of 
God's judgment lest they become too complacent, but in times 
1. Ibid., p. xii. 
2. 'I51d. 
3. Ibid., pp. xii-xiv. 
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of crisis it is just as necessary to remind our Earths of God's 
redemption lest they grow too desperate. 1 
For Horton saw a new age of regeneration ahead, when Chris-
tian truth would once again be called upon to orient an emerg-
ing civilization to the eternal verities, in human and worldly 
terms. " Then," he prophesied, " the need will not be for an 
Augustine or a Barth, but for an Origen, an Aquinas, a Schleier-
macher, who will assert the other segment of Christian truth, 
i.e., the self-imparting, world-pervading character of God who 
became incarnate in Christ and continues the process in and 
through the church. " ~ 
3. "Post-scientific Method 
Prior to 1934, Horton was thoroughly convinced that the 
!!empirical" or " scientific" methods employed by Macintosh and 
Wieman were highly relevant for theology. But gradually he be-
gan to question his previous assumptions concerning the value 
of a largely scientific theology. It seemed to him that history 
was moving out of the age of science alone into a new age where 
the old scientific method is no longer adequate. He proclaimed 
that nthe urgency of the decisions which mankind must make in 
our time is such that scientific tentativeness is simply out as 
a possible religious attitude."3 He predicted that theological 
1. Walter M. Horton, Theology in Transition, p. xiv. 
2. Ibid • . 
3. Ibid., p. xvi. 
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thought will abandon pure scientific thought "with its cool 
detachment" and adopt political thought, "with its fierce com-
mitment to unprovable beliefs and passionate slogans."1 
He did not allow himself to be swept completely into ir-
rationalism, however. He recognized the dangers inherent in 
the excesses of Barthianism and employed and valued the method 
of "cool detachment 11 whenever he thought the situation war-
ranted it. 2 He still recognized the need for philosophy of 
religion with its rigorous empirical method, but he declared 
that it could not be regarded as the ultimate criterion for 
theology, because God cannot be captured in scientifically des-
cribed process as observable value. He believed that theology 
must be founded primarily on the biblical revelation which 
records God's series of mighty acts culminating in Jesus Christ.3 
Whereas he had previously allowed room for faith as a 
"possible over-belief" to be added to the more certain affirma-
tions of scientific theology, he now asserted that scientific 
natural theology was only a corrective for the excesses of 
revelational theology, which is essentially sound. Horton 
wrote that his "center of confidence and hope had passed from 
science to revelation, from human discovery to divine guidance.n4 
1. Ibid., p. xvi. 
2. Ibid., p. xvii. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., p. xviii. 
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4. The Supplementation of the Social Gospel 
Horton continued to believe that the Christian Gospel ap-
plies to society as well as to individuals.l The social calami-
ties of the day that were destroying the faith of many people 
that a Christian world order could ever be an earthly reality, 
were actually strengthening his belief in the realization of 
the Kingdom of God on earth. To his way of thinking, the King-
dom was the only concrete alternative to annihilation. But he 
did not focus his attention on the complete realization of the 
Kingdom on earth and in human history. From the absolutist 
point of view, the Kingdom will not have arrived in its en-
tirety as long as a single human will opposes God's will. 
Thoroughly aware of the depths of human perversity and the 
magnitude of the social problems facing humanity, Horton was 
ready to admit that the Kingdom may never be fully realized, 
in that sense, here on earth. But he did believe that it was 
present as a powerful, growing reality and that no evil could 
be justly regarded as inevitable. He wrote, in the midst of the 
world's worst economic depression and emerging military tyran-
nies that war and economic exploitation ••• are destined to 
be eliminated in a new historic era whose promise is already 
2 
visible on our horizon." 
Horton's optimism regarding the amelioration of social 
1. Ibid., p. xix. 
2. Ibid., p. xxii. 
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evils was not grounded in a belief that modern civilization is 
on the right track and that man is essentially capable of set-
ting thing s right for himself. On the contrary, he believed 
man had a perverse, as well as a virtuous, side to his nature 
and that our culture has been stricken with a "deadly disease 
which superficial remedies cannot heal."l He classed such older 
liberal schemes as socialism and pacifism as being outmoded 
liberal illusions which were not radical enough to accomplish 
their purposes. He had become very skeptical of all liberal 
experiments involving planned economies, including Russian com-
munism, British socialism and American New Dealism. For, he 
argued, all such schemes tend -- to greater or lesser degrees 
to destroy individual freedom, responsibility, and in1t1ative.2 
Certainly, he maintained, there can be no Kingdom of God if 
this happens. 
He could no longer accept the old liberal ideal of paci-
fism as a matter of internati onal policy, because, he maintained 
it was unrealistic in its view of human nature and its evalua-
tion of tyranny. Self-interest and coercion are inevitable in 
politics and the realistic Christian will seek to use these 
forces in some constructive fashion, rather than to repress them. 
He recognized the horror and threat of modern tyranny and warned 
Christians not to oppose their government "in its attempt to 
1. Walter M. Horton, Theology in Transition, p. xix. 
2. Ibi~., p. xx. 
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parry the thrust of aggression by the only means now available."l 
Horton concluded that the Kingdom of God was a long way off 
and might never be fully realized on earth. To the extent that 
it would come, it would be largely God's doing and not man's. 
The problem was regarded by Horton as serious: "We need a re-
made humanity if we are to enter the Kingdom." 2 But, in the 
long view, he was still optimistic. He firmly believed that ·· 
social evils were passing away, "not alone by our fumbling 
efforts, but by a divine providence that works through and above 
our efforts."3 He believed that right would win ultimately, 
but it would be in the form of crucified truth ana goodness.4 
C. THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIS NEO-LIBERALISM 
1. The War Years 
Just before the outbreak of World War II, Horton took a 
trip through Asia and the Middle East and returned to the United 
States convinced that world civilization was on the verg~ of 
crashing to its ruin. Out of his deep•felt concern, he wrote 
can Christianity Sa!! Civilization? (1940), which expressed 
the theme that wss to dominate his . thinking for years to come. 5 
Two years Jater, his book OUr Eternal Contemporary was published. 
The theology expressed therein wa-s largely devel0ped prior to 
1. Ibid., p. xii. 
2. !Did., p. xxii. 
3. Ibi'CT. 
4. !0!0., pp. xxii-xxiii. 
5. mrl:'t'er M. Horton, "Ten Revolutionary Years," The Christian 
~ury, LXVI, (1949}, p. 490. 
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the war, but it was colored by his reaction to the horror of 
1 the early war years. 
Horton had always regarded theology and ethics as insep-
arable, and the war served to strengthen his conviction. As his 
2 
ethics changed, so his theology was modified. He had been a 
pacifist in the first World War, but he had been forced to sur-
render that way of thinking during his period of critical re-
evaluation of liberalism. The second World War made him even 
more certain that tyranny and aggression must be checked even 
with military might if necessary. He saw the preservation of 
world order as a vital necessity for human existence, and there-
fore condoned the restraint of lawlessness.3 However, he was 
not blind to the destructive power of modern war and well knew 
that total war threatens civilization just as surely as tyranny. 
Therefore, he proposed that we ;r find new ways of fighting for 
peace--spiritual resistance movements, Marshall plans, regional 
security pacts, pressure politics of many sorts, not only start-
ing short of war, but stopping short of war.u4 
As Horton puzzled over the dilemma of those years, he be-
came more and more convinced that the Christian Church held the 
answer. With this in mind, he wrote Our Christian Faith (1945), 
which, he explained, was "influenced by the Madras vision of the 
1. Ibid., P• ~90. 
2. Ibid • . 
3 • rorcr. _ 
4. Ibid.~ P• 491. 
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church as a world Christian communi ty with a mission to regen-
1 
erate our dying world culture." Similarly, his book Toward a 
Reborn Church (1949) expressed his view of the current situa-
tion within an ecumenical frame of reference. 
2. Liberal Nee-orthodox Deadlock 
For a brief time during the war, Horton's concern for pub-
lic affairs and world government made him, in his words, 11 a 
more convinced political liberal and considerably more of a 
2 
theological liberal." This phase of liberalism was quickly 
shattered, however, when he made a firsthand inspection of 
war-ravaged Europe. He was forced to admit that nee-orthodoxy 
did have a vital message for that situation. "When Christian 
civilization has collapsed," he reasoned, "as it so largely has 
in Europe, it cannot be restored on a rational, naturalistic 
basis, but only by an appeal to the Christian ultimate, which 
is not natural law, but God in Christ.3 
Horton had been led, full circle, to the conclusion he had 
reached in 1934· He proclaimed: 
1. Ibid., 
2. Ibid., 
3· Ibid . . 
"I hold no brief for the continuance, unal-
tered, of the older type of liberalism that 
prevailed at the turn of the century. As far 
back as 1934, I became convinced of its radi-
cal defects and announced its demise ( prema-
turely, some
4
critics have said) without too 
much regret. 
P• 420. 
P• h9 1. 
4· Walter M. Horton, Liberalism Old and New, P• 4. 
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Though he was certain that old liberalism was no longer 
effective, and while he was appreciative of the role that neo-
orthodoxy had played in startling Christians out of their pre-
war Utopianism and was playing in helping postwar European 
Christians find their faith, he began to suspect that nee-
orthodoxy was not powerful enough to deliver Christians from 
the postwar mood of pessimism and futility. 1 Consequently, 
Horton once again settled . back into his accustomed position 
between liberalism and nee-orthodoxy, which he liked to call 
"Christian Realism" or "Evangelical Catholicism."2 
3. A New Liberalism 
In 1952, Horton delivered an address at Sweet Briar 
College, Virginia, that was to have far-reaching significance, 
":Liberalism--Old and New". That pronouncement caught up all 
the loose ends and trends of Horton's recent thinking and 
writing and expressed them in the form of a bold, new proposal. 
He had become concerned enough about the shortcomings of neo-
orthodoxy to see the genuine need for a new "opposition party" 
which could point to danger spots and correct the defects of 
a one-sided theology. It was in this address that he called for 
the development of a neo-liberal theology: 
What I do believe to be possible and needful 
in this age of nee-orthodox hegemony is the 
development of a new liberalism, relevant to the 
new situation, which would continue the old 
1. Ibid. , p. 4. 
2. Walter M. Horton, The Christian Centurz, LXVI,(l949~ P• 492. 
liberalism somewhat as the butterfly continues 
the caterpillar, sloughing off its old dried-up 
skin, but perpetuating its vital principle.l 
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He was aware that the liberal tradition was all but extinct 
in Europe and that any liberal renaissance would have to be gm 
in the United States where, in certain theological schools, it 
had retained its vigor. He cited Boston University School of 
Theology: as such an example and commented that "among recent 
hard-hitting books from the liberal camp, Harold DeWolf's Re-
ligious Revolt Against Reason (1949) seems to me to prefigure 
most clearly the position the new liberalism needs to take. 112 
~nile Horton did not, in this particular address, develop 
the content of nee-liberalism very specifically, his subsequent 
writings made it clear that he was continuing to develop those 
facets o f' his thinking that were rooted in the liberal heritage. 
Fundamental to his emerging neo-liberal theology was the kind 
of theological method he elected to use. In Christian Theology, 
An Ecumenical Approach (1955), he emphasized the rational na-
ture of the new liberalism in these words: 
There is a large group of liberals who have 
reconsidered their position in the light of 
neo-orthodox criticism, but remained adamant 
on the place of reason in theology. L. Harold 
DeWolf' speaks for many of these 'neo-liberals.'3 
This respect for reason grounds Horton's concern that natural 
theology be given a more central place in theological systems. 
1. Walter M. Horton, Liberalism Old ~nd New, p. 4. 
2. Ibid., P• 12. -- -- --
3· Walter M. Horton, · christian Theology, An Ecumenical Approach 
(New York: Harper, 1955), P• 74· 
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From Horton's point of view, the rejection by neo-ortho-
doxy of natural theology marked it as a truncated system. In 
omitting or denying this critical area, it simply did not pre-
sent the whole body of Christian theology. Horton maintained 
his stand against Barth and Brunner in favor of natural the-
ology.1 This emphasis upon natural theology points up the 
nee-liberal desire to counter-balance the exclusive emphasis 
of nee-orthodoxy upon God's utter transcendence, with the doc-
trine of the divine immanence. Horton had seen the need for 
this particular correction even when he was most appreciative 
of Barth's and Brunner's efforts. In an article written for 
the Christian Century in 1939, "Between Liberalism and Nee-
orthodoxy" he had asserted the need for proclaiming 11 the self-
imparting, world-pervading character of God who became incar-
nate in Christ and continues the process in and through the 
church. 112 
Likewise, his experience of World War II and its after-
math convinced him that only a reassertion of the reality and 
importance of natural law could stem the rising tide of moral 
relativism that threatened to drown the remaining world civili-
zation as it had the Nazi jurists, who regarded law as simply 
the will of the German Volk.3 
Horton was convinced that "Christian teaching should 
1. Walter M. Horton, The Christian Century, LXVI, (1949}, p. 491. 
2. Walter M. Horton, Theolog;y in Transl:tion,, P• xiv. 
3· Walter M. Horton, ~· cit., LJrui, 0. 949) , p. 491. 
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respectfully preserve all tested truth, even if it is not 
immediately useful. 111 Nee-liberalism must give a proper place 
to the truth of the ancient Greek philosophy and Roman juris-
prudence that bears on the Christian interpretation of natural 
theology and natural law. Theology is once again being called 
to a constructive task, Borton proclaimed, and must use 
rational philosophy to supplement the revelation of Scripture. 
Horton's neo-liberal position was · suprema Scriptura, not sola 
~iptura.2 
It became apparent that Horton's brand of nee-liberalism 
would also contain a revised estimate of the nature of man. The 
neo-orthodox theme was evident when in his book Christian 
Theology, !B Ecumenical Approach (1955), he wrote of man: "It 
has somehow become second nature for him to oppose the will of 
God.n3 But that it is a new form of liberalism that dominates 
Horton's attention is certain in view of Horton's characterization 
of man as 11 God's highest creature, destined to exercise dominion 
over the other creature~. n4 
Probably the most characteristic element that has emerged 
in Horton's neo-liberal theology is his doetrine of the Church. 
Early twentieth century liberals had all but forgotten the 
Church, or at least had relegated it to a minor status. But 
Horton has rediscovered the Church in a powerfully growing 
1. Walter M. Horton, ~ Christian Century, LXVI, (1949), p. 491. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Walter M. Horton, Christian Theology, An Ecumenical Approach, 
p. 147. 
4. Ibid., p. 150. 
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ecumenical guise. This insight which is revealed in his earlier 
books, Our Christian Faith (1945) and Toward a Reborn Church 
(1949) was expanded and more fully expressed in his systematic 
theology, Christian Theology--An Ecumenical Approach (1955). 
His continuing activity in the ecumenical movement1 is enabling 
him to develop what may prove to be his distinctive contribution 
to neo-liberal theology: a systematic analysis of the continually 
evolving theological consensus that might eventually unite the 
Catholic and Protestant as well as the liberal and orthodox 
branches of Christendom. 
1. He served as consultant at the Oxford, Madras, and Amster-
dam World Conferences and in 1947 he was attached to the 
Study Department of the World Council of Churches at its 
central office in Geneva, Switzerland. Protestant Thought 
in the Twentieth Centur), Arnold S. Nash ed. (New York: 
The Macmillan C"o., 1951 , p. 104. 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND: THE CENTRAL IDEAS OF LATE NINETEETH 
AND EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICAN LIBERALISM 
A. THEOLOGICAL METHOD 
1. Nature and Function of Theology 
a. Definition of Theology 
The liberals of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries made the following distinction between religion and 
theology. They believed that the former was concerned with 
firsthand neligious experience, while the latter attempted to 
systematize the convictions and doctrines arising out of those 
experiences. Brown wrote: "Christian theology, or dogmatics 
as it is technically called, is that branch of theological science 
which aims to give systematic expression to the doctrines of 
the Christian faith." 1 Coe furthered this distinction when he 
stated that the self-authenticating authority of religion does 
1. William A. Brown, Christian Theology in Outline (New York, 
Charles Scribner's Sons, l9oS), p. 3. 
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not apply to theology. ''The science of divine things has the 
same kind of authority as any other science, namely that of 
correct observation and of logical inference." 1 
Macintosh and Brown affirmed the empirical nature of the-
ology, but took pains to distinguish it sharply from psychology 
of religion which they saw as limited to describing the activi-
ties of the human mind, while they saw theology as concerned 
with the activities of God. 2 In this respect, Brown criticized 
Schleiermacher for not seeing far enough. ''The subject matter 
of theology," said Brown, "is not religious experience, but the 
Q£9; whom that experience reveals."3 
b. Relation of Human and Divine Aspects in Theology 
The liberals were agreed that theology is the science that 
centers around God and his activity. More specifically, it is 
grounded in God's historic revelation in Jesus Christ and not 
in imagination or fancy. 4 Among the liberals,. McConnell was 
especially concerned to make it clear that God did not impinge 
upon human history by invading the world from some holy sphere, 
but that God acted and continues to act as one who has been and 
continues to be immanent in the world. "If we were asked to name 
the most absorbing theme at present before the theologians," 
1. George A~ Coe; The Religion of the Mature Mind (New York: 
Fleming H. Revell Co., 1902), p. 106. 
2. D. c. Macintosh, Theolof, as an Einpirieal Science (New York: 
The Macmillan Co., 1919 , p. 2'5. · 
3· Brown, Christian Theology in Outline, p. 8. 
4. Ibid., p. 9. 
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wrote McConnell, "we should probably give first place to the 
current doctrine of divine innnanence."l Though granting the 
divine subject of theology, the liberals also made it clear 
that theology was a science constructed by man using his 
reasoned experience and must be evaluated like any other 
human science. 2 
c. Theology as a Continually Evolving Science 
Liberals believed that man constructs his theologies with 
the aid of his reason, working with the raw materials of reli-
gious experiences. Because man continues to revise his inter-
pretations of his religious experiences and because his reason 
must ever continue to grapple with new empirical data, theologi-
cal science must continue to develop. 
Religion does not come down from heaven as a 
finished thing to which men must adjust them-
selves: rather, it arises through their own 
inner impulses and longings •••• Proceeding 
thus from within outward, religion requires 
readjustment as continuous as the struggle for 
life itself. A developing humanity implies a 
developing religion.3 
2. Data and Presuppositions 
a. Human Faculties 
The liberals were all agreed that man's power to reason 
plays a key role in the construction of theology. Theology cen-
ters in the activity of God which is communicated or revealed 
1. Francis J. McConnell, The Diviner I~nence (New York: Eaton 
and Mains, 1910), p. 9:--
2. Coe, ~ Religion of the Mature ~' p. 106. 
3. Ibid., p. 2l. 
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to us, but this would be utterly impossible without a rational 
mind to receive it. 1 This ability of the human mind to grasp 
divine revelation makes it clear that there is a special rela-
2 tion between God and man which has to do with rational capacity. 
Knudson alluded to this high view of human reason when he wrote: 
"Modern thought begins, as did Descartes, with faith in man's 
unfettered reason. 11 3 In context, this statement meant that rea-
son was unfettered by dogmatic authority, but preseftt ~generation 
Christians might desire clarification regarding the fetters of 
sin upon human reason. 
The liberals also gave a prominent place to faith as a 
necessary human faculty. Bowne takes issue with Lessing's argu-
ment that reason will eventually supplant faith. Only faith 
can comprehend God's righteousness and grace, and only by faith 
can we get insight into His mysterious methods in the universe. 
11It is very doubtful if the human mind will ever attain, during 
its earthly existence, .to any satisfactory interpretation of 
God's methods in the universe. Their mystery and impenetrability 
grow more and more marked."4 
For Macintosh, faith in God was grounded in God's dependa-
bility, i.e., He acts consistently so that men may learn through 
observation and experiment what God does under different condi-
tions.5 
1. Brown; Christian Theology in Outline, p. 44. 
2. Ibid., p. 56. · 
3. Albert c. Knudson, Present Tendencies in Religious Thought 
(New York: Abindgori Press, 1924), p. 7>. 
4. Borden P. Bowne, Studies in Christianity (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1909), pp. 2)"; 24. . 
5. Macintosh, Theology ~ ~ Empirical Science, p. 35. 
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b. Biblical Data 
The Bible was accorded a high place by the liberals in the 
construction of theology. Brown maintained that theology is 
grounded in the Biblical revelatio~. "The ultimate scourge of 
Christian theology is the Christian religion itself with the 
revelation in which it had its rise. The proximate sources are 
the records which have preserved to us our knowledge of the 
origin and history of Christianity. Chief among these are the 
Bible, the creeds of the church, and the works of the leading 
Christian theologians." 1 Fosdick took pains to indicate that 
the entire Bible is indispensable to the theologian. Even 
pre-moral passages are useful, because they reveal much about 
the nature of man and sin; and people today are actually living 
in all the recorded stages of development. 2 Macintosh was more 
concerned to ~lean ''the essential facts about great religious 
personalities, such as the historic Jesus," but Biblical data 
were still represented in his thinking.3 Thus, the liberals 
were genuinely concerned with the Biblical revelation and es-
pecially with what Fosdick called the Spirit of Christ.4 
c. Extra-Biblical Data 
Though Brown admitted the importance of the Bible, "because 
of its clo_se connection with Jesus Christ who is the center of 
theology,u5 he maintained that utterances of the Christian spirit 
1. Brown, Christian · TheoloQ in Outline, p. 16. 
2. Harry E. Fosdick; The Modern Use of the Bible (New York: The 
Macmillan· Co., '1925l,p. 27. -- - -
3· Macintosh, Theology as a:ri ElnSirical Science, p. 28. 4· Fosdick, The Modern Use of t e Bible; p. 30. 
5. Brown, ChriStian TheOlOgy-in Outline, p. 23. 
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beyond the Bible were also important. In this category, he 
placed the study of comparative religions and psychology of 
religion. 1 Macintosh likewise stressed the value of data gained 
from "the results of scientific, historical, and literary 
criticism of sacred books."2 
Mathews widened the scope, indicating that liberals or 
"modernists" accepted all the results of scientific research as 
data with which to think religiously.3 McConnell correctly 
pointed out that philosophical idealism was an immensely impor-
tant datum since it, more than anything else, had brought the 
world to the realization of divine immanence.4 Philosophy of 
history was cited by Knudson as an important datum, since the 
discovery of the unity of the laws of history, more than meta-
physics, had brought the supernatural view of history into dis-
repute among liberals.5 So the empirical sciences, the non-
Christian religions, philosophy, and history were all carefully 
studied by the liberal theologians. 
d. Presuppositions Regarding Method 
The liberals were agreed that, an open-minded, thoroughly 
empirical scientific method was superior to the older pre-
disposed, deductive, dogmatic process. Macintosh wrote 
1. Ibid., pp. 2-4. 
2. Macintosh, Theology as an Empir i cal Science, p. 28. 
3. Shailer Mathews, The Faith of Modernism (New York: The Mac-
millan Co., 1924);-p. 29. --
4. McConnell, The Diviner Immanence, p. 137. 
5. Knudson, Present Tendencies !E Religious Thought, pp. 223-24. 
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convincingly of the need to make theology an empirical 
science. Theology should begin with only a minimum definition 
of God. "Then it must proceed to find out from religlous 
experience more particularly just what attributes and relations 
can be ascribed to that religious object .nl Coe also emphasized 
the need for theology to embrace the empirical spirit: "Religion 
includes thinking, and thinking is most fruitful when it sticks 
close to the facts of experience. 112 But Knudson was sensitive 
to the need for a higher kind of empiricism than the pure sense 
experience of science and so reminded his colleagues of Bowne's 
"transcendental empiricism" which affirms the reality of the 
self and its religious experiences.3 
3. Procedure 
a. Rational Method 
Perhaps Mathews was the most ardent spokesman for the 
rational method. He described the liberal or modernist movement 
as a phase of the scientific struggle for freedom in thought and 
belief.4 Among the presuppositions of rational method in 
1. Macintosh, Theo~ ~~an Empirical Science, p. 27. 
2. Coe, The Religion of a Mature Mind, p. 60. 
3. Knudson, 2.£· cit., pp7' 136-37.-
4. Mathews, ~ Faith £t Modernism, p. 23. 
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empirical theology, Macintosh included the laws of thought and 
methods common to all scientific investigation.1 Coe went so 
far as to say that theologians who employ rational method will 
find that science "has lifted the veil of creation and gazed at 
nature face to face • • • • Henceforth nature is for him so much 
pliant lab oratory m.a terial. n2 
For all its objectivity and precision, the rational method 
is what Knudson called its nee-rational guise was not necessi-
tarian in its metaphysics, but personalistic.3 That means that 
liberal theologians were not finally bound to deductive logic 
by a narrow set of laws, but were able to construct systems 
which reflected the same freedom and creativity that human and 
divine minds enjoy. Macintosh was also anxious to make it clear 
that liberal rational method was not limited to what he called 
"dry reason" or what Bowne used to refer to as "closet speculation." 
The liberals were anxious to learn all they could fran the dog-
matic heritage, provided they could relate it to the findings 
of modern research. Macintosh referred to this as the 
"religio-empirical approach."4 
b. Natur8 and Use of the Bible 
The liberals drew a sharp distinction between God's revela-
tion which is to be found in the Bible and the Bible itself 
which is a human document that records that progressive 
1. Macintosh, Theology !! !E Empirical Science, p. 28. 
2. Coe, The Religion of ~Mature Mind, p. 23. 
3. Knudson, Present Tendencies ~ ~eligious Thought, p. 223. 
4. Macintosh, 22• ~., pp. 105-106. 
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revelation. 1 Mathews stressed the fact that we must never begin 
Bible study with the assumption of a supernatural revelation, 
but, rather, seek information regarding the origin, time of 
writing, and the integrity of the Biblical material. 2 Such a 
method led liberals to reject the idea of the inerrancy of the 
Bible.3 Fosdick also rejected a literal interpretation of the 
Bible and admitted that there existed many contradictions in 
the Bible that are irreconcilable. The view of Biblical revela-
tion as progressive s~ved the liberals "from the old and impos-
sible attempt to harmonize the Bible with itself, to make it 
speak with unanimous voice, to resolve its conflicts and con-
tradictions into a strained artificial unity."4 But Fosdick 
made it clear that he believed that God's own spirit was active 
"behind the prpcess'' as men wrote the Bible • .5 He was not 
ashamed to confess that, granting his liberal presupposition 
"being a Bible Christian in this sense is a great matter." 6 
In addition to the use of literary and historical criticism 
in Bible study, which all the liberals accepted,7 Coe added that 
it is necessary for us to test Biblical ideas by the highest 
1. Brown, Christian Theology in Outline, p. 50; Bowne, Studies 
in Christianity, p. 1; Fosdick, The Modern ~ ~ the 
Bible, P• 24. · 
2. Mathews; ~ Faith 2l Modernism, p~ 38. 
3. Mathews, The · Faith of Modernism, P• 44; Bowne, Studies in 
ChristianitY, P• j~ · · 
4~ Fosdick, · The -Modern Use of the Bible, p. 24 . 
.5~ Ibid.; p~~. ---
6~ Ibid., p. 181. 
1. Brown, Christian Theology :in Outline, p. 15; Mathews, The 
Faith of Mod~rnism; p. ·Jl; William Clarke (New York: · Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1908), p. 59; Fosdick, The Modern Use of 
the Bible, · p. 22; Macintosh, Theology as an Emeyirical Science, 
p. 28; Coe, The Religion of~ Mature Mind, p. 1. 
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human standards1 and in our daily living. 2 The liberals varied 
somewhat in their attitude toward the importance of the Bible's 
·- -
revelational value, but they all agreed in subjecting the docu-
ment that conveyed it to the most thorough literary, historical, 
humanistic and pragmatic inquiry. While Fosdick spoke most 
reverently of the Bible, Bowne (without making any distinction 
between oral tradition and written documents) could .. write: "'Ihe 
Church was Christian long before it had the Bible. 11 3 
c. General and Special Revelation 
The liberals believed that God was forever immanent in his 
creation and that his constant activity constituted a general 
revelation for all to see who cared to seek. But the perception 
of general revelation was not due solely to man's discovery of 
God. Fosdick wrote: "I do not believe that man ever found God 
when God was not seeking to be found. 'Ihe upper side is God's 
revelation."4 Beyond this general revelation, which itself 
rested on God's initiative, the liberals were aware of a special 
revelation which was, at least, equally important. Bowne and 
McConnell emphasized the value of special revelation when they 
went so far as to say that· general revelation has no final mean-
ing apart from the special revelation of the Bible. 
The idea of the unity of God and the consequent harmony of 
his laws, without which rational science would perish, has come 
1~ Coe, The -Religion of!!: Mature Mind, p. 36. 
2. Ibid.,; p. 93. -- -~ . 
3· Bowne, Studies in Christianity, p. 41. 
4. Fosdick, The Modern Use of ~ Bible, p. 30. 
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mainly through the influence of Christian teaching. Philosophy 
found reasons for the doctrine, but it followed the special 
revelation of religious insight. Bowne wrote= 
We consider the raven and rapine of nature •••• 
Or the lower forms of life, how few seem t~ 
have any meaning? ••• We look at them in amaze-
ment and astonishment, and aak ourselves, How 
can these things be'? ••• We are left in great 
uncertainty as to th~ir meaning •••• It is defi-
nitely settled at last that whoever has words of 
eternal life, science and philosophy have them 
not. The conceptions of God which are necessary 
to love and trust must be sought elsewhere.l 
Bowne found the answer in the special revelation of the Christ-
like God. Likewise, McConnell wrote: "It is from the spirit of 
Christianity that we get a hint as to the meaning of nature's 
voice and word. n2 
d. General Axioms 
It comes as a refreshing surprise to present-day students 
of theology, so often mired down in theological jargon and highly 
paradoxical, often non-rational, theologies, to read Clarke's 
statement to the effect that cammunication is more important 
than the perfection of technical phraseology. Therefore, it is 
best to use the least and simplest technical language. For the 
sake of itself and for the Christian people, theology should not 
be deliberately made an abstract study, but should be kept as 
near to actual life as possible. 3 Furthermore, there are two 
dangers to be avoided. The first is oversystematization, which 
1. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, pp. 21-23. 
2. McConnell, The Diviner Immanence, p. 22. 
3. William N. Ciirke, An Outline-of Christian Theolog~ (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1908):-p. 62. 
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occurs whenever man forgets the severe limitations of his knowl-
edge and attempts to formulate a neat and complete system which 
eliminates all mystery. The second is fragmentariness, which 
occurs when man, despairing of ever constructing a perfect system, 
turns his back on all systems and becomes content with and even 
prideful of his paradoxical constructs. God's world is a universe 
and we are required to seek coherence. 1 
Macintosh stressed the need to be empirical and cautioned 
the theologian to begin with only minimal definitions; then, 
using empirical data, to correct and enlarge upon them later. 
Thus, theological definitions should be constructed a posteriori. 2 
Probably one of Fosdick's greatest contributions to this 
whole area of methodology was his statement that theologians 
are concerned with translating the abiding experiences of reli-
gion into new and meaningful categories of thought. Concerning 
Biblical criticism he wrote: "It is impossible that a Book 
written 2,000 to 3,000 years ago should be used in the twen-
tieth century A.D. without having some of its forms of thought 
translated into modern categories.3 
4· Criteria of Truth 
a. Rational Consistency 
Coe wrote that theology must be tested just as any other 
science is tested, i.e., by the correctness of its observations 
1~ Ibid., pp~ 60-62. 
2. Macintosh, Theology ~~Empirical Science, P• 27. 
3. Fosdick, The Modern Use of the Bible, p. 129. 
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and the logic of its inferences. 1 Bowne expressed the liberal 
consensus when he wrote: "The mind itself, alert and critical, 
and with all its furniture of experienced life, is the only 
standard." 2 Macintosh agreed that the human mind could bring 
the need for critical judgment to bear and thus test a theologi-
cal system. For him, the laws of thought comprised the funda-
mentals of any rational criticism.3 
b. Empirical Coherence 
In addition to possessing internal rational consistency, as 
required by the law of formal logic, the liberals were concerned 
that a theological system should cohere at every point with all 
available empirical evidence. Brown wrote: 11 It may be said that 
the necessary connection between doctrine and experience is one 
of the axioms of modern theological thought. 11 4 Mathews echoed 
this sAntiment when he wrote that liberals 11 are intellectually 
convinced that Christian attitudea and faiths are consistent 
with other realities.n5 Or, again in the words of Coe, "Through 
all the uncouth pictures painted by the religious imagination, 
and even through all the devout gnashing of teeth against phi-
losophy and science, the religious heart has been seeking to 
square itself with reality.n6 
1. Coe, The Religion of a Mature Mind, p. 106. 
2. Bowne;-studies in CErTstianitf~ 47. · 
3. Macintosh, TheoTO~ as ·an Emp rical· Science, P• 28. 
4· Brown, Ch.ristian eOI'o~ in ·Outline, p. 8. 5. Mathews, The . Falth of M~ernism, pp. 33-34· 
6. Coe, £E· cit., P• 597 
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This deeply felt need to adopt an empirical test ror truth 
was given important clarification by Bowne and Knudson. The 
latter wrote approvingly or Bowne's 11 transcendental empiricism" 
which took into consideration the reality of the invisible self 
and its unobservable, but all-important, religious experiences. 
Thus, the liberals wentbeyond the sense empiricism employed 
by the sciences1 in their desire to test the validity of their 
theology in terms of coherence with empirical reality. 
c. Internal Religious Authority 
It will come as a surprise to same to find that a good 
many or the liberal theologians under study made a place for 
a test for truth that is almost completely subjective, i.e., the 
test of religious self-authentication. Bowne's theory of trans-
cendental empiricism undergirded it intellectually by main-
taining that religious experiences--though unverifiable--were a 
legitimate part of total empirical data. Even one as rational 
as Brown could write that religious authority resides "within 
the individual, and consists in the appeal which is made by 
divine truth to the reason, conscience, and religious feeling 
of ~.n2 
Coe wrote of Jesus that "his words carry immediate convic-
tion to the heart and conscience. As the eternal hills need no 
buttresses to hold them up, so the words of the Great Teacher 
lean not upon the past or upon any syllogism, but are self-
1. 
2. 
Knudson, Present Tendencies in Religious Thou~ht, pp. 136-37. 
Brown, Christian Theology in Outline, p. 52.Italics mine.) 
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1 
supporting." Both McConnell and Fosdick employed this reli-
gious criterion which they referred to as the "Spirit of 
Christ." 
B. THE DOCTRINE OF GOD 
1. The Knowledge of God 
a. The God-Idea as a Reflection of Cultural Values 
Empirical method helped the liberals see a clear relation-
ship between the various conceptions of God and the societies 
in which they had been devised. They did not claim that God was 
a creation of society, but rather that once the God-idea had 
become the property of a social group, it soon took on the qual-
ities of that group.3 Rauschenbusch wrote: "Under tyrannous 
conditions the idea of God was necessarily tainted with the 
cruel hardness of society."4 Likewise, Bowne reasoned that be-
cause theology had long echoed the political absolutism of times 
paBt, it had portrayed God as an irresponsible ruler. 
Mathews frankly admitted that liberals looked to society 
for "patterns" to express the divine nature. He noted that sov-
ereignty is immanent in a democracy but transcendent when ex-
pressed by an authoritarian government. The former, he hoped, 
would be the new theological pattern. He admitted, however, 
1. Coe, The ~eligion of a Mature Mind, p. 98. 
2. McConnell, The Diviner ' Immanence;-p. 77; Fosdick, 1~e Modern 
Use of the Bible, P• 30. 
3· Walter Rauschenvusch, A Theolo~y for the Social Gospel (New 
York, The Macmillan Company, 1 17~p. 167. 
4· Ibid., P• 174· 
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that democratic eovereignty "is too unregulated and too inef-
fectual. • • • We find better patterns in science and social 
relations." 1 
Beneath their appreciation for the cultural factors af-
fecting the formulation of all doctrines of God, the liberals . 
nevertheless held that, in Knudson's words, na real God, a 
living God, must reveal himself." No uveiled Being" could ever 
be more than a nonentity, and certainly not the basis of a. 
2 
religion. Or a.s Bowne put it, a naturalistic or sociological 
study of God-concepts will reveal interesting and valuable his-
torical continuities, psychological uniformities, and rational 
harmonies, but we never know God in the deepest sense until we 
deal directly with the immanent, self-revealing God.3 
b. God Known in Nature 
The liberal view of divine immanence4 followed naturally 
from the idea that God can be known by studying the world of 
nature. The liberal consensus was that God is in the world and 
is ever present in all nature, so that in all our dealings with 
ourselves and with nature we are involved in an encounter with 
deity.5 Coe explained that because God is not only the Creator 
of the universe, but also the Upholder of all things, we con-
tinually meet him and his ways in the natural order. 6 
1. Mathews; The Faith of Modernism, p. 109. 
2. Knudson, Fresent Te'iidencles In Religious Thought, pp. 75-76. 
3· •. Bowne, Studies In ChristianitY; p. 63. 
4 To be discussed-rn section 4-b~ 
5. Knudson, ~· cit~, p. 106; Coe, The Religion of a Mature 
Mind., p.219~ · · 
6. Coe, ~. cit., p. 415. 
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The liberals were led to minimize the miracle-working 
powers of God, as a direct consequence of their belief that 
nature gives us reliable knowledge of God. Mathews was one who 
made much of the dependable, law-abiding character of God as a 
direct inference from the rational and constant laws of nature. 
He wrote~ "Where God was once believed to appear occasionally, 
He now is seen to be present wherever His will works in nature. 
Science has again become the handmaid of faith." 1 
c. God Known through Jesus Christ 
All of the liberal theologians under consideration would 
have agreed with the following statement of Fosdick: "In the 
face of Christ we have seen the effulgence of His ~God's~ 
glory."2 Brown identified this divine gl .ory with Christ's 
character and purpose and maintained that it is one of the 
three elements at the center of Christian convictions about 
God, the other two being personality and absoluteness.3 For 
Brown, one important idea involved in accepting the view that 
God is known through Christ is that God can reveal himself through 
man.4 For Clarke, our knowledge of God through Jesus Christ cen-
tered in the nature of the love that Christ revealed to us. "Christ 
expresses the yearning impulse and the giving impulse of God."5 
1. Mathews, The Faith of Modernism, p. 113. 
2. Fosdick, The ModernUse ofthe-·Bible, p. 268. 
3. Brown, Chr-ritian TheOIOgy-in-Dutline, p. 82. 
4. Ibid., pp. 105-106. - -
5. ~ke, An Outline of Christian Theology, p. 97. 
Macintosh tried to explain, in logical fashion, why these 
virtues exemplified by Christ constituted true knowledge of 
God. His sound conclusion may be appreciated, though his cir-
cular method of argumentation places the logical validity of his 
argument in question. 
But if we are entitled to evaluate the personal-
ity and lifework ' of Jesus as God-like~ we are 
entitled to go further and draw some very impor-
tant deductions. If Christ is characteristically 
God-like, God is characteristically Christ-like; 
the· Christ-like is the norm of the divine char-
acter and purpose. In other words, we have support 
here for the ·christo-centric theological princi-
ple, according to which there is to be included 
in our view of God all that is deductible from the 
proposition that the spirit of Jesus is a revela-
tion of what God is like, while there is to be ex-
cluded from it all that contradicts this view.l 
d. God Known in Religious Experience 
Brown expressed a basic liberal assumption when he postulated 
the existence of a natural kinship between God and man. It is 
the existence of this kinship, despite all of God's majesty, 
2 
which makes it possible for man to know and worship God. By 
virtue of this special relationship, God is able to make himself 
known to man in moments which man identifies as "religious ex-
perience." 
Most commonly, these moments of religious experience are 
associated with prayer, wherein, in Clarke's words: "He says 'I' 
and men address him as 'Thou' • " 3 God is known in those religious 
1. Macintosh, Theologz as ~ Empirical Science, pp. 120-21. 
2. Brown, -Christian ·Theology in Outline, p. · 103. -
3. Clarke, An Outline ~ Christian Theologz, p. 68. 
experiences which are illuminated by divine love and judgment. 
McConnell mentioned the divine love which man experiences as 
he reflects upon the divine love and responsibility demanded 
by creatorship. 1 Macintosh referred to religious experiences 
of God's judgment which are necessitated by his holy love. 2 
2. God as a Living Person 
a. Divine Personality 
Theologians in the main stream of the Protestant liberal -
tradition (excluding naturalists and humanists) all made the 
belief that God is a living person, central in their doctrines 
of God. They were aware that such a concept would be open to 
attack. Macintosh wrote that 
objection is -- frequently made to the idea of the 
personality- of God on the ground of its being 
unduly anthropomorphic. No doubt it is true that 
many of the specific qualities and limitations 
of hurilan personality cannot be properly applied 
to God. But this may be interpreted as meaning 
(to follow a suggestion from ·Lotze again) not 
that God is not personal, but that he alone is 
completely personal, man's personality being but 
incomplete and fragmentary.j 
If person be defined as a self-conscious, self-directing intel-
ligence, then, surely, wrote Clarke, God must be a person. Such 
a designation does not suggest that his being is limited, for, 
as Macintosh suggested, "God may be more than we can mean by 
1. McConnell, The Diviner Immanence, p. 110. 
2. Macintosh, Theology as an Empirical Science, p. 163 .. 
3· Ibid., p. 190. --
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1 personal, but he is not less." _ This defense of the use of the 
word "personality" in describing God was expanded by Clarke 
when he wrote: "Personality in God is not an outgrown anthro-
pomorphism. • • • He is the one perfect and typical person, and 
man, as yet, possesses personality only in a rudimentary and 
2 imperfect way •••• God alone is fully personal." These 
statements, quoted at length, make it very cle_ar that the lib-
erals were not guilty of creating a 11 superman"3 when they ap-
plied the term 11 personalit~" _ to God~ Rather, they took man's 
highest natural essence, i.e., _ h~s personality, and made it 
the starting point for any conception of a deity which would 
. - - . 
correlate minimally with the data of Biblic~l and general revela-
tion. 11 If we accept the Christian principle that God can reveal 
himself through man, then all that goes to make up the highest 
life in man must make its contribution to our thought of God.'14 
b. Divine Spirit and Life 
The liberal view of divine personality will be further 
analyzed under two headings: "spirit" and 11 life." Brown used 
these designations to express the formal and active aspects of 
God's personality. Thus, to speak of God's "spirit" is to refer 
to God's innate morality, conscience, reason, and even kinship 
with man's own spirit• To these, Clarke added self-consciousness 
1. Clarke, "An Outline of Christian Theology, pp. 67-68. 
2. Ibid., p.-os. - -- -
3. Ma!news, The Faith of Modernism, p. 119. 4. Brown, ChriStian Theology in Outline, p. 106. 
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and self-directing intelligence. 1 
To refer to God's "life" is to cite the possibility of the 
divine spirit to initiate action and even to change.2 The attri-
bute of freedom of action is implicit here. For the liberal~ 
divine personality implied a living God who can and does enter 
the human situation and reveal himself at his own pleasure.3 
3. The Divine Character 
a. Moral Perfection 
The liberals viewed God' a moral perfection from .a Christo-
logical perspective. For them, to say that God's character is 
morally perfect was to assert that he possesses the high ethical 
character and lofty purpose which were illustrated in Jesus' 
life.4 Brown proclaimed that this approach would enable theolo• 
glans to escape weak sentimentality and pure speculation.5 
Macintosh, as well, declared the Christ-like to be the norm of 
the divine character and purpose. Thus, the Chriatocentric 
theological principle was determinative for him.6 
Rauschenbusch saw this Christ-like moral perfection revealed 
in God's willingness to suffer for all of mankind. For him, the 
cross is the permanent law of God's nature, to such an extent 
1. Clarke, An Outline of Christian Theology, p. 67. 
2. Brown,' Christian Theology in Outline, p. 104. 
3. Knudson, Present Tendencies in Religious Thought, p •. 106; 
Fosdick, The Modern Use of the Bible~ p. 268. 
4. Brown, .2.E.• cit., p. 827 - -
5. Ibid., p. 106. 
6. MaCintosh, Theology as an Empirical Science, pp. 120-21. 
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that patripassianism can no longer be regarded as selr-evident 
heresy. 1 God's morally perfect nature was seen by Macintosh to 
be best summed up in the religious expressions, "God the Father, n 
2 
and 11 your Father in heaven who is perfect. 11 
b. Divine Love and Goodness 
Liberal theologians placed divine love at the forefront of 
all of God's perfect moral attributes. This love was defined by 
pointing to the life and teachings of Jesus. It was the revela-
tion of God's love in Jesus that made it possible for the lib-
erals, who believed God to be Lord of all cosmic law and process 
that the natural sciences were revealing, to believe that such a 
mighty God was also to be loved and trusted as our heavenly 
Father. Thus Mathews was able to write the following about the 
liberal Christian faith: "It trusts Him--the awful, mysterious 
God of abysmal space, of galaxies of stars, of evolution, of 
human liberty--as Father." 3 This divine love was seen as having 
a twofold nature, i.e., both "giving'' and npossessing." This 
love gives itself to the b e loved, but also seeks to possess the 
beloved. 4 Clarke went so far as to say that God 1 s love is: like 
human love in this respect. He cites, as Biblical grounding for 
his thesis, the picture of the giving Father-God in John 3; 16 
and the parable of the seeking-shepherd-God in Luke 15: 3-7· 
Clarke sums up his concept as follows: 11 Christ expresses the 
1. Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel, p. 179. 
2. Macintosh, Theology ~ ~ Empirical Sgience, p. 163. 
3· Mathews, The Faith of Modernism, p. 118. 
4• Brown, ChriStian Theology in Outline, p. 109. 
67 
yearning impulse and the giving impulse of God; for in him, God 
eagerly pours himself out to men, and as eagerly seeks them ror 
his own; and this is exactly what we know as love.nl 
McConnell stresses the idea that God's love takes the initia-
tive. God's love is not dependent upon our taking a first step 
toward him, but is always yearning for our redemption. To think 
otherwise is to empty the Gospel of its meaning.2 Clarke links 
this initiating love of God to his goodness. "He himself is 
morally perfect and acts upon his perfection, ardently desiring 
to do good things to all beings that are capable of goodness.n3 
Liberals who employed more of the metaphysical in their 
system often looked to the implications of personal creation 
for a clue to the nature of God's love. Bowne was the great 
spokesman for this position. "It was an awful responsibility 
that was taken when our human race was launched with its fear-
ful possibilities of good and evil. God thereby put himself 
under infinite obligation to care for his human family."4 "In 
the moral world he that is greatest of all should be the servant 
of all. There is no exception from this rule, not even for God 
himself."5 
1. Clarke, An Outline of Christian Theology, p. 97. 
2. McConnell, The Diviner Immanence, pp. 134-135. 
3. Clarke, ~· cit., p. 72. 
4. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, p. 95. 
5. Ibid., p. 98. 
See also McConnell, ££· cit., p. 110. 
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c. Divine Wrath 
Contrary to much present-day opinion, the leading liberal 
theologians were not sentimental in their views of God's love. 
Brown saw divine wrath against sin as the necessary corollary 
of divine love, for if God is truly a moral person, he must feel 
indignation against that which hinders his moral purpose. 
Macintosh saw the moral absoluteness of God as consisting of a 
pair of attributes, holiness and love. He wrote that he failed 
to see why so many considered the reconciling of God's mercy 
with his justice to be the greatest of all theological problems. 
For him, divine love and divine wrath were not so antithetical. 
"Perfect holiness includes love, and perfect 16ve is holy. God 
would not be dealing justly with the sinner, if he refused to 
be merciful to him; nor would it be true mercy to grant an un-
just forgiveness, or indulgence.n2 Mathews also rebelled 
against a sentimental view of God's love, declaring God's love 
to be no weak affection, but moral and self-respecting. "It is 
God who is love, not love that is God."3 
Though the liberals recognized the reality and necessity of 
divine wrath, they subordinated it, ultimately, to the divine 
love. It serves as an instrumental and not an intrinsic value, 
for ita chief purpose is not to stigmatize with guilt or mark 
for retribution, "but something more akin to diagnosis with a 
1. Brown, Christian Theology in Outline, p. 111. 
2. Macintosh, Theology ~~Empirical Science, p. 163. 
3. Mathews, The Faith of Modernism, p. 119. 
view to eff ecting a cure. " God was seen by Macintosh as the 
Great Phy sician, rather that the Great Judge. 1 For the liberals , 
the God whose wrath was very real, was still the Savior of the 
world. 
4· The Absoluteness of God 
a. Abstract and Personalistic Concepts 
From the time of the ancient Greeks, philosophers have tried 
to construct a rational system into which all of man's various 
and often seemingly conflicting, experiences could be fitted so 
as to yield a harmonious interpretation of the universe. The 
key for the Greeks was what they termed the Absolute, by which 
they meant the ultimate reality which lies back of all phenomena. 
But this abstract conception of God was poles apart from the 
Hebrew-Christian understanding of God, and the liberals, ex-
cluding naturalists and humanists, were quick to perceive this. 
''The abstract (non-personal) conception of God is foreign to the 
genius of Christianity, and historically has been the source of 
2 
many errors." 
Brown wrote that the Reformers saw God as the embodiment 
of his moral law, i.e., as arbitrary will.3 This thesis mi ght 
appear a bit superficial to some today, in view of the nee-re-
formers' emphasis on the divine grace, almost to the neglect of 
1. Macintosh, Theology ~ !B Empirical Science, p. 166. 
2. Brown, Christian Theology in Outline, 111. 
3 • Ibid. , p. 9 3 . -
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the moral law. However this may be, Brown was correct in noting 
that the liberal interpretation of God's absoluteness centered 
neither on philosophical abstraction nor on dogmatic will, but 
on God as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. 1 He is a Cosmic 
2 Person possessing intellect, emotion, and will. 
b. The Divine Immanence and Triune Manifestation 
The idea of God's immanence constitutes one side of the 
doctrine of God's absoluteness, and was central to the liberal 
doctrine of God. .Fosdick emphasized the belief that God was not 
far off, but here in the human world. 3 Coe saw God in nature 
and in the souls of men, and as the living source of their very 
being. 4 Knudson proclaimed that this whole idea was firmly rooted 
in Scripture.5 Clarke explained that by divine immanence, lib-
erals meant that God is everywhere and always present in the 
universe, nowhere absent from it, and never separated from its 
life. 9 
It was Mathews who stressed the significance of natural 
law in this connection. God's activity no longer needs to be 
explained by the miracle story, since He performs his will by 
means of his immanence in natural law. 7 Mathews' modernized 
1. Ibid., p. 93. 
2. I"b'f(l.' pp. 10.5-106. ' 
Seesection 2-a above, 11 God as a Living Person." 
3· Fosdick, The Modern Use of the Bible, -p. 268. 4· Cae, The Religion of a Mature-Mind p. 219 . 
.5. Kp,.udson, Present Tendencies in Religious T.houiht, p. 106. 
6. Clarke~ An Outline £t. Christ!an~eo!o~:y, p. 30. 
7. Mathews, The Faith of Modernism, p. ll . 
Compare with sectionl-b on" God Revealed in Nature.'' 
version of Amos' famous hymn to divine immanence, Amos 9 
bears quoting here as a fitting summary of the liberal view. 
"Though we take the wings of the telescope and fly to the 
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utmost depth of atoms, there, too, He must sustain us. Though 
we trace the course of human evolution and social transformation, 
there, too, must God be found.hl 
God's triune self-manifestation bore a direct relationship 
to the divine immanence in the thinking of most liberal theolo-
gians. Only an immanent God may be experienced by man, and the 
Trinity decla~es that God is experienced as the Absolute One, 
as the Revealing One {via his immanence in nature, history, and 
Jesus Christ), and as the Self-imparting One. Clarke wanted 
to make it clear that the Trinity concerns God's three-fold 
self-manifestation and not three distinct individuals in the 
Godhead. The word "person" used in expressing the doctrine of 
the Trinity is misleading for moderns, since the original Latin 
word person~ did not mean a complete and separate personality, 
but first a "mask" and then a "character" in a play. Clarke 
added that this does not mean simply that God has thrice expressed 
himself but that the one divine Person actually exists in three 
1. Mathews, The Faith of Modernism, p. 108. 
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different modes. 1 Brown also believed that the doctrine 
affirms the fullness and richness of God's life in contrast 
to an abstract and barren concept of his being.2 
Bowne went further in the direction of a social view of 
the Trinity. He readily admitted the difficulties inherent in 
the view of God as a single, lonely personality, devoid of the 
eternal fellowship which is demanded by the moral life. This 
conception usually runs off into agnosticism on the one hand 
or pantheism on the other. Consequently, he believed that the 
conception of a community of persons in the unity of the divine 
existence should be given earnest consideration. 3 Despite the 
divergence in liberal explanations concerning the Trinity, all 
would have agreed that the Father-God who was in Christ recon-
ciling the world to himself, is at the same time the "Holy 
Spirit" immanent in the Christlike everywhere. 4 
c. The Divine Transcendence and Mystery 
The necessary obverse to the immanentalist view in the 
doctrine of God's absoluteness is divine transcendence. The 
liberals were by no means limited to an immanentalist view of 
God, as has often been asserted. God, they believed, is both 
immanent in the world and transcendent to it. McConnell 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Clarke, An Outline of Christian Theology, p. 177. 
Brown, Christian Theolo~y in Outline, p. 162. 
Bowne, studies In Chris ianity, pp. 92-93. 
Macintosh, TheolOgy !! ~Empirical Science, p. 193. 
explained that transcendence means transcendence of the universe 
as we know it. Transcendence means that "no part of God's 
creation exhausts his entire power or meaning. It may be that 
the entire system at what we would call any one moment of time 
does not exhaust them. ttl Clarke wrote that divine transcendence 
means that God is not shut up in, limited to, or required in his 
totality to maintain and order the world. God is a free Spirit, 
always able to act upon the world. "Transcendence without innna-
nence would give us Deism, cold and barren; immanence without 
transcendence would give us Pantheism, fatalistic and paralyzing.n2 
Thus, while God was believed to be immanent in natural law, 
He is not a slave to it, but a free Ferson using his creation to 
ach ieve his moral purposes. Macintosh expressed the conviction 
of moat liberals (exclusive of the naturalists) and sharply dis-
tinguished between the mechanistic interpretation of nature 
given by those who deny personality and the central liberal in-
terpretation that affirmed the existence of Divine Personality 
which is superior to natural processes.3 Therefore, though 
liberals firmly believed that God generally uses the evolutionary 
method, Clarke could write that the Free Spirit is not in 
bondage to his own methods4 and that acts of special creation 
and even miracles are not to be dogmatically ruled out. However, 
1. McConnell, The Diviner Immanence, p. 64. 
2. Clarke, An OUtline of Christian Theolo!y' p. 130. 
3. Mathews,~e Faith Of Modernism, pp. 1 3-14. 
4. Clarke, ££• cit., p:-132. 
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Clarke hastened to add that such activity must be infrequent or 
1 
the beneficent general uniformity of nature would be broken. 
A discussion of God's transcend~nce may also properly in-
clude a consideration of God's "omni-powers." Regarding God's 
omnipotence, Brown wrote that God is Absolute in the sense that 
he is master of the universe. But his omnipotence must be con-
sistent with the revelation given in Jesus Christ. That is, God 
can do everything that his will and purpose suggest. 2 Conversely, 
God cannot do those things which violate his moral nature. This 
would include his rational nature as well, for it was noted 
above that natural law also has a general beneficial influence 
upon _humanity. Divine omniscience is related to divine tran- · 
s c..e.nj ence, according to Clarke, by the fact that God has knowl-
e ·.d ge of time, but is not limited by it.3 But Clarke maintained 
that God's foreknowledge does not limit the reality of human 
freedom. This is an implicit distinction between foreordination 
and foreknowledge.4 
The liberals, after all their systematizing was done, were 
quite ready to admit that the i mmanent- t ranscendent God was still 
a great mystery to them. Even the self-styled 11 modernist " Mathews 
could write that " the God of the Modernist is not a fully under-
stood God. Such a God cannot be worshiped. Rationalism can never 
satisfy the heart of man. Mystery always lies beyond knowledge 
1. Ibid., P• 134· 
2. Brown, Christian Theoloff in Outline, p. 118. 
See also Clarke, An 6ut ne-or Chrfstian Theology, p . 85. 
3. Clarke, .4n Outline-of Christian Theology, p. 83. 
4· ~., p-. 8$. -
'{b 
and grows into knowledge.tt Mathews caught the twin concept of 
immanence and transcendence as he described God in terms of a 
great hyperbole that comes out from infinity into fellowship 
with men, only to reach out again into infinity. "This is the 
God our Christian movement gives us--a God participating in 
human struggle, but always greater than human knowledge, found 
by reasonable faith, but not without sacred mystery. 111 
C. THE DOCTRINE OF MAN 
1. The Nature of Man 
a. Kinship with God 
Along with the concept of the immanence of God, the belief 
that man is naturally related to God in some special sense was 
one of the hallmarks of liberal theology. Fosdick stated that 
it was the very basis of liberal theology to believe that man 
2 
and God belong together and in each other are fulfilled. Clarke 
observed that man and God have such similarity of nature that 
they have communion with one another. Indeed, the natural rela-
tion between God and man is that of parent and child.3 McConnell 
believed that the doctrine of divine immanence rationally grounded 
this idea of a divine-human relationship, for if God is 
1. Mathews, The Faith of Modernism, p. 117. 
2. Fosdick, The Modern-use of the Bible, p. 267. 
3· Clarke, An Outline of Christian Theology, p. 192. 
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everywhere present, then even the human soul is in part an ex-
pression of the divine activity. 1 
Clarke distinguished the components of man's personality 
as intellect, sensibility, and volition "in a self-conscious 
unity with moral judgment crowning their action with signifi-
2 
cance." But he singled out none of these components as being 
the divine part of man's personality. He rejected '~he old 
popular saying 11 that it is reason that distinguishes man from 
beast and relates him to God, for reason is to a lesser degree 
present in animals. So, also, do emotion, will and even mor-
ality in a rudimentary sense appear in some animals.3 Clarke 
maintained that "the naturalness and universality of religion 
in the human race marks the separateness of man from all crea-
tures below him."4 It was in this religious capacity of the 
human spirit that Clarke found "that image or likeness of God, 
the ijiblical suggestion of which has been so fruitful in Chris-
tian thought.••5 
Brown said that this liberal thesis could be empirically 
verified by observing the Christlike capacities and ideals in 
man which can only be explained by a kinship between God and 
man.
6 This kinship theory the liberals believed to be exceed-
ingly necessary. Brown saw that it alone makes is possible for 
1. McConnell, The Diviner I~anence, pp. 66-67. 
2. -clarke, An outline of Christian Theology, p. 187. 
3. Ibid.: p:-188. 
4· Ibid., P• 190. 
5. '!'bid., p. 191. 
6. Brown, Christian Theologz in Outline, p. 237. 
us to believe in man's ultimate conformity to God in character. 
Because man's mind is a counterpart of the creator's, God can 
manifest himself to man and man can understand the works of God. 
Without such a relationship, there could be neither science nor 
1 
revelation. Moreover, it is the presupposition of the Chris-
tian doctrine of incarnation, for Jesus Christ, a true man, is 
able to reveal God, because there exists betwen man and God a 
spiritual kinship which can be expressed only in terms of father-
hood and sonship. 2 
Coe applied this belief in human dignity to children, who, 
he said, must contain at the outset a germ of the highest per-
sonality within, or they could not develop as they do from 
within by free self-expression.3 McConnell, who was equally 
sure of the natural relationship between God and man, never-
theless cautioned us to remember that the special religious re-
lationship, wherein man acknowledges God as his Father, is not 
universal. Metaphysically, God is near all men, but religiously, 
many men are far from Him.4 
b. Freedom of the Will 
That men possess genuine freedom whereby they make selec-
tions and moral choices was also accepted by the liberal theolo-
gians. For Macintosh, it was both psychologically impossible and 
1. Clarke, An Outline of Christian Theology, p. 191. 
2. : ..Brown, Christianity Theology in Outline, p~ 239. 
3· Coe, The Religion of a Mature Mind, · p. 313. 4· McConnell, The Diviner Immanence;-p. 134. 
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moral l y wrong to deny human freedom because such a course would 
make God the author of our sins.l Even McConnell, who so 
vigorously stressed the me t aphysics of divine immanence and 
activity in every area of life, asserted the existence of real 
human freedom.2 Macintosh unequivocally rejected the idea of 
double predestination, saying it "would be the action of a fiendt"3 
He did, however, admit to the possibility of a conditional pre-
destination, which he inferred from the moral perfection of God; 
i.e., all persons are conditionally predestined to be conformed to 
the Christlike image, if they can be induced to come of their own 
free will. 4 
Rauschenbusch, like Macintosh, based his belief in human 
freedom on man's moral nature. Morality, he reasoned, rests on 
a sense of responsibility, but responsibility is impossib le with-
out true freedom. 5 Brown, as well, subscribed to the belief in 
human freedom of the will, but, like Rauschenbusch, he was aware 
of the role of social responsibility in the individual person's 
life. Thus he saw human freedom facing a very real limitation.6 
Clarke expanded this idea of the limitation of human freedom. 
First, the sphere of human freedom is limited by the facts of 
existence; e.g., man does not choose his nationality or sex. 
Second, sin has destroyed the harmony of man's power to choose 
good, even as Paul affirms in Romans 7. 7 In the same mood, 
1. Macintosh, Theology ~ !E Empirical Science, p. 71. 
2. McConnell, The Diviner Immanence, pp. 66-67. 
3. Macintosh, OE• cit., p.-165. 
4. · Ibid. 
5. ~auschenbusch, A Theology!££~ Social GosEel, p. 59. 
6. Brown, Christian Theology in Outline, p. 249. 
7. Clarke, An Outline 2f Christian Theology, pp. 213-14. 
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Brown was led to conclude that the Christian man realizes true 
freedom only through complete dependence upon his heavenly 
father. 1 
2. The Reality of Sin 
a. The Nature of Sin 
The charge is frequently made today that the liberals of 
the early twentieth century did not recognize the reality and 
prevalence of human sinfulness. This charge, however, is dif-
ficult to accept in the light of the evidence. It is quite true 
that some liberals shied away from the use of the word "sin." 
Mathews illustrated this position when he admitted that lib-
erals were more concerned with economic oppression, poverty, 
war, lust, degeneracy, and other concrete evils than they were 
with what they considered to be a barren concept of "sin."2 
Clarke's list of specific sins appeared as follows: lack of 
responsibility relative to money, untruthfulnes, sexual im-
morality, intoxication, profanity, cruelty, anger, moral shallow-
ness, and selfis~ess.3 Liberals were very much aware of 
the evil in the world, and Brown even used the word "depravity" 
in connection with a discussion of human sinfulness, but for 
him it indicated a "tendency" rather than a "state.n4 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Clarke viewed sin in a two-fold sense. Objectively, sin 
Brown, Christian Theolog~ in Outline, p. 249. 
Mathews, The ~lth of Mo ern'ism, pp. 96-97. 
Clarke, An Outline of Christian Theology, p. 230. 
Brown, ~· cit., p.:2so. 
is (1) badness, (2) the abnormal--in view of man's high calling, 
(3} departure from duty, and (4) opposition to God's mor al 
government. Subjectively considered, sin is comprised of defec-
tive motive and inner moral quality. It occurs when man places 
his own willful selfishness over against God's desires. "Under 
its impulse, a man says, 'I will act from myself and for myself. 
My own will and not God shall be the source and law of my action, 
and my own self and not humanity shall be the end to which my 
action is directed'."l Clarke believed that the Genesis descrip-
tion of sin was startlingly accurate. That primitive account 
portrays sin as the setting up of human self-will in God's place, 
as willful transgression of known law, as abnormal, and as the 
cause of man forfeiting his destiny. Clarke concludes, "The 
passage is remarkable for true insight concerning the mE~aning and 
relations of sin."2 
Brown distinguished between the "formal" and "material" 
elements in the condition known as sin. By the formal element 
of sin he meant the transgression of any of God's laws --·whether 
known or not. It is "constant" as it is a violation of eternal 
oughtness. The material element in sin occurs only when man 
consciously violates a law, or laws, of which he had knowledge 
and accepts as binding. Thus, the latter is "variable, •v since 
1. Clarke, An Outline of Christian Theolog~, pp. 235-36. 
2. Ibid., p:-239. 
8J. 
environment and insight condition all men so greatly. 1 Most 
of the liberals, however, had "material" sin in mind when they 
dealt with this problem and would have generally acceptEid 
Mathews• definition: 11 Sin is a conscious yielding, because of 
immediate pleasure, to the backward pull of outgrown good.n2 
b. The Origin and Transmission of Sin 
The liberals rejected the Augustinian idea that man is 
totally depraved in his natural state, that all human s:i.ns re-
sult directly from the sin of an ancestor thousands of years 
ago, and that from it there is no deliverance, except that of 
election.3 Indeed, Coe thought that the theory had exercised 
a positively unwholesome influence upon the human race. He 
wrote: "Habitually associate the notion of sin with the thought 
of what you are, and you will gravitate in that direction. 114 
Most of the liberals would have agreed that sin has its origin 
in every man because man begins his life on a submoral plane 
and responds to his primal animal nature at first. Thus, Bowne 
was able to write that sin is 11a relic of the animal not yet 
outgrown, a resultant of the mechanisms of appetite and impulse 
and reflex action for which the proper inhibitions ars not yet 
developed: and only slowly does it grow into a consciousness o£ 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Brown, Christian Theology in Outline, pp. 265-66. 
It should be noted that DeWOlf has made a similar distinction 
in recent years, but he reverses the terminology. See his 
A Theolo~ of the Living Church, p. 182. 
Mathews, he-Firth of Modernism, p. 97. 
Ibid., p. 96. --
GOe; ~ Religion of a Mature ~~ p. 385. 
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itself as evil."l Coe referred to the inner struggle against 
the remnants of the ape and tiger nature.2 Rauschenbusch was 
able to add to this theory the idea of the stubbornness of the 
human will and the drag of environment. 
Brown penetrated still more deeply into the problem. He 
was aware of metaphysical explanations of the origin of sin, 
which emphasized man's finitude, temptation by extern~l forces , 
and the freedom of the human will; and psychological ones which 
centered around man's misuse of his freedom. He admitted that 
man's animal ancestry was reflected in present-day sins and that 
environment continues to be important, yet he stoutly maintained 
that theology had been right in its view that 11in the secret 
places of the human spirit takes place the strange change by 
which the non-moral is transformed into the immoral. We face 
here a mystery which we cannot explain, yet may not deny."3 
Clarke went further than Brown in challenging the belief that 
sin has its origim in the dominion of the body over the spirit. 
He clearly saw that the realm of spirit contained subtle and 
dangerous sins of ita own. In fact, he wrote: "The higher part 
of man has capabilities of evil far greater than the brute ele-
ment ever possessed. 11 He firmly re jeoted the notion that sin 
could be explained as a mere incident of growth.5 
While liberals did reject the belief that all sin stems 
1. Bowne, Studies in Christianitz, p. 145. 
2. Coe, Th~ Religion~~ Mature Mind, p. 114. 
3. Brown, Christian Theology in OUtline, p. 276. 
4. Clarke, An Outline of Christian Theology, p. 232. 
5. Ibid. 
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from Adam's fatal choice, some of them saw in the Genesis story 
an important religious truth. Rauschenbusch said, "It is one of 
the few attempts of individualistic theology to get a solidaris-
tic view of its field of work." The view of the human J:>ace as 
a great unity appealed to him. He saw that 11 tbis natura 1 unity 
is the basis and carrierfur the transmission and universality 
of sin."l While Rauschenbusch stressed the role of environ-
ment above all, he admitted that there is truth in the biologi-
cal view of sin's origin. "Idiocy and feeble mindedness, 
neurotic diatur.bances, weakness of inhibition, perverse desires, 
stubbornness and anti-social impulses in children must l~ve 
had their adequate biological causes somewhere back on the 
line. 112 
Clarke also stressed the solidaristic view of sin. Scrip-
ture declares and experience testifies that moral evil has 
tainted the human race.3 "The race connection itself has been 
the means of perpetuating ~:i.n. 11 4 Both the good and the evil 
potentialities are transmitted biologically, but Clarke seemed 
to think that the negative tendencies outweighed the good, for 
he wrote, "Children are not born either wholly good or neutral 
between good and evil, but with evil tendencies which grow into 
sin when responsible life begins."5 Both Clarke and Rauschen-
busch were careful to proclaim, however, that though there is 
1. Rausehenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel, pp. 57-58. 
2. Ibid., p. 58. 
3. Clarke, An outline~ Christian Theology, p. 239. 
4. Ibid., p:-249. 
5. Ibid., p. 244. 
84 
truth in this idea of the bi ological transmission of the ten-
1 dency to sin, this cannot be identified with guilt. Tradi-
tional theology went too far when it tried to involve us in 
. 2 
the guilt of Adam. Guilt cannot be transmitted .or trans-
ferred.3 Rauschenbusch balanced the matter by saying that though 
sinful tendencies are transmitted biologically, the actual sins, 
themselves, are not transmitted by heredity, but by being so-
cialized.4 
c. The Prevalence of Sin 
Of all the liberals, Coe was probably the most optimistic 
regarding the amount of sin in the world. He referred to the 
tremendous influence that Paul's doctrine of human depravity 
has had upon the development of the Christian religion, but he 
denied that the sense of sin is the chief agent in developing 
a religion and cited Jesus as an example of one who did not dwell 
on the fact of sin.5 Coe denied that sin is as widespread or as 
important as most conservative theologians have maintained. In 
fact, he ' wrote that there are some people who "have never known 
a negative period. Taught from infancy to count themselves the 
Lord's, they have neier had any other fundamental preference.n6 
1. Ibid., p. 24.5 -. . 
2. Rauschenbu~ch, ! Theolog: ~ ~ Social Gospel, p. 59. 
3· Olarke, .9E• cit., p. 24 • · 
4· Rauscnenousch, .££· cit., p. 60 • 
.5. Coe, The Religion or-i Mature Mind, pp. 363-364. 
6. Ibid.:-p. 210. -- -
The "old-fashioned experience of the sense of sin," Goe 
maintained, was largely a false product of the erroneous Pauline 
conception of sin. 
This abnormal and inaccurate idea about man is decl:l.ning 
for three reasons. (1) Life, with all its exciting potential for 
good, has become more important than doctrine; (2) fear is un-
able to spark modern man's good motives; and (3) modern man 
emphasizes the good in every sphere of life. 1 Goe wrotet that "the 
sense of sin is certainly not present as it once was."2 
This extreme view of Coe, however, was not shared by the 
majority of responsible liberal theologians. Brown was quite 
aware that along with the ascending qualities in man's spirit, 
there is also a continuing deterioration due to the "inherent 
tendency to evil in human nature."3 Clarke was even more out-
spoken concerning the prevalence of sin. He pointed out that in 
the Christian revelation man is uniformly addressed as a sinner 
and that he is always so regarded until God changes him. "The 
Bible bears one long testimony to human sinfulness."4 Moreover, 
Clarke thought that empirical observation also sees it to be 
true, "and deeper study only deepens the conception of its great-
ness. n 5 Mc-Connell admitted that many men do not put themselves 
into a t'ilial relationship with God and "in spirit and i.ntention 
they are far from God. n 6 
1. Ibid., pp. 374-376. 
2. Ibid., p. 370. 
3. Brown, Christian Theology in Outline, p. 40. 
4. Clarke, All Outline of Christian Theology, p. 227. 
5. Ibid., p. 229. 
6. McConnell, ~~Diviner Immanence, p. 134. 
Rauschenbusch believed that a profound sense of human sin-
fulness is a very necessary part of the religious life and that 
it deepens as moral insight matures.l His great awareness of 
the extent of sin led him to declare, 11 By our very nature we 
are involved in tragedy •••• The weakness or the stubborn-
ness of will and the tempting situations of life combine to 
weave the tragic web of sin and failure of which we all make 
experience before we are through with our years."2 From this 
point of view, it was precisely this consciousness of human sin 
and suffering and the desire for a better life which, alone, 
would regenerate theology.3 
3. The Destiny of Man 
a. Conversion and Redemption 
The liberals held a positive view of man's intrinsic worth 
and ultimate destiny. They believed that he was a sinner, but, 
also, that he was worth saving. Bowne noted that men ai•e sin-
ners, but not outcasts. God's grace still prevails and His will 
is for our salvation. 4 Macintosh wrote that God, indeed, hates 
sin, but He loves the sinner, so that no sin is unpardonable if 
man repents of it.5 Brown also recognized that it is the Divine 
Spirit that is transfor.ming men into the image of Christ. 6 Even 
the empirically minded Mathews wrote: "I believe that humanity 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel, p. 31. 
Ibid., p. 32. 
1J5T'a'., p. 14. 
BOWne, Studies in Christianitz, pp. 222-23. 
Macintosh, TheoiOgz ~~Empirical Science, p. 168~ 
Brown, Christian Theologz in Outline, p. 39. 
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without God is incapable of full moral life and liable to suf-
1 fering because of its sin and weakness." He definitely be-
lieved in the need and rea.lity of God's forgiveness of sins. 
Fosdick refuted the very idea which popular thought ha.s often 
ascribed to the liberals. He warned that we cannot by 11 pull-
ing on our own bootstraps, set out to lift ourselves." 2 Macintosh 
believed that at the heart justification is a matter of faith, 
i.e., turning to God in order to be turned from sin. Faith, in 
turn, becomes manifested as good will and must ultimately be ex-
pressed in good works, i.e., in right conduct toward God and 
man.3 
In general, the liberals emphasized that because of God's 
continual grace toward man, man possesses the ability to turn 
to God. Coe wrote that '' anyone can be a follower of Jesus and 
a child of God who desires the success of the Kingdom of God 
strongly enough to throw his life into its common life. ~~at 
could be simpler? 11 4 It will be noted that Coe failed to men-
tion the need for the prior act of repentance which Macintosh 
made central. However, most of the liberals would have agreed 
with Coe that conversion experiences can be either dramatic or 
gradual, at the conscious or subconscious level. 5 
Coe interjected an interesting alternative into the debate 
as to whether 8alvation is by faith or works. He suggested a 
1. Mhnhews ~ The Faith of Modernism, p. 180. 
2. Fosdic~The Modern Use of the Bible, p. 270. 
3· Macintosn;-Theology as an Empirical Science, p. 169. 4. Coe, The Religion or-a Mature Mind, p. 193. 
5 . . Ibid.-;-p". 210. -- -
-
88 
theory of sa~vation by education in which there is involved the 
unfolding of the divine germ present from the beginning in the 
1 child-personality. Liberals, Coe said, could accept this, since 
they believed in man's divine kinship with God. 2 Coe empha-
sized this human qignity, which extends even to little chil-
dren, when he pointed out that the child is doubly worthy of 
reverent observation, for (1) we must learn how to lead him to 
God and (2) we see "how God utters himself with the child-con-
sciousness."3 But no matter what are the exact details in the 
process of conversion, liberals were agreed " that God is in it 
all from be ginning to end. n4 
b. The Ascent of Man 
The liberals were in agreement with Bowne that the creation 
of man had meaning only in the light of a divine purpose which 
seeks to train and develop souls into mature children of God.5 
Clarke saw this development as a gradual growth toward perfec-
tion itself.6 Macintosh referred to this as a coming of man 
" into the filial relation, the right religious adjustment to 
7 1 the Father'." This development, or growth, or adjustment, 
included working together with God to help him establish the 
Kingdom of God on earth. 8 This was the natural corollary to 
1. Ibid.~ p. 317. 
2. !Cia., P• 313. 
3. 'I'6'I(l·., p. 318. 4. Ibid., P• 212. 5. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, p. 219. 
6. Clarke, An Outline of Christian Theology, p. 68. 
7. MacimtosE; ~· cit . -, -p. 165. 
8. Bowne, 212· cit., pp. --- 2Z2-23. 
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the fact that man is not a solitary creature, but exists in 
1 
society. Coe was especially conscious of this fact, and when 
he considered the ascent of man, he noted that 
the end of the individual life is a per-
fected community life. This, once more, is 
not to be worked for as a means to any in-
dividual self-realization, for this would 
place my interest above that of the com-
munity, whereas I must reach the point of 
consciously identifying my personal good 
with the common good.2 · 
So important was the realization of the Kingdom of God on earth 
to Coe, that he declared that all who ''take sides with Christ" 
in the building of the Kingdom are Christians.3 
Coe saw modern man as already advancing rapidly toward per-
faction. The spirit of science, he wrote, has emancipated man 
from irrelevant mystical and other-worldly religious concerns. 
"The old type of awe and resignation is gone forever."4 "We no 
longer feel that we are pilgrims and strangers passing through 
a disagreeable country ; ••• we feel more and more at home where 
we are; ••• the world belongs to us and we propose to cultivate 
it.".5 Mathews saw this "cultivation'' as including the use of 
techniques of social progress so that man's good will might be 
controlled by his good sense. 6 So highly did Coe regard man's 
potential that he was led to write that "an ideal manhood would 
1. Clarke, An Outline of Christian Theology, p. 219. 
2. Coe, The~eliglon or-a Mature Mind, p. 172. 
3· Ibid.;-p. 193. -- --
4. Ibid. ' p • 25 • 
.5. Ibid., p. 29. 
6. Matliews, The Faith of Modernism, pp. 96-97. 
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be the supreme information as to the divine character."! 
However, this continuing progress which Coe envisioned 
was not automatic. He explicitly renounced as false, the theory 
that there is a "secret spring" in the universe that pushes 
everything onward and upward. The evolutionary theory rightly 
interpreted and applied to the hl.iman situation must ttrecognize 
human endeavor as the essential condition of further progress."2 
Most of the liberals were nowhere nearly as optimistic con-
cerning the question of man's steadily improving character and 
his relations with his neighbors. They would have been more in 
accord with Clarke who, while admitting that humanity did pos-
sess "upward tendencies" and was a "slowly rising race, 11 also 
admitted that humanity's progress was highly disappointing. 
"Old evils wear away; but the new and better conditions that 
follow develop new evils of their own, which in turn, must be 
slowly and painfully overcome. 113 Liberal-optimist though he was, 
Clarke saw that the "central alienation of' man from God and from 
his brothers in which sin consists has not come to an end. 114 
c. Human Immortality 
The idea of the immortality of the human soul was very 1m-
portant for all the liberal theologians. It constituted a great 
and necessary part of their view of man's destiny. Brown saw 
that it was necessary not only that man's deep and legitimate 
1. Coe, ~Religion £!a Mature Mind, p. 41 
2. Ibid., p. 396. 
3. Ciarke, An Outline of Christian Theologz, pp. 242-43. 
4. ~-
longings to continue being in a relationship with God might 
be satisfied or to provide divine justice with a dimension in 
which it can dispense rewards and punishments, but primarily 
that God's fatherly purpose for his children might be rea:li zed , 
i.e., that men might attain to the moral excellence of Christ's 
1 
character. Only an immortal life can guarantee such a high 
destiny, and since man has been called to this destiny by a faith-
ful God, eternal life must be a reality. 
Brown rooted his belief in human immortality in man's na-
2 tural kinship with God. Clarke reasoned along the same line, 
that because man's spirit resembles God's own Spirit, man is 
i mm ortal by nature.3 This belief in human immortality was linked 
with the preceding idea of man's moral and religious growth and 
always with the idea of a Christlike God. Mathews summed it up 
as follows: "I believe in the continuance of individual per-
sonality beyond death; and that the future life will be one of 
growth and joy in proportion to its fellowship with God and its 
moral likeness to Jesus Christ."4 
1. Brown, Christian Theology in Outline, p. 250. 
2. Ibid., P• 239. --
3· Clarke, An Ogtline of Christian Theolo~, p. 192. 4· Mathews, The Faith ~ Modernism, p. 18 . 
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D. TEE DOCTRINE OF CHRIST 
1. Jesus of History 
a. The Humanity of Jesus 
That Jesus was an historical person, and not a creation 
of the religious imagination, the liberals all took for granted. 
Fosdick thus could write= "I am taking it for granted that we 
can know this character who so gloriously lived and died in 
Palestine.nl Clarke substantiated his belief in the historical 
reality of Jesus with the biographical data concerning him which 
Clarke says are as well attested as any facts of that ancient 
period.2 Coe regarded liberal interest in the historical Jesus 
as the hallmark of liberal Christology. Its battle cry was "'Back 
to Christ!' Back from theoretical Christa to the concrete his-
toric figure."° Clarke had, at least, recognized that the his-
torical nucleus was partly obscured by myths which had grown up 
around the memory of Jesus, but Coe seems not to have attached 
any importance to that idea. 
The liberals went on to make it clear that not only did 
Jesus actually live, but he lived a truly human life. Fosdick 
vigorously proclaimed that "Jesus was true man and his divinity 
must always be asserted and interpreted in such ways as will 
not cast doubt on that unmistakable fact."4 Rauschenbusoh 
1. Fosdick, The Modern Use of the Bible, p. 210. 
2. Clarke, An Outline of Christian Theology, p. 260. 
3. Goe, The R•ligion of.! Matur~ JJind, p. 42. 
4. Fosdick, £E.• cit., p. 253. 
asserted that Jesus' temptations and struggles were not shadow 
plays, but the trials of a real man which had to be endured 
throughout his entire life. 1 Macintosh went so far, in defend-
ing Jesus' true humanity, as to argue that even Jesus had to be 
saved from sin, though admittedly it was by way of prevention 
rather than cure. 2 
b. Human Potential Revealed 
Not only was Jesus perfectly man; he was also perfect man. 
Clarke referred to him as the normal and ideal man. 3 Again, he 
says: "Christ is the 'New Humanity' -- the divine standard 
brought near."4 He was, in Macintosh's words, the great re-
vealer of the divine potential in human nature and in every 
human life.5 Because of this revelation of what a human life 
could become, Jesus caused men, forever after, to view their 
own intrinsic worth and potential with greater respect and hope. 
Specifically, he made it possible for fallen men to believe in 
the possibility of their moral regeneration. 6 The liberals were 
agreed that Jesus revealed what God intended should be the con-
dition of all his human children. 
1. Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel, p. 151. 
2. Macintosh, Theo"Iogy ~ an &nlirical Science, p. 131. 
3· Clarke, An Outline of Cnrist an Theology, p. 301. 4· Ibid., P• 3$8. . 
5. Macintosh, ~· cit., p. 131. 
6. Fosdick, The Modern Use of the Bible, PP• 224-25. 
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2. Christ of Faith 
a. The Eternal Presence 
The liberals laid great stress on the Jesus of history, but 
most of them balanced this with an equally strong emphasis upon 
the Christ of faith. They were not primarily scholastics inter-
ested in arguing about Christology, but men passionately dedi-
cated to the building of God's Kingdom here on earth. As such, 
they were concerned not so much with a concept about a first-
century Jesus as with a contemporary living Christ who could 
strengthen them in their task. Thus, Bowne could write: 11 The 
power is gone if we are dealing with Jesus the carpenter's son; 
for the power depends not on the words and deeds themselves, but 
1 
on him who said and did them." 
It was the Christ of experience that most liberals used 
when interpreting the Jesus of history. Brown well recognized 
the value of historical scholarship, but he also knew that the 
methods of empirical science are unable to probe the deepest 
secrets of personality; hence, 11 the last word must always be 
2 
spoken by the human spirit." Coe felt so strongly about this 
that he argued that no matter how vigorously one might affirm 
Christ intellectually, if he had not experienced Christ, he was 
not a Christian. 3 However, Coe 1 s view of the encounter of the 
believer with Christ would probably not have satisfied Brown or 
1. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, p. 101. 
2. Brown, Christian-Theology in Outline, p. 331. 
3· Coe, The Religion of a Mature Mind, p. 421. 
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Bowne, for Coe maintained that just to acknowledge Christ's 
ideal moral nature was to experience Christ. "Thus, through an 
effect wrought within his moral nature, he apprehends the Christ 
of experience."1 However they might explain it, the liberals 
agreed that the Christ of faith was more than the Jesus of his-
tory and was central to a living and effective Christian faith. 
b. Moral Excellence of God Revealed 
While liberals believed that Jesus Christ means good news 
about man, they also believed that, even more important, he means 
good news about God. Christ reveals God in a full and unique 
manner. As Rauschenbusch put it, "Other conceptions /:of GodJ 
have to be outlived; his has to be attained."2 Fosdick referred 
to the revelation of God as Christ as the most significant idea 
ever vouchsafed to the world.3 Liberals acknowledged the ethical 
perfection of Christ4 and interpreted this as an affirmation of 
God's moral excellence. Because of this, reasoned Coe, the Christ 
figure has become the moral ideal of the whole western world.n5 
Through the eyes of faith, liberals were able to see Jesus• 
sacrifice of himself on the Cross as a human interpretation of 
God's continuing love for man. Fosdick wrote of Jesus• death 
that it was the world's most appealing and effective exhibition 
of vicarious sacrifice.6 The fact of Jesus' religious optimism, 
1. Ibid., p. 413. 
2. Rauschenbusch, A Theology~~ Social Gospel, p. 152. 
3. Fosdick, The Modern Use of the Bible, p. 222. 
4. Ibid., p. 226; McConnell-,-The Diviner Immanence, p. 93. 
5. noe; The Religion of ~Mature Mind, pp. 410-11. 
6. Fosdick, ~· cit., p. 229. 
which Rauschenbusch cited, was derived from his faith in the 
intrinsic good of creation which was, itself, grounded in God's 
love. Thus, implicitly, God's love was revealed through Christ.l 
McConnell summed up the view of those liberals who explained 
the revelation as those who know the Christ of faith, when he 
wrote, "In the life of .Jesus God has come nearest the human 
race. In him we see what God is."2 
3. The Person of Christ 
a. Subordination of' Metaphysical ~uesti ons 
That tne ancient Christological controversies centered 
around metaphysical questions, the liberals were well aware, 
but they were just as certain that metaphysical speculation must 
give way to practical considerations. Mathews thought that the 
fact that men experience the salvation of God through Christ 
should be the real basis of discussion concerning his divinity. 
11 The fact that men have f'ound religious satisfaction in their 
loyalty to Jesus argues the sanity of their conviction that God 
was, in him, reconciling the world to himself. That is the 
religious heart of the belief in his metaphysical deity."3 
Rauschenbusch denounced all preoccupation with the doctrine 
of two natures and that of the Virgin Birth as vain. "Theology 
•· 
has been on a false trail in seeking the key to his life in the 
1. Rausehenbusch, A Theology 12£ ~ Social Gospel, p. 156. 
2. McConnell, The Uiviner Immanence, p. 94. 
3. Mathews, The Faith~ Modernism, p. 137. 
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difficult doctrine of the two natures •••• We shall come 
closer to the secret of Jesus if we think less of the physical 
1 process of conception and more of the spiritual processes." 
Brown also directed attention to the realm of the spirit, though 
he referred to it as psychological interest. He noted that the 
emphasis of historical criticism upon Jesus' humanity, coupled 
with the emphasis of idealistic philosophy upon divine immanence, 
had contributed to the rise of the psychological perspective con-
2 
earning the Incarnation. 
b. The Special Relationship Between God and Man 
The liberals believed that the philosophical principle of 
the immanence of God in his world, including the lives of the 
people in it, goes far to explain, or at least make plausible 
the Incarnation. They utterly rejected the thought that an im-
passable gulf of difference in nature separate.s man from God. 
Such an assumption, Clarke said, would make an Incarnation im-
possible, or at least unintelligible. To accept an Incarnation 
based upon such a premise would reduce it to a mechanical and 
lifeless conception. Despite the profound sense of separation 
from God that man feels because of his sinfulness, the ability 
of man to commune with God indicates that there is a common 
ground between God and man. 3 Bowne likewise insisted that there 
1. Rauschenbusch, !_Theologl for the Social Gospel, p. +50. 
See also Mathews, The Fa th of Modern1sm, p. 142. 
2. Brown, Christian Tneolo~ In-outline, pp. 342-43· 
3. Clarke, ~ Outline of C istian Theology, pp. 290-91. 
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must be a community or kinship between God and man to make the 
Incarnation possible. 1 Fosdick compared the pre-liberal view 
of the God-man relationship to an oil and water hypothesis, whiCh 
he vigorously rejected. He maintained that by regarding the good 
in man as evidence of divine indwelling, liberals can logically 
believe in a divine Christ. 2 Coe saw the logical implications 
of the hypothesis of divine immanence when he aaserted that In-
carnation is more than a two-thousand-year-old event. "It is the 
central principle, or shall we say fact, of every Christian 11fe.n3 
McConnell felt compelled to defend the doctrine of i~nanence 
against the charge that it stripped the Incarnation of its 
uniqueness, since it declares that God is in every man as he was 
in Christ.4 He pointed out that the theory of immanence does 
not deny that unique metaphysical relations exist. "The meta-
physical relation of any soul to God has its own peculiarities. 
We speak of persons as having differences of endowment or of 
constitution."5 In such a manner, Jesus' character possessed 
native endowments which made for a different relationship with 
God .6 
c. God the Son as Man 
The liberals were agreed that Jesus Christ is authoritative 
for Christians because, in some sense, God was present in that 
1. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, p. 92. 
2. Fosdick, The Modern Use of the Bible, p. 267. 
3. Coe, The Reiigion of-a-Mature-Mind, p. 168. 
4. McConnell, The-niviner Immanence;-p. 91. 
5. Ibid., p. 9~ ----
6. Tbia., p. 93. 
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human life. Mathews clearly expressed this consensus when he 
wrote: "The world is not saved by the carpenter of Nazareth, 
by the author of incomparably beutiful ideas, by the most 
representative of martyrs. The Christian salvat!£E centers about 
God in a man, not in a man made into a God. 111 
---- ~--------
There was, however, a sharp difference of opinion as to 
just how this divine indwelling occurred. The liberal ideas to 
be reviewed first represent what is technically known as a 
"high Christology." A high Christology begins with the premise 
that Jesus Christ was true God and seeks to explain the existence 
of the human in him. Clarke began his system by pointing out 
that while man cannot, by growing, transcend his finite nature 
and become more than a perfect man, God can enter into the 
finite and become man. "Barriers that are impassable above to 
man may not be impassable below to God •••• The infinite does 
not need to go outside of itself to find ' the finite~ it has free 
entrance to the finite which it embraces."2 Clarke assumed that 
God, within human limitations, would be man. Bowne also shared 
this view that being a man "means only existence under certain 
conditioos and laws.'' Accordingly, when any being is subjected 
to the conditions it becomes a human being.3 
It may seen incredible to mid-twentieth century Christians 
that the conditions of human existence should have been thought 
to consist only of the formal essentials of finiteness and 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Mathews, The Faith£! Modernism, p. 124. 
Clarke, An Outline of Christian Theology, p. 292. 
Bowne, StUdies lE Cnristianity, p. 91. 
J.OO 
completely neglect existential factors such as the religious 
sense of inadequacy and sin and the consciousness of the cos-
mic aseity which relegates man to a subordinate position at the 
very root of his being. Moreover, neither Clarke nor Bowne seemed 
to be aware that their theories laid the groundwork for a modern 
Apollinarian heresy, i.e., the idea that Jesus was a "man" with 
a divine ego, which to modern thinking is self-contradictory. 
Clarke made it clear that he did not believe that this God-
becoming-man event entailed a division in God's nature. "The 
truth is rather this: that the God of infinitely varied activ-
1 ity added to his other self-expressions the act of becoming man." 
This· sort of thing, Clarke maintained, is not without its human 
parallels, though of course to a lesser degree. The more mature 
a person is, the easier he finds it to '' go out of himself" and 
enter into the lives of others. 2 The parental and marital re-
lationships offer the most obvious human parallels. If imperfect 
man himself possesses this ability, surely, Clarke argued, God, 
the perfect being, can participate in a human nature without 
3 dividing himself. 
Bowne and McConnell did not believe that a bare mathematical 
unity within the Godhead was possible or even desirable. They 
also held to a high Christology, but believed that the only ra-
tional way to understand how God could become man, while at the 
1. Clarke.J An O~tline of Christian Theology, p. 295. 
2. Ibid., p:-296. 
3· Ibid • . -
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same time remaining the sovereign lord of the universe, was to 
postulate a social view of the Trinity. 1 McConnell referred to 
it as the '1 theory of the community of personal life in what we 
call the Godhead." 2 He explained that God is not cramped in the 
"over-tightness of a personality to which a unitarian conception 
shuts him."3 A solitary divine personality would smother in its 
own egotism. But the heart of God's nature is love, which craves 
an object worthy of its love. Only in an eternal, personal Other 
would such an object be found. 
This Person does, indeed, exist, reasoned McConnell, as 
God the Son, and it was this .Son that was limited for a time to 
the human condition.4 Clarke re-emphasized that this liberal 
view was indeed a high Christology when he proclaimed that "J:esus 
was not such a human being as human parents could bring into ex-
istence, but, by virtue of being divine, was the normal and ideal 
man. 11 Jesus was not produced from the "vitiated" human stock.5 
Though God had metaphysically become. "man" in Jesus, according 
to this high Christology, Clarke admitted that Jesus' conscious-
ness was not that of a normal human being. 11 His consciousness 
was neither that of God nor that of man exclusively, but was that 
of the unique God-man who was constituted by the Incarnation. No 
other personal consciousness was ever· wholly like his." 6 
1. Bowne, Studies in Christianitz, p. 92. 
2. McConnell, The Diviner Immanence, p. 100. 
3· Ibid., p. ln27 
4· Ibid. . - . 
See also Bowne, ~· cit., p. 92. 
5. Clarke, An Outline of Christian IDheology, p. 301. 
6. ~., p-:-298. -
d. God's Will and Spirit Expressed in the Man Jesus 
Most of the liberals of the period under study would have 
rejected the high Christology outlined above, in favor of what 
is technically known as a nlow'' Christology. A low Christology 
begins with the premise that Jesus Christ was a true man and 
seeks to explain the existence of the divine in him. For Brown, 
the doctrine of the deity of Christ meant not that Jesus was 
metaphysically God, but that God is morally Christlike. 1 
Macintosh also made it quite plain that most liberals did not 
ascribe deity to Jesus of Nazareth. He preferred to use the 
word 11 divine."2 Macintosh went on to explain that the presence 
of the divine power and quality in the character of Jesus' life 
could be best explained by the theory that Jesus opened up his 
life to the influence of God's activity.3 Rauschenbusch re-
ferred to a unity of will that Jesus had with the Father-God, 
so that his aims were in harmony with God's own purposes.4 
The secret of Jesus has to do not so much with metaphysics, 
as with the spiritual dimension of "desire, choice, affirma-
tion, and self surrender within his own will and personality. 
The mysteries of the spiritual world take place w.ithin the will . .5 
Macintosh saw this type of Incarnation as "progressive"; 
i.e., Jesus grew in the grace of God. Moreover, "the divinity 
1. Brown, Christian Theologz in Outline, p. 347. 
2. Macintosh, Theology ~ ~ Empirical Science, p. 122. 
3. Ibid-., p. 120. 
4. Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel, p. 1.51 • 
.5. Ibid. , p. 1.50. 
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of Jesus was much more an achievement of his religious experi-
1 
ence than a native endowment.n It was not, in Rauschenbusch's 
2 
words, ''an effortless endowment." Though they regarded it as 
ll progressive," liberals like Rauschenbusch believed it was ul-
timately perfected, so that in Jesus was " a perfect religious 
personality, a spiritual ~ife completely filled by the realiza-
tion of a God who is love."3 
This moral and religious indwelling of the Father-God in 
the human Jesus, Macintosh maintained, was not merely an "·ethi-
cal" or "functional" divinity in a shallow sense; rather it 
constituted an nessentialn divinity as well.4 Because these 
liberals maintained the sharp metaphysical distinction between 
God and Jesus, they did not regard direct personal communication 
with the immortal Jesus through prayer as a religious necessity. 
Communion with the God and Father of Jesus Christ supplies man 
with all· the religious values he needs (except for purely senti-
mental ones), and belief in prayer contact with Jesus is a 
"spiritual luxury, and it can be affirmed only as a personal 
'over-belief'. "5 
4. The Work of Christ 
a. Objective Theories Renounced 
The liberals were agreed that all the "objective" theories 
1. Macintosh, Theolo~ as an Empirical Science, p. 120. 
2. Rauschenbusch, AeOiogy for the Social Gospel, p. 151. 
3· Ibid., PP• 154-'55. . - . . 
4. Macintosh, ££• cit., p. 121. 
5. Ibid., p. 122. 
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of the Atonement had to be largely abandoned. These theories 
were based on the belief that in order for man to be saved some 
external manipulation of the consequences of the moral laws 
was necessary to meet God's inflexible demands for justice; i.e., 
an event must have transpired that was external or objective to 
man's subjective inner soul. Clarke pointed out, however, that 
reconciliation cannot properly be regarded as a formal agree-
ment or a settling of scores between God and man. It is rather 
'' a meeting of God and men in genuine spiritual fellowship. 111 
Similarly, Mathews protested that salvation is not judicial, 
but consists in relating the total personal life of man with 
2 God in the new relationship shown by Jesus. 
The idea that Jesus could literally take our sins upon him-
self and pay for them was regarded as false, since, in Rauschen-
busch's words, guilt as well as merit i s personal and cannot be 
transferred from one person to another. 3 Macintosh summed up 
liberal objections when he asked that men turn away from those 
theories of the Atonement which center around the reconciling 
of God to Irian "by some obscure and artificial transcendent 
process." Liberals, he continued, believed that real reconcilia-
tion between God and man concerns not just a pardon for past 
sins, as a guarantee of safety in the life to come, but Hthe 
winning of a moral victory 11 in the present life on earth.4 
1. Clarke, An Outline of Christian Theolo~y, p. 339. 
2. Mathews, The Faith of Modernism, p. 1$ • 
3· Rauschenb"iiSCh, A Theology for the Social Gospel, p. 245. 
4· Macintosh, Theology ~~EmPiriCal Science, p. 129. 
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b. The Moral Theory of the Atonement 
The liberals believed that the most significant thing 
about the whole salvation experience was the moral transfor-
mation wrought in the soul of man.l Coe explained that the 
change occurred within the moral nature of man.2 Because this 
liberal approach was concerned with an inward subjective, moral 
change on the part of man, it has been referred to as the moral 
or subjective theory of the Atonement. McConnell expressed it 
in these words~ 11 To sum up, the Cross shows us a Father under 
moral obligation to exert every moral influence for the moral 
salvation of his children."3 Thus, Brown pointed out that a 
moral conception of sacrifice, substitutes for the ceremonial.4 
Bowne admitted that this liberal interpretation was first clearly 
espoused by Abelard in the twelfth century but had usually been 
ignored. Since the liberals had rediscovered it, however, he 
predicted that Christian thought will never again lose sight of 
the moral interpretation.5 
Despite the emphasis upon a transformation within man's 
nature, the liberals recognized that it was necessary for God 
to take the initiative. Mathews wrote that it was simply a mat-
ter of learning to cooperate with God by exerting human effort.6 
Man must utilize his faith, but even this is not sufficient for 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Brown, Christian Theoloiy !a Outline, p. 368. 
Coe, The Religion of a ature Mind, p. 413. 
McConnell, The Diviner Immanence;-p. 111. 
Brown, ££• Cit., p. 359. 
Bowne, Studies in Christianity, p. 141. 
Mathews, The E!Ith of Modernism, p. 162. 
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salvation. Bowne pointed out that prior to man's responding 
faith there is always God's preveni'ent grace. "Grace, not .faith, 
is the deepest .factor in our salvation •••• Hence the .formula 
given by St. Paul, 'By grace are ye saved, through faith•." 1 
The actual moral transformation is necessitated because, 
according to the liberal interpretation, God cannot forgive un-
righteous men without also making them righteous in fact. Other-
wise, he would be false to his own moral nature. "To forgive 
wicked men while they remain wicked would be immoral," wrote 
Bowne. "This cannot be secured by calling or declaring them 
righteous, but only by a spiritual transformation. n2 Since the 
employment of divine commands or sheer human will power would 
be ineffective, there must be a moral solution to the dilemma.3 
Moreover, this moral salvation was not salvation in sin, but 
salvation from it. 4 
Jesus' part in the moral regeneration of men, Rauschen-
busch explained, consisted in his learning of and adopting for 
himself God's own attitude toward sin. Thus, Jesus was able to 
reveal God's abhorrence .for sin and his method of dealing with 
it.5 Moreover, he was able to draw others into his realization 
of God so that they too freely loved God and appropriated his 
will as their own. Thus he set in motion a beginning of 
1. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, p. 1?6. 
2. Ibid., p. 148. -
3. Ibid., pp. 160-61. 
4. Ibid., p. 161. 
5. Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel, pp. 261-62. 
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spiritual life within the organized total of the human race, 
1 
and this henceforth pervaded the common life. In Bowne's words, 
the moral view of the Atonement satisfactorily explained how the 
2 
estrangement between God and man is brought to an end. Macintosh 
pointed to the reconciliation of man with his fellow man as well 
as with God, as the true meaning of at-one-ment.3 
c. The Message From the Cross 
The Cross was seen by the liberals to be the summing up 
of Jesus' ministry of reconciliation. Without the message that 
the Cross-experience teaches, man's moral atonement could not be 
realized. The Cross of Jesus Christ was the nhow" part of the 
liberal interpretation of Atonement. The Cross was interpreted 
as revealing God's absolute hostility to sin, for it was pre-
cisely because God in Christ would never compromise with sin 
that Jesus went to the Cross. The power of sin over humanity 
was also clearly revealed in the hideous behavior of the people 
toward Jesus Christ. 
Of course, the Cross was also seen to reveal the love of 
God for man. Bowne saw this love revealed in the sacrifice that 
God made in order to win men from sin.4 Clarke described this 
costly sacrifice born of God's inf'inite love. "He must stand by 
while it goes on, and behold it, and suffer the disgust, the 
1. Ibid., p. 265. 
2. Bowne, Studies in Christianitt, P• 163. 
3· Macintosh, TheolOgy as !£ Emp rical Science, pp. 129~30. 
4· Bowne, £E• cit., p. Ib3. 
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grief, the weariness, that sin in one whom he is seeking to 
eave must produce •••• If he cannot bear, he cannot save. 111 
Mathews saw in the drama of the Cross the ncost of spirit-
u_a_l conquest" as God, through Jesus, participated in this 
2 Event. Mathews saw that the Cross also demonstrated beyond 
all doubt that 'the life of love is triumphant over impersonal 
forces and death itself.n3 Finally, all the liberals believed 
that the ultimate purpose of the Cross-event was to "win men 
out of their sin to God."4 This subjective moral view of the 
Atonement is summed up in Fosdick's words concerning the Cross: 
"It has bowed them in gratitude, chastened them in penitence, 
wakened them to hope, and inspired them to devotion."5 
E. THE DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD 
1. The Church 
a. The Nature and Condition of the Church 
The liberals devoted a rather small proportion of space to 
their consideration of the Church, and most of that contained 
negative obs.er-vations. Though Rauschenbusch was one of the few 
liberals who held a high evaluation of the Church, he unhesita-
tingly admitted that only two of Jesus' sayings contained the 
1. Clarke, ~ Outline of Christian · Theolo~y, p. 343· 
2. Mathews, The Faith Of Modernism, p. 16 • 
3· Ibid., pp:-160-61. ---. 
4. Clarke, 21?,• cit., P• 347· 
,5. Fosdick, The Modern Use of the Bible, p. 231. 
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word 11 church;' and that both of these passages are of question-
able authenticity. Moreover, in Rauschenbusch's opinion Jesus 
never intended to found the kind of institution that has been 
called "the Church." 1 Brown pointed to the many divisions within 
the Church which have resulted from the conflicts between the 
advocates of "traditional" Christianity and the proponents of 
11 vital" Christianity. 2 Clarke did not believe that the churches 
ever would become united as the Church. ''It does not appear to 
have been the providential purpose that all Christians should 
be gathered into one great organization, and it does not seem 
probable that such a purpose will hereafter be manifested by 
the fulfillment of it."3 Clarke did not believe that a univer-
sal church organization would be a legitimate part of religion 
anyway, since religion consists only in the "inner life of the 
soul in God."4 Bowne and Coe did not even regard the Church 
as Christian. Bowne flatly declared that if he were asked if 
the Church were Christian, he could only say that the Church is 
becoming Christian, but not yet Christian in the ideal sense.5 
That these liberals believed that the Church was a long way 
from realizing its goal was well illustrated by Coe who wrote: 
"The Church is, in fact, staggering under the discovery of how 
much it means to be a Christian." 6 
1. Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel, pp. 131-32. 
2. Brown, Christian Theology in Outline, p. 70. 
3· Clarke, An Outline of Christian Theology, pp. 381-82. 
4· Ibid. - .. '~ . -
5. BOWne,studi es in Christianity, p. 105. 
6. Coe, 'Jhe ReligiOn of~ Mature Mind, p. 381. 
The liberals rejected the ideas of other-worldly 
salvation taught by the more orthodox churches in favor of 
a more concrete salvation which had to do with God and man 
cooperating on earth for a better society. 1 Thus, Bowne 
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was led to write that he rejected the 11 life-raftn theory of 
the Church, i.e., a saving institution for a few fortunate 
souls who managed to escape the world. 2 None of the liberals, 
sympathetic or critical, wanted to see the Church once again 
assume its medieval prerogatives over all of society.3 
On the other hand there were some liberals of the same 
period who ranked the Church very high in their theologies. 
Such a one was Brown, who gave the doctrines of the Church 
first place in his systematic theology. He defined the church 
as 11 the religious society, tracing its origin historically 
from Jesus of Nazareth. u4 He believed that its religious 
character distinguishes it from all other organizations,5 
that it alone perpetuates Christ's redeeming influence and by 
the power of the Holy Spirit mediates Christ's life to the 
world. 6 Finally, he believed that since the Lord of the Church 
1. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, p. 321. 
2. Ibid., p. 318. --
3. Rauschenbusch, A Theology for ~ Social Gospel, p. 145. 
4. Brown, Christian Theology in Outline, p. 57. 
5. Ibid., p. 58. 
6. Ibid., p. 57. 
is God of the world, its mission is universal. 
These high claims were supported by McConnell, who 
believed in God's special nearness to the Church in spite 
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of the generally accepted doctrine of divine immanence which 
asserted that God was always present everywhere. 1 McConnell 
explained that he had reference to a "spiritual" or "higher" 
nearness as opposed to a purely "metaphysical" nearness.2 
In this understanding, McConnell made it plain that -the true 
Church is not limited to material structures or formal societies 
attached thereto, but consists also of the "invisible Church," 
i.e., the millions of souls, known or nameless, who continue 
to incarnate Christ's Spirit in their own lives.3 Though 
Clarke was not optimistic concerning the achievement of a re-
united universal Church, and though he devoted only two pages 
to his consideration of the Church, he was aware of its basic 
characteristic. He knew that organization does not constitute 
its nature, but that Christian people doing Christ's work 
do.4 
1. McConnell, The Diviner Immanence, P• 115. 
2. Ibid., p. 12G. _ _ 
3. ~., p. 125. 
4. ~ke, An Outline of Christian Theology, p. 381. 
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This social view of the Church appealed also to Rauschen-
busch, who referred approvingly to Paul's discussion of the 
Church as the body of Christ as 11 the first and classical dis-
cussion in Christian thought of the nature and functions of a 
composite spiritual organism." 1 While 'Rauschehbusch recognized 
that the Church has faltered, sinned, and is defiled, he as-
serted athat the Spirit of the Lord has always been an inform-
ing principle of life within her, and • ·• • she has kept her 
own collective personality intact." 2 Even Clarke admitted that 
the Church has been helpful in furthering Christian causes. 
Rauschenbusch concluded that Protestant theology was gaining a 
fresh understanding of the importance of the Church.3 Mathews 
spoke for the liberals who held the Church in positive regard 
when he wrote: rti believe in the Church as the community of 
those who in different conditions and ages loyally further the 
religion of Jesus Christ."4 
b. Creeds and Sacraments 
The liberals were agreed that the great importance that 
had once been attributed to the sacraments was on the wane. 
Rauschenbusch noted that this was especially true in practical 
Church life.5 Clarke plainly stated that the Spirit o~ God 
1. Rauschenbusch, ! Theology for .the 'Social Gospel, p. 70. 
2. Ibid., P• 70. , 
3· Ibid., P• 123. 4· Mathews, The Faith o~ Modernism, p. 181. 
5. Rauschenbusch, ££• cit., p. 197. 
113 
works in a direct manner and has no need of sacraments. 1 
McConn ell, on the other hand, while believing in the divine 
immanence, also believed that there is a "diviner immanence!! 
which occurs on a spiritual plane and explains why the soul 
does come to a deeper intuition of God in moments of partici-
pation in the sacraments. Rauschenbusch recognized this " deeper 
intuition 11 in the act of baptism. In that sacrament which is 
based on 11 the organic unity of the family; the parents thereby 
dedicate the child to God and pledge themselves to give it 
2 Christian nurture." Likewise, in the Lord's Supper 11 we re-
affirm our supreme allegiance to our Lord who taught us to know 
God as our common father and to realize that all men are our 
brethren."3 
The liberals also felt that the creeds had been developed 
and stressed overmuch. They believed that they should be re-
duced to a simple straightforward statement of the essential 
Christian facts. Bowne's revised Apostle's Creed is as f ollows: 
11 I believe in God the Father Almi ghty, and in Jesus Christ his 
Son our Lord. I believe in the Holy Spirit, in the forgiveness 
of sins, in the Kingdom of God on earth, and in the life ever-
lasting."4 It is interesting to note that in this instance 
belief in the Kingdom supplants--it does not complement--the 
belief in the Holy Catholic Church. 
1. Clarke, An Outline of Christian Theology, p. 381. 
2. Rauschenbusch, ! Theology for the Social Gospel, p. 199. 
3· Ibid., p. 206~ 4· Bowne, Studies in Christianity, pp. 372-73· 
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c. The Church's Relationship to the Kingdom of God 
The liberals were aware of a relationship between the 
Church and the Kingdom of God, though the former was seen as 
completely overshadowed by the latter. Rauschenbusch pointed 
out that loyalty to the Kingdom of God awakened loyalty to Christ, 
" though not always a loyalty to the Church." 1 Bowne saw the 
reason for this in the Church's mistaken choice of 11 John the 
Baptist, the austere and ascetic dweller in the desert for its 
model, rather than the Master. 112 Because the Church forsook 
the Founder of the Kingdom of God, Bowne argued, it lost to a 
large extent the Kingdom of ideals, and serious consequences 
followed. Jesus' distinctive ethical principles were neglected 
by the Church, religious formalism outweighed concern for social 
justice, Christianity lost its revolutionary power, democratic 
stirrings were denied religious sanction, and the individual 
was left unrelated to the social order.3 
Having lost its inner dynamic, the Church, Rauschenbusch 
proclaimed, grows old and is a perpetuation of the past. But, 
he countered, the ever young Kingdom is the power of the coming 
age.4 Only in recent times, Bowne chided, has any apprecia-
tion for humanity appeared in t he Church. Indeed, he continued, 
the Church has a long and terrible record of obstruction to 
mental, moral, social and political progress. Moreover, 11 what 
1. Rauschenbusch, A Theologl for the Social Gospel, p. 148. 
2. Bowne, Studies Tn Christ anrt!:-p. 345. 
3. Rauschenbusch, 2E· cit., pp.33-38. 
4. Ibid., PP• 129-30. 
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tyranny or oppression is there that the Church has not espoused 
and supported?" Bowne concluded his attack by affirming that 
" the most bitter and determined enemy of progress has been the 
ecclesiastical organization." 1 
Rauschenbusch, though critical of serious shortcomings in 
the Church, had a high regard for it. He made it clear that 
criticism of the Church by the liberals sprang~om a genuine 
concern for social welfare and an appreciation of the tremendous 
latent forces in the Church. 2 Rauschenbusch believed that the 
Kingdom which embraces all human life is more than the Church. 
Since it is also the supreme end of God, it is proper that the 
Church should serve it.3 McConnell, who also regarded the 
Church highly, believed that the Church is the nerve, muscle, 
will and spirit of the Kingdom of God.4 
This is to be contrasted with Bowne's view that the Church 
is only one instrument through which men serve the Kingdom "and 
by no means the most important. 11 .5 Family, school, state and 
labor all perform services of vastly greater value than can the 
Church, which, according to Bowne, is "concerned with cere-
monial worship and is therefore relatively insigni f icant. 116 
He concluded that the Church will continue to be unimportant 
until it recognizes and honors all the interests· of humanity. 7 
1. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, pp. 3.58-.58. 
2. Rauschenbusch, x-Tfieology ~ the Social Gospel, p. 122. 
3· Ibid, P• 143. 4· McConnell, The Diviner Immanence, pp. 122-23. 
5. Bowne, ~· cit., p. 323 
6. Ibid. . -
7. Ibid., PP• 345-46. 
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Rauschenbusch believed that the Church is powerless to save, 
in spite of it s institutional character, continuity, ordina-
tion, ministry, and doctrine, unless it also has the spirit 
1 
of the Kingdom within. 
2. The Kingdom of God 
a. The Essence of the Kingdom of God 
For most liberals, Christianity was synonymous with the 
Kingdom of God. Brown stated forthrightly that the Gospel of 
Christianity is that of the Kingdom of God. 2 Coe said that 
everything that could be identified as belonging to the Chris-
tian conception of life could be found in the idea of the 
Kingdom of God.3 Clarke was aware that the ethical undergird-
ing of the Kingdom idea was not original with Je~us, but, he 
declared, Jesus was the first to discover and proclaim that the 
King was also the Heavenly Father.4 This Kingdom idea which 
Jesus shaped so significantly and for which he gave up his life 
was lost by doctrinal theology.5 But Rauschenbusch emphasized 
that liberal theologians have recovered and restored the King-
6 dom1 idea to its rightful place. He believed that the doctrine 
of the Kingdom of God should be in the center of theology, and 
that all other doctrines must be made to harmonize with it. 7 
1. Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel, p. 130. 
2. Brown, Christian Theology rn-outline, p. 37. 
3· Coe, The Religion of a Mature Mind, p. 168. 
4· Clark~An Outline-of-Christian-Theology, pp. 276-77· 
5. Rauschenbusch, ££· cit., p. 53. 
6. Ibid., P• 139. 
7. Ibid., P• 131. 
J. J. ., 
11 To those whose minds live in the social gospel, the Kingdom of 
God is a dear truth, the marrow of the gospel, just as the in-
carnation was to Athanasius, justification by faith alone to 
1 Luther, and the sovereignty of God to Jonathan Edwards. For 
Rauschenbusch, it was the Kingdom of God idea that made theology 
a dynamic, worthy science. 2 
Brown described the Kingdom of God as a spiritual society3 
founded on the social nature of personality~ It was for liberals 
the Christian idea of the ideal society. Rauschenbusch de-
scribed this Christian ideal as a society where the law of 
Christ shall prevail, and result in ''peace, justice, and a 
glorious blossoming of human 11fe.".5 Coe prophesied. that 
work will resemble play and 11 the radiant energy of the sun 
6 
shall run to and fro upon our errands.n Likewise Bowne en-
visioned the subjugation of nature "so that the drudgery of 
the race shall be done by cosmic forces." 7 Mathews, whose view 
was similar, asserted that the Kingdom of God should be 11 a so-
cial order in which economic, political, and all other institu-
tions will embody the cosmic good will which Jesus taught and 
8 
revealed." 
The liberal concept of the Kingdom was further developed 
1. Ibid., pp. 131-32. 
2. Ibid., P• 140. 
3. Brown, Christian Theology in Outline, p. 37. 
4. Ibid., p. 192. · 
.5. Rauschenbuech, A Theolo~ for the Social Gospel, p. 224. 
6. Coe, The Religion of a ature Uind, p. 28. 
7. Bowne:-Titudies in CEristianity~ 31.5. 
8. Mathews, The Faith of Modernism, p. 167. 
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in Bowne .' s vision of a society devoid of needless inequalities 
1 
and obstacles to the development of personality. Brown cau-
tioned that the Kingdom must not be equated with any political 
or economic program. However, it must realistically include 
political and economic reforms as legitimate means to the 
2 
spiritual end. He saw that economic progress would serve the 
spiritual needs of society because material abundance would 
mean more leisure time in which men might develop 11 the upper 
3 
ranges of their existence." Brown saw this as the 11 full de-
velopment and realization of the individual in society."4 
So far had this Kingdom concept replaced that of the Church, 
that Brown could write that a man is saved only as he becomes a 
member of that growing society.5 But, Rauschenbusch wrote, the 
matter of personal salvation is put into proper social perspec-
6 tive in the Kingdom of God. For Bowne, the human aspect of the 
Kingdom idea loomed so large that he was able to write that the 
Kingdom of God is ess.entially no other than the Kingdom of man. 7 
b. Apocalyptic versus Immanental Coming 
Liberals uniformly rejected the apocalyptic view of the 
coming of the Kingdom on earth. Bowne admitted that Christian 
enthusiasm mi ght lead to desires for some concrete manifestation 
-------------------------1. Bowne, Studies in Christianitt, p. 323. 
2. ·Brown, Christian Theology in utline, p. 197. 
3. Bowne, .£E. cit., p. 315. -
4· Brown; £E· Cit., p. 195. 
5. Ibid., p. 1~ 
6. Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel, p. 145. 
7. Bowne, ££· cit.~ p. 317. 
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of the coming of the Kingdom, e.g., the descent of the New 
Jerusalem from heaven, but, he pointed out, 11 this would be only 
a celestial show, with no more spiritual significance than a 
splandid circua. 11 1 In his view, "the Kingdom comes in the in-
dividual when his will is set to do the will of God. It comes 
in the community in proportion as the members of the community 
are bent on doing the will of God. 112 Brown summed up the 
liberal's moral and religious view of the coming of the Kingdom 
when he stated that salvation is by change of heart, and not 
change of environment.3 This denial of a miraculous End of 
the World and Advent of the Kingdom did not mean that the liberals 
visualized endless human existence upon the earth. Most of them 
would probably have agreed with Rauschenbusch's prediction that 
the "astronomical clock is already ticking which will ring in 
the end. 114 But this was scientific eschatology and not religious 
apocalyptic ism. 
The liberals believed that Jesus taught a gradual coming 
of the Kingdom. Bowne saw proof of this in his parables of the 
leaven and the seed. The yeast gradually leavens the dough and 
the seed gradually puts out blade, ear, and grain.5 
Rauschenbusch explained that while Jesus was born in an 
apocalyptic environment, he shook off those catastrophic ideas 
and substituted developmental ones for them.6 In this context 
1. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, p. 307. 
2. Ibid., p. 308. -
3. Brown, Christian Theology in Outline, p. 196. 
4. Rauschenbusch, A Theology for~ Social Gospel, p. 227. 
5. Bowne, ~· ci~., p. 301. 
6. Rauschenbusch, op. cit., p. 220. 
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he emphasized the importance of developing and using educa-
1 tional facilities, and Bowne called for a progressive moraliz-
2 ing and rationalizing of human life. This emphasis on the 
gradual development of the Kingdom on earth did not mean that 
the possibility and even value of sudden and violent catastro-
phe was denied by all the liberals. Rauschenbusch noted that 
"political and social revolutions may shake down the fortifica-
tions of the Kingdom of Evil in a day." 3 
,Nhile these liberals looked to the future for the fUller 
realization of the Kingdom here on earth, they also believed 
that it was, at least in a small degree, in existence right 
now. It was, in Coe's words, here as ninternal organizing 
principle. 11 4 Rauschenbusch reasoned that since the Kingdom is 
of God who is both future and present, it must also exist, with 
God, in the present. Moreover, it existed in the past as well, 
-
since God exists "in all tenses." This reasoning enabled Rauseh-
e n bus ch to declare that "even before Christ, men of God saw 
the Kingdom of God.'' 5 
c. Divine and Human Cooperation 
Contrary to much current criticism, the theistic liberals 
did not take a completely humanistic view of the realization of 
the Kingdom. Rauschenbusch stated plainly that human resources 
1. Rauschenbusch, A Theolo~l for the Social Gospel, p. 226. 
2. Bowne, Studies In Chris anrt;;-p· 313. 
3.· Rauschenbusch, ££· cit., p. 2 6. 4 Coe, The Religion or-i Mature Mind, p. 168. 
5. Rauschenbusch, ££• cit., p. 1~ 
are so weak that the Kingdom must be divine in its origin, pro-
1 gress and consummation. The Kingdom of God is surely humanly 
organized, Rauschenbusch admitted, but it must be according to 
the will of God. 2 Mathews likewise realized the impossibility 
of the Kingdom on earth unless God has "a share in the building 
of this new social order." 3 
Though these liberals all asserted that God was mighty in 
the process of Kingdom building they did not become quietistic 
in their outlook. The Kingdom was, to their way of looking, a 
gift, to be sure, but also a task.4 Bowne summed it up in these 
words: "We pray that God 1 s Kingdom may come, and we believe 
that this prayer commits us to the attitude of trying to make it 
come, by doing our best. 115 Knudson also supported the argument 
that human effort is required to bring in the Kingdom. He re-
jected the naturalistic theory of progress which held that be-
cause development is inherent in the very structure of reailty, 
evolution is automatic, in favor of the ethical theory of prog-
1" e s.s which taught that social progress "is a conquest, not a 
6 bequest; ..• it is contingent, not necessary." He believed 
that the idea of the gradual improvement of life through human 
effort was thoroughly consistent with belief in divine Provi-
dence.7 Perhaps Coe, more than the others, best illustrated 
1. Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel, p. 139. 
2. Ibid., p. 142. - --
3· Mathews, The Faith of Modernism, p. 166. 
4. Rauschenbusch, ~· Cit., p. 142. · 
,5. Bowne, Studies In cnristianii;, pp. 321-22. 
6. Knudson, Present~endencies ~Religious Thought, pp • .53-54. 
7 • Ibid. , p. 55 . 
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this belief in the necessity for human effort, when he wrote: 
"We have just one thing to do in life, and that is to build up 
the Kingdom of God. nl 
d. Realization of the Kingdom on Earth 
Most of the liberals were realistically aware of the tre-
mendous obstacles blocking the way to the achievement of the 
Kingdom on earth. Rauschenbusch was more aware of' this, and he 
warned that the Kingdom will not come just by peaceful develop-
ment, but by conflict with the "Kingdom of Evil" at every stage 
in the advance. It would be folly, he continued,to underesti-
mate the power of sin. There is no smooth road to the Kingdom 
2 
on earth. Nevertheless, the liberals were optimis t ic in their 
ultimate view. Bowne rejected the ideas of orthodox theology 
that the world was a "sinking wreck" or a "hopelessly banlrnupt" 
concern which "was mort gaged to the devil and he had foreclosed. 11 3 
He believed that the world was fundamentally good because God 
had created it and was working in it, bringing it to perfection.4 
Rauschenbusch called for a rebirth of the ancient millennial 
hope which the Romam Catholic Church had eliminated from eechat-
ology. Though its apocalyptic form was crude and inaccurate as 
to time, its promise of the victory of God in society was valid 
and necessary • .5 
1. Ibid., p. 399. 
2. Rauschenbuech, A Theologl for the Social Gospel, pp. 139, 226. 
3· Bowne; Studies in Christ anrty:-p. 318. 
4. Ibid., pp. 321-22. . 
5. Rauschenbusch, ~· cit., p. 224. 
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Coe's world-view was probably more extreme than most. He 
believed that his time was good and that the future would be 
even better, because "progress is the order of the world."l He 
did not distinguish between naturalistic and ethical progress 
as Knudson had done. Mathews also believed that the Kingdom of 
God would come on earth, i.e., in human earthly history. He 
believed that Jesus' social teachings were thoroughly practical 
and that love and justice would triumph ultimately because, as 
he put it, he believed in the God revealed in Jesus Christ.2 
F. SUMMARY 
1. Method 
Liberal method was grounded in respect for human rational 
faculties and belief in the essential orderliness of the uni-
verse. Taking their clue from the natural sciences the liberals 
used the scientific empirical method. This meant that they used 
all available data in constructing their theologies, including 
psychology, philosophy, sociology, and archaeology, as well as 
the Bible, which they subjected to the most searching textual and 
historical criticism. The more evangelical of the liberals also 
possessed a great respect for religious intuition, which they be-
lieved was the gift of the Holy Spirit. This enabled them to 
1. Coe, The Religion of a Mature Mind, p. 29. 
2. Mathews, The Faith of-Modern!sm;-p. 181. 
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interpret general revelation in the light of special revelation. 
In the last case, however, decisions as to the truthfulness of a 
proposition were generally made on the basis of internal ra-
tional consistency and comprehensive coherence. 
2. God 
The first thing that the liberals taught about God was that 
He is a Person. By this they did not intend to limit the Divine 
Personality to imperfect human standards but only to assert that 
God must possess, at the very least, minimal personality traits, 
i.e., cognition, emotion and volition. Indeed some liberals, 
while maintaining a formal monotheism, actually affirmed the 
communitarian nature of the one cosmic Person, i.e., the meta-
physical reality of the hypostases (Father, Son and Spirit) 
within the Godhead. As a Person, they taught, He must be a free 
spirit above the necessity of bowing before His own natural laws. 
Material content was given to this formal concept by refer-
ring to the life of Jesus Christ; i.e., God was declared to be 
Christlike. This meant that moral perfection was attributed to 
God. He is perfect in love, but also perfect in justice. Thus, 
while the liberals emphasized the forgiving love of God they 
avoided becoming sentimental about it. At the heart or the lib-
eral doctrine of God was the belief in the divine immanance. God 
is everywhere and always present in His world and has been and 
continues to be perceived in three ways. He reveals Himself in 
nature as Creator and Sustainer and is called "Father"; in 
history as Lord and Christ and is called ''Son"; in the depths 
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of the human soul as Counselor and Companion and is called "Holy 
Spirit." 
3. Man 
The liberals believed that man has inherent worth; that he 
enjoys, by God's grace, a special relationship with God. Man, 
they proclaimed, is a child of God and possesses in his soul 
the divine image which can never be completely destroyed. Though 
man is part animal and to that extent in bondage to his natural 
environment, he does possess in the higher reaches of his being 
a will which, to a degree, can make free choices. Because man 
is in part free, he is also in part responsible for the vast 
amount of moral evil in the world. Because man's freedom is 
real, his guilt is also real, and the moral evil he commits 
knowingly must be called sin. The liberals were aware of the 
prevalence of sin, especially the sins of society. Man, they 
recognized, is a sinner, but he is primarily a child of the 
Christlike God who will not let him die. Because God's grace 
is real and prevenient, and because man is free to exercise his 
faith responsively, man can be saved from sin and redeemed to a 
higher life here on earth. Furthermore, they reasoned, because 
man is related to and loved by God, he is immortal, and will at 
death inherit eternal life. 
4. Christ 
In the realm of Christology, the liberals tended to shun 
metaphysical speculation in favor of concentration on the more 
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empirical data represented by the historical Jesus of Nazareth. 
However, they also recognized that as the Revealer of God's 
moral nature, and Founder of the Kingdom of God he is a living 
religious symbol--a Christ of faith--as well. 
The liberals split into two camps over Christology. One 
group, concentrating on the Christ of faith, engaged in intense 
metaphysical speculation and developed a Kenotic theory of the 
Incarnation which affirmed that Jesus' personality was identical 
with the second Person in the Trinity. The other group empha~ 
sized the Jesus of history and the divine-human kinship, and 
expanded the theories developed by Schleiermacher and Ritschl 
which affirmed the identity of Jesus' moral will and religious 
spirit with God's own will and spirit. 
The liberals closed ranks when expounding their theory of 
the Atonement. They uniformly rejected the various impersonal 
and objective theories of reconciliation in favor of a version 
of Abelard's moral and subjective theory. For the liberals, 
Atonement involved not a change in God's nature or a manipula-
tion of the consequences of violated moral law, but a repentant 
change in the depths of the human soul. 
5. Church and Kingdom 
In general, the liberals did not hold the church in very 
high regard. They viewed the ritual and sacramental observances 
of the Church as other-worldly and irrelevant and ~he past oppo~ 
sition of the ecclesiastical hierarchy to intellectual and social 
progress as especially offensive. Some liberals, however, did 
see hope and value in the Church, but mostly as potential. Their 
main emphasis was on the Kingdom of God which they equated with 
the entire Gospel message. The Kingdom, they proclaimed, was 
the Christian version of the ideal society in which economic, 
political, cultural and spiritual harmony would reign supreme. 
They rejected apocalyptic hopes as false and prophesied an im-
manental coming which, they maintained, Jesus himself had taught. 
The Kingdom could not come without God's help, but neither could 
it come without human cooperation. They were all certain that 
the Kin gdom of God would be established after the obstacles were 
surmounted here on earth in human history. 
CHAPTER III 
1919-1933: HORTON'S EARLY LIBERAL PERIOD 
A. LIBERAL METHODOLOGY 
1. Philosophical Idealism Rejected 
a. Excessive Subjectivism 
During his graduate studies at Columbia University, Horton 
had been made very much aware of the fierce philosophical war-
fare raging between naturalism and idealism. There at Columbia, 
one of the citadels of naturalism, he became acquainted with the 
arguments of this position. While he continued his studies in 
Europe, this anti-idealistic point of view was emphasized anew 
by Pierre Janet of the College de France who was an exponent of 
"behaviorist" psychology. Horton was impressed as Janet pro-
claimed as false the Cartesian belief that consciousness is 
fundamental and action secondary. According to Janet, action 
really precedes thought in the life of the growing child and in 
the history of the race .1 "As a matter of fact ••• thought is 
not a separate entity at all; it is 'a little fragment of 
1. Walter M. Horton, "Origin and Psychological FUnction of 
Religion," American Journal of Psychology, XXXV (January, 
1924), p. 18. 
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conduct'•" Janet believed that philosophical idealism has re-
sulted from a false distinction between action and thought. 1 
In support of this statement, Janet reminded his students that 
"you cannot think the letter L without moving the tip of your 
tongue."2 While Horton believed that Janet's behavioristic 
presuppositions were inadequate as a final metaphysical account 
of personality,3 his thought from that time on reflected his sus-
picion that philosophical idealism might be unduly subjective. 
Six years after his synopsis of Janet's lectures had ap-
peared in the American Journal of Fsychology, Horton wrote 
Theism and th~ Modern Mood, (1930). It is apparent that Horton's 
suspicion of idealism had grown into an explicit rejection of 
it. He wrote: 
Sooner or later, I believe, the stuffy sub-
jectivism of modern philosophic thought, an 
evil inheritance from Descartes, which Kant 
only fastened upon us in his endeavor to shake 
it off, is destined to give way to a more con-
fidently realistic philosophy, which will re-
unite facts and values, things and ideals, 
efficient and final cause!, in a cosmology 
reminiscent of Aristotle. 
In Theism~ the Scientific Spir~ (1933), Horton continued 
to criticize the false subjectivism of idealism, laying at its 
1. Horton, "Origin and Psychological Function of Religion, 11 
Ibid., XXXV (January, 1924}, p. 30, n. 14. 
2. Ibid. . 
3. Ibid., p. 49, n. 24. 
4. Walter M. Horton, Theism and the Modern Mood, (New York~ 
Harper and Brothers, l930~p:-84. ----
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feet "half the problems that contemporary theism must face--
such as the recurrent accusation that religion is 'subjective•, 
and its apparent object, God, is only a 'projection', produced 
by 'wishful thinking'." All of this is an evil heritage from 
that unfortunate alliance with idealism. 1 
b. Rejection of Natural Science and the Materialistic Reaction 
Horton's criticism was founded largely on the belief that 
philosophical idealism was either blind to the findings of the 
natural sciences, or worse, held them in contempt. He appre-
ciated certain values in idealism, however. He was glad to see 
its criticism of naturalistic philosophy, which he did not em-
brace wholehsartedly, and he appreciated its "intuition of the 
reality of the spiritual" and its "exploration of the inner 
caverns and vast abysses of the human spirit.n2 But he was 
firmly convinced that the interest of religion will not be 
served until "more substantial justice is done to the claims of 
science. n3 He strongly objected to what he believed to be "the 
tendency of idealism to disparage scientific knowledge as 
purely 'phenomenal', and to exalt in its place some intricate 
form of rational dialectics or some capricious and subjective 
form of intuition."4 A alight inconsistency is evident here, 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
M. Horton, Theism and the Scientific Spirit (New York: 
and Brothers, 1933,;-p:-12!. 
Walter 
Harper 
Ibid., 
"''ETCT. 
I'5'IO.' p. 
p. 122. 
177. 
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since it will be noted that he had earlier praised idealism ror 
its intuition. 
Horton spoke approvingly of late nineteenth century philo-
sophy, which had "recovered t rom its metaphysical jab," de-
cided against "all further dialectical flights into transcendental 
spheres," and returned to the "empirical mechanical temper of 
the eighteenth century."l All of this places Horton at the 
opposite pole from McConnell and Knudson, both of whom had em-
braced philosophical idealism as the very keystone of the liberal 
ideal of divine immanence. But this does not mean that Horton 
was not a liberal or that he was a thoroughgoing materialist. 
He would have asserted that his vigorous insistence upon the 
incorporation of scientific findings into theology made him 
even more of a liberal. Moreover, one of his strongest criti-
clams of idealism was that it fostered a materialistic reaction! 
It was disgruntled thinkers like J. s. Mill and August Comte 
who, reacting against idealism, produced the concepts of the 
finite God and humanism. Most significant of all, he reasoned, 
Russian Connnunism, 11 the greatest atheistic movement the world 
has ever seen," is a direct descent of German idealism.2 
When Hegelianism capsized "like a top-heavy iceberg'' the 
world saw the dialectical materialism of Feuerbach and Karl Marx 
emerge as its other side."0 
1 • Ibid • , p • 125 • 
2. Ibid., p. 121. 
3. Ibid. 
2. The Value of a Scientific Approach 
a. The Integrity and Religious Spirit of the Empirical Method 
Horton, like Coe before him, recognized in the scientific 
method of free and honest inquiry, a mood akin to the religious 
spirit. There is, he said, "an ideal of humility, self-
effacement, and loyal cooperation for the good of mankind in the 
very nature of the scientific enterprise."l He was firmly con-
vinced that scientific method was thoroughly compatible with the 
religious temperament. The gain in intellectual integrity was 
also a great value inherent in scientific empirical method. It 
was a value so great in his eyes "that any radical departure 
from the empirical can henceforth only be regarded as a step 
backward." 2 
b. Release from Dogmatism and Supernaturalism 
Horton's liberalism was reinforced as a result of his 
, , 
association with Eugene Menegoz while studying in Europe. He was 
" J' wholly in agreement with Menegoz that scientific method releases 
us from a false supernaturalism. In an article written in 19263 
"' / he quoted with approval Menegoz's assertion that modern man can 
no longer believe in miracles in the Biblical sense.4 He was 
1. Walter M. Horton, "What Kind of Religious Experience is to be 
Expected of the Scientifically Trained College Student?" 
Religious Education, XX (February, 1925), p. 23. 
2. Walter M. Horton, "Objective Elements in the Experience of 
God," Journal S2.f. Religion, VII (October, 1927), p. 540. 
3. Walter M. Horton, "Theology of Eugene M6negoz," Journal.£! 
Religion, VI (March, 1926). 
4. Ibid., p. 187. 
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careful to exclude 'spiritual happenings,' e.g., conversion, 
since in the Biblical view, miracles are confined to the physi-
cal realm. Scientific method need not destroy the valid message 
in the miracle stories, however, for God is uniquely at work in 
some events. Thus it is possible to accept scientific method 
and reject both supernaturalism and determinism.l 
The influence of Coe and Janet had led Horton to see psycho-
logy as an important instrument of scientific progress in 
this area. In 1928 he wrote: "Psychology's first and most far-
reaching effect upon the concept of religion has been to free 
it from all supernaturalistic connotations •••• I mean simply 
that the element of lawless caprice, the el~ment of inexplica-
bility, the element of the miraculous in the strict traditional 
sense of the word, has been virtually eliminated from the con-
cept of religion."2 Here he was primarily concerned with 
psychical rather than physical problems. Just as the Church 
had to recognize the view of physical phenomena held by the 
natural sciences, it would also come to accept the view of 
psychical phenomena given by psychology. Outstanding religioU8 
experiences "have been proved, upon careful investigation to 
involve mental processes common outside the field of religion."3 
Thus it was his contention that in both the physical and 
1. Ibid., p. 189. 
2. Walter M. Horton, "Changes,in the Concept of Religion 
Necessitated by :Psychology', !!_eligioua Education, XXIII 
(January, 1928), p. 30. 
3. Ibid. 
psychical realms, scientific method had freed theology from 
supernaturalism. There was no question in his mind that this 
was a gain for theology. 11 Theology has come to prefer a de-
pendable and law-abiding God to a God of caprice. 111 
c. Return to Reality 
From the time of the Darwinian era until the present, Hor-
ton explained, science has been thoroughly realistic and empir-
ical.2 When this same spirit has been incorporated in theology, 
the results have been gratifying. This desire of his to base 
theology upon the firm foundation of facts discovered by the 
sciences was in complete harmony with liberals like Mathews, 
Macintosh, and Coe who called for a thoroughgoing empirical 
approach. Horton believed that the fact that scientists in the 
Einsteinian era of the early thirties were becoming more ideal-
istic as theologians were becoming more realistic was a healthy 
sign that they might meet one day.3 
He saw the new science of psychology leading religion back 
to reality. He pointed out that the function of the two dis-
ciplines was similar, if not identical: one cured sick minds 
and the other ministered to sick souls. Furthermore, he rea-
soned, since the difference between normal and abnormal is only 
a matter of degree, the same process ''which makes abnormal people 
1. Walter M. Horton, !! Psychological Approach to Theology,n Jour-
nal of Religion, IX (July, 1929), 340-41. 
2. Horton, Theism and the Scientific Spirit, p. 125. 
3· Ibid., pp. 176-77. -
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normal may go on to make normal people supernormal."l Janet 
and Coe had shown Horton that some of the insights of psycho-
logy could be profitably integrated into theology with the 
result that theology would be in closer touch with reality. 
3. The Inadequacies of a Strictly Scientific Theology 
a. The Inability of Strictly Empirical Method to Discover 
Important Religious Data 
Horton continued to believe that a sincere seeker after 
truth could, through the strict approach of laboratory science, 
experience a religious awakening. That is, science can lead 
man to appreciate the Principle orbi.dden Unity that underlies 
the apparent world chaos~ "one almighty Force or Energy, mani-
fasting itself alike in the atom, the embyro, the earthquake, 
and the whirling planets, in accordance with one universal 
law. 112 But he readily admitted that this is pantheism. Because 
science is impersonal and abstract, the Religion of Science 
takes an impersonal, panthQistic view of the universe.3 For 
all his faith in the value of science and its method, Horton 
did not believe that natural science could ever discover the 
personal God of religion. 4 / / It was Menegoz who had impressed 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Horton, "Changes in the Concept of Religion Necessitated by 
Psychology, .. Reli~ious Education, XXIII (January, 1928), p. 33. 
Walter M. Horton, What Kind of Religious Experience is to 
be Expected of the Scientifically Trained College Student?" 
Religious Education, XX (February, 1925), pp. 21-22. 
Horton, "Changes in the Concept of Religion Necessitated by 
Psychology," Religious Education, XX (February, 1925), p. 22. 
Horton, Theism~ the Scientific Spirit, p. 195. 
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him with the fact that though questions of historical truth can 
be s ettled objectively and impersonally by scientific empirical 
method, the question of the eternal truth revealed in history 
must be settled by each person for himself. 1 
Science can never tell the whole truth about anything, ex-
plained Horton, because it 11 confines its attention to those as-
pects of reality which can be mechanically manipulated as a 
r e sult of a quantitative analysis. A scientific explanation is 
therefore always a partial explanation, and a scientific account 
of a phenomenon is always an abatract account, which is to the 
2 
concrete phenomenon itself as a blueprint is to a cathedral." 
Horton certainly had the highest regard for scientific 
objectivity, but as early as 19273 he made clear that it must 
be supplemented by what he. called n contemplative ob j ecti vi ty." 
Scientific objectivity, he explained, is achieved by elimi-
nating all personal feelings and analyzing the object in the 
cold light of reason. Contemplative objectivity also elimi-
nated the self, but in an entirely different way. Here objec-
tivity is achieved as the self is lost in love for the object. 
" The more deeply one loves and admires the object, the nearer 
one is to contemplative objectivity. The acme is reached when 
one gets so completely inside the object that one can, so to 
1. Horton, "Theology of Eugene Mene'goz," Journal of Religion, 
VI ( March, 1926), 184. 
2. Horton, 11Psychological Approach to Theology, 11 Journal of 
Religion, IX (July, 1929), 340. 
3· Walter M. Horton, "Objective Elements in the Experience of 
God," Journal of Religion, VII (October, 1927). 
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speak, look back upon one's self through the very eyes of the 
object."l VJhile scientific objectivity obtains an exactitude 
that is impossible for contemplative objectivity, the latter 
"explores the full concreteness of the object in a fashion that 
makes science look like mere surface knowledge. rr2 
b. The Inadequacy of Naturalism as a Ground for Human Ideals 
and Values 
By 1930, Horton had become concerned about the over-reliance 
upon the method of the empirical sciences; in particular he was 
critical of religious humanism.3 As a theologian, he was con-
cerned with values, ideals, ends, purposes and meanings, and he 
knew that a purely scientific, factual, naturalistic approach 
could never deal adequately with them.4 He warned, "the world 
of science is not a world in which a human being lives; it is 
a world of mathematical formulae and bloodless abstraction, which 
would kill any red-blooded creature who tried to live in it as 
quickly and effectively as a breath of poison gas. n·5 He was 
concerned because many liberals, particularly the humanists, 
seemed to have overlooked this obvious fact. In their zeal for 
1. Horton, "Objective Elements in the Experience of God," 
Journal of Religion, VII {October, 1927), p. 555. 
2. Ibid. 
3. warE'er M. Horton, "The Dualism of Facta and Values in 
Humanism," Crozer Quarterlz, VII (July, 1930), p. 370. 
4. Ibid. , .. 
5. Ibid. , p. 270. 
scientific method in religion, they were perileasly close to 
scientific naturalism which always unoercuts "that sense of 
dignity and worth of man which is the focus of their faith."l 
The point Horton was making was that liberals cannot hold their 
high estimate of man and his values while at the same time 
~cc~pting the interpretation of the cosmos advanced by scientific 
naturalism. This is an impossible metaphysical dualism. Unless 
human ideals and values are grounded in the cosmos they exist 
only in the "subjective dreamland of pure essence, eternally 
divorced from existence."2 The end result of this will be the 
loss of all hopes and ideals--the death of religion. 
The only hope is a theistic interpretation of life which 
must necessarily go beyond the barren empiricism of the 
natural sciences. Horton's concept of "contemplative objectivity" 
has already been discussed in . section "a." But he realized 
that something more than contemplation was needed. Scientific 
concepts fail to see life as a whole, while faith concepts can 
do just that even though they lack mathematical precision and 
are "vague, pictorial, symbolic, and apt to be riddled with 
inconsistencies."3 Even when theologians make intelligent use 
of scientific data and method, while trying to settle questions 
about ultimate reality they cannot suspend their religious 
faith any more than they could postpone ''eating and breathing 
1. Horton, "The Dualism of Facts and Values in Humanism," 
VII (July, 1930), p. 270. 
2. Ibid., p. 271. 
3. ~on, Theism ~ the Modern Mo~d, p. 138. 
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while investigating the physiology of digestion and respira-
tion. 11 1 To do so would be to lose the all-important synoptic 
view of reality which theism offers and which alone is capable 
of grounding human ideals and values. 
In this criticism, Horton had seen farther than most of his 
liberal predecessors. It is true that Bowne had warned against 
"closet speculation" and Macintosh had said that 11dry reason 
is not enough," but these were calls for greater use of the 
findings of empirical science. True enough, most of the 
liberals, e.g., Fosdick, Brown, Bowne and Macintosh, recognized 
the need for spiritual insight and faith, but prior to Horton 
none except Bowne had so clearly seen the danger inherent in 
the empirical method of the natural sciences.2 
c. The Fallacy of Psychologism 
Since his association with Coe, Horton had been very much 
interested in the relationship between psychology of religion 
and theolo~y. Both deal with man's religious experiences. But 
in 19273 Horton expressed concern over calling theolog~ the 
science of religious experience. If stress is placed on the 
objective factors involved in the experiences, then theology 
inclines toward philosophy, but if the subjective factors are 
emphasized, theology becomes a branch of psychology.4 
1. Ibid., p. 129. 
2. Bowne stressed this over and over again throughout all his 
work. He often railed against "sense-bound empiricism." 
Cf., his references to "logic-chopping." 
3. Horton, "Objective Elements in the Experience of God," 
Journal of Religion, VII (October, 1927). 
4. ~., p. 540. 
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In Horton's view, if the latter becomes a reality, religion 
will be done to death, for the very essence of religion is that 
it reaches out to an objective beyond.l Thus, he explained, 
the chief danger of psychology of religion is its excessive 
subjectivism. Everything is seen as emanating from the mind 
of the subject. This, of course, includes all of man's ideals 
and gods, which are seen to "have only a purely subjective 
existence in the mind of the believer. This is the fallacy of 
psychologism." If not supplemented and corrected by the in-
sights of theology, this fallacy could lead to a denial of the 
reality of the objective world and its persons.2 While he 
realized that a proper psychological study must begin with the 
mental experiences of the individual, he also knew that 
theology must lead it on to a social and cosmic world view,3 "for 
there are many important areas of religious interest and reli-
gious faith which are invisible from _the psychological angle.n4 
Horton had been suspicious of extreme behaviorism in psycho-
logy since hearing Janet's lectures while studying in Europe. 
These misgivings continued to grow and by 1931 centered chiefly 
on Watsonian behaviorism.5 Horton made it perfectly clear that 
he did not reject behaviorism as a method, i.e., studying the 
mind through its adaptive responses to environment, but he did 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Ibid., p. 541. 
wralter M. Horton, A Psycholo~ical Approach to Theology (New 
York, Harper and Brothers, 1 3l), p. 29. 
Ibid • , p. 31. 
Ibid., p. vii. 
Ibid., p. 31. 
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object when people like Watson denounced all thought, 
consciousness, free will and immortality as myth. For a 
scientist to announce, as part of his findings, that which he 
had already assumed before the investigation began is to 
commit "the fallacy of the forgotten assumption," which, 
according to Horton, is ·exactly what extreme behaviorism was 
l doing. 
Horton believed that psychology of religion unaided could 
never construct a theology which would practically serve the 
interests of religion. Psychiatry takes man to pieces, "re-
moves his inhibiting conflicts and complexes, oils his works, 
and then, unless guided by religion, puts him together again 
without giving him a new mainspring, or, at best with an ordi-
nary standardized mainspring borrowed from the man on the 
street. 11 2 He agreed with his liberal teachers, such as Brown, 
Mathews, and Macintosh, that t he findings of psychology must 
be accepted and used by theology, but he rejected the extremes 
of psychology and even differed from Coe whose definition of 
religion as the "effort at completion, unification and con-
servation of values" he regarded as too subjective.3 
1. Ibid., pp. 24-25. 
2. Hor'ton, "Changes in the Concept of Religion Necessitated 
by Psychology," Religious Education, XXI II (January, 1928), 
pp. 33-39. 
3. ~., p. 32. 
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4. Realism in Theological Method 
a. The Nature and Task of Theology 
Horton made a distinction between theology and religion. 
Religion is man's actual adjustment to that Cosmic Power that 
is the source of all life and value, while theology is the 
science that attempts to sort out and systematize man's ideas 
about his religion. Psychology has shown, he said, that reli-
gion is a vital and normal function, like eating and breathing, 
which all people must exercise. But the qualifications for 
being religious no longer include acceptance of particular 
theological doctrines.l 
Likewise, Horton differentiated between theology and 
philosophy of religion. In the latter, one strives for empirical 
exactitude and certitude, while in the former the chief virtue 
is balance and proportion. This is an echo of his ideas of 
"contemplative ob jecti vi ty" and the 11fai th concept" mentioned 
above. In 1930, in the midst of his liberal period, he was 
nevertheless able to write: "Laugh, if you must, at the para-
doxical ways of systematic theologians--how they love to 
affirm, at one and the same moment, both free-will and predes-
tination, omnipotence and moral perfection--! will venture to 
assert that it is precisely in these shocking theological para-
doxes, rather than in the neat, self-consistent systems of the 
1. Ibid., p. 31. 
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philosophers, that we come closest to ultimate truth."l 
Horton had learned from some of the greatest religious 
liberals of all time, like Coe, Brown and Rauschenbusch, and 
he continued the liberal tradition in his own writings. But 
he was never blind to the dangers of extreme liberalism, as he 
showed in his criticism of humanism.2 The dualistic plight of 
naturalism, the metaphysical ground of humanism, has been dis-
cussed above, but Horton offered a criticism of liberalism that 
was even more serious because it applied to the total liberal 
movement. His criticism centered around the fact of the reluc~ 
tance of liberalism to offer any sort of religious authority 
because of its deep-seated suspicion of all kinds of dogmatism.3 
Though Horton well understood this fear, he, nevertheless, pre-
dicted that unless liberalism took a more authoritative stand, 
seeking people would drift back to the Roman Church or some 
other organization which claims infallible authority.4 
But, in spite of his criticisms, Horton remained a staunch 
liberal. "Are we to say with Karl Barth and his reactionary 
school," he asked, "that there is nothing in the modern mind 
worth assimilating, and that the whole attempt of liberal 
theology to come to some understanding with modern ideas was a 
1. Horton, Theism and the Modern Mood, pp. 138-39. 
2. Horton, "The Dualismof Facts and Values in Humanism," 
Crozer Quarter!!, VII (July, 1930); Ibid., pp. 43-48. 
3. Walter M. Horton, "Authority without Infallibility," 
Religious Realism, ed. D. C. Macintosh {New York: 
Macmillan Co., 1931), pp. 277-78. 
4. Ibid., p. 2~9. 
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false blunder? No, we cannot say that; there is too much of 
proven worth in modern science and modern humanitarianism."l 
Yet Horton's liberalism was never truculent. While his 
intellectual integrity demanded adherence to liberal theology, 
his sensitive religious nature responded to the evangelical 
spirit of the more orthodox. " / In Eugene Menegoz he had found 
a kindred soul, in this respect. Of M~ntgoz he wrote that he 
"had the happy faculty of delivering telling blows without 
wounding the susceptibility of the adversary. The orthodox 
might rage against him and misinterpret him, but they never 
exhausted his patience; with infinite pains he answered each 
objection a hundred times over, if need be, until at length 
his views, or rather his reasonable and kindly attitude, had 
their effect upon the most irreconcilable."2 Even in these 
early liberal years, Horton revealed an interest in finding 
"a middle path between orthodoxy and ultra rationalistic 
liberalism. n3 
When Horton was writing his dissertation about the &bb' 
Bautain he became greatly impressed with Bautain's capacity as 
a theological system bu1lder.4 Surely, this early contact must 
have helped to elicit Horton's own desire to construct a systematic 
theology. The disillusionment following the first world war led 
him to the conclusion that only theology could fulfill the 
1. Horton, Theism and the Modern Mood, p. 43. 
2. Horton, "Theology of Eugene M6ndgoz," Journa 1 of Religion, 
VI (March, 1926}, p. 137. 
3 • Ib id • , p • 18 0. 
4. Walter M. Horton, The Philosophy of Abb~ Bautain (New York 
University Press, l926), p. 102. 
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intellectual task of leading people back to God and the good 
1 2 life. By 1931·- he was expressing his desire to see a the-
ological renaissance-- 11 theology in the grand style and hospi-
table mood of St. Thomas Aquinas, but without his dogmatic 
presuppositions; theology no longer shrinking from new truth, 
but eager to peer through Galileo 1 s telescope, and sail with 
Darwin on the Beagle, and participate in every new adventure 
of thought which the advance o:f science makes possible."3 
Though our democratic age would probably never tolerate the-
ology as ''queen of the sciences 11 it might be, Horton suggested, 
that " after a sufficient period of good behavior, she mi ght be 
elected to preside over their deliberations and arbitrate their 
disputes. 11 4 In any event, he ardently hoped for a confedera-
tion of the arts and sciences with theology at the head. 
b. Faith and the Bible 
While studying abroad, Horton was much impressed with the 
French Protestant thought of Eugene M'n~goz and Auguste Saba-
tier, and in particular with their attempt to reconcile faith 
with science. He learned from their joint solution that "reli-
gious faith is something deeper than religious belief. Reli-
gious beliefs are symbolic representations of truths too great 
to be expressed in any one system of thought--truths which the 
1. Horton, Theism and the Modern Mood, pp. 18-19. 
2. Horton, A PsyehOIOg!Cil Approach to Theology. 
3. Ibid. , p. 6 • 
4· Ibid., p. 9 . 
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moral and religious consciousness, not the reason, grasps by an 
act of faith. Faith is the eternal witness to an order of 
truth transcending scientific truth."l Horton was sufficiently 
impressed with this fideism,2 so that he was able to write that 
"faith can never completely give way to knowledge in these high 
regions. n3 Of course, he was in perfect harmony with great 
liberals like Bowne, who said that reason would never displace 
faith, and Brown, who spoke of religion's internal authority in 
the conscience. Horton knew from personal experience that God 
was his ve~y life, and that to suspend faith in God would be 
quite impossible. "God, in the religious sense of the word, is 
to human personality what food and breath are to the body; we 
sicken and die without him."4 He cited Pascal as one of the 
first to realize that theology can never aspire to the knowledge 
of God apart from an act of personal self-dedication.5 
Horton was as much aware of the value of Biblical data as 
Fosdick, but in addition, Horton expanded his views to take in 
all the great sacred literature of the world. Such documents 
were for him ttthe great and primary source of wisdome upon which 
theology must draw.n6 He included the sacred books of the 
/ / II 1. Horton, "Theology of Eugene Menegoz, Journal of Religion, VI 
(March, 1926), p. 176. 
2. Ibid., p. 180. 
3. ~on, "Objective Elements in the Experience of God," Journal 
of Religion, VII (October, 1927), p. 560. 
4. Horton, Theism and the Modern Mood, pp. 129-30. 
5. Horton, Theism and the Scientific Spirit, p. 196. 
6. Horton, A Psychological Approach to Theology, p. 20. 
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ancient East of which the greatest is the Bible. "It remains 
the foundation; the rest is superstructure."! 
He also had high regard for the Confessions of St. 
Augustine, the Franciscan Fiorette, the Imitation of Christ and 
even modern religious biographies such as William James used in 
compiling The Varieties of ~ligiou! Experience. Science can 
give invaluable assistance to theology in purging the "dross" 
from religious literature; however, the great insights into 
life's meaning and ideal possibilities can never come from 
science but only through the religious intuition recorded in the 
sacred literature of the world. 2 But, added Horton in the true 
liberal spirit, "theology must irrevocably abandon all preten-
sions to possess, in the Bible, in the creeds of the Church, in 
the teachings of Jesus, or anywhere else, truth that can be 
called 'infallible' or 'final•, and is not subject to revision."3 
c. Reason and Science 
Horton had never denied the right of reason and science to 
occupy high positions in the modern age. Though he was aware 
that scientific training in college usually elicited an in-
crease in critical temper and a lessening of emotional spon-
t a n~ i ty in religious matters, he maintained that the religious 
experience itself was not snuffed out. He was quite certa in 
1. Horton , "Psychological Approach to Theology," Journal of 
Religion, IX (July, 1929), p. 353. 
2. Ibid., p. 20. 
3. Ibid., p. 23. 
that though science might close certain realms of religious 
experience, it also opens new realms hitherto unknown. Through 
science man can come to appreciate the underlying principles 
and the mysterious unity that pervades the cosmos. 1 If theology 
is to possess a truly synoptic view of reality it must incor-
porate the findings of the sciences into its system. 
Horton, in agreement with liberals generally, welcomed 
the incorporation of the findings of the natural sciences into 
theology. "The belief in miracles has indeed receded before 
the advance of science, but theology has come to prefer a 
dependable and law-abiding God to a God of caprice • 112 Likewise 
psychology is important. In fact, he believed that theology 
would abandon her antagonistic attitude.3 In an article written 
for the Journal £! Religion in 1929 he wrote, "I have gradually 
come to see that the psychological approach to theology consti-
tutes a genuine principle of theological reconstructions. 114 
Horton was ready to accept the "anthropocentric" theology that 
would follow, but he denied that this would mean adopting a 
humanistic philosophy. "It simply means that we shall find it 
most logical to begin with those doctrines concerning Man, Sin, 
and Salvation to which psychology, the science of human nature 
and human behavior, may be expected to make its most direct and 
1. Horton, "What Kind of Religious Experience is to be Expected 
of the Scientifically Trained College Student?" Religious 
Education, XX (February, 1925), p. 21. 
2. Horton, "Psychological Approach to Theology, 11 Journal of 
Religion, VII (July, 1929),pp.340-41. ---
3 . Ibid., p. 343. 
4. Ibid., p. 347. 
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telling contributions."1 Two years later in his book A 
Psychological Approach to Theology, Horton indicated that it was 
Coe who had convinced him of the central importance of psycho-
logy for theology, and admitted that the psychological approach 
to theology was most congenial to his own religious convictions. 2 
Though his main scientific interest was psychology, Horton 
also regarded the findings of sociology as having a direct 
bearing upon theological problems. In particular, he respected 
the work of Rauschenbusch and his concept of the social gospe1. 3 
d. Empirical Theology 
Horton not only held the established sciences in high 
regard, but like Macintosh, desired that theology itself should 
become a true member of the scientific family. He was in pro-
test against the narrow definition of science which fitted only 
those disciplines that measure quantity, e.g., physics, chem-
istry, and biology, and eliminated all those which measure 
quality, e.g., psychology and sociology.4 "Wherever there is 
a well-marked group of phenomena to be studied, there a science 
is possible, and the methods of that science are not to be 
dictated by other sciences, but by the nature of the phenomena 
1. Horton, rrpsychological Approach to Theology," Journal of 
Religion, VII (July, 1929), p. 350. 
2. Ibid., p. viii. 
3. Ibid., P• 345, p. 353. 
4. if'Orton, "Authority Without Infallibility," Religious Realism, 
ed. D. C. Macintosh (New York~ Macmillan Co., 1931), pp. 284-
285. 
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to be studied.nl If this definition would be accepted, he 
believed that it would only be a matter of time before a renovated 
theology would be accepted as a genuine science. It would be a 
new natural theology, but beginning with religious experience 
rather than with nature, and empirical in method rather than 
rationalistic.2 But the empirical method and the new theology 
must not be limited to "a purely scientific psychological 
analysis of religious experience, or we shall find all metaphysical 
ultimates evaporating in the process.n3 He was reflecting 
Bowne's concept of "transcendental empiricism" when he widened 
his idea of empiricism to include "a kind of contemplation • 
• • 
which views things in their wholeness, and as it were, from 
within. 114 
He believed that a theology based upon the principles in-
dicated above could free theology from "the black hole of sub-
jectivism." He firmly held that unless religion became grounded 
in objective reality its pragmatic benefits would not materialize.5 
He was seeking to perfect a "realistic" method that would dispel 
the illusion of subjectivism that afflicts modern epistemology. 
At no time, he wrote 1 is the self alone with itself. 11 Air 
tight subjectivity is a pure abstraction."6 Horton proposed 
1. Ibid., pp. 285·86. 
2. HOrton, Theism and the Modern Mood, P• 96. 
3. Horton, "Psychological .Approach to Theology," Journal of 
Religion, IX (July, 1929), P• 351. 
4. Ibid., P• 352. 
5. Horton, "Objective Elements in the Experience of God," Journal 
of Religion, VII (October, 192/}, p. 541. 
6. !Did., p. 544. 
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that the objective reality of God, the religious Object, 
can be established once the accidental and subjective 
aspects of religious experience are eliminated by scientific 
investigation. "If to believe that :God is an objective 
reality that can be scientifically studied is to be a realist, 
then I am a realist."l 
Horton believed that his theological approach, which he 
variously described as "scientific," "empirical," and "realis ... 
tic," would successfully steer liberalism between the atheism 
of scientific naturalism and the weakness of a conviction-less 
liberalism. Though he agreed with the liberal assertion that 
nothing human can be infallible, he believed it was possible 
for liberal theology to have "authority without infallibility." 
By this he did not mean inerrancy but the kind of professional 
competence and reliability one expects from a doctor or a lawyer.2 
The theology which he envisoned consisted of three divisions. 
"1. Scientific Theology--a body of affirmations proved and 
tested, confirmed by all competent authorities, and to be disre-
garded at one's peril. 11 3 The main task of scientific theology, 
he asserted, is to get the scientific world to admit that "it 
is legitimate to postulate the existen~ ££ ~ ~ !£ actual 
fact, ~ indubitable ~!£!existence of the physical world, the 
1. Horton, Theism and the Scientific Spirit, p. 178. 
2. Horton, "Authority Without Infallibility, 11 Religious Realism, 
ed., D. C. Macintosh, p. 280. 
3. Ibid., p. 282. 
-
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animal world,.!!!£ the human world."1 Not only is God "real," 
argued Horton, He is in fact, much more real than the entities 
which the physicists and biologists study,~ for these simple 
sciences owe their exactness to the fact that theyhlve artifi-
cially isolated and abstracted certain of the more manageable 
aspects of re~lity from their concrete context; whi l e the 
theologian is dealing with a vast network of concrete relationships, 
and takes his data from the most unitary and synthetic of all 
types of human experience.u2 
Scientific theology would, according to Horton, presuppose 
a realistic theory of values. That is, values are not deter-
mined by our momentary subjective whims but by reliable objective 
structures and processes.3 
The guiding principles of scientific theology were summed 
up as follows: 
Distinguish carefully, in all your teaching 
and your thinking, between beliefs which~ 
be empirically verified, and those which .£!!! 
not. Reduce as many of your beliefs as possi-
ble . to stricti? scientific forms, and~uild 
with~ the oundations of your ?iith. ~ 
remains ma_z do for ~ philosophical super-
structure, or the religious turrets and battle-
ments; but it ShOuld not be put into the corner 
stone.4-- - - --
1. Ibid., p. 287. 
2. Ibid • ' p. 2 91 • 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., p. 283. 
"2. Philosophic Theology--a body of reasoned convictions 
involving value judgments and hence not scientific, but sup-
ported by much evidence, and a great deal of authoritative 
opinion."l -Philosophic theology, Horton explained, is con-
cerned with the three pivotal concepts around which all theology 
revolves, i.e., God, man, and the world. Its metaphysical 
theories are, of course, continually affected by new scientific 
discoveries. This philosophic theology critically evaluates 
the relation of religion to ethics, and the strength and 
weakness of the various religions. Then, from within the 
religious tradition it believes to be best, it seeks to enrich 
and guide its further developments. 2 
The principles guiding the construction of a philosophic 
theology, Horton expressed as follows: 
~ out !!! the competing opinions upon ~ 
~· • • • Then examine ~ • • • probing 
them for internal inconsistenc~s and fallacies ••• 
and bri'ilgiiigto bear upon them the whole £ody 
of known facts and commonly accepted values •••• 
Eventually, narrow down the alternatives £I the 
process of eliminatiOn; until all extremes and 
untenable-views have been canceied out ••• -:-
There within tha~rrow ran~e, you may be pretty 
certain, the truth must lie. 
1. Ibid., p. 282. 
2. Ibid., p. 296. 
3. Ibid., pp. 294-95. 
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"3. Practical .£!: Empirical Theology--affirmations of reli-
gious faith and hope, based upon knowledge and reasoned convic-
tions, but necessarily venturing out beyond the realm of the 
known into the realm of the possible and conjectural."1 Prac-
tical theology is necessary, explained Horton, because scientific 
and philosophic theology have only begun their exploration of 
the infinite mystery of life. Truly, they have begun to take 
religion out of the urealm of fairyland" and give it standing in 
the "realm of the knowable," but it must be admitted that the 
answers to most religious questions remain cloaked in mystery. 
"Reason casts but a flickering candle flame, amid swirling mists, 
and we must ~ our way, rather than ~ our way, in matters of 
religion. He who would wait for full philosophical certitude, 
before embracing a religious credo, must wait forever. rr2 
He quite candidly admitted that the religious person must 
resort to empirical knowledge or common sense in order to solve 
this practical problem. Nor did he apologize for the use of 
"common sense" knowledge which he recognized as the basis of 
science and philosophy and even superior to them in many prac-
tical situations. "Common sense lacks di sinterestedne as and 
objectivity, order and method, exactness and consistency; but 
it is apt to contain a certain native wit, a certain sense of 
proportion, a certain practical insight which is all too rare 
1. Ibid., p. 282. 
2 • Ibid • , p • 2 98 • 
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among scientists and philosophers."! Practical reasoning moves 
toward religious certitude, like science and philosophy, via 
experimental verification and the weighing of logical alterna-
tives. But, he explained, unlike science and philosophy, practical 
reasoning must function with the scheme of a "forced option," 
as William James called it. 2 That is to say, that practical 
man in the midst of his real life situations, must make some 
assumptions even while he is investigating religion. 3 
Horton summed up the guiding principles of practical theology 
as follows: 
Do not be a disinterested bystander; take sides. 
no not wait until all the logical-alternatives 
have been careful!.l sifted out; the time is-
short. As ~~!~becomes morally imperative 
to choose between religious attitudes, act at 
once, thou~h you have but the dimmest intUi'tions 
.!.!, your gu de; and let ~~ issue decide whether 
you ~ right .£!: WI'gng •••• A conviction 
acted ~pon provides f~ its ~ correction and 
grows at!!!! into~ practical certitude.4 
Horton well realized the problem involved in relating scien-
tific and philosophic theology to practical theology. In the 
former disciplines, reason precedes faith, while in the latter 
faith takes precedence. He believed that the solution to the 
problem lay in the fact that the religious crises of life are 
1. Ibid., pp. 298-99. 
2. Ibid., p. 14. 
3. Ibid., p. 299. 
4. Ibid., p. 300. 
not always upon man. There are times when man can reflect 
rationally upon his problems. Thus, Horton concludes~ "The 
practical upshot of these considerations is that the theolo-
gian who wishes to achieve for himself a practical religious 
certitude ••• must alternate between religious insight and 
rational reflection."1 
B. LIBERAL DOCTRINE OF GOD 
1. The Origin and Importance of the God-idea 
a. Extreme Skepticism of Behavioristic Psychology 
.LvO 
Horton was greatly impressed with the original and vital 
way in which Janet related psychological studies of religion, 
and in 1924, the American Journal of Psychology featured Hor-
ton's notes of Janet's lectures entitled, norigin and Psycho-
logical Function of Religion."2 Therein, Horton expressed 
Janet's conviction that the belief in gods or disembodied spirits 
arose as a direct result of the human power to think. When man 
first realized that his neighbor could say one thing and think 
another, the idea of a double or a spirit existing behind the 
visible person was born. 3 Because all human masters and friends 
1 • Ib id • , p. 3 03. 
2. Horton, 11 0rigin and Psychological Function of Religion," 
American Journal of Psychology, XXXV (January, 1924). 
3. Ibid., pp. 30-31.--
J.O'I 
eventually prove to be fallible, continued Janet, man yearns 
for "an ideal, invisible, all-powerful, all comprehending di-
rector and friend: a god. 111 Janet's thesis was that primitive 
man took his new-found "spirit" and combined it with his desire 
for an infallible source of power and protection and fashioned 
a 11god. 11 Moral power and exalted function was accorded these 
"gods" in stages progressing from fear to petition.2 
Of course, argued Janet, these gods have no objective 
reality. They are the creations of men's minds. From his case 
work in psychopathic behavior at the Salp~tri~re, he was able 
to cite instances of patients who obtained the answers to their 
prayers, simply by impersonating deity after they had offered 
their petition.3 There are two kinds of existence, continued 
Janett (1) facts which are believed in because they exist, and 
(2) realities which exist because they are believed in. The 
god of religion is of the latter type. Religion is a matter of 
synthesis while science and philosophy are matters of analysis.4 
Since analysis kills synthesis, reasoned Janet, psychotherapy 
must be the new substitute for religion and its subjective god . 5 
1. Ibid., p. 32. 
2. Ibid., p. 31. 
3. Ibid., pp. 31-32. 
4. Ibid., p. 39. 
5. Ibid., p. 48. 
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Horton respected Janet's scholarly work in the field of 
psychology, and his concern that American theologians should be 
aware of Janet's radical views prompted him to publish his notes 
of Janet's lectures. But though Horton inclined toward the left 
in this first period of his creativity, he was still a theist 
and in agreement with the great liberals, whose doctrines of God 
were studied in Chapter II. Horton would have agreed with 
Rauschenbusch that the idea of God is molded to a great degree 
by the thinking of the society wherein it originated,l but like 
Bowne and Knudson he was also certain that God was an objective 
reality who must reveal Himself to us if we are to know Him more 
fully. 2 
b. The "Pathetic" Fallacy 
In an article entitled "Reasons for Believing in God, 113 
Horton referred to a source of man's thinking about God which 
Santayana had called the "pathetic" fallacy. This is man's 
naive assumption that God has human emotions and is concerned 
with the same things that concern humanity. Horton admitted that 
the history of religion provides ample evidence of this tendency. 4 
"I admit, therefore," he wrote, "that the god-idea sprang 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Rauschenbusch, A Theologz for the Social Gospel, p. 167. 
Cf. Bowne, Studies in Christiani~, p. 63, and Knudson, 
Present Tendencies in Religious ought, p. 76. 
Walter M. Horton, "Reasons for Believing in God," Journal of 
Religion, III (November, 1923). 
Ibid., p. 603. 
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originally--at least in part--from a very dangerous fal-
lacy. nl Religious ideas must be continually and critically 
evaluated or theism will be only a rationalization of an 
illogical posit1on.2 But, in fact, wrote Horton, the god-
idea has gone through tremendous transformation as the result 
of an "empirical process of trial-and-error, which had re-
peatedly brought the god-idea to the test of the facta, and 
so provided for its correction."3 
c. The Objective Reality of God 
In an article appearing in The Christian Century (1931), 
entitled 11 The Impotence of God" and included later in his book 
Theism~£ the Scientific Spirit (1933), Horton expressed the 
vitality of his theism in these words: "Whatever may happen to 
the !2!£ 'god,' the~ of God can no more perish than the 
idea of man ••• and man's quest for God can no more cease 
than the quest for happiness, with which it is indissolubly 
linked. 114 Moreover, for him, this 11 idea 11 referred to an ob-
jective reality which "is as certain as that of a tree or a 
child. God is in a certain sense an empirical fact. rr5 He 
1. Ibid., p. 603. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., pp. 603-604. 
4. Horton, Theism and the Scientific Spirit, pp. 208-209. 
5. Horton, "Objective Elements in the Experience of God," 
Journal of Religion, VII (October, 1927), p. 542. 
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believed that it is absolutely necessary for man to hold to the 
concept of God as the objective element in religion; otherwise, 
man will become "trapped in an air-tight chamber of subjectiv-
ism. u When this happens man ceases to be religious •1 
Nor did he believe that humanism was a valid religion. De-
spite the high hope of humanism for human social development, it 
is doomed to defeat, predicted Horton, as long as those hopes 
remain ungrounded in "a unified world intelligence, heart, and 
purpose."2 Horton stressed the idea of God as the objective 
reality in religion, because he believed that such a cosmic 
ground was necessary to preserve the validity of all man's hopes, 
ideals, and values, which would otherwise be challenged as being 
mere subjective desires with no legitimate claim to be believed 
by modern man. 3 
In the midst of the despair and religious skepticism which 
followed World War I he found cause for hope in the fact that 
"people were disturbed about the meaning of life and anxious to 
find an object of religious trust." 4 Even though all the evi ... 
dence was far from being in, he knew that men must comndt them-
selves to the most reasonable hypothesis about God and live as 
1. Ibid., p. 541.· . 
2. Horton, "The Dualism of Fact and Values in Humanism," Crozer 
Quarterl~, VII (July, 1930), p. 274. From the ~uest £!the A~, 
Haydon, pp. 111-21. 
3. Horton, Theism and the Modern Mood, p. 274. 
4. M~·, p. 17. -----
J.bJ. 
though it were true. ''Faith," he wrote, "can never completely 
give way to knowledge in these high regions. 111 
2. The Empirical Search for God 
a. The Priority of the Religious Approach 
In Theism and~ Modern Mood (1930), Horton described his 
empirical approach to the doctrine of God. He first made it 
very clear that the objective Reality he was seeking was not 
the rational god of philosophical speculation but the living 
God of religious experience. He noted that the classical the-
ological systems had failed to achieve a vital religious defi-
nition of God because they dealt largely with logical abstrac-
tions.2 "Ultimately, of course," Horton explained, ''the phi-
losophic quest for a highest principle of explanation converges 
with the religious quest for a highest object of devotion,"3 
but the religious approach should receive priority. Furthermore, 
he believed that the religious experiences used as data should 
. include those of all humanity and not only those that are uniquely 
Christian. In giving his reason for this, he wrote: 11 V'.'hen Chris-
tians claim a monopoly of the knowledge of God, non-Christians 
may be pardoned for regarding the Christian God as a subjective 
delusion peculiar to Ghristians. 11 4 F'rom such a perspective he 
1. Horton, "The Dualism ot: Fact and Values in Humanism," Crozer_ 
Quarterly, VII (July 1930), 560. 
2. Horton, Theism and the Modern Mood, pp. 146-47· 
3· Ibid.; p. 99. -- --
4· Ibicr., p. 96. 
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was led to see that there is a sense in which all men do ex-
perience God. 1 
The fact that the god-idea is relative and changeable in 
no wise proves that God lacks objective reality. If, reasoned 
Horton, we applied such a test to physical theories, nwe should 
be obliged to conclude that atoms, and molecules, electrons, 
and protons, were nothing but ideas in the human mind, and there 
was in fact no physical world at all."2 As physical theories 
deal with matters that are relative and continually changing, 
and yet are regarded as providing man with a reasonable degree 
of truth about the objective world, so the religious experi-
ences of humanity could lead empirical theology to an accurate 
understanding of God--"a Being revealed in human experience, a 
Dependable Factor in it which can be isolated by scientific 
analysis just as one isolated chemical elements or bacteria or 
vitamins." 3 In this respect Horton's faith in empirical method 
went beyond that of most of the liberals with the possible. ex-
ception of Mathews and Macintosh.4 It is a significant indica-
tion of the degree of Horton's radical liberalism in this par-
ticular area, that he cited the naturalistic philosopher Henry 
Nelson Wieman as the outstanding exponent of the 11 method of 
isolation" whereby God could be discovered.u5 
1. Ibid., P• 94. 
2. Ibid., p. 87. 
3· Ibid., p. 97. 
4. See Mathews' The Faith of Modernism, and Macintosh's . Theology 
as an Empiricar-science:-
5. Horton, Theism and the Modern Mood, p. 98. 
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b. Provisional Definitions of God 
In the search for the objective God, Horton took his cue 
from Tolstoy who felt that life was meaningless until the simple 
thought of God brought an inrush of saving, vital power. He 
accepted Tolstoy's phrase, "God is he without whom one cannot 
live, u as fundamental in any truly religious conception of God. 
For the religious person, Horton explained, God is not primarily 
an "explanatory concept," but the "great Resource."1 Thus, 
the first of the preliminary concepts which Horton viewed as 
fundamental was that God is "~ sourc~ of those vi tal ~mergie a 
that~ to!~~ at'& b~st.n2 Immediately, he found it 
necessary to amend this statement, since it seemed to imply that 
God exists as a sort of natural resource to be exploited by men. 
Realizing that God has worth in Himself apart from man, Horton 
wrote: ".Q££ is that supremely worthful B41ting !?.z devotion to 
Which (££Whom) !!a may ~ttain the ~vigorous vitality~ 
~highest degree .2£ selfhood of which~ is 2_apable. 113 
Having established these basic religious facts about God, 
Horton next turned to the empirical search for a Being or Power 
that harmonized with these concepts. His method was to scan 
carefully all of existence beginning with individual conscious-
ness and radiating out to the limit of the cosmos. "Let us 
embody," he wrote, "whatever we discover that is divine in a 
1 • Ibid • , p • 102 • 
2. Ibid., pp. 102-103. 
3. Ibid., p. 104. 
provisional definition of God, which may be revised and ex-
panded if we later dis cover anything of higher worth. ,.l 
Musing about the psychological phenomena inherent in 
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individual existence, Horton postulated the existence of many 
selves in each human person. In moments of crisis, man "pulls 
himself togethertt by appealing to his highest self. In view 
of the preliminary concepts, Horton was led to state as his 
first provisional definition of God that ".Q:22. is !!!1. .2!!!. better 
self."2 This is a more radical view than most of the leading 
liberals would have allowed. Even the philosophical idealism 
of Bowne, McConnell and Knudson maintained a strict separation 
of ego-identity between God and man.3 But its apparent radical 
nature is somewhat modified by Horton's following statement 
that God is "at least that.n4 
But Horton did not stop with the higher or "wider self," 
for logic pressed him to acknowledge that the self is really 
derived from "our common human heritage of custcm and aspira-
tion, embodied in persons and institutions. n5 His second pro-
visional definition is developed as follows: If God is our 
1. Ibid., p. 105. 
2 . Ibia., P• 106. 
These definitions also appeared in Walter M. Horton, "What 
God Means te Me," Intercollegian, XLVII (1930). 
3. See Bowne's Studies in Chriatianit~, McConnell's The Diviner 
Immanence, and Knudson's Present Tendencies in ReiiSious 
Thought. -
4. Horton, Theism and the Modern Mood, p. 107. 
5. Ibid., 108, andli'Orton, "Objective Elements in the Experience 
O'f'G.od," Journal of Religion, VII (Dctober, 1927), p. 552. 
highest self1 which, in turn is a product of human culture, 
then, "God is all ~ 1~ best in .2££ human heritage. n2 He 
confessed that, for him, this "best" was to be found in the 
J.Ov 
Hebrew-Christian tradition. He was sufficiently impressed with 
humanistic values that he could write: even "if there be no 
superhuman deity • • • there still exists a deity great enough 
to make life worth living : the divine spirit of sacrificial 
good will which was in the Founder of Christianity, and which 
survives and grows, even today, as the Spirit in the Church. 113 
Even at this non-theistic level, he believed that God was an 
objective reality. In an article entitled, "Objective Elements 
in the Experience of God, n4 he wrote: "No, man does not 'pray 
himself' out of his misery, all that is best in humanity 
• • • 
comes to his rescue in the thought of God.n5 Though Horton 
himself passed immediately on to a more conventional view of 
God, it is doubtful if any of the liberals would have found it 
possible to come, even momentarily, so close to the humanistic 
position. 
His third, and last, provisional definition of God derived 
from his conviction that the same logic which drives man 
to seek the source of his individual worth in the human race, 
1. A careful reading of Horton's theology suggests that "in our 
highest self ••• " would have been more expressive of---
Horton's theistic faith even in this early period. 
2. Horton, Theism and the Modern Mood, p. 109. 
3. Ibid., p. 115. ----- ----
4. i!'Orton, ttObjective Elements in the Experience of God," Journal 
of Religion, VII (October, 1927}. 
5. ~., pp. 552-53. 
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drives man "to seek the source of what is best in humanity in 
something beyond humanity," since humanity like self is depen-
dent and exists within an environment.1 Thus, 'Uod is ~ !!!1 
cosmic drift ~ trend toward harmony, fellowship, !E£ mutual 
aid, whereby£!:!!:. efforts to create !.. just equilibrium in human 
affairs !!! supported ~ sustained."2 For Horton, this meant 
that man's finite effort to bring in the Kingdom of God is "sus-
tained by something in the structure of the universe. n:3 He 
denied that an "act of faith" was necessary to discern this 
"cosmic drift." "I claim," he argued, "that it is an empirical 
fact, capable of social verification--a fact as objective as 
those great star drifts which the astronomers are able to chart 
after years of pat~ent observation."4 Such a vigorous attempt 
to define God in empirical fashion is best paralleled among the 
liberals by Macintosh and Mathews,5 but even their efforts 
lacked the meticulously systematic and completely empirical 
qualities of Horton's approach. 
~. Merging the Philosophic and Religious Quest 
Up to this point Horton had been describing religion's 
practical and intuitive approach to the existence of God. He 
realized that such an approach was not final; that in order to 
1. Horton, Theism and the Modern Mood, p. 116. 
2. Ibid., p. ll7. ------
3 • 'I'6"I(J. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Macintosh, Theology~ !E Empirical Science, p. 193; Mathews, 
The Faith of Modernism, p. 118. 
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prove satisfactorily the existence of God he would have to em-
ploy philosophical method. In Theism and the Modern Mood, Hor-
ton invited skepties to: 
take the process of cosmic evolution as 
naturalistically as you please. Use no tele-
ological terms in describing it, rule out the 
hypothesis of an immanent Purpose or a guid-
ing Providence; confine yourself to the basic 
objective fact of an increasing differentiation 
and integration of structure. Call it •.• 
simply a 1 drift 1 • Even on this minimum basis, 
the process has religious meaning; and to de-
fine God in terms of it 1s to w:Orship a great 
and exalted deity. 1. 
Nevertheless, he continued, a 'drift' is no satisfactory 
name for God, for reason demands that man see the evolution . in-
herent in the cosmos, as emergent, and not "as bursting up 
volcanically from below." 2 To claim that evolution is self-
explanatory, he argued, would be " like describing the develop-
ment of personality in a child without taking his parents i n to 
the picture. Human history taken by itself, is like one end 
of a telephone conversation; it irresistibly suggests the ex-
istence of an external stimulus to which it is the response. 11 3 
Thus, the !! cosmic drift" or the evolutionary process is not 
God, since even this process has an environment from which it 
draws its life. 
Furthermore, he reasoned, the nature of the Ultimate Source 
might reasonablY be deduced from the highest type of development 
1. Horton, Theism and the Modern Mood, p. 121. 
2. Ibid., p. 166. ------ ----
3· Walter M. Horton, "Reasons forBelieving in God," Journal of 
Religion, III (Novemver, 1923), 610. 
that takes place in the evolutionary process. "Since the highest 
type of integration occurring in the evolutionary process is 
that which we see in the richest forms of human personality, it 
is fair to assume the presence in the super-evolutionary environ-
ment of an at-least personal Being, possessing a central unifying 
consciousness, who dominates the evolutionary process from 
above.ttl This view of God as at-least-personal was completely 
in accord with the general liberal doctrine of God. Clarke had 
said: "God may be more than we can mean by personal, but he is 
not less."2 
Both religious insight and philosophic inquiry, concluded 
Horton, lead men to affirm that "it is empirically certain • • • 
that at least three divine objects exist: the God of nature, the 
God of society, and the God within, corresponding roughly to the 
Father, Logos, and the Holy Spirit of the Christian Trinity."3 
Both the religious and philosophic quests finally identify all 
three as one. Philosophy expresses it as "one great universal 
cosmic energy, expressing itself in different shapes and at dif-
ferent levels of intensity."4 Personal religion supplements and 
1. Horton, Theism and the Modern Mood, p. 166; Horton, "Reasons 
for Believing in-Go~ Journal of Religion, III, p. 610; and 
Horton, A Psychological Approach to Theology, p. 236. 
2. Horton, An Outline of Christian Theology, PP• 67-68; Brown 
Christian-Theology in Outline, p. l02; Mathews, The Faith 2f 
Modernism, p. 119; and Macintosh, Theology~ ~Empirical 
Science, p. 190. 
3. Horton, "Objective Elements in the Experience of God," Journal 
of Religion, VII, p. 559. 
4. Ibid., P• 560. 
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climaxes this effort, by identifying "the God of the heart with 
the God of society and history, and with the ruler of the cos-
mos; and it has conceived him in personal terms. 11 1 
In this early period of his liberalism, Horton felt strong 
kinship with certain humanists. He singled out Prof. Eustace 
Haydon as one of the humanists that he appreciated most. Haydon 
had founded his view of "god" on "the existence of a process of 
•social enfoldment,' supporting our highest endeavor."2 Of 
Haydon's definition Horton wrote: "I would hardly care to change 
a word of his description."3 Horton's view of God differed from 
the humanist view, as Haydon had expressed it, only in that the 
immanent God, admitted in principle by Haydon, actually consti-
tutes ttevidence for and partial revelation of a transcendent 
God" in whom H0 rton "intuitively" believed. 4 It is apparent 
then, that while Horton held a doctrine of God that closely 
approximated the view held by most liberals, he leaned more 
closely to the humanists, as regards method and their more ten-
tative and skeptical mood, than did most liberals. It would 
be inaccurate, however, to classify his doctrine of God as com-
pletely humanistic, for Horton freely admitted that since only 
omniscience could comprehend deity, and because man knows so 
1. Horton, "Objective Elements in the Experience of God," Journal 
of Religion, VII (October, 1927), p. 560. 
2. Horton, "The Dualism of Facts and Values in Humanism," Grozer 
Quarterly, VII (July, 1930), p. 212; Haydon,~ ~uest of the 
Ages, pp. 111-21. 
3. Ibid., p. 273. 
4. Ibid., p. 274. 
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very little about the world, the empirical concept of God is 
wholly inadequate.1 Finally, the religious man must take the 
"leap of faith," but warned Horton, when man takes th.a t leap, 
it is vitally important that he begins with his feet "firmly 
2 braced upon the springboard of knowledge." 
d. The Christian Experience of God 
Horton believed that the uniquely Christian concept of God 
has two foci~ the mystical-pantheistic and the prophetic-
dualistic.3 Horton arrived at this opinion via his usual path 
of empirical method. He went straight into the reality of 
Christian living and focused upon the Catholic modernist Baron von 
Huegel's conception of God, which emphasized the divine trans-
cendence.4 This interpretation, which Horton believed to be 
representative of much Christian experience, was balanced with 
the ~nglican Studdert-Kennedy's immanental concept of God, which 
Horton also felt was representative. 5 The idea of God as abso-
lute Source and Ground seemed to Horton to be paradoxically 
opposed to the idea of God as "a creative warrior, eternally 
laboring and eternally suffering.n6 He believed both ideas 
were legitimate parts of the Christian experience of God, but 
realized the difficulty involved in resolving such a complete 
1. Horton, Theism and the Modern Mood, p. 134. 
2. Ibid., pp. 137 -~ 
3. ~., pp. 157-59. 
4. Ibid., P• 149. 
5. Ibid., p. 156. 
6. Ibid. 
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paradox. It is most interest i ng to see that even in the rather 
radical, almost humanistic-naturalist period in Horton's think-
ing, he was beginning to take seriously some of the ideas being 
advanced by the dialectical theologians. Concerning the 
paradox, Horton wrote that "if we are wise, we shall not try 
to resolve it too completely. In the realm of faith, balance 
and proportion are more significant than exactness and consis-
tency ••• ~ I am not in sympathy with all features of Karl 
Barth's theology, but I think he is right in his contention 
that the ultimate affirmations o~ religious faith always in-
volve an element of paradox and can be rightly stated only by 
a delicate and constant balance of the Yes and the No. rrl 
In an article entitled "The Impotence of God," which first 
appeared in the Christian Century2 and was later repri nted in 
his .book Theism and~ Scientific Spirit,3 Horton illustrated 
how the Christian faith balances the two extremes. The idea 
of the divine transcendence has long found expression in what 
he referred to a a "cosmic gods," which correspond to Einstein 1 s 
"Cosmic Order" and Wieman's "Integrating process at work in the 
universe. tt4 But, he ob j acted, such cosmic religion is reserved 
for the intellectual elect. Moreover, though such gods possess 
the power to "swing the stars 11 they offer little help to man "at 
his daily mundane chores."5 The idea of divine immanence has 
1. Ibid • , p. 160. 
2. Waiter M. Horton, "The Impotence of God," Christian Century, 
XLVII (March, 1931), pp. 370-73 . 
3. Horton, Theism and the Scientific Spirit, pp. 206-18. 
4. Ibid., p. 210. 
5. Ibid., p. 211. 
found expression in what Horton called "humanistic gods.""These 
are the gods,'' he wrote, nthat most men trust most of the time: 
the little intimate, friendly gods, immediately related to hu-
man needs." 1 Horton's acute religious and psychological dis-
cernment enabled him to see these gods in their modern guise as 
"friendship, money, family solidarity, the solvency of the bus-
iness firm. " 2 Man puts his ultimate trust in these finite gods 
at his peril, he warned, but he admitted that the hi ghest of 
these, i.e., Love, Friendship, Justice, Peace, Beauty and Truth , 
cann ot be abandoned without sacrificing the very heart of life's 
meaning.3 The Christian experience, he believed, most per-
fectly resolves this paradox, by proclaiming the existence of 
a God who is both cosmic and human. This Christ-like God can 
tt stoop from high heaven to intervene in human affairs, and 
throw all the influence of the eternal stars on the side of 
truth and righteousness. The peculiar appeal of the Christian 
conception of God lies in the fact that it does thus unite, most 
intimately, the human and the cosmic. 11 4 
In his Psychological Approach to Theology (1931), he stated 
unequivocally that love i s the key to understanding the Chris-
tian view of God.5 In Theism and the Scientific Spirit (1933}, 
1. Ibid., p • .. 213. 
2. Ibid., P• 214. 
3· Ibid., P• 215. 
4· Ibid., P• 216. 5. Horton, A Ps;y:chological Approach ~ Theology, P• 233· 
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he expressed the idea in Johannine terms when he testified: "I 
1 believe that 'God is love'." Horton explained that for him, God 
is the spirit of sacrificial-redeeming love that was revealed 
in the life of Jesus of Nazareth. This does not mean that God 
is completely revealed in Jesus Christ or that he is completely 
absent elsewhere, but simply that he found nthe world of moral 
reality most translucent " in Jesus' life. It would be difficult 
to find a more Christocentric confession than Hor.ton 1 s words: 
"I experience God, as nowhere else, in the forgiving love of 
Christ." Thus, for him, God was no passive philosophical Abso-
lute, but " an active Will, which seeks and saves that which is 
lost. 112 
He proclaimed that God's love was active on a cosmic scale 
and " tends to become all-controlling." 3 He based his belief 
on the fact that there is much empirical evidence to support 
the contention that altruism is a cosmic law as real as the law 
of 11 survival of the fittest." Horton admitted his indebtedness 
to Henry Drummond and quoted extensively from his book The As-
cent of Man.4 Horton accepted Drummond's thesis that altruism, 
or the principle of vicarious sacrifice is grounded in parental 
care for the offspring. He quoted Drummond's argument: "With-
out some rudimentary maternal solicitude for the egg in the 
humblest forms of life, or for the young among higher forms, 
1. Horton, Theism and the Scientific Spirit, p. 201. 
2. Ibid., p. 202. ---- ---
3· I'5Id., P• 1.57 · -
4· Henry Drummond, The Ascent of Man (New York: James Potts, 
1894). -
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the living world would not only suffer, but would cease •••• 
The vicarious principle is shot through and through the whole 
vast web of Nature. nl Horton believed that the love revealed 
in Christ was the supreme revelation of the cosmic reality which 
permeates all of creation and is struggling to subdue man and 
nature alike.2 
The idea of a divine struggle against evil and recalci-
trant nature suggests an ultimate dualism. Horton strongly 
rejected such a dualism. He also plainly rejected Brightman's 
concept of a finite God struggling against a "non-rational 
Giver. n3 He argued that such a view was not satisfying for 
the intellect or for faith, because "!..!! impotent Q2!! !!. !!2. .9:2.9. 
at all."4 Horton was intrigued by the theory of Edouard Le 
Roy, who in his book Probl~me de ~' expressed the belief that 
the created world of nature, as well as man, is relatively free 
and independent of God and can therefore thwart or resist God's 
will.5 The fact that it is created and hence dependent dis-
poses of any ultimate dualism and the fact that it possesses 
some degree of freedom, even at the abstract and inanimate level 
relieved God of, at least, much direct responsibility for 
natural evil. 
In expressing his preference for Le Roy's view, Horton took 
1. Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
2. Horton, Theism~ the Scientific Spirit, p. 204. 
3. Ibid., p. l97, n. 4r;-
4. Horton, Theism and the Modern Mood, p. 5. 
5. Ed ouard Le Roy, Pro"b''eme de Dieu. 
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special pains to point out that he was violently opposed to the 
"monistic idealism" which grounded Brightman's theory and ac-
counted for its error, so he believed. In this respect, he was 
thoroughly at variance with Bowne, McConnell, and Knudson who 
were thorough-going exponents of the idealistic philosophy, but 
who, as personalistic idealists, would have taken vigorous ex-
ception to his charge that Brightman's type of phi l osophy was a 
monistic idealism. Nevertheless, all of them would have accep ted 
hisstatement that Christ-like love is central in defining God, 1 
and most would have joined him in rejecting a finite God con-
cept. ''A God whom man must help if He is kept from failure, 
is no God for religious faith. He is too much like men to be 
worshiped !'2 In like manner, the liberals would have given as-
sent to Horton's admission that science cannot guarantee God's 
ultimate triumph over moral and natural evil, but it must be 
believed "as an act of religious faith, which only the dim 
future can verify."3 
1. Brown, Christia~ Theology in Outline, p. 109; Mathews, The 
Faith of Modernism, p. 119; Clarke, An Outline of Christian 
Theologz, pp, 72, 97; and McConnell, The Diviner-Immanence, 
p. 110. 
2. Mathews, Faith of Modernism, p~ll7. 
See also Clarke:-An Outline of Christian Theology, p. 85. 
3. Horton, Theisnand~he Scientific Spirit, p. 264. 
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C. LIBERAL DOCTRINE OF MAN 
1. The Need for a Psychological Orientation 
Horton was distressed by the fact that most of what the-
ology had written about man seemed to be extremely pessimistic. 
Ever since St. Paul, and particularly, since St. Augustine, 
clas sic theology has viewed humanity as a "mass of perdition" 
and a " running sore." 1 "I have always found it hard to under-
stand," he wrote, "why the barbarically cruel theologies of St. 
Augustine, Calvin, and Jonathan Edwards should be considered 
orthodox." 2 Horton demanded that the old cornerstone of false 
Augustinian presuppositions be replaced by the new cornerstone 
provided by the Darwinian thesis. "Instead of a fallen crea-
ture," Horton proclaimed, ''we now see in man a slowly rising 
creature. 11 3 
The new understanding of man, he asserted, must take its 
cue from the findings of modern psychology. Questions about 
nori ginal human nature and its driving motives; on the degree 
of empirical liberty and responsi bility to be ascribed to the 
human will'~/+ and on the nature and cause of sin, all fall within 
the province of psychology. Horton believed that metaphysics 
had very little to add to a true understanding of man, but that 
1. Horton, 
2. Horton, 
3· Horton, 4· Horton:, 
ligion, 
! Psychological Approach to Theology, 
Theism and the Modern Mood, p. 5o. 
~· cit:-;-p-:Lj:l. -
Psychological Approach to Theology," 
IX (July, 1929), 350. 
P• 41. 
Journal of Re-
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psychology, including psychotherapy, could help greatly.l His 
enthusiasm for psychology and his generally optimistic view of 
man was a clear reflection of the general liberal position, par-
ticularly the thought of Coe.2 
It should be noted that Horton's general acceptance of the 
liberal view of man did not preclude him from criticizing the 
"popular liberalism" that was current even as he was drawing 
on the valuable resources of liberalism at its beat. Horton 
believed in the positive values and potential inherent in man, 
but he was also aware of the sad fact of sin. He described 
popular liberalism as "a gospel of sweetness and light, hope and 
cheer; .• gospel of inevitable progress, 'onward and upward 
forever'; a gospel of self-reliance and self-expression, with 
no gloomy sense of sin to becloud one's self-complacency."3 
This rather critical and pessimistic connnent was to become 
increasingly dominant in Horton's thinking and it is interesting 
that it should find expression in the same year that Horton 
expressed his extremely optimistic evaluation of man in A 
Psychological Approach to Theology. 
1. Ibid., p. 351. 
2. See-Coe, The Religion of a Mature Mind, p. 29. 
3. Walter M.IfOrton, "ThePresentPred'I'Ciment of Religion," 
Intercollegian, XLVIII (1931), p. 285. 
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2. The Nature or Man 
a. Man's Original Nature 
Horton's careful study of the findings of psychology led 
him to assert that man inherits rrom his animal ancestors a 
physical organism which is equipped with automatic, unlearned 
devices such as the circulatory and digestive systems.l Unlike 
the lower animals, however, man does not possess instinct, but 
is endowed instead with great learning capacity and adaptability.2 
Those tendencies which are often wrongly called instincts, he 
said, are really more flexible and are properly called "drives." 
It is these drives that Augustinian theology demanded man 
crush, but , Horton reminded, Freud correctly pointed out the 
danger of repression.3 Supplementing these drives are the 
rather general traits or appetites such as curiosity, language 
and religion.4 
It will be noted that Horton's approach was severely 
empirical. Nowhere did he make any mention of man's kinship 
with God or his divine and immortal spirit. In this sense he 
was far more extreme than the outstanding liberals had been. 
Brown had referred to man's "divine sonship. nS Clarke spoke of 
the "image or likeness of God" in man6 and Coe had proclaimed 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Horton, A Pslchological Approach to Theolo.sz, pp. 43-44. 
Ibid., pp. 4 -45. 
Ibid. 
:H"Orton, .2..£• cit., p. 46. 
Brown, Christian Theology in Outline, p. 39. 
Clarke, An Outline of Christian Theology, p. 191. 
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that even in the child there exists "a germ of the highest 
personality. " 1 Horton, a fervent Christian theist, refrained 
from incorporating these vital and yet controversial elements 
in his view of man's original nature, because he desired to 
construct a doctrine of man solely on the basis of psychological 
data. 
b. Man's Learned Nature 
The experience of life begins at once to alter the child's 
drives and tendencies. A system of' conditioned ref lexes is 
built up which, in turn, become habits. 2 Groups of habits cen-
ter around an "emotional habit" to form what Horton called a 
sentiment.3 The character of the child is the sum total of the 
dominant sentiments or attitudes.4 
In adolescence, he continued, the first stage is marked 
by the disruption of much of the childhood character.5 As the 
growing person is attracted to ideals which are embodied in 
persons and institutions, there is " the more or less sudden 
emergence of unified self-conscious personality."6 
1fuile the problem of adolescence is to achieve freedom from 
childish dependence, the problem in mature life is to remain 
free. Man must continually strive to be critical of self and 
1. Coe, The Reli gion of!! Mature Mind, p. 313. 
2. Horton, A Psychofogi'cal ~.Approa"CE"to Theology, pp. 53-54. 
3· Ibid., P• 54. 
4· Ibid., p. !55. 
5. Ibid., P• 57. 
6. Ibid., P• 58. 
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society and "not become the helpless slave of habit and conven-
1 tion." But Horton believed that the actions of man, even in 
his maturity, were more the product of emotions than of ideas. 
The only way that man can escape from the power of his emo-
tional environment is to 11 form new emotional connections" by 
2 gazing prolongedly upon the ideas. 
Thus, Horton was aware that man is not completely free, 
for both his original and his learned nature incline man to fol-
low the lead of his drives, traits, habits, and sentiments. In 
this respect he was in harmony with the thinking of Clarke who 
had taught that human freedom, though real, was limi t ed first 
because "the sphere of free-will is narrower than that of life. 11 3 
Man can not chose his sex and race. It is limited, secondly, 
because 11 the effect of free-will is diminished by want of har-
mony among the powers of man himself."4 Man's sin has weakened 
his ability to choose freely. Horton concluded that Calvin's 
pessimism about human nature was unwarranted, for even though 
man is caught in the pull of the native inertia of his organism, 
he is also subject to the equally natural urge toward self-
completion.5 Thus human nature 11 is inherently ambiguous." 6 
Though Coe had spoken of the struggle in every man between the 
higher tendencies and the "ape and tiger nature,"7 most of the 
1. Ibid., pp. 61-62. 
2. Ibid., PP• 62-63. 
3. Clarke, An Outline of Christian Theology, p. 213. 
4· Ibid., p--. 214. 
5. Horton, A fsychological Approach to Theology, p. 6.5. 
6. Ibid. , 
7. Coe, The Religion of!! Mature Mind, p. 114. 
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liberals sounded a more optimistic note. Horton, therefore, 
seems to have held a somewhat more critical and complex view. 
3. The Problem of Sin 
a. Sin and Moral Disease 
In the field of medicine and psychiatry are to be found 
listed hundreds of specific diseases with their characteristic 
symptoms and cures. But in theology, complained Horton, the 
concern is still with sin, in general, traced to a single 
cause (the Fall of Adam), and healed by a single remedy (the 
atoning blood of Christ). Theology, he wrote, "is still at 
the stage which is represented in the history of medicine by 
the theory that all diseases are due to demon possession, and 
are all to be cured by exorcism. nl In his attempt to reach a 
precise definition of sin, Horton turned to Hadfield's term 
"moral disease. u2 It was Horton's thesis that the first step 
was to distinguish between sin, in the proper sense, and related 
maladies. Hadfield had succeeded in doing just this. His 
term "moral disease" referred 
1. 
2. 
3. 
"to a group of disorders resembling organic and 
nervous disease in their involuntary character, 
but resembling sin or crime in their manner of 
expressing themselves. Kleptomania, uncontrollable 
ill-temper, and certain forms of sexual perver-
sion would be cases in point. A person afflicted 
with one of these moral diseases can no more help 
himself than a person afflicted with'St. Vitus' 
Dance 1 or hysterical blindness. n3 
Horton, A Psychological Ap!roach to Theolo~y, p. 68. 
Hadfield; James A., Psycho ogy an~MoralsNew York: 
Robert M. McBride & Company, 1923}, Chapter VI. 
Ibid., p. 72. 
Many well-intentioned religious people have been terribly 
wrong, continued Horton, in their treatment of morally diseased 
persons as sinners. He applied William James' term "sick souls" 
to Augustine and John Bunyan, whom he blamed for the dismal 
state of theology. He connnented bitterly that their 11meticu-
lously accurate observations concerning their own uncontrollable 
obsessions have been erected into a general theory of the bondage 
and depravity of the human will." 1 
Though Horton believed that when sins become manifested in 
social institutions they are passed from one generation to 
another, he firmly denied any hereditary infection. "There is," 
he wrote, "no single stream of Original Sin, flowing on like a 
hereditary curse from generation to generation. 11 2 In this 
respect he echoed Rauschenbusch who had written~ "The permanent 
vioes and crimes of adults are not transmitted by heredity, but 
by being socialized."3 Mathews had also rejected the Augus-
tinian thesis,4 as had Coe.5 
Horton's denial of all hereditary transmission of sins was 
followed by his positive assertion that true sin is volitional, 
hence blameworthy, while moral disease is uncontrollable and 
1. Ibid., p. 73. 
2. Ibid., p. 75. 
3. RiUSchenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel, p. 60. 
4. Mathews, The Faith of Modernism, p. 96. 
5. Coe, !h! Religion of a Mature Min~, p. 370. 
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therefore not subject to moral censure. 1 Of the sinner he wrote: 
"His conduct is dominated by fear, or anger, or some other con-
tractive emotion, which tends to isolate him from his fellowmen 
and from his world and forces him into a self-centered and self-
contained existence. 112 He defined sin, in the proper religious 
sense of the word, as tta collective term applicable to all dis-
orders of the will which tend to destroy normal harmonious 
relations between the individual and those cosmic sources of 
energy and inspiration on which the health and vigor of the 
higher life depend. n3 The three-fold dimensions of sin Horton 
had borrowed from Wieman.4 
Horton's care in distinguishing sin from moral disease finds 
no clear parallel among other liberals. Ferhaps, a similar need 
was dimly perceived by Brown who referred to the "religious" a a 
distinct from the "moral" connotations of the word 11 sin."5 
Certainly Horton's desire to understand sin in the specific sense 
and not as "Sin" in general is directly paralleled in Mathews' 
statement that the word Sin is less used because 11we talk more 
about sins."6 Likewise Horton's insistence upon the volitional 
character of sin is clearly a reflection of liberal thinking which 
1. Horton, A Psychological Approach to Theology, p. 77. 
2. Ibid., p. 78. 
3. Ibid., p. 75. 
4. ~. Wieman, The Wrestle of Religion with Truth (New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1927), p; 112. ----
5. Brown, Christian Theology in Outline, P• 261. 
6. Mathews, The Faith of Modernism, pp. 96-97. 
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was given clear expression by Mathews ana Rauschenbusch. 1 
b. The Causes of Sin 
Horton refused to label any part of man's nature as the 
evil source from which sin flows. But he aid admit that the 
powerful drives within man often go out of control with the 
resulting "destruction of all harmony of personal aevelopment.n2 
Such a view of the origin of sin was also expressed by Bowne, 
who called attention to our animal ancestry,3 and by Coe, who 
spoke of the "remnant of the ape and tiger nature. 11 4 Man's 
drives, which lead man to take impulsive actions, are in them-
selves non-moral, but when they become habitual can become a 
source of sin. 5 
The power of evil personal influences, and in particular, 
the drag of society, were regarded by Horton as primary sources 
of sin.6 Among the leading liberals this view had been most 
vigorously espoused by Rauschenbusch who maintained that if 
there is any truth at all in the myth of the Fall of Adam, it 
resides in the valid though primitive understanding that all men 
are linked together socially, and hence are all victims of the 
sins which are "transmitted along the lines of social tradition."? 
1. Mathews, The Faith of Modernism, p. 97; and Rauschenbusch, 
A Theology for the Social GOsp!l, p. 46. 
2. Horton, A PsychOlOgical Approach to Theology, p. 79. 
3. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, p. 145. 
4. Coe, The Religion of a Mature Mind, p. 114. 
5. Horton;-A Psychological Approach to Theology, p. so. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Raus chenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel, pp.57-58, 60. 
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But even in his period of extreme liberalism, Horton was 
not blind to the peculiarly demonic quality of human sin. Human 
sin is more than mere animal behavior, he believed. In fact, 
" to call man 'brutish' when he falls is to slander the 'brute•. 111 
The very qualities which distinguish man from the animal "are 
precisely what makes man the supreme sinner. Wben man starts to 
go wrong he shows himself a genius at it. 112 In grasping this 
dark truth, Horton was almost alone in reaching out beyond what 
most of the liberals had believed about the origin of sin. Bowne 
was the other important liberal who grasped this fact. He had 
wid tten the following as early as 1909. "It is one of the para-
doxes of our human life that some of the worst woes spring from 
our high nature, and even from the moral and r e ligious nature 
itself."3 
3· The Cure for Sins 
In seeking a scientifically valid cure for sins, Horton 
turned again to the findings of modern psychology and psycho-
therapy. He singled out two types of moral dis ease, viz., 
neuroses and delinquency, and shcweil how similar they are (yet 
ultimately different), to what is properly called sin. His in-
vestigation prompted him to report that neuroses result from a 
deficiency of drive or lack of will power. The neurotic lacks 
a stimulating motive or purpose about which he can organize his 
1. Horton, A Psychological Approach to Theology, p. 81. 
2. Ibid., p. 86. 
3. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, p. 329. 
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life or there is a conflict between a powerful drive and a re-
pressing tendency. 1 In the case of delinquency, the conflict 
is not within the person, but between the person and society. 2 
The psychological principle that is involved, however, is the 
same in both cases. Both the neurotic and the delinquent seek 
to avoid unpleasant stimuli and achieve pleasure.3 It was Hor-
ton's contention that the causes and symptoms of these two types 
of psychic aberrations correspond exactly to the nature and 
causes of sin.4 If this is true, he reasoned, the techniques 
employed by the psychotherapist and the case worker in curing 
neuroses and delinquency may prove to be adaptable to the task 
of curins ains as well.S 
He reviewed the method the psychiatrist employs when he 
treats a neurosis. The psychiatrist's aim is to unify the per-
sonality of the patient around a dominant interest. In many 
cases the power of suggestion or simply putting the patient to 
6 
work resolves the difficulty. However, in many cases psycho-
analysis is needed, which includes the following steps: (1) re-
laxation, (2) probing for the complex, (3) draining off the 
complex, and (4) re-education through sublimation.? The 
technique which the case worker employs in treating delinquency 
1. Horton, A Ps;y:chological AJ2J2roach to Theology, PP • 81- 82. 
2. Ibid., p. 83. 
3· Ibid., f'· 84. 4· Ibicl., P• 85. 5· Ibid., p. 25. Q. Ibid., f'· 88. 
7- Ibid., PP• 90-91. 
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is similar. Horton referred to the following system suggested 
by Dr. Miriam Van Waters in her book Youth in Conflict, pp. 178-87. 
(l) Insight. The social worker resolves the social conflict by 
helping the patient to understand his own case. (2) Trans-
ference. An emotional bond is created between the patient and 
some object beyond himself. (3) Development of Personality. The 
case worker helps the patient acquire new behavior goals and 
skills and the desire for social esteem. ( 4) Development of 
New Social Belationships. The patient is helped to achieve har-
monious patterns in and between social groups.l 
Horton believed that pastors could learn a grea t deal about 
treating religious maladjustments by studying the techniques 
used by psychiatrists and social workers. He believed that he 
had clearly demonstrated that sin, like neurosis and delin-
quency, required for its cure, insight, sympathy, and a com-
pelling object of devotion. Sin is most difficult to cure, 
however, since it is more comprehensive. To be cured of sin, 
Horton summarized, man must be relieved of mental miseries, social 
wrong doings, and learn to alternate his life between the worship 
of God and service to humanity. 2 He concluded that 11 love by it-
self offers no way of salvation; psychological technique by it-
self offers no way of salvation; but love working through psy-
cholog.ical technique is ~ way of salvation for the individual, 
as love working through sociological techniques is the way of 
1. Ibid., pp. 92-93. 
2. Ibid., p. 97. 
188 
salvation for society." 1 In his careful parallel analysis of the 
nature and cure of sin and moral disease, Horton had gone far 
beyond any previous liberal doctrines of sin. Still, his ra-
tionalization of the whole problem in the scientific spirit was 
thoroughly consonant with liberalism. It is interesting to note, 
in this respect, that he completely rejected the proposal of his 
predecessor in this area. Coe had been a pioneer in the realm of 
psychology and theology, but his idea of ''salvation by educa-
2 tion" was regarded by Horton as '' a mere prospectus, alluring to 
the eye but unsupported by any substantial accomplishments. 11 3 
4. Human Immortality 
a. Empirical Data 
In thinking about life after death, Horton, as was his cus-
tom, chose to begin with the facts. There are, he explained, a 
great many empirical facts which bear upon the question regard-
ing life beyond the grave. He admitted that some of these facts 
point " to blank extinction as the final destiny toward which 
mankind is moving."4 The first, and most obvious, of the nega-
tive data that he identified is "the great universal fact of 
death itself, which inevitably awaits every human being, as it 
awaits every living thing."5 Moreover, he admitted that the 
1. Ibid., P• 127. 
2. Coe, The Religion of~ Mature Mind, pp. 294-9.5. 
3· Horton, A Psyihological Approach to Theology, p. 125. 
4. Ibid., p. 243; 
5. Ibid., P• 244. 
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intimate relationship between the body and the mind make it 
difficult to imagine the survival of a disembodied mind. 1 
Countering these rather forbidding facts of our experience, 
Horton continued, are the equally apparent f ac t s of biological 
and sociological immortality. 2 But the hope thus generated is 
short-lived, f or the cosmological margin of human existence is 
"so narrow, that it seems certain to end, at last, in universal 
death," for mankind and his civilization.3 
Probing more deeply into the evidence, and using J. Arthur 
Thomson's concept of the " insurgence" and "resurgence" of life, 4 
he illustrated the insurgenc e of life by indicating the tenacity 
of life even in the most unfavorable environmental situations, 
e. g ., life near the snow line in the Alps. Likewise, he pro-
claimed that the resurgence of life is observable as nit rises 
miraculously . to reassert itself,"5even after it has been 
beaten to earth and apparently extinguished. In the careers of 
the great prophets, he maintained, this same phenomenon was to 
be seen on the psychological and sociological level. Though a 
prophet might be put to death, the mysterious power within him 
persisted and found embodiment in other lives and institutions. 6 
.i. 
The supreme example of life's insurgence and resurgence at the 
spiritual level is found in the Christian experience of Jesus 
1. Horton, A Pst4hological Approach to T.heol£gi, p. 244. 
2. Ibid., PP• 2 -45. 
3· Ibid., P• 246. 4. J. Arthur Thomson, Introduction to Science (New York: Henry 
Holt and Company, 1911), pp. 185=86. 
5. Horton, ~ Ps~chological Approach to Theology, p. 248. 
6. Ibid., P• 24 · 
Christ. In this instance, he explained, Jesus' "flaming spirit 
• • • somehow contriv-ed to leap the gap of death and become in-
carnate in the discouraged hearts of his followers." 1 Horton 
was aware that he had not proved the existence of immortality, 
but he believed he had, at least, ehown that the cosmos consti-
tutes an en:vironment which is sympathetic to the idea of per-
sonal immortality. 2 
He even considered the findings of the Society for ~­
chical Research in his search for empirical data bearing upon 
the question of life after death. He seriously weighed the p os-
sibility that mental telepathy might perhaps explain 11 trans-
mortem communication,"3 but concluded that it is more probable 
that mediums telepathically draw ideas from those present or at 
a distance, rather than from " the beyond. 11 4 Consequently, he 
believed that the evidence from psychical research was ambigu-
ous.5 
He thoroughly rejected the argument from physrological p sy-
chology which reduces all va lue judgments to "muscular tensionstt 
and "prior conditioning ." 6 In resolving the lmotty mind-body 
problem, he accepted the 11 transmissive 11 or 11 interactionist 11 the-
ory of William James and Henri Bergson, which stated that the 
body does not produce the mind, but rather, transmits personality 
1. Ibid., p. 250 
2. Ibid., p. 251. 
3· Ibid.; PP• 253-54. 4. Ibid., p. 254. 
5. Ibid., P• 252. 
6. Ibid., ~· 255. 
J. t1 J. 
as a bulb transmits light from the 1 arc. In fact, Horton be-
lieved that empirical evidence enabled him to state that as 
personality grows, it trbecomes less and less dependent up on its 
physical tap root, and more and more dependent upon social and 
2 
cosmic sustenance." To illustrate this, he focused upon the 
life of every person. The unborn infant grows beyond its ini-
tial, complete dependence upon the mother and is eventually cut 
off from the parent to survive in a new environment. In the 
next stage the child is completely dependent upon his family, 
but he gradually learns to fend for himself and one day . steps 
out into the social world. The mature adult exists in a much 
vaster environment than any he has heretofore inhabited. In 
fact, it is very difficult to locate just where he does live in 
terms of time and space. Though his body may inhabit a particu-
lar place, his ~ind travels to infinity.3 This marked the end 
of the empirical data, but so sug gestive was the cumulative ef-
fect for Horton that he was moved to write that "the contempla-
tion of such a fully developed personality may well suggest the 
question whether death may not be, for him at least, simply 
another of those transitions from a narrow to a wider matrix 
of life, of which birth is the first; whether the severing of 
his connection with his bodily organism may not turn out to be 
something as natural and as trivial as the cutting of the um-
bilical cord.tt4 
1. Ibid.; PP• 255-56. 
2. Ibid., p. 256. 
3· Ibid., PP• 2.56-58. 
4· Ibid., p. 259. 
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None of the liberals included in this study had made as 
thorough an investigation of the empirical data regarding human 
immortality. Mathews had been content simply to state his be-
lief " in the continuance of individual personality beyond death. 111 
Brown took a further step when he argued that "life after death 
is necessary ••• that God's fatherly purpose for his children 
may be r ealized through their complete conformity to Christ in 
the Kingdom of glory." 2 Clarke was most explicit of all when he 
proclaimed that man is ·immortal by nature because his spirit 
resembles God's spirit.3 
b. The nover-beliefs" of Faith 
Horton admitted that though the empirical evidence was 
favorable to belief in immortality, it was far from conclusive. 
Nevertheless, because the idea of immortality so vitally affects 
the conduct of man's life, man must adopt a positive attitude 
toward it. In short, it is necessary to make a venture of faith.4 
That Horton continued to develop his theology along strictly 
liberal-rational lines is to be seen from the following descrip-
tion of the interpenetration of faith and reason. "When a ma-
ture religious individual finds himself faced with the necessity 
of making a venture of faith, for lack of conclusive evidence, 
he does not close his eyes dreamily and say, 'What do I wish 
1. Mathews, The Faith of Modernism, p. 180. 
2. Brown, ChriStian Theology in Outline, p. 250. 
3. Clarke, An Outline of Christian Theologz, p. 192. 
4· Horton, ! PsychologiCal Approach to Theology, p. 260. 
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were true1' He opens his eyes, takes a broad survey of the 
situation, and then, in the light of all his best-founded con-
victions, he inquires, 'What ought I to wish1' -- a vastly 
different question."1 
By maintaining a careful balance between his spiritual in-
sight and the empirical data, Horton was able to formulate 
several "over-beliefs" which he believed would increase man's 
understanding regarding the nature of the life to come. ( 1) It 
will be a life as radically different from the present life •as 
the life of the child is from that of the embryo, or the life of 
the man is f r om that of the child. n2 ( 2) The new exist ence will 
be. lived in a larger matrix, just as all previous metamorphoses 
hav e required larger environments.3 (3) As all previous stages 
have involved the abandonment of important relationships, so 
the next one will involve a comparable loss, i.e., that of 
man's individual physical organism. 4 (4} The soul will probably 
not be absorbed into the life of God, since all the empirical 
evidence of evolution reveals a marked trend toward the con-
servation of individuality. 5 (5) Human individuality will 
survive in a very different way; perhaps as part of the animat-
ing principle of some social organism, similar to the relation-
ship Christ bears to his Church. Perhaps there will be a series 
1. Ibid., p. 263. 
2. Ibid., p. 266. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., pp. 266-67. 
5. 
.!£i9.·, p. 257 • 
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of deaths and rebirths--each one wider than the last--until 
men become parts of God Himself, "retaining our individuality 
but surrendering our separateness. 111 At this point Horton's 
thought was most radical, and its pantheistic or at least pan-
psychistic .tendencies were most at variance with his liberal 
colleagues. The other points already listed, and most of those 
which follow, rather closely parallel the liberal ideas ex-
pounded in Chapter II. (6) Thera will necessarily be a "Judg-
ment Day" which will prepare men to make a fresh start in the 
new life. It may be that the brain-screen will be removed, 
thus allowing all past memories to flood in upon the conscious-
ness and thereby judge the self via complete and sudden self 
knowledge.2 (7 ) Souls will be in more intimate touch with one 
another once the organic envelopes have been sloughed ofr. 3 
(8) Though process and change will characterize the new 
existence, there will also be continuity regarding the nature of 
God and His moral law. 4 (9) The classic Protestant doctrine 
of a final division of saints and sinners at death is not con-
sonant with the love of God. "Far superior to this is the 
Catholic view •.• according to which there is moral effort, 
and social intercourse in the next life as in this •••• Some-
what along these lines ••• it is possible to conceive of a 
future life which continues the moral discipline and moral progress 
1. Ibid., p. 267. 
2. Ibid., pp. 267-68. 
3. Ibid., p. 268. 
4. Ibid., pp. 268-69. 
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of this, on a grander scale." 
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This last point clearly illustrates the honest apprecia-
tion which Horton had for theological concepts originating from 
communions other than his own. Even in this early period, Her-
ton was be ginning to exhibit tendencies toward an ecumenical 
perspective. (10) At last, all mankind will be gathered "into 
one great fellowship, whose unity is the life of God ."2 This 
honest declaration of belief in universal salvation placed Her-
ton in the left wing of the liberal camp. He defended it with 
the simple statement that he believed "mercy is more deeply em-
bedded than justice in the nature of our world."3 
D. LIBERAL DOCTRINE OF CHRIST 
1. Jesus of Nazareth 
a. His Life and Accomplishment 
It is certainly true, wrote Horton, that Christian the-
ologians have pushed metaphysical speculation regarding the In-
carnation and the person of Christ to the utmost limit. 
have gone beyond this and 
gogy, and mummery," which 
tians. 4 Horton seemingly 
1. Horton, A 
2. Ibid., p7 
3· Ibid., p. 
4. Ibid., P• 
Psbchological 
27 . 
271. 
148. 
''plunged into a sea of magic, 
is very distasteful to liberal 
had expressed an attitude that 
Approach to Theology, p. 267. 
Some 
mysta-
Chris-
was 
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common among many liberals prior to and during his liberal 
period. Brown, Mathews and Rauschenbusch had affirmed that 
psychological and practical religious interests had taken 
precedence over metaphysical interests.l 
However, Horton believed that metaphysical theories had 
value and he saw within them the truth that had inspired men 
to construct them in the first place. He explained that though 
the kenotic doctrine of the Incarnation seems wholly concerned 
with a "celestial spirit stooping from high heaven, and taking 
upon him human flesh' for us men and our salvation' ,n2 it is 
also perfectly faithful "to the literal fact of the earthly 
Jesus, who identified himself with the lonely and outcast and 
the lost that he might bring them back to themselves and back 
to the divine source from which he believed they sprang."3 
In like manner he interpreted the metaphysics of the Atone-
ment. On the surface it deals with "a mysterious legal trans-
action between the persons of the Trinity, whereby Christ, the 
righteous one, has his righteousness transferred to sinful man 
and has man's guilt and punishment artificially transferred to 
him."4 The abiding truth that is really expressed therein, he 
continued, is the "sense of cleansing, reconciliation, and 
1. Brown, Christian Theology in Outline, pp. 342-43; Mathews, 
The Faith of Modernism, p. 152; and Rauschenbusch, A Theology 
for the Social Gospel, p. 150. 
2. Horton, ! Psychological •pproach to Theology, p. 149. 
3. Ibid. 
4. foia., P· 15o. 
.U:l'l 
infinite indebtedness which came to the first Christians as 
they considered the grim fact of their leader's tragic death."l 
Though most liberals of this period had turned from meta-
physical speculation, Horton was not the only liberal to ex-
hibit interest in the realm of metaphysics. Clarke, Bowne, and 
McConnell had all constructed elaborate metaphysical theories 
to support their high Christology which averred that Jesus was, 
indeed, the Second Person in the Trinity.2 In this connection 
it should be noted ~hat Horton, though sympathetic to meta-
physics, did not adhere to a high Christology.3 
Horton's interpretation of the actual process of the ~tone­
ment went beyond the liberal view that was then current.4 He 
stated that the moral theory of the Atonement, which most 
liberals regarded as the truest interpretation of the meaning 
of the Cross, was inadequate to express the full meaning of 
Christ's sacrifice. The moral theory proclaimed only that Christ 
bore the sins of man 11 by sympathy, 11 i.e., Jesus exemplified "God's 
suffering love in such a way as to win men to repentance," but it 
denied any objective change in the relationship between God and 
man.5 He protested against this over-subjective interpretation. 
1. Ibid., p. 150. 
2. See discussion in Chapter II, 3-c. 
3. Horton, A Psychological !EE£oach to Theology, pp. 141-43, 
154-165. The latter passage is taken from his article , "Shall 
We Discard the Living Christ'?" Biblical World , LIII, (1 9191,276 -82. 
4. Brown, Christian ~eology in OUtline, PP• 358-59; Clarke, An 
OUtline of Christ~an Theology, p. 339; Bowne, Studies in 
Christianity, p. 148; Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social 
Gospel, p. 265; McConnell, ~ Divi~ Immanence, p. 111; 
Macintosh, Theologx ~ ~ Emairical Science, p. 129; and Coe, 
The Religion £f ~ Mature Min , pp. 410-ll. 
5. Horton, A ~ychological Approach to Theology, p. 150. 
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He did not reject the moral dimensions of the Atonement, but he 
did insist that the objective quality be recognized as well. He 
wished to emphasize the existence of a new and objective fact, 
viz., that through Jesus' life and death . nthere has flowed into 
human history a kind of vicarious, sacrifi-cial love which was 
radically new, and which has the power to reconcile men not only 
to their hard lot in life, but to their own past failures and 
traitorous deeds." 1 
b. The Unique Contribution of Jesus 
Beneath all the legends and metaphysical theories which 
cluster around the life of the historical Jesus, Horton dis-
cerned four important contributions made by Jesus. (1) He in-
augurated a new era in the history of Western morals. 2 His new 
command to love even enemies broke the terrible circle of re-
taliation, i.e., the lex talion~s, which had imprisoned the 
moral thinking and acting of Jews and Greeks alike.3 (2) Jesus 
became and continues to become the center of numerous histori-
cal influences which aim to liberate and transform personality. 
The religious and moral power which he radiated through his fol-
lowers so long a go has continued to find expression in humani-
tarian efforts across the ages.4 (3) Jesus, himself, has become 
the very symbol of the love which he believed to be the ground 
of all reality.5 (4) The supreme contribution of Jesus is that 
1~ Ibid.; P• 151. 
2. Ibid.; p. 141. 
3· Ibid., PP• 141-42. 
4~ Ibid., p. 142. 
5~ Ibid., p. 143· 
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he had made "the existence of a good God seem credib le and al-
mos t tangibly real. " 1 Though Horton embraced what is techni-
cally known as a '1 low 11 Christology, i.e., he affirmed the true 
humanity of Jesus prior to speculating about the divine quality 
of h is p er son, he accorded it a place of higher importance in 
his theology than did most of the liberals prior to, and during 
his early period. Most of the libera l s would cer·tainly have in-
sisted that only Jesus can lead us to a mature appreciation of 
2 the natur e of God but few would have said, as Horton did, that 
the orderlines s of nature .and the trend of human his t ory must 
g'ive place to the revelation of Jesus Christ with r e spect to 
' ' 3 proving the existence of 11 a Cosmic Mind." 
With an eye to the futur e , Horton suggested that there mi ght 
b e still another contribut ion of Jesus. He mi ght very well "be-
come t he flag, emblem, the organizing center of world unity in 
r eligion."4 Though Horton appr eciated the growing, universal 
appeal of men like Socrates, Buddha, and Lincoln, he believed 
that Jesus belonged to the whole human race in a special sense. 
"He belongs to all of ~ because deliberately,~ with ~ full 
counting of the cos t and risk , he gave himself to all of us. 11 5 
1. Ibid., P• 151. 
2. Brown, Christian Theology in Outline; pp. 82,106; Clarke, An 
Outline of Chr1stian Theology, p. 97; Fosdick, The Modern 
Use of tEB Bible, p. 268; and Macintosh, Theology as an Em-
I?TricalSCience, PP.• 120-21. - - -
3· Horton, A Psychological Approach to TheoloEl, p. 151. 4· I bid., p.l$2~ 
5. Ibid., P• 144. 
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He believed that Gandi's reverence ror Jesus proved that the 
Christian estimate or Jesus is more than simple prejudice.l 
2. The Contemporary Christ 
a. The Religious Need 
Horton, in accord with the liberal thinking of the time, 
gave great importance to the work of the historic Jesus. But, 
he went somewhat beyond liberal thinking in the degree to which 
he emphasized the religious need for the "living Christ." He 
said that "no mere figure in the pages of a book, however 
active and inspiring, can ever perform the redemptive functions 
which Christianity attributes to Christ."2 He reminded his 
readers that when the Salvation Army invites sinners to "come 
to Jesus" and when it proclaims that "Jesus saves, it ~not 
~ simply the Je~ ,.2f historz; it means the 'living 
Christ': ~living spirit whose imperfect body is the Church, 
whose immediate presence and ~aling power ~ be ~xperienced £y 
men today. 113 Horton found the origin of this concept of the 
1. Ibid., p. 152. 
2. IOIO., p. 153. For close approximations from liberal sources, 
see-Mathews, The Faith of Modernism, P• 124, and Coe, The 
Religion of a~ture Mind, p. l68. The latter deals more with 
the incarnation of the divine Spirit in each of us. 
3. Horton, A Psychological Approach to Theology, p. 153. These 
re.ferences relating to the discussion of the 11 living Christ" 
will also be found in Horton's article, "Shall We Discard the 
Living Christ?" Biblical World, .tii i ;( 191 9 ),, 276-282, published 
in 1919. This was Horton's first published article. 
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rt1iving Christ" in the first resurrection experiences of the 
disciples and the Damascus road experience of St. Paul; the 
latter believed that Jesus was not only revealed to him, but in 
him as well.l Christians have recognized, Horton declared, that 
the source of Paul's great energy and sense of mission lay in 
his experience of the indwelling Christ.2 
b. Psychological Interpretation 
The term "living Christ" or "Christ of faith" often appears 
in Christological discussions but it has seldom been precisely 
defined. The liberals provided no exception to this rule. Brown 
had said that the Jesus of history must be interpreted by the 
Christ of faith3 and Coe had spoken of the Christ-figure as a 
moral ideal,4 but the analysis was pressed no further. Horton, 
however, was determined to analyze the matter in the cold light 
of modern psychological data. He decided that the experience 
of the 11 living Christ" could be best described 11 aa t he rein-
forcement of the individual will by conscious and continual sub-
mission to the influences of a personified ideal--an ideal which, 
moreover, the believer feels to be grounded in the nature of 
things and reality as well as imaginat ively present in power. n5 
Horton explained further that this ideal is built up cumula-
tively in the mind of the believer as he encounters people and 
1. Horton, A Psychological Approach to Theology, p. 154. 
2. Ibid., p. 155. 
3. Brown, Christian Theology in Outline, p. 331. 
4. Coe, The Religion of~ Mature Mi nd, pp. 410-411. 
5. Horton, ££• cit., p. 156. 
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situations throughout his life. This ideal is very much like 
a "composite photograph" whi ch embodies the best features or 
all the Christian and Church experiences that the believer has 
encountered.l In times of stress, he reasoned, "when something 
in the Gospe 1 • • • is preached, or lived f:it_7 strikes home, 11 2 
and the ideal becomes animated and incarnates itself in the very 
life of the believer. "This ever actualized, ever glorified 
ideal is the Living Christ. 113 
c. The Objective Reality of the Living Christ 
Though Horton was sensitive to the psychological ramifi-
cations involved in the experience of the living Christ he held 
no mere subjective view of the total phenomenon. "I am strongly 
inclined to assert," he wrote, "that there ie a present reality 
working in the world, through the Church, which is substantially 
identical with the personality of Jesus of Nazareth." 4 He de-
fended his assertion by listing the ways in which the Christ-
personality possessed objective reality. (1) Since Christians 
ground their ideal of Christ on the portrait of the Founder 
depicted in the Gospels, Jesus as he was in ancient Galilee 
possesses a degree of objective immortality in that he lives in 
the minds of the believers as they contemplate his life. 5 
(2) Jesus enjoys objective immortality in the sense that the 
1. Horton, A Psychological Approach to Theology, p. 156. 
2. Ibid., p7 157. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., p. 158. 
5. Ibid. 
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deeds he perf ormed continue to echo across the centuries, and 
his personal influence transmitted to the first Christians con-
I' 11 l tinues to b e so ·relayed. Because each generation continues 
to add the best insight of its own day, e.g., Greek philosophy 
and modern science, to each preceding image, and ultimately to 
the first century imag e itself, the personality of Jesus has 
the objective immortality of a growing ideal. 2 Though Horton 
conceded that the image of the living Christ possessed subjec-
tive reality in that it existed only in the mind of the believer 
and could b e p sychologically described, he was adamant in his 
assertion that 11 the Reality it repre sents" is, in fact, objec-
tively real.3 "We may assert positively,fl he concluded, "that 
the experience of the living Christ is not merely a subjective 
illusion, for we have seen that in most instances it is trace-
able to ex ternal stimulation, in the shape of some actual con-
tact, present or past, with Christian tradition and the Chris-
tian spirit.4 
3· The Relationship Between the Historic "Jesus and 
the Living Christ 
a. The Value of the Historic Jesus 
Horton realized that there is a world of difference between 
theory and practice. Because the real world so often dashes to 
1. Ibid., p. 158. 
2. Ibid., pp. 158-59. 
3. Ibid., p. 161. 
4· Ibid., P• 162. 
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bits our most precious theories, he recognized that "it makes 
a tremendous difference that Jesus really lived; that the ideals 
which he represented in his teachings were really proved practi-
cable in his life. 111 The experience of the living Christ would 
be powerless to help the believer, he insisted, if the Chris-
tian did not already know that Jesus had "under typical human 
conditions ••• met and mastered the forces of evil."2 The 
f i rst value of the historic Jesus, then, for Horton, was that 
it grounded the concept of the Christ of faith in the his t oric 
reality of common humanity. 
The living Christ animates and vivifies the ideals that we 
have and helps us to live up to them, but, he cautioned, this 
idealized portrait of Christ must be continually informed and 
corrected by the historic Jesus.3 He insisted that when new 
moral issues arise, the Christian is driven back to the his-
toric Jesus to ask, "What would Jesus do in this situation? n4 
He reasoned that even though Jesus had never faced the situation 
in question, still, "as the classic embodiment of the attitude 
of love there is something authoritative about the ethical 
pattern of his life.rr5 Thus, the second value of the his-
toric Jesus is the fact that 1 t is the source of all "new 
ethical insights into new social situations. 116 
1. Horton, A Psychological Approach to Theology, p. 159. 
2. Ibid • 
3. IEid., p. 160. 
4. l'6TCT. 
5. 1"5Td. 
6. Ibid. 
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b. The Value of the Christ of Faith 
To insure proper balance, Horton insisted that the picture 
of the Jesus of history must be continually held alongside the 
conception of the living Christ. His first point was that the 
image of the living Christ summarizes and depicts in vivid 
fashion all the ideals that Christians have developed through 
the centuries as they have responded, in the spirit of Jesu~ 
to their ever-changing social environment. 1 
Secondly, he asserted that it is only as the Christian be-
lieves that the same divine reality which animated the historic 
Jesus is also incarnate in the Christian as the living Christ, 
that he is empowered to live up to the ideals of his faith. It 
was at this point that Horton found serious fault with his lib-
eral colleagues. Liberals are noted for their sensitivity to 
ethical issues, he agreed, but they lack the religious dynamic 
of the evangelical Ch..ristian. Hif there is one thing that we 
miss in the liberal Christianity which more and more prevails, 
it is that sense of the presence of a great sustaining moral 
2 power." He concluded with the warning that ~: liberalism needs 
to recover the experience o f the Living Christ."3 
The critical study of liberal Christology in Chapter II 
r eveals that the liberals did place somewhat more emphasis on 
the concept of the Jesus of history than on that of the Christ 
1. Ibid., p. 161. 
2. Ibid. 
3· Ibid. 
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of faith. 1 However, no lack of evangelical fervor is apparent 
in their view of Christ. 2 It is apparent from his writing3 that 
Horton was not referring to the great liberal spokesmen, whose 
thoughts are studied in Chapter II, but to the generation of 
self-styled liberals who followed. Horton did not identify them 
beyond remarking that the new generation did not inherit the 
zeal and character which they (the great liberals) embodied. 4 
4. The Deity of Christ 
The meaning Horton gave to the expression "deity of Christ" 
was quite different from the more conservative understanding of 
the term. In the spirit of the liberals, he carefully avoided 
the pitfall of making an outright identification of Jesus with 
God. "The Christ who 'alone' can save, is not the historical 
character known as Jesus Christ, nor even the glorified Presence 
known as the Living Christ; he is the Eternal Logos."5 Thus, 
Horton held to the Johannine concept of a cosmic Christ.6 When 
Christians acknowledge Jesus as the Christ, he continued, they 
are saying that, for them, the divine Christ or Logos was 
"uniquely epitomized ••• in the person of Jesus the Nazarene," 
1. 
2 .• 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
See Chapter II, 2-a. 
Mathews, The Faith of Modernism, p. 123; Rauschenbusch, 
A Theologz for the SOcial Gospel, p. 152; McConnell, ~ 
Diviner Immanence, p. 94; Fosdick, The Modern Use of the 
Bible, pp. 222, 229, 270-71; and coe;-The ReligiOn of a 
Mature Mind, p. 189. 
Horton, A Psychological Approac~ to Theology, p. 125. 
Ibid.' p. l25. 
!'bid., p. 180. 
see-the "prologue" to the Gospel of John, Chapter 1. 
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so that when they encounter his Holy Spirit, through the Church, 
they are 11 in touch with God, Himself.nl Horton's ready admis-
sion that the divine power worked mightily in Jesus of Naza-
reth, coupled with his resolute refusal to draw the easy in-
ference that Jesus was God, was, and remains, an important char-
acteristic of liberal Christology. A good liberal parallel to 
Horton's analysis can be found in Mathews' statement: 'The 
world is not saved by the carpenter of Nazareth, by the author 
of incomparably beautiful ideas, by the most representative of 
martyrs. The Christian salvation centers about God in~~, 
not in!!~ made into!! Q.2£." 2 
E. LIBERAL DOCTRI NE OF THE CHURCH 
AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD 
1. Church and Sacraments 
a. Catholic-Protestant Tension 
Horton's psycho-sociological interpretation of the doctrine 
of the living Christ led him naturally to consider the doctrine 
of the Church. His first observation was that " the conception 
of the Living Christ is different in the Catholic and Protestant 
churches."3 Horton explained that the Catholic believes that 
the nReal Presence" of the living Christ can be encountered only 
1. Horton, A Psychological Approach to Theology, p. 181. 
2. Mathews, The Faith of Modernism, p. 124. 
3· Horton, ~cit., p-.-155. 
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through the visible and tangible elements of the Holy Eucharist 
which are dispensed by the Priests of the Church. He pointed 
out that the Protestant does not relate the experience of the 
living Christ so closely to the Church, since he believes that 
it is mystically available to all without mediation. Horton 
quoted Schleiermacher's assertion that " the Catholic comes to 
Christ through the Church, while the Protestant comes to the 
1 Church through Christ." Horton believed that both the Catho-
lic idea and the Protestant objection to the Catholic tendency 
"to find Christ literally, materially . and perfectly embodied 
in the ritual, dogma, and government of the Church1 112 must be 
re garded as correct. He recognized the greatness of the Catho-
lic doctrine of the Real Presence of the living Christ in the 
Church, and suggested that, with reservations, Protestants could 
appropriate it. He quickly added, however, that Protestants 
must continue to protest against the notion that this Real 
Presence is most perfectly manifested in the Eucharist. "Christ's 
Real Presence is primarily to be found in the individual and 
corporate life of Christ-like people.n3 
Horton's careful and sympathetic analysis of Catholic-Pro-
testant differences was unparalleled in liberal theologies. In 
fact, the amount of space that he devoted to developing his doc-
trine of the Church was quite remarkable for a liberal of that 
1. Horton, A Psfichological Approach to Theology, p. 155. 
2. Ibid., p~ 16 . 
3· Ibid. 
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time. 1 Mathews had not concerned himself with the doctrine or 
2 the Church, Bowne spoke disparagingly of the Church, and 
Rauschenbusch and Coe referred to the Church only in passing, 
as an adjunct to the Kingdom of God. 3 Only Brown seemed to 
hold the Church in high re gard, and he even placed the doctrine 
of the Church at the be ginning of his theology.4 Moreover, be-
fore Horton, he alone among the liberals proclaimed that tt the 
way to meet the Catholic claim is not to denounce it, but to 
understand it."5 
b. The True Church 
Horton admitted the correctness and importance of the Cath-
olic effort to maintain contact with the historic Jesus through 
the visible Church , but he suggested .that their conception of 
contact through hand-laying apostolic succession was seriously 
deficient. True apostolic succession, he proclaimed, maintains 
the connection with the historic Jesus by " the contact of life 
upon life--a vital sacrament which the layman is often more com-
petent to perform than the clergyman1" 6 Moreover, the influence 
of Christlike men and women moves out beyond the confines of the 
institutional Church and into all the areas of the surrounding 
civilization. Obviously, the 11 body of Chri s tn cannot be limited 
to the visible Church. 
1. See Mathews, The Faith of Modernism. 
2. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, pp, 290, 305, 323, 257-58. 
3· Rauschenbusch, ~ Theology !££ the Social GosSel, p. 143; and 
Coe, The Religion of a Mature Mind, pp. 181- 2, 381. 
4• Brown~hristian Theology in Outline, pp, 57-58. 
5. Ibid., P• 70. ---
6. Horton, A Psychological Approach to Theology, p. 164. 
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Horton saw the true Church working in homes, schools, 
hos pitals, and social agencies as well as in ecclesiastical 
organizations and called for an expanded conception of the 
Church which would include "many persons and institutions that 
hardly know the name of Christ." 1 Nevertheless, he argued 
that if they have truly "been drawn into the apostolic succes-
sian through the kindling touch of Christian life upon non-
Christian life," then they have become, in fact; 11 parts of the 
living, growing Body of the Living Christ. 11 2 
He admitted that such a !! body" was really not a very ade-
quate one for the great Spirit of Christ, but at the present 
time, that is the best He has. Horton ventured to predict, how-
ever, that the future would see a better body, "a Christian 
world civilization." 3 \Vhen Horton pushed his concept of the 
true Church--the body of Christ--to the point where it coin-
cided with the ideal human culture, he was following the lead 
of the liberals who nad preceded him •. Bowne had said that " the 
Church will not become the Church of Humanity until it finds a 
holy p lace for all the interests of humanity,"4 and Rauschen-
busch had proclaimed that the saving power with the Church 
"rests on the presence of the Kingdon of God within her."5 
1. Ibid., p. 16~. 
2. Ibid . 
3· I'5Td. : 
4. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, pp. 345-46. 
5. Rauschenbusch, ~ Theolog! for the Social Gospel, p. 130. 
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2. Building Religious Consensus 
a. The Necessity of Agreement 
Horton chose to refer to the concept of the Kingdom of God 
by the more modern term, nworld civilization." He developed 
his doctrine of the ideal society in the light of a vivid aware-
ness of current events. As long ago as the early 1930's he was 
aware of the growing tension. between the cultures of the West 
and those of the East--in particular that of the Soviet Union.l 
So concerned was he, that he wrote: · "We must have a world ci v-
ilization, if we are not to cut one another's throats. rr 2 That 
he was not considering some secular utopia is evident in his 
declaration that such a world civilization could exist only if 
it was grounded in a world religion. By that he meant that 
East and West must reach a common agreement regarding the na-
ture of the world and the laws which should govern human con-
duct. He cited classic Athens, medieval Europe, and ancient 
China as examples of this kind of achievement on a smaller scale 
which resulted in the flowering of great cultures~3 
b. Unity with Diversity 
Horton next proceeded to inquire into the probable nature 
of the universal religion that is to ground the world civiliza-
tion. The very fact that he would even consider such a matter 
is proof of his extremely open-minded attitude in this area of 
1. Horton, A Ps~chological Approach to Theology, pp . 168-69. 
2. Ibid.:, p-; 16 . 
3· Ibid. , 
212 
theology. The other liberals, who took their stand in the camp 
of Christian theism, seemed to :take it for granted that Chris-
tianity was the final religion and ·that the Kingdom of God would 
appear in all its fullness as soon as the Christian Gospel had 
been imparted to all the world. For example Brown had written 
of the Church that 11 since its God is Lord of the world, its 
mission is universal."l 
Horton's own familiarity with the sciences led him to list 
humanistic scientism as the first possible rallying point. He 
took seriously "the possibility that the world may be united in 
the acceptance of a secular, humanistic creed, based solely 
upon the hope of man's mastery over nature and his destiny, 
through science and the machine." 2 Then with the prophet's 
discriminating sense he observed that this possibility lf is be-
ing seriously entertained and explored, by those who are guiding 
the reconstruction of civilization in Russia and Turkey, and to 
some extent in China."3 He saw the power of scientism as re-
siding in the universal nature of its scientific principles and 
the leveling effect which machinery and technology exerted upon 
society. He concluded, however, that such a religion will, ul-
'· 
timately, fail because it can never satisfy man 1 s deepest needs. 
He explained that man "craves light upon the mystery of his 
destiny, and needs objects of devotion higher than himself, 
1. Brown, - Christian Theology in Outline, p. 70. 
2. Horton, A Psychological Approach to Theology, p. 170. 
3· Ibid. - .. .._ . 
capable of quickening his deeper emotions and flooding his ex-
istence with meaning. 111 
Horton next considered the claim of Christianity to be the 
unifying world religion. In a mood completely at odds with his 
liberal colleagues, he began with the assertion that certainly, 
Protestantism could not qualify. He added the stinging observa-
tion that "the notion of the whole world becoming Baptist, or 
Presbyterian, or even Protestant-in- general is simply too gro-
tesque to be entertained for a moment." 2 The liberal~ seemed 
to develop their theology on the assumption that when the King-
dom arrived, it would do StO in liberal guise. Rauschenbusch 
certainly gave this impression when he proclaimed that liberals 
had recovered and restored the Kingdom idea. 3 Because Protes-
tantism is closely tied to the middle class and various nation-
states, Horton believed that it is simply too provincial to 
serve as the world religion.4-
He plainly said that Catholicism appeared to him to have 
a much better chance of becoming the religion of the world. This 
statement has no parallel in liberal writings just prior to and 
during h is time. Brown may have been conciliatory in his words 
about Catholicism but he was also very sure that it represented 
the :1 traditional" type of religion and was in conflict with the 
"vital" religion of Protestantism.5 Horton appreciated the 
1. Ibid., P• 171. 
2. Ibid., p. 172. 
3· Rauschenbusch, · A Theology for the Social Gospel, p. 139. 
See also Brown, Christian Theology in Outline, p. 192. 
4· Horton, ££· cit., p.172. 
5. Brown, Christian Theology in Outline, p. 70. 
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ability of Catholicism "to absorb elements from its cultural 
environment, and build them into a rich yet harmonious whole."l 
Cathelic Christianity, he asserted, is cosmopolitan, and it 
knows how to appeal to the masses. But he concluded that nit 
has one fatal defect; it apparently cannot reconcile itself 
with the modern spirit of free inquiry; and it accordingly seeks 
to create religious unity by coercive authority rather than by 
free consent."2 
For all his sympathy toward the Catholic approach, Horton 
was finally in agreement with the liberals in his attitude 
toward Roman Catholicism. For if there is one thing that marks 
one as a liberal, it is resistance to authority and it was at 
precisely this point that Horton condemned Catholicism. He 
offered the hope that there might be a revival of Catholic 
philosophy which would reconcile religion with the findings of 
modern science and thereby purge the Catholic Church of its 
popular superstitions. Such an occurrence would make a Catho-
lie-Christian hegemony possible. The other Christian alter-
native is for Protestants to overcome their divisiveness, 
recognize their narrowness "and lay claim to that great Catholic 
heritage which ought to belong equally to all Christians." If 
they did, "there migbt be some chance of a Protestant world 
hegemony."3 
1. Horton, A Psychological Approach to Theology, p. 172. 
2. Ibid. -
3. Ibid., p. 173. 
id.LO 
He cited religious syncretism such as that exemplified by 
Theosophy and Bahaism, as the third possibility. But he be-
lieved that such apparent agreement was reached only because 
the adherents had actually accepted one of the great religions 
as the ground of their system. Beneath the differing termi-
nologies of the various syncretistic systems, he believed -that 
he detected an identical religious orientation, i.e., 11 a com-
mon mystic experience, and a common faith in the Absolute Being 
who is the ground of all existence." 1 For Horton, it was obvi-
ous that Hinduism was the basic reli gion involved here, whether 
it was admitted or not. Thus, religious syncretism is really 
nothlng more than the absorption of many religious ideas into 
the all-embracing Hindu philosophy. This reduction of all the 
distinctive insights of the various religions to a least com-
mon denominator of f aith he flatly rejected. 
In Horton's opinion, the world religion of tomorrow will 
transcend all of the afore-mentioned options. Since none of -
the religions are perfect, they must all learn from one another 
2 
and, no less important, from the scientific spirit. He ex-
plicitly rejected any artificial uniformity or 11 Least Common 
Denominator of existing faiths.n3 It is vitally important, he 
wrote, that each of the great religions 11 follow its own logic, 
while respecting the obligation of the others to do the same. n4 
1. Ibid., P• 174· 
2. Ibid.; pp. 167-74-
3· Ibid., P • 174. 
4. Ibid. 
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He was much impressed with the statement of Rabbi Silver "that 
religions may meet and co-operate without endeavoring to swallow 
one another up, ••• that there are in every religion precious 
values which are necessarily private and distinctive, and which 
would be lost to humanity if that religion permitted itself to 
be dissolved in some general melting pot."l Horton envisioned 
a new world which would be progressively realized as the various 
religions pushed "co-operatively toward a faith that lies 
somewhere in the region to which the highest and most vigorous 
affirmation of the greatest religions seem to point. tt2 For this 
bold e·clecticism he made no excuse whatsoever, though there exists 
no parallel to it in any of the theologies of the leading Chris-
tian theistic liberals of his early period. 
He recognized that Christians will "naturally hope that 
Christianity will contribute more than the others to the new 
faith." 3 However, cautioned Horton, they must realize that the 
new world religion will be as different from present-day 
Christianity as "the Christianity which conquered the Roman 
Empire was richer and more manifold than the Jewish Christianity 
which first entered the Mediterranean melting pot."4 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Horton, A Psychological Approach to Theol~, p. 168, from 
Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, Religion in ~ Cnanging World (New 
York: Richard K. Smith, Inc., l930}7 
Horton, A Psychological Approach!£ Theology, p. 174. 
Ibid., p. 175. 
Ibid.; and Horton, Theism and the Modern Mood, p. 114. 
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Though Horton was not sure whether the world religion would 
bear the name "Christianity," he did believe that 11 it would 
surely be Christian in spirit. 11 1 He felt very certain that "if 
any one person is to become the flag, the emblem, the organizing 
center of world unity in religion ••• it is most likely to be 
Jesus. 11 2 But, he explained, it would be the Christ-principle in 
a state as advanced beyond the living Christ of today as the 
living Christ of today is advanced beyond the historic Jesus of 
the first century. He described this process as "a natui•al ex-
pansion of the original Chr:l.stian impulse, combined with an 
nourished by all sorts of congenial materials from foreing 
sources. " 3 
Horton'~ radical hopes were tempered by a religious realism 
at this point. He cautioned that until all the other great re-
ligions haq assimilated the best implied in the word ~•christ," 
Christians must maintain their separate Church. 4 His appre-
elation for the distinctiveness of Christ and his loyalty to the 
Church were summed up in these words: "I still know nothing 
diviner than Christian love at its best, and no institution 
worthier of a man's unreserved devotion than the institution 
which was born of this spirit, and seeks to make it universal."5 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Horton, A Ps§chological !E££oach to Theologz, p. 175. 
Ibid • , p. 15 • 
Ib id • , p. 1 7"5. 
Ibid. , p • 17 6 • 
Horton, Theism and the Modern Mood, p. 115. 
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Nevertheless, he saw the distant time of which St. Paul spoke 
when Christ shall "deliver up the Kingdom" to his Father, that 
henceforth "God may be all in all.ul Moses and Buddha must 
surrender their leadership at the same time, he concluded. 2 
3. The Kingdom of God~ ~World Civilization 
a. Christian Presuppositions 
For Horton, there could be no rational hope for the Kingdom 
of God apart from faith in the possibility of human brotherhood 
in earthly history. This was a typical liberal attitude and 
finds its parallel in Mathews' statements: "I believe in the 
ultimate triumph of love and justice because I believe in the God 
revealed in Jesus Christ", and "I believe in the practicability 
of the teaching of Jesus in social life."3 This belief Horton 
supplemented with the idea that the cosmos is ultimately friendly 
to man and that it is presided over by a Father.4 Upon this 
foundation, he believed, Christians rest their ideal of the 
abundant life. The ideal is not pure abstraction, he continued, 
for the Christian graces of faith, hope, and love, had always 
presupposed the more obvious and concrete classical virtues of 
prudence, justice, temperance, and courage. Horton was in 
thorough agreement with St. Thomas Aquinas at this point, who 
he explained, was "not so much repairing deficiencies in the 
1. I Cor. 15: 24-28. 
2. Horton, A Psychological Approach to Theology, p. 176. 
3. Mathews, The Faith of Modernism, pp. 180-81. 
4. Horton, 2£· cit., p:-129. 
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Christian Gospel" as he was "making explicit its own under-
lying prasuppositions. 111 Horton did not elaborate upon the 
details of the ideal civilization as the liberal thinkers 
before him had dona.2 
Horton placed the blame for the failure of the Kingdom to 
appear squarely on the shoulders of the orthodox theologians. 
"Ever since the rise of monasticism," he lamented, "the Church 
has tended to look upon human nature as something inherently 
• • 
• evil."3 Such a theological concept, he continued, has 
appealed to man's lower motives, when the proper c.ourse would 
have been to stake all upon man's responsiveness to love and 
trust.4 This faith in the ability of man to respond to love 
was certainly shared by all of the liberals.5 But not all would 
have placed the blame so completely on orthodox teachings con-
cerning man. Clarke, for example, made a very complete cata-
logue of sins and concluded with the statement that "observation 
shows that sin is the abiding habit of the human race •• • • 
Theology encounters it not as an element in some theory, but 
as a vast and terrible reality.u6 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Horton, A Psychological ~tproach to Theology, p. 114. 
Sea Brown, Christian Thao ogy in Outline, p. 195; Mathews, 
The Faith of Modernism, p. 167; Bowne, Studies in 
Christianiti, p. 322; and Coe, The Religion of a Mat~ 
Mind, pp. 28-29. 
Horton, £E· cit., pp. 126-27. 
Ibid. 
Sea Coe, The Religion of a Mature Mind, pp. 313-325 for a 
good representative exampLe of how the liberals viewed the 
possible response of man--in this case the child--to love 
and nurture. 
Clarke, An Outline of Christian Theology, pp. 230-31. 
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Horton concluded that society will be saved through 
sociological techniques. The other liberals had also placed 
great emphasis upon the need to pay attention to sociological 
factors,l but they had not reduced the sine qua ~ of salvation 
to such capsule form. 
b. Guarded Optimism 
That the Kingdom would eventually be realized in earthly 
history, Horton ardently believed. However, the awful experience 
of World War I had expelled any illusions that he ndght have 
held about the path being an easy and short one, beginning here 
with all the great values of the status quo. Of his post-World 
War I generation, he wrote: "There is no rosy optimism about 
the Christian attitude toward the existing world order; it is 
grimly realistic, to the point of bitter cynicism.tt2 Horton bad 
completely rejected the Hegelian suggestion that history will 
continue to advance along the path of rationality.3 He was fully 
aware that there might very well be a recurrence of "one of' 
those great cultural catastro~ which have from time to time 
turned the clock of world history back for a century or two. 11 4 
Horton was not the first liberal to temper his optimistic hopes 
about the realization of the Kingdom with a cautious realism. 
Rauschenbusch, who is recognized as the liberal prophet of the 
1. See the references to the liberal expressions, cited above, 
with regard to details of the ideal society. 
2. Horton, ! Psychological Approach to Theology, p. 130. 
3. Ibid., p. 177. 
4. Ibid. 
Kingdom, pa.r excellence .. had expressed himself as follows: "The 
coming of the Kingdom of God will not be by peaceful develop-
ment only, but by conflict with the Kingdom of ~il. We should 
estimate the power of sin too lightly if we forecast a smooth 
road." 1 
With true prophetic insight Horton saw, as far back as 1931, 
that the greatest single obstacle blocking the way toward a 
fuller realization of the world civilization would be the clash 
of interest between, what he termed, 11 the intolerant secularism 
of Soviet Russia" and the "social conservatism of the great his-
2 toric religions." If armed conflict resulted, he warned, 
orderly progress would be impossible for the next one or two 
hundred yearB, Moreover, it would be a tragedy of the deepest 
proportions "for Russian Communism is essentially religious in 
spirit," and the Christian faith "has much more in connnon with 
the Soviet ideal than might appear from a casual glance at 
_American Christianity."3 Horton believed that the only solution 
lay in the hope that the Western partisans for religion will 
begin "to appreciate the greatness of the Communist faith, and 
r espond to it as a challenge rather than a menace."4 He con-
eluded this meditation with a challenge. ''On the plane of war 
and violence, a conflict between Communism and religion would 
be a calamity for mankind: on the pla ne of discussion and 
1. Rauschenbusch, ~ Theology for the Social Gospel, 
2. Horton, ~ Ps~chological Approach to Theology, p. 
3· Ibid.; p. 17 . 
4· Ibid . . 
p. 266. 
177· 
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emulation, such a conflict would tend to bring out the best in 
both contestants."! Of the liberals reviewed in Chapter II 
Horton stood alone, as one who incorporated a careful analysis 
of current world events into his view of the coming of the 
Kingdom of God. 
Even in this early liberal period, he was becoming aware of 
a stirring within the vitals of the Christian Church itself 
which he believed was to have a profound effect upon the 
realization of the ideal world civilization. He saw the Jerusalem 
Council of A.D. 1928 a parallel to the Jerusalem Council in A.D. 
45. He was encouraged because the modern council indicated that 
the Church was still "sloughing off provincialism" in order that 
the essential mes8age of the Gospel might "be made available and 
2 intelligible in an enlarging environment." 
F. SUMMARY OF THE SIGNIFICANT IDEAS EXPRESSED 
IN HORTON'S EARLY LIBERAL PERIOD 
1. Method 
Horton rejected idealistic philosophy because he believed 
that it failed to pay sufficient attention to the findings of 
the natural sciences which he held to be of tremendous importance 
for modern theology. In this respect, he differed with some 
liberals who, although they valued scientific findings as much 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
as he, continued to view them in the light of idealistic phi-
losophy.1 Horton adopted the empirical method of the natural 
sciences, but supp lemented scientific objectivity with the con-
templative objectivity of faith. He went beyond most of the 
liberals, with the p ossible exception of Coe, in his apprecia-
tion of psychology as affording an important source of data for 
use in constructing a modern theology. However, he was aware 
of the danger in subjectivism which is always present when psy-
chology is employed and rejected extreme behaviorism outright. 
He endeavored to build a ''realisticn or Tl empirical" theology 
that would convey a degree o f authority to the modern free-
thinking mind, without seeming to be infallible. His enthusia-sm 
and e x tensive and sometimes almost exclusive employment of 
scientific method and finding s placed him with the liberals, 
but left of center. 
2. God 
Horton rejected that concept of God that had been born of 
metaphysical speculation, and in this he paralleled most other 
liberal theologians. He concerned himself with the quest for 
the God of religion and he believed that he found amp le proof 
of the objective existence of this God in personal experience, 
the history of the human race, and the teleological drift in-
herent in life. He agreed with his liberal predecessors that 
a cosmic Mind possessing an at-least-human personality must be 
1. See McConnell, Bowne and Knudson. 
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postulated to explain the teleological facts of life. True to 
previous liberal convictions, he emphasized both the immanence 
and transcendence of God. He thoroughly rejected all finitistic 
conceptions of God, and concluded that the problem of natural 
evil must be left with faith, which somehow balances God's 
power and love and trusts in the ultimate victory of righteous 
love over all kinds of evil. 
3. Man 
The extremity of Horton's liberalism found its clearest 
expression in his doctrine of man, wherein he rejected the 
Augustinian view of man as barbaric. He preferred to view 
human nature through the eys of modern psychology and, in so 
doing, found in man a whole series of non-moral mechanisms but 
not a trace of "original sin." He did recognize the existence 
of sin, but he also believed that psychology had revealed the 
existence of a very similar class of "moral diseases" which 
must be sharply differentiated therefrom. The treatment of 
sin should follow the techniques employed by psychiatrists and 
case workers in their treatment of delinquency and neurosis. 
He grounded his doctrine of human immortality on the empirical 
evidence for the "insurgence" and 11 resurgence 11 of life in its 
biological, sociological, and spiritual levels. Horton com-
bined a recognition of the biological stages of life with his 
Christian convictions to obtain a set of "over-beliefs" con-
cerning the nature of life-after-death which closely paralleled 
other liberal views of immortality. 
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4. Christ 
I n accor d wi th the liberal tendency, Horton stressed the 
importance of the his t orical Jes us. Whil e he did not emphas ize 
the role of metaphysica l t heorie s that relate to Christ's person 
and work, he did confess that there was truth inherent in them. 
He appreciated the value of the moral theory of the Atonement, 
but went beyond the liberals at tbis point, in that he 
emphasized the objective factors involved in that drama which, 
he believed, most liberals had not suffic i ently appreciated. He 
also believed that the liberals had failed to make enough room 
for the l iv i ng Ghrist in their Christological construction. He 
employed psychology to analyze the concept of the Christ of 
faith and concluded that it is a personified ideal that the 
believer constructs out of the Christian ideals which he 
encounters throughout lif e. The historic Jesus mus t continually 
correct and inform this idea, but the ideal of the living Christ 
goes beyond the first century Jesus and incorporates all the 
Christian insight of the centuries. Moreover, he concluded, it 
opens the door to moral power because it represents the objec-
tive reality of God Himself. Horton subjected the problem of 
the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith to a more 
systematic analysis than the liberals before him had done. 
5. Church and Kingdom 
On the whole, Horton appreciated the Church more than other 
liberals, with the possible exception of Brown. He saw the true 
Church present wherever earnest Christians worked and witnessed 
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in home, factory, school and hospital. He moved ahead of the 
liberals when he revealed his deep and genuine appreciation 
for certain Catholic interpretations of Church and sacrament, 
though he never ceased to hold his fundamentally liberal-
Protestant views. Like other liberals, he laid great stress 
on the Kingdom of God, which he identified with a religious 
world civilization. He believed that a world religio~consensus 
must be first realized. He stated very plainly that none of 
the great religions or "isms" could possibly become the needed 
world religion. Horton again moved to the extreme left of the 
liberal camp when he included even liberal-Protestant Chris-
tianity in his blanket rejection. The new -universal religion 
would include those truths toward which the great religions, at 
their best, pointed. Certainly, he admitted, the Spirit of 
Christ would be central, though the world religion would probably 
not be Christian in name. He rejected any belief in automatic 
or easy progress toward the Kingdom, and in this he echoed the 
thoughts of Rauschenbusch himself; but he did believe that 
ultimately, the earthly Kingdom of God, or world civilization, 
would be a reality. With this courageous confession he took 
his stand with the liberals. 
CHAPTER IV 
1933-1939: HORTON'S REALISTIC PERIOD 
A. REALISTIC METHOD 
1. Realistic View of the Theological Crisis 
a. The Death of Liberalism as a System 
In an article written for the Christian Century in 19391 
Horton made a public admission that his thinking had undergone 
a radical transformation during the years from 1934 to 1939. He 
alluded to the period in his thinking prior to 1934, and de-
~bed it as a continuation of the thinking expressed in his 
book, Theology~ the Modern~ (published in 1930), in 
which he tried to interpret the Christian gospel in terms that 
would be acceptable to an age that was scientifically literate 
and possessed a liberal orientation.2 After 1934, he explained, 
his thinking was an amplification of the ideas formulated in 
his book Realistic ~heology (published in 1934) which grew out 
1. 
2. 
Walter M. Horton, "Between Liberalism and the New Orthodoxy, n 
The Christian ~entury, LXVII (May 17, 1939), p. 637. 
Ibid • . 
- -
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of John Bennett's question, "After liberalism ..... what'l"l In view 
of Horton's numerous articles and books which were all permeated 
by the liberal spirit2 his book Realistic Theology came as some~ 
thing of a shock to the theological world.3 "It seems to me, as 
to Bennett, 11 wrote Horton, "that liberalism as a system of 
theology has collapsed and must be replaced. 11 4 He prophesied · 
that a new theology grounded in the "general 'realistic' tendency" 
would replace the older liberal theology.5 
He reasoned that liberalism had long been hard pressed by 
the fundamentalists on the right and the humanists on the left. 
Liberals could not move to the right without forfeiting - their 
scientific method, and they could not move further toward the 
left without losing their theistic faith. Moreover, in their 
zeal to modernize the Christian message they had entered into a 
compromising alliance with the intellectual outlook of Western 
1. John Bennett, "After Liberalism-..;.What'/ 11 The Christian Century, 
L (November 8, 1933), 1403-06. 
2. Horton, "Reasons for Believing in God," Journal of Religion, 
III (November, 1923}; Horton, "What Kind of Religious 
Experience is to be Expected of the Scientifically Trained 
College Student?" Religious Education, XX (February, 1925); 
Horton, "Objective -Elements in the Experience of God," 
Journal of Religion, VII (October, 1927); Horton, "Changes 
in the Concept of Religion Necessitated by Psychology," 
Religious Education, XXIII (January, 1928); Horton, 
"Psychological Approach to Theology," Journal of Religion, 
IX (July, 1929); Horton, 11What God Means to Me7 
Intercollegian, XLVII (1930); Horton, Theism and ~Modern 
Mood; Horton, A Psychological Approach !£ Theo!Ogz; Horton, 
Theism and the Scientific Spirit. 
3. Horton,-rrsetween Liberalism and New Orthodoxy," The Christian 
Centurz, LXVII (May, 1939), p. 637. 
4. Walter M. Horton, Realistic Theology (New York~ Harper and 
Brothers, 1934) / Preface, p. ix. 
5. Ibid. 
civilization, and even that of a particular segment of that so-
ciety, i.e., the middle class. 1 W~en the West began to decline, 
liberalism also began to fail. "O irony of ironies," lamented 
Horton, "its 'thought forms' have become 'out-modedl' The 
thoroughness with which liberalism did its work has been its 
own undoing; having completely assimilated the characteristic 
ideas of a particular era i~ history, it was foredoomed to perish 
with the passing of the era.n 2 
The method of liberalism was inadequate, he charged, and 
eventually contribut~d to the decline of liberal theology. In 
his view the belief that "scientific correctness and philosoph-
ical breadth," by themselves, could make the Christian message 
relevant for moderns, was an erroneous premise that resulted in 
rationalizing away some of the deepest Christian truths.3 He 
was certain that the nexcessive trust in human science and human 
eo-operative endeavor" displayed by the older liberalism had been 
proved fallacious in modern t1mes.4 
b. Conserving Liberal Values 
Horton did not want to be misunderstood, so he took special 
pains in his next book (Contemporary English ~eology, published 
in 1936), to make it clear that it was liberalism.!!.! system 
which he regarded as dead, and not the liberal attitude which he 
continued to respect ~d employ. He continued to recommend the 
1. Ibid.,; p; ~· 
2~ IblC!. 
3 ~ 'I"66'Q. , p • 39 • . . . 
4. Walter M~ Horton~ · Contem~orary En~lish Theology; (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 193 ), P• 11 • 
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liberal spirit to those "who are still struggling in the chains 
or dogmatism."l Moreover, he recognized that there were genuine 
values that had been developed by liberalism and he earnestly 
desired to salvage "whatever genuine values may be rescued f'rom 
the wreck."2 
Chief among these values, for Horton, was the idea of "con-
tinuity" which is the concept of' "the unity of all things in 
God." Horton believed that this concept could be modified, but 
never abandoned.3 He admitted that an unqualif'ied emphasis 
upon it could lead to pantheism, but he was also aware that a 
complete denial of it would lead to an equally disastrous deism.4 
another value was lib~ism's fair-mindedness and eagerness to 
learn from opposing systems of thought. This spirit has been re-
tained by many liberals even though they have gone over to 
conservative camps. Horton's hope was that "this liberalism-~one­
into-solution" would eventuate in a new spirit of unity between 
Catholic and Protestant as well as between liberal and conservative 
Protestant. 5 Thus, it became clear that Horton desired to conserve 
liberal values and give them expression "in a new comprehensive 
body of truth. n6 
It was Horton's major premise that if any of the values of' 
liberalism were to be given new meaningful expression, it would 
have to be done in the new spirit of the age. •one word alone 
1. Ibid., p. ix. 
2. Horton, Realistic Theologz, p. 15. 
3. Ibid., p. 33. 
4. Ibid., p. 34. 
5. HOrton, Contemporary English Theology, p. x. 
6. ~., p. 173. 
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comes to us clearly, so far, out of the darkness ahead, as a 
prophecy of the age to come; but in this word, as it seems to 
me, we have a reliable clue to the whole spirit and temper of 
the new age. The word is realism." 1 He defined the realistic 
spirit as a craving for objective facts, ''however disagreeable," 
and a disdain for subjective phantasy, "however glorious." 2 The 
realists, among whom he included himself, were in revolt against 
the romanticism and false optimism of nineteenth century lib-
eralism.3 That Horton's break with liberalism was not as com-
plete as some of his statements in Realistic Theolog implied, 
was again made clear in Contemporary Enslish Theology, when he 
said that in the former book he "meant to suggest that what has 
come to be called 'realism' was the true heir of liberalism, 
and stood in vital continuity with the liberal spirit, attitude, 
and method of approach, however it might differ from the recent 
Modernistic system of theology which has 'had its day and 
ceased to ber."4 
However, even in Realistic Theology Horton had been suffi-
ciently dispa~sionate to recognize the latent dangers in "real-
ism." In particular, he cited "the danger of emphasizing the 
bald and massive aspects of reality at the expense of those in-
visible capillary forces which do not strike the eye of the 
1. Horton, -Realistic Theology, p. 10. 
2. Ibid., p~ 12. 
3· ibid • . 4. Horton, Contemporary English Theology, P• ix. 
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average observer, but finally split the hardest rock and the 
stoutest walls of social captivity and oppression."1 
2. Nee-orthodox Tendencies 
It was Horton's contention that since liberalism could not 
continue its radical evolution without moving beyond humanism 
into "futilitarianism, 11 it nru.st do an about-face and seek a 
r e .p prochement with conservative theology. In his view, most 
liberals were doing just this. "I have be en so led myself, 11 
proclaimed Horton, "--even to the verge of orthodoxy. 112 He had 
come to the conclusion that ne·o-orthodoxy might very well be 
more than a "weird post-war psychosi~.n3 Perhaps, he suggested, 
if liberalism was purged of its "idealistic illusions" it could 
contribute to the new theology--a "realistic theology~tt4 
Horton found many varieties of "realistic" t he ology cropping 
up in various section~ of Christendom. In Europe, the "theology 
of crisis" was protesting against the "world-affirming 
optimism of Schleiermacher' s theology.•r5 Horton paid tribute 
to the "sense of an extra dimension" which the continental 
theologians displayed. 6 In England, Archbishop Temple was advo-
cating a kind of "Platonic realism."7 In America, Macintosh and 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
s. 
6. 
7. 
Horton, Realistic Theolo~, p. 15. 
Horton, "Between Liberal~m and the New Orthodoxy, 
Christian Century, LXVII (May, 1939), p. 637. 
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I'b'Id. 
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Wieman had collaborated with other like-minded thinkers to pro-
duce a symposium called Religio~ Realism. 1 Reinhold Niebuhr 
was also seen by Horton as a proponent of religious realism.2 
He concluded his list with the statement that "the clearest ex-
pression of it is to be found in Paul Tillich's book on The 
Religious Situation, where the term 1Belief-ful Realism' is used 
to describe the author's position. tt3 The inclusion of Macintosh 
and Wieman makes it clear that, in Horton's view, the realistic 
trend was not limited to people with an orthodox theological 
orientation, but the total scene was one in which the orthodox 
quality of thinking was prominent • 
. 
There could be no doubt that in Horton's thinking realistic 
theology was closer to orthodoxy than liberalism had been. "My 
own center of confidence and hope," he wrote, "has passed from 
science to revelation, from human discovery to divine guidance. 
I would not expunge any chapters or paragraphs from what I have 
written in defense of a scientific natural theology, but I would 
print all such passages in smaller type."4 
3. The Essence of Realistic Method 
a. General Presuppositions 
Horton admitted that the idea of a theological system that 
embraced all known truth, i.e., a modern version of the medieval 
1. Ibid., P• 14. 
2. lbi'd. 
3. Ibid., p. 13. 
4. i!O'rton, "Between Liberalism and the New Orthodoxy," !.!!!, 
Christian Century, LXVII (May, 1939), p. 639. 
scholastic theology, which was justly called the "Queen of the 
Sciences," was all but impossible. This was true because of 
the vast increase in empirical data and a new appreciation of 
the diversities and limitations in the various disciplines. He 
believed that all truths constitute one system for God "but 
the difficulty of correctly visualizing this final harmony is 
such as to discourage the attempt to be completely rational and 
systematic in one's thinking. ttl 
However, though theological systems are difficult to con-
struct, they are nevertheless necessary. Horton recognized the 
serious limitation of the liberal attempts to build a system 
yet he genuinely admired them for the good they had accomplished. 
He believed that the liberal efforts at reconciling Christian 
thought with scientific thought were 11more monumental than the 
medieval attempt to reconcile the Bible and Aristotle."2 There-
fore, he advocated the building of a new theological system, 
but the new systematic theology must go beyond natural theology 
which is the attempt to construct a doctrine of God solely from 
the evidence in nature.n3 He admitted that the chapter entitled 
-
"The God of Human Experience" in his book Theism and the Modern 
~ present•d a doctrine of God based solely on natural theology, 
while the chapter entitled "The God of Christian Faith," in the 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Walter M. Horton, "Revelation," Revelation, ed. John Baillie 
and Hugh Martin (New York: The .Macmillan Co., 1937), p. 267. 
Ibid .• , p. 241. 
lOIC., pp. 268•69. 
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same volume, was more dependent on articles of the Christian 
faith. He noted that since writing Theism and !B! Modern Mood 
he ~d come to "stress the objective side of revelation (divine 
self-disclosure) more than the subjective attitude of venture-
some faith."l 
In constructing the new theology, he continued, it must be 
remembered that th• experimental method cannot be employed as 
it is in the sciences, "since religious experiments cannot be 
conducted under control conditions, in a brief span of space-
time. They are more like the experiments of politics, which 
take centuries to perform, and require steadfast faith in a 
goal that remains invisible."2 The new realistic method must 
dispense with "the judicial mood of cautious tentativeness,n3 
which had been brilliantly developed by Wieman in his attempt to 
construct a truly scientific natural theology. Though Horton 
had once hailed him as a pioneer in a new age,4 he had subse-
quently become convinced that man haspassed from the "age of 
science" to the "age of political thought, with its fierce com-
mitment to unprovable beliefs.n5 He was not pleading for 
irrationalism, for he clearly recognized the dangers and inade-
quacies of Barthianism, which he criticized as being as wide of the 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Ibid., p. 272, n. 1. 
Ibid., p. 273. 
HOrton, Contemporar~ Enilish Theologa' p. 152. 
Horton, "Between Lr era ism and New rthod oxy," The Christian 
Century,LXVII (May, 1939), p. 639. 
~.; and Horton, Realistic Theology, p. 115. 
mark to the right as is humanism to the left. He was adamant 
in his claim that theology should be doctrine grounded in faith 
(Glaubenslehr&), but he was equally forceful in his statement 
that it must not be a blind faith. "It is kindled by a revela-
tion whiCh is itself luminous; which awakens our ambition to 
fit all known truth together according to the pattern given us 
in Chr1st." 1 
Horton's understanding of realistic method centered in the 
attitude "to face all _the ~acts o~ life candi~ly, beginning 
preferably with the most stubborn, perplexing, and dishearten-
2 ing ones." ~e strongly believed that theological method in-
volves digging deeply 11 1nto the solid structure of objective 
reality, until there appears whatever ground of courage, hope, 
and faith is actually there, independent of human preferences 
and desires."3 Realistic method must not begin by postulating 
the existence of the kind of God that is believed to be conso-
nant with human ideas of moral! ty • .. It will not begin by assum-
ing the Hegelian dictum that "the real is the rational and the 
rational the real." 
"It is prepared to accept a God who is a 'consuming fire' 
and a terrible Judge as well as a loving Father, and it is will-
ing to recognize chaotic, tragic, uncontrollable, and even 
devilish factors in reality, if candid observations lead to 
1. Horton; "Revelation," Revelation, ed. John Baillie and Hugh 
Martini P• 273. 
2~ Horton, · Re·alistic Theology, p. 38. 
3· ~· · 
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such conclusions."l The next step was to rormulate a general 
concept that would, as far as possible, cover all the data. The 
hypothesis would be subject to rurther elaboration and revision 
when warranted by additional observations and experiences. 
He stressed the ract that the realistic method would employ 
reason "enriched by the data or religious experience."2 But 
it should also be noted that there were other liberals who 
were apparently also aware or the need to "enrich" reason with 
religious experience. For instance, Bowne had said that 11 the 
basal ractors of the Christian religion are not merely rational 
truths to be discovered by reflection, they are also and more 
especially facts to be learned by evidence.n3 Even Macintosh, 
one of the more radical of the liberals, had noted the ralsity 
of the view that "the ultimate authority in religion • • • ie 
the •dry light or reason. '"4 Horton did allow that the realis-
tic method, as he conceived it, had three important points in 
common with the older liberalism: (1) love of truth, (2) an 
appeal to experience, and (3) the readiness t o accept new 
knowledge when it is reliably attested.5 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Ibid • , p • 39. 
Horton, "Revelation," Revelation, ed. John Baillie and Hugh 
Martin, p. 272. 
Bowne, Studies in Christianity. pp. ·23-24. 
Macintosh, Theolo~ ~ !a ·Empirical Science, pp. 105-106. 
Horton, Realistic heology, p. 39. 
b. The Analysis of Reason 
(1) Values of Reason 
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Horton had become more appreciative of orthodox theology 
and its awa reness of supra-rational values, but he never em-
braced irrationalism. He called attention to the fact that 
the Christian Church has never been long content with the ex-
treme kind of non-rational theology that was emanating from 
Germany in the 1930 1s.l In the very midst of his new awareness 
of conservative values, he was disturbed lest the orthodox claims 
of divine revelation "be embraced with fanatical fervor, and 
understood in a superstitious sense.n2 He believed that the 
primary dictum for systematic theology was God's special reve-
lation in Jesus Christ and in the history of Israel, but that 
"it must use rational methods in expounding and confirming the 
supra-rational revelation committed to its care.n3 Theology 
must either use reason to integrate revelation with common knowJ-
e d ge or assume that man lives in a chaotic world presided over 
by an irrational God. 4 Horton thus saw as one value of reason, 
its usefulness in constructing a natural theology which would 
supplement revelational theology. In a wider context, he saw 
another value of reason in connection with philosophy of reli-
gion. Its role in that discipline would be to compare and 
1. Horton, "Revelation," Revelation, ed. John Baillie and Hugh 
Martin, pp. 261-62. 
2. Ib id • , p. 227 • 
3. Ibid., p. 273. 
4. Ibid • , p. 272 • 
evaluate, and thereby help verify, Christian claims with those 
of non-Christians.l This function of reason was particularly 
meaningful to Horton, who was aware that many people regarded 
the idea of God as "a mere subjective delusion."2 He believed 
that it was the task of reason to "establish it as a matter of 
knowledge that some divine reality, whatever its ultimate nature 
may be, is surely there."3 
(2) Limitations of Reason 
Horton began by showing how reason in the service of the 
exact sciences is limited. These disciplines exist only by 
virtue of abstraction, i.e., phenomena which exist outside of 
their empirical observation (in the narrow or positivistic sense 
of the term) are not considered. Horton lists the following as 
examples of areas beyond the concern of science~ (1) all 
phenomena which cannot be put in a class or treated as instances 
of a general law, such as private and unrepeatable aspects of 
reality; (2) value judgments; and (3) all questions of ulti-
mate origin, nature, meaning and destiny.4 He pointed out that 
these are the very questions that concern man most and since 
reason cannot deal with them adequately, man cannot live by 
reason alone .5 
1. Ibid., pp. 2'7Q-71. 
2. Ibid., p. 2'71. 
3. "!'SSd. 
4. Ibid., pp. 245-46. 
5. Ibid., P• 246. 
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It is true, continued Horton, that reason in the service of 
philosophy takes up the discarded data of values and meanings 
and attempts to relate them to laws and facts. This philosophic 
activity purifies, disciplines, and guides man's religious 
thought, but Horton believed that such reason "endlessly 
approaches a goal which it never reaches."1 He plainly declared 
that none of the great issues, viz., monism versus pluralism, 
idealism versus materialism, and determinism versus libertarian-
ism, can ever be brought to the point of decision by reason 
alone.2 He reflected Kierkegaard's concern for man's exis-
tential predicament and immediate decision, when he accused 
philosophy of being unable to tell men "now" and with absolute 
certainty what object is worthy ef supreme devotion.3 
Furthermore, he charged that philosophy is unable to gain 
a true view of values and norms because the reason it employs is 
"morally inadequate." Horton explained this by affirming that 
"the morally twisted person cannot correctly see the saving 
truth without which he cannot be delivered from his twist.n4 
Moreover, reason is limited by human finitude. All of man's 
logical presuppositions and definitions are products of man's 
very limited point of view. When man criticizes them, he must 
use criteria which are equally inadequate. Thus, human reason 
1. Ibid., p. 247. 
2. IOTcr. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., p. 248. 
can never break out of the circle of its finite perspective.l 
This penetrating criticism of reason per~' not just a 
particular method of rational procedure, marked a sharp turn in 
Horton's thinking. The older liberalism had admitted the need 
to blend natural theology with revelational theology.2 Horton, 
in his first liberal period, had stressed the importance of 
balancing scientific objectivity with "contemplative" objec-
tivity3 and had proclaimed the need for faith as well as 
reason. 4 But nowhere had he gone so far as actually to challenge 
the soundness of reason or intimate that it might be defective 
in some respect, which is exactly what he did in the article he 
contributed to the symposium on revelation, published in 1937. 
c. The Analysis of Revelation 
(1) The Nature and Value of Revelation 
Horton was sharply critical of the liberal temper that had 
gradually robbed the concept of revelation of all its unique-
ness. He charged that the liberals had reduced the idea of 
revelation to the notions of scientific discovery and religious 
insigpt. The distinctive element in the idea of revelation--
the thing that must be re-asserted in the clearest possible 
term.s--is the idea of 11d ivine dis closure of a realm or truth 
1. Ibid., pp. 248-49. 
2. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, pp. 20-22; and McConnell, The 
Diviner Immanence, p. ~2. 
3. Horton, "ob jectiVe Elements in the Experience of God," 
Journal of Religion, VII (October, 1927 ), 339-40. 
4. Horton, Theism and ~Modern Mood, p. 13b . 
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which cannot be apprehended by sense, or by ordinary processes 
of thought."l He made it plain that he did not think that author-
ity and intuition are any more "God-given than the active ra-
tional faculties by which they must be checked and controlled,n2 
since all human knowledge is possible only because it is 
preceded by a divine revelation. Nevertheless, he insisted that 
the term revelation in its religious sense, connotes that the 
datum of revelation is "infinitely more impressive than any 
datum of perception."3 Even more important for Horton than the 
idea of intensity, however, was the aforementioned idea that 
human reason cannot apprehend (to be distinguished from compre-
~) the data of revelation. 
He gave a simple yet effective illustration of the difference 
between discovery and revelation. When a man discovers a new 
truth he shouts "Eurekal I have found it1" but "when he meets 
the God of Grace revealed in the Cross of Christ, he bows in 
gratitude, and confesses, 'Thou hast found me' l tt4 Horton 
defined the difference in the following words. "Reason • • • 
means ordinary reflective thinking, based on sense data (science) 
and appreciative valuation' (philosophy), while revelation strictly 
applies only to ~ intentional self-disclosure of ~ gracious 
1. Horton, "Revelation," Revelation, ed. John Baillie and Hugh 
Martin, pp. 241-42. 
2. Ibid., p. 243. 
3. Ibid. 
4 • 1bi'd. ' p • 24 4. 
God."l He had gone far beyond the older liberalism in the 
degree of his distinction between reason and revelation. 
Horton distinguished between general and special revelation, 
as the older liberalism had done, but, again, the sharpness with 
which he made the distinction was unique. Some liberals like 
Bowne and McConnell declared the need to interpret general 
revelation in the light of special revelation, 2 but the difference 
between the two forms was largely a matter of subjective reaction 
on the part of man. Horton believed that there is an all-
important objective and qualitative difference between the two. 
General revelation, he explained, involves a disclosure of "the 
holy" but it differs from special or "full-fledged revelation" 
in that it does not·disclose the depths of divine initiative.3 
General revelation is impersonal, "it takes the form of law."4 
But in special revelation God reveals "the center of His being, 
His very heart and soul, which are elsewhere hidden by the 
general and impersonal working of the natural and moral orders."5 
Special revelation is the phenomenon of God's personal initiative 
in the love of Christ and the justice of the Covenant that 
supplements the general and impersonal revelation of His power 
in nature .6 
1. Ibid., p. 245. 
2. McConnell, The Diviner Immanence, P• 22; and Mathews, Studies 
in Christianity, pp. 21-22. 
3. HOrton, "Revelation," Revelation, ed. John Baillie and Hugh 
Martin, p. 245. 
4. Ibid., p. 257. 
5. !bid., p. 258. 
6. Ibid., p. 257. 
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(2) Limitations of Revelation 
Horton believed that revelation alone could give man the 
correct perspective on life, but he also held that i t s existence 
apart from reason is just as impossible as the existence of 
reason apart from revelation. Revelation apart from reason 
would be unintelligible. "If reason without revelation is blind, 
revelation without reason is a dazzling, unintelligible light.nl 
There is a sense in which reason must even precede revelation. 
He cited Augustine's admission that the "love of truth" was 
first awakened in him through reading Cicero's Hortensius, and 
Horton affirmed that Augustine could not have received the 
Gospel revelation without the prior grasp of reason.2 But the 
revelation principle appeared again when Horton asserted that 
even this reason is "an inner principle of light" which the 
gracious God bequeaths to all men.3 This assertion of an inti-
mate and continuing interdependence between reason and faith 
and revelation, though not as completely developed, is very 
similar to that developed by 'neWolr4 whose thought was reviewed 
briefly in the provisional definition of neo-liberalism. 5 
1. Ibid., p. 264. 
2. Ibid., p. 265. 
3. I"6''d. 
4. ~arold DeWolf, A Theology of~ Living Church (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, l953), pp. 33-45. 
5. See section on Previous Research in the Field which appears 
in the Introduction, pp. 9-14. 
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Finally, Horton acknowledged that revelation is not the final 
authority in matters of empirical fact and causal law. In that 
realm, reason in the role of natural science is the supreme 
authority. 1 
d. The Use of the Bible 
The liberals had always insisted that the Bible be studied 
as any other piece of literature, i.e., it should be subjected 
to literary and historical criticism. This was emphasized by 
Mathews, Fosdick, and Coe in particular.2 Horton continued to 
believe in the soundness of Biblical criticism as the older 
liberalism had practiced it, but Reinhold Niebuhr had taught 
him that purely historical interpretations are quite incomplete. 
He was convinced that the Christian must look behind the his-
torical meaning for the eternal meaning that is therein expressed.3 
Though this idea had not been prevalent among the older liberals, 
Fosdick had written that "the Bible at its heart cannot be 
known save through spiritual insights." 4 
Horton believed that one of the lasting contributions of 
the orthodox revival would be the discovery of "the dimension 
of depth in the Bible."5 He credited this largely to the work 
1. Horton, "Revelation," Revelation, ed. John Baillie and Hugh 
Martin, p. 264. 
2. Mathews, The Faith of Modernism, p. 31; Fosdick, The Modern 
Use of the Bible, p:-129; and Coe, The Religion of a Mature 
Mind;-p:---9"1. - --
3. waiter M. Horton, The Si~nificance of Swendenbor~ for Q£2-
temporart Theologf-riew ork~ The Swedenborg Pu lishing 
Associat on, l938 ' , p. 26. 
4. Fosdick, The Modern Use of the Bible, P• 178. 
5. Horton, Contemporary-cQntinental Theology, p. 219. 
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of Barth. In a sharp criticism of the older liberalism, he 
wrote~ "Before Barth, the Bible was to many living Protestants 
only a great piece of historical literature."1 The cause of 
his criticism is to be seen in statements like one by Brown, 
who declared that the Bible is important because of its close 
contact with Jesus Christ who is the center of theology, but 
the "utterances of the Christian Spirit" beyond the Bible are 
of great interest to liberalism.2 Perhaps Horton's insin-
uation was too strong to suit the facts for Bowne had plainly 
said that, "of God's ~-revealing movement the Bible is the 
historical and literary product and record.tt3 And no less a 
liberal Biblical scholar than Fosdick had said, "I think that 
the spirit of God was behind that process ~formation of the 
Bible_7 and in it."4 Nevertheless, Horton credited neo-
orthodoxy with reviving the all but forgotten idea that the 
Bible conveys "a personal Word from a living God, speaking 
directly to our present state." 
4. Ecumenical Awareness 
One of the most interesting and significant phases of 
Horton's thought during this period was his growing ecumenical 
consciousness. Though this will be treated more fully under 
the section dealing with the Church, it is touched upon here 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Ibid • , p • 219 • 
Brown, Christian Theolo~l in OUtline, pp. 17,23. 
Bowne, Studies in Chris anfty, p. 4. (Italics mine) 
Fosdick, ~ Moaern Use of the Bible, p. 30. 
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because it was closely related to his methodology at that time. 
As a result of his studies of English theology he became con-
vinced that "English moderation, with all of its •muddling•, is 
a better guide today than German extremism."1 He had found to 
his satisfaction that ~glish theology could interpret German 
theology and, moreover, it maintained an unbroken contact with 
the Catholic tradition. Horton reasoned that the double advan-
tage fitted English theology for leadership in the present the-
ological crisis.2 
Horton•s appreciation for Catholicism centered in its use 
. . 
of philosop~ within the framework of its theology, while clearly 
distinguishing the one from the other. "Personally," he wrote, 
"I think that this is the risht · solution of the whole problem, 
and we must all come to it in the end. n3 Even in this "realis-
tic" period Horton was so repelled by the anti-philoa.ophical 
mood of nee-orthodoxy that he boldly declared that '' the Catho-
. . 
lies and not the Protestants are the natural allies of liberal-
ism, since they perpetuate the Greek philosophic tra~ition."4 
Just four years previous (1939) he had written of the demise of 
liberalism in his book Realistic ~eologl, and indeed, that 
general temper colored all of his writings between 1934 and 
1939. However, in 1938 his Contemporary Continental Theology 
contained occasional favorable allusions to liberalism. In one 
1. Horton, Contemporary Enalish .Theology, p. viii. 
2~ Ibid., · p. ~lx. · · 
3. Horton, Contemporary Continental Theology, p. 83. 
4· ~., P• 228. 
such passage he wrote: "As a believer in the need of a trans-
formed, reinvigorated liberal Protestantism ~he did not use 
the term "realistic theology" here_7, I am therefore led to de-
clare myself a liberal Catholic. rrl His sympathy with this one 
phase of liberal method could hardly have been more pronounced, 
even in his initial period, yet few liberals would have gone so 
far in proclaiming their loyalty to the values of philosophyt 
It must be noted that Horton did not plan to return to Rome, 
but he had embraced what John Oberlin bad called "Evangelical 
Catholicism," at least as regards theological method. 
B. REALISTIC DOCTRINE OF GOD 
1. The Idea of God in Developmental Context 
a. Values and Difficulties Inherent in Non-Christian Conceptions 
Horton believed that it was perfectly proper to discuss 
non-Christian ideas of God in connection with a study of the 
Christian doctrine of God. He did not agree with the extreme 
neo-orthodox theologians who denied that there was any simi-
larity between pagan and Christian conceptions of deity. 2 He 
described various ideas of God from an evolutionary perspective. 
Thus polytheism with its "bewildering multitude and confusion 
of Gods"3 evolved into an orderly pantheon with a "Kingwgod" 
1. Ibid. 
2. WiTter M. Horton, God (New Yorks Association Press, 1937), p. 1. 
3. Ibid. 
-
supreme. 1 Since all the divine functions of the other gods are 
regarded as manifestations of him, pantheism resulted. Humanism 
2 
conceives of the real! ty as "an orderly human system." Ethical 
monotheism subordinates both the nature-view of pantheism and 
the social-vie~ of humanism to a moral and purposive creator-
God.3 All these ideas, pagan and Christian alike, are bound 
together by the one dominant urge, i.e., to find "an ideal 
Source of Help and Object of Devotion."4 
He proclaimed that every one of these ideas of God contains 
a great truth that must be incorporated in any balanced doctrine 
of God. Polytheism and pantheism conserve the truth that there 
i• a sacredness and holiness inherent in nature.5 Humanism 
rightfully proclaims that human social relationships are sacred, 
. . . . 
from the family to the world cammunity. 6 Theism reveals the 
truth that man is called to engage in a teleological struggle 
against evil and imperfection in fellowship with a benevolent 
God.7 He concluded that the world's great religions provide 
convincing proof that there is a divine creative and sustaining 
Solll"ce that is "manifest partly through human institutions, 
partly through nature, ~ partly through prophetic discernment 
££ideal values and possibilities.8 He made it very clear that 
1. Ibid., P• 2. 
2. !'OI'Q.' P• 3~ 
3· !'bid'.; P• . 4;. . ~: Ibid.' PP• 4-5. Ibid., P• 6 ~ 
6. !'b!CJ., P• 5· 
1· Ibid., P• 1· 8. Ibid., P• 8. 
nature, society, ar1d even the prophetic "word" are only media-
l ~ and that the divine Reality lies beyond them all. It can 
be seen from this analysis that even in his "realistic" period, 
Horton's thought retained much of the breadth and tolerance that 
had characterized his earlier liberal views about God. 
b. The Religious Insights of the Ancient Hebrews 
Horton found the divine attributes, necessary for construc-
ting any adequate doctrine of God, clearly expressed in the Old 
and New Testaments. Amos had proclaimed the righteousness of 
God, and Hosea, God's love. 2 Isaiah had bridged this paradox 
with the idea of a spared r.emnamt. 3 Jeremiah revealed that God 
works inwardly in the heart of the believer.,4 and Ezekiel spoke 
of God's interest in human society.5 II Isaiah had contributed 
the idea that God utilizes the principle of vicarious suffering.6 
Horton believed that the supreme value of Jesus was not so much 
his summing up of these prophetic oracles as his actual living 
of them in his daily life. In Christ, continued Horton, God 
revealed His desire to draw near to man in a very special sense.? 
In going directly to the Bible for data concerning the 
doctrine of God, Horton was doing something that most of the 
older liberals h .ad .failed to do. \1/b.ile it is quite true that 
1. Ibid., PP• 8-9. 
2. Ib!Q., pp. 18-19. 
3· I'6Id., p. 19. 4· Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
5. Ibid.; P• 20~ 
6. md. 
7 • !Did., P• 21 . 
they paid lip service to their Biblical heritage and occasionally 
used the life and teachings .of Jesus as a guide in constructing 
1 their doctrines of God, theydid not go as deeply into the total 
Biblical view of God nor did they seem to take the Biblical data 
as seriously as Horton did. During his liberal period, Horton 
had been generally too preoccupied with evidence from the na-
·tural sciences to devote much space to Biblical evidence, but 
his realistic period exhibited a marked change and must largely 
be accounted for by his admitted new appreciation for the Bible 
which the neo-orthodox thinkers had inspired. 2 
c. The Intellectual Theories of the Ancient Greeks 
The pagan converts to Christianity had difficulty under-
standing how the creator-God of the Old Testament is related 
to the redeeming-God of the New Testament. To this need Greek 
philosophy spoke, explained Horton, postulating the existence 
. . . 
of the Logos, or creative wisdom and reason of God, whien serves 
as a link between the creating God and man who needs to be re-
deemed. Philo of Alexandria equated the Logos with the pro-
phetic word in the Old Testament, and Clement and Origen identi-
fied it as Jesus Christ of the New Testament and thus explained 
how the creator-God communicates His saving grace to sinful man.3 
The trouble with this explanation was that exalted powers were 
1. Brown, Christian Theolofl in Outline, pp, 82, 106; Macintosh, 
Theolopt· .!.! !!! F.mplrlca sCience, p. 102; and Fosdick, _!!!!. 
Modern se of the Bible, p. 286. . · 
2. Horton,-contimporart Continental Theology, p. 219. 
3· Horton, God, P• 23. 
soon attributed to the Logos in its own right and monotheism 
was again imperiled. Horton credited the Council of Nicaea 
(325 A.D.) with stopping this trend by explicitly denying that 
1 
the Logos or "Eternal Son" is a second god. 
He believed that the concept of the Trinity was one of 
the great products of Greek thought, but that the idea had been 
misunderstood and needed clarification. The first misconcep-
tion is the idea that Jesus is the Second Person in the Trinity. 
This, warned Horton, is incorrect. The Second Person or Logos 
is the creative concern of God that found expression in Jesus 
while Jesus, himself, remained true man. 2 The second miscon-
ception revolves around the word "persons." The Latin word 
persona and the Greek word prosopon did not refer to "person" 
in the modern sense of that word, but rather to the mask which 
an actor wore while he played a particular role. Thus, "the 
'persons' of the Trinity are not, strictly speaking, persons 
at all, but different manifestations or impersonations of one 
and the same God."3 Horton rejected the Sabellian idea that 
God plays His roles successively and embraced the Nicaean view 
that there never was a time when God was not "playing all three 
roles at ~·"4 Horton summed up his Trinitarian view as fol-
lows: 
1. Ibid. 1 
2. i'6IQ., 
3. Y"66Q.' 
4· Ibid • . 
God the Father is the p~imal creative Source 
and final ideal Goal bf the whole universe. 
God above his creation, God not yet fully 
P• 24 · . 
PP• 24-25. 
P• 25. 
. . . 
revealed, is the Eternal Father. • •• God 
revealing himself in his creation, God com-
ing to us for our healing and helping, is 
God the Son •• · •• God rising within or among 
us; God in us saying 'Yes' fo the God beyond 
us, is God the Holy Spirit. 
The above exposition or Horton's position reveals that he 
continued to hold a view similar to the view he had expressed 
2 during his liberal period, although it was greatly expanded. 
His modalistic interpretation remained in harmony with that of 
most of the liberals, 3 but differed r.rom the quite a-typical 
"eommunitarian" views of Bowne and McConnell.4 Perhaps the 
only noteworthy change in Horton's view or the Trinity during 
this realistic period was his attempt ~o construct a. modified 
modalism that would avoid the error of Sabellianism.~ 
2. The Idea of God Defended and Questioned 
a. Arguments for the Existence of God 
Horton stated that the ''oldest and most generally recog-
nized of all positive arguments for the reality of God" is the 
cosmological-teleological argument.6 This argument cited the 
evidence of natural order and purpose and posited an Orderer 
and Purposer as the only reasonable explanation. Thus "creation'' 
1. Ibid., p. 26. 
2. Horton, Theism and the Modern Mood, · p. 125. . 
3. Brown, Clirlstle.ii'TlJ.iOiogt in· O'ijt!Ine·, p. 162; Macintosh, The-
olo~as an ~lrlcai· Sc ence, p~ 193; and Clarke, An Outline 
of Iitran eolos, P• 177 •. . . . 
4· Bowne, Studies ~- c~istianity, pp. 92-93, and McConnell,~ 
Diviner Immanence, p. too. S. Horton, God, p. 25. 
6. Ibid., p~8. 
was affirmed as more believable than "chance." The Darwinian 
hypothesis, however, disturbed this whole argument by suggest-
ing a third possibility, i.e., "natural selection." According 
to this theory the order and adaptation of animate nature is 
the product of the self-seeking and groping of living organisms 
quite apart from a directing Intelligence. 1 Horton defended 
the old argument on the basis that "natural selection" explained 
only the matter of selection, but not the prior fact of ~~­
tion. The cosmological-teleological argument with its theistic 
conclusion still provides the most reasonable hypotheis.2 
The argument from the Moral Law, Horton indicated, was 
Hebrew in origin whereas the cosmological-teleological argument 
was the product of the Greek mind. The former argument cited 
the evidence from human history for the existence of a universal 
Moral Law that ruled over the nations. The original Deuteronomic 
conception of reward for virtue and punishment for sin was 
modified in the book of . Job but the underlying conviction that 
there is a cosmic justice operative in the affairs of men re-
mained.3 Such all-pervading divine justice, the argument con-
eludes, can only be ascribed to a divine Judge, i.e., God. 
The final argument that Horton advanced was the argument 
from the experience of grace and guidance in the Christian life. 
The previous arguments are more readily appreciated, Horton 
admitted, since they are "external" in that they begin with 
1. Ibid., p. 39. 
2. "'bb'd., p. 40. 
3. Ibid., pp. 42-44. 
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evidence from nature and history "which is plainly and indis-
putably there."l The trouble is that the "external" arguments 
leave us "cold and unmoved."2 The most convincing experiences 
of all are private, they are "internal" and hence not very con-
vincing to those who have not shared them. Horton frankly ad-
mitted that the only way to test this most important argument 
is actually to comndt oneself to the proposition in the first 
placel "Yet marriage, vocational adjustment, national loyalty, 
and all the major choices of life make the same demand."3 The 
"grace" which the believer experiences is a sense of loving 
and merciful treatment beyond anything deserved, that "warms 
our better potentialities into life. n4 The "guidance 11 that is 
experienced is a sense of prompting that comes to the believer 
in the various affairs of life. Both grace and guidance 8eem 
to require a divine Source of magnanimous nature. 
All of these arguments, with variations, bad been developed 
by the older liberalism.5 However, Horton had not previously 
devoted as much space to developing them as he did in the real-
istic period. The closest parallel to the three arguments for 
God is perhaps to be seen in his earlier discussion of the 
three areas in which God may be found.6 Apparently, Horton's 
1. Ibid., p. 46. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., p. 47. 
4. Ibid • 
5. Mathews, The Faith of Modernism, pp. 111, 113; Macintosh, Theology 
as an Empirical Science, p. l63; and Bowne, studies in 
cnriStianity, p. 63. 
6. Horton, Theism~ the Modern Mood, pp. 124-25. 
new-found "realism" had not done much to shake his faith in the 
age-old philosophic "proofs" for the existence of God. 
b. Some Unsolved Problems for Theism 
Theism, admitted Horton, ~ad not given a perfectly satis-
factory answer to questions about the exact nature of reality. 
It might be that the God of the cosmos, the God of the moral 
law, and the God of religious experience are "three unrelated 
realities." 1 He believed that the answer of pantheism was more 
satisfying with regard to this particular question since it 
claims that God approves of all reality, while theists are still 
per~lexed as to why much of reality is contrary to the will of 
God. 
Moreover, he continued, theism has no rational solution 
for the problem of evil. Theism does not so much try to explain 
evil as it tries to help man to face it. It affirms the reality 
. .--;--
of evil, as pantheism does not do, but proclaims that God faces 
it with His children. 2 
Finally, Horton contended that theism has never solved 
the question of human freedom. It is caught between the concept 
of a sovereign God who controls His universe and a free moral 
agent who can and does say "Nol" to that same God.3 
Horton said plainly that until full intellectual solutions 
can be formulated regarding these major problems ''the Christian 
idea of God is ~ precisely true in any version that has so far 
1. Horton, God, pp. 50-51. 
2. Ibid~; p:-;'2. 
3· !Dia., P• 53· 
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1 been formulated." His realistic mood was apparent as he con-
sidered the possibility that man may perhaps never attain to a 
tully rational understanding of God because of the inherently 
finite nature of the human intelligence.2 He concluded that 
the "true knowledge of God" was not to be found by the intel-
lect alone but through a religious commitment to God.3 
The rather subdued note on which Horton concluded this sec-
tion provided a noticeable contrast to his earlier speculation 
regarding the knowledge of God in his Theism ~ ~ Modern 
Mood, and even to his considerations of the arguments for God 
which he formulated in his realistic period. Yet it should be 
noted that in connection with those arguments he admitt~d that 
data from personal experience were more convincing than the more 
rationalistic arguments from nature and morality.4 
3· The Nature of God and His Dealings with the World 
a. The Divine Nature 
According to Horton, the older liberalism quite rightly 
rescued the idea of God's personal and moral attributes when 
more orthodox thinkers had lost themselves in a maze of meta-
physical speculation about the First Cause.5 Unfortunately, the 
1. Ibid • . 
2. !Did., P• s4. 
3· !'bid., p~ 55. 
4· Ibid~; PP• 46-47· 5. !'bid.' PP• 26-27. 
liberal preoccupation with God's forgiving and sacrificial love1 
"has sometimes conveyed the idea of a God so kindly as to be 
lacking in all moral rectitude, so personal as to be man-like, 
so approachable that one no longer feels the impulse to bow be-
fore the mystery of his holiness. 112 Perhaps it was unfortunate 
that Horton made so sweeping a charge without documentation, for 
several of the most important liberals took special pains to 
avoid just this pitfall. Brown has indfcated that divine wrath 
against sin is a necessary corollary of God's love.3 Macintosh 
affirmed that nperfeet holiness includes love, and perfect love 
is holy. God would not be dealing justly with the sinner, if he 
refused to be merciful to him; nor would it be true mercy to 
grant an unjust forgiveness, of indulgence."4 Mathews boldly 
proclaimed that "the God of the Modernist is not a fully under-
stood God •••• A God whom man must help • . •• is no God for 
religion. He is too much like men to be worshiped •• • • This 
is the God our Christian movement gives us -- a God participa-
ting in human struggle ••• found by reasonable faith but not 
without sacred mystery."5 
Horton retained the liberal concept of a personal God but 
he expressed it in carefully guarded language. He denied that 
1. Clarke, An Outline of Christian · Theolo~, pp. 12, 97; McCon-
nell, The-Diviner Immanence; pp. 134-3~ Rauschenbusch, A The-
ology tor the Social Gospel, p. 179; and Macintosh, Theology-
as ·an ~ir!eal Science, pp. 120-21. 
2~ HOrtdn, od, p. 21. 
3. Brown,. christian Theology in Outline, pp. 109-110. 
4~ Macintosh, Theolo~ ~ an Emlirical Science, p. 163. 5. Mathews, The Fait of Modern sm, p. 117. 
the word "personal" necessarily implied that God is anthropo-
morphic, just as the liberals before him had done1 though he 
did not so credit them. He explained that nit does mean that 
he claims our loyal devotion as no sub-personal being could do, 
and that under the right conditions we can commune with him 'as 
a man speaks with his friend'. " 2 Man is very limited in his 
choice of symbols and unless he (man) conceives of God in terms 
of intelligent pe~sonality he will "think of him as an Ocean, 
or an Energy, or a Tree of Life, or an Organic ~~ole, or some-
thing else that is sub-human."3 But Horton rejected all such 
alternatives because nothing sub-human can ultimately claim 
man's religious devotion. He preferred to use the term "super-
personal"; i.e., God's personality is "like human personality 
with its limitations negated and its possibilities vastly ex-
panded."4 Horton's concept of the personality of God was a 
logical development of views he had expressed thirteen years 
earlier.s 
The view that God is personal, and loving, he continued, 
should not obscure the reality of his righteousness. The conse-
quences of the moral law cannot be waived by a plea for mercy, 
6 he warned. The Gospel combines the view of God's "outgoing, 
1~ Mathews, The Faith of Modernism, p. 119; Clarke, An Outline of 
Ollristian~eology, pp. 67-68; and Macintosh, TheOlogy .!.!! an-
Emplrleal Science, p. 190. 
2. Horton, God, p. 28. 
) •• Ibid~ :, · - . 
4 TOrd. , p • 29 • 5. Horton, "Reasons for Believing in God," Journal of Religion, 
III (November, 1923), 612. 
6. Horton, ~' P• 32. 
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forgiving, sacrificial love" with "grim severity toward those 
of his children who resist his authority and behave hard-
heartedly toward their brother-men. 11 1 This emphasis upon God's 
righteousness was new for Horton, though he had mentioned it in 
passing during his liberal period. 2 However, that it was not 
neglected by some of the greatest liberals has been noted above. 
Horton believed that God is directly accessible but he 
denied that man can ever experience God apart from mediation. 3 
In fact, he regarded the emphasis upon the transcendence of God 
as one of the great contributions of the nee-orthodox revival. 4 
He did not wish to discard the concept of immanence altogether, 
but he did believe that the created things of the world ought 
to be seen in their proper place, as created and dependent ob-
jects.5 God mediates himself to man through the works of his 
creation and through the thoughts and experiences of man. Even 
during a wholly mystical experience, insisted Horton, the wor-
shipper is not in direct contact with God, but experiences him 
through the veil of his human thoughts and feelings.6 For Horton, 
the emphasis upon the divine transcendence preserves the idea of 
God's "awful over.poweringness" and "mysterious •otherness'" so 
that all attempts to identify God with any part or process in 
creation are thwarted.? However, he desired to make it clear 
1. Ibid • , p. 3 3 • 
2. HOrton, Theism and the Modern Mood, p. 161. 
3. Horton, God, p.~.---- ----
4. Horton, contemporary Continental Theology, p. 220. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Hor€on, God, p. 31. 
7. ~., p~21. 
that he did not think that God's use of mediators is rooted in 
any divine haughtiness; rather, just the opposite is true. God 
desires to communicate more effectively; and in order to over-
come the great gulf that separates him from finite man, he 
expresses himself through media that are comprehensible to the 
human mind .1 
The transcendence of God had been noted by some of the 
liberala.2 Even McConnell had emphasized the idea of divine 
transcendence.3 Horton himself in his earlier period had 
pointed out the need to balance the two ideaa,4 but the degree 
of intensity with which he defended it was new. 
b. The Providence of God 
Horton was sharp~y critical of the liberal view of Provi-
dence, because he believed that the liberals had confused it with 
the idea of human progress.5 He admitted that he had been such a 
one himself, and quoted a statement he had made in a high school 
debate in 1913. In it he described Providence as "that mighty, 
irresistible enrolling force which some men call Progress and 
other men call Providence, but all men alike respect." He added 
that "within a twelvemonth afterwards it began to ring iron-
ically in my inward ear.n6 He credited the war and the 
1. Ibid., p. 31. 
2. see-Mathews, The Faith ef Modernism, p. 117; and Clarke, ~ 
Outline of Chrritian'Theology, p. 130. 
3. McConnell, The Diviner Immanence, p. 64. 
4. Horton, TheiSm and the Modern Mood, pp. 149-153. 
5. Horton, Realist~ThiOlogy, p.-s47 
6. Ibid., pp. 87-88. 
depression with rousing men from their illusion that human 
society was progressing under the guidance of divine Providence,l 
and had come to believe that Providence is often better seen in 
the destruction of the social order. He cited Barth's simile 
of the butterfly and the cocoon, and agreed that the Providence 
of God should be identified with the butterfly struggling for 
new life and not with the imprisoning cocoon.2 
It would be difficult to document Horton's charge that the 
liberal doctrine of Providence was the same as the liberal idea 
of hu~n progress and false to assume that they all viewed progress 
as smooth and automatic. Certainly they did not equate progress 
with the status quo. The liberals saw divine P·rovidence expressed 
in God's love and judgment.3 They were noted for their desire 
to change the status quo4 and Rauschenbusch said quite plainly 
that the "Kingdom of Evil" nesists the establishment of the 
Kingdom of God continually.5 Perhaps the one clear example of 
the extreme view of human progress held by some liberals is 
found in Coe's statement sumndng up the spirit of his time. "The 
prevailing sentiment is that the present is good; that the future 
1. Ib id • , p • 9 0. 
2. Ibid., p. 94. 
3. Bra-in, Christian Theology in Outline, p. 111; Clarke, An 
Outline ot Christian Theology, p. 72; McConnell, The DiViner 
Immanence, pp. 134-35; and Macintosh, Theology ~ !B Empirical 
Science, pp. 163,166. 
4. Brown, Christian !heology in Outline, pp. 195-197; Mathews, 
The Faith of Modernism, p.-r67; Bowne, Studies in Christianity, 
p:-322; Rauschenbusch, A Theologthfor the Sociar-Gosaei, p. 224; 
Fosdick, !a! Modern ~-orrtlie B Ie; PP: 248-49; an ICoe, ~ 
Religion of a Mature Mind, p. 168. 
5. Rauschenbusch, A TheoiOgy for the Social Gospel, p. 139. 
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is to be better; that progress is the order of the world." 1 
Horton proposed to construct a realistic doctrine of Prov-
idence on the basis of the Pr.?Ph~tie and apostolic testimonies. 
He began with Amos's vision of God's "plumb line" of righteous-
ness and included Jeremiah's insight whiCh excludes false pa-
triotism, and the ideas of II Isaiah and Job that there is no 
exact equivalence between sin and suffering. 2 To this prophetic 
teaching he added the Pauline insight that all things are work-
- . 
ing together for good for them that are committed to God's will.3 
Because the prophets were concerned to arouse a lethargic people, 
explained Horton, they emphasized that aspect of divine Provi-
dence that was related to the Moral Law.4 The apostolic doe-
trine of Providence, on the other hand, was intended to sustain 
and encourage the people of God during their terrible trial, and 
so dealt with the special guidance and protection which God ex-
tends to all His people in such times.5 Thus, Horton saw the 
Providence of God working in a two-fold sense. It is "a general 
impersonal principle of justice" and "a dynamic principle of 
saving graee."6 
Certainly many of the liberals were also aware of this 
double quality in the divine activity, but Horton had come to 
emphasize the reality and importance of the wrathful dimension 
1. coe, ~ Relisiort or~ Mature Mind, p. 29. 
2. Horton, Reali-stic "Theology, pp:-91-102. 
3~ Ibid~; p. 1o6~ 
4~ Ibid~;, p~ 103~ 
s. !OICI~;, p~ 106: 
6. !OIQ., p. 113. 
of the Providence of God as the older liberals had failed to do. 
He proclaimed that "good realists" must accept the"stubborn 
facts," 1 and bel~eved that God is . ~aying "in tones of mingled 
sorrow and anger, •You must and you shall have deeper fellow-
ship in your social order. You may take it~ way (stretch-
ing out the right hand) or you may take it this way• (clenching 
the left fist)." 2 
This view of God's severity Horton balanced with an equally 
strong conviction of the reality of God's special benevolent 
Providence for his faithfUl ones. He criticized those liberals 
who disclaimed such a belief because they thought it immoral 
and superstitious.3 Why should God treat sinner and saint alike, 
he asked, "and why, above all, should we attempt to prescribe 
exactly how God's providence ought to work, in terms of human 
analogies and ~ priori reasonings, instead of observing objec-
tively just how it does work?"4 
It was at precisely this point that Horton contrasted his 
new realistic approaCh with the older liberal attitude. The 
latter begins with"~ ought to be"and moves to what is; the 
former is more thoroughly empirical in that it always begins 
with"~ is."5 He argued that the records of the Oxford Group, 
the Salvation Army, and the Quakers are ri~ in examples of 
l. Ibid~, P• 114. 
2. Ibid.; P• 113. 
3· I"'OI:.:. P• 107~ 
4- Ibid. ' 5. Ibid., P• 108. 
special providence. "They move unharmed among brigands, and 
drunkards, they minister to the diseased without catching the 
infection. Their extraordinary immunity can be explained in part, 
no doubt by the effect of their courageous and radiant person-
alities upon their own physical powers of resistance and upon the 
attitudes of the people with whom they meet; but I am convinced 
there is more to it than that."1 The character and power of his 
realistic interpretation of the Providence of God went beyond 
the views in his earlier writings as well as those expressed by 
the older liberals. 
C. REALISTIC DOCTRINE OF MAN 
1. Realistic Orientation 
a. Values of Nee-orthodoxy 
In 1939 Horton wrote an article for The Christian Century,2 
in which he reviewed his transition from an extreme liberal 
position to a position very close to neo-orthodoxy. In the 
article he revealed how Frof. A. K. Rule of the Louisville 
Presbyterian Seminary had challenged him to spend as much time 
studying the orthodox view of the nature of man as he had spent 
trying to understand that of the humanists.3 Horton, who could 
1. Ibid., p. 110. 
2. HOrton, "Between Liberalism and the New Orthodoxy, " The 
Christian Century, !XVII (May, 1939) , -6.37-40. 
3. !bid., p. 638. 
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hardly refuse the challenge and still claim to be a liberal, 
turned to a study of Augustine and Calvin and was surprised to 
find that "with the Augustinian theologians furnishing the forms 
• • • and contemporary tragic events • • • furnishing the 
matter," it seemed more and more "that form and matter fit like 
glove and hand."l "Old phrases like •the wrath of God,' 'original 
sin,' 'perdition and judgment,• come alive again as I follow 
current events and try to understand the Enropean crisis. 11 2 He 
became convinced that 4ugustinian theology had recognized the 
"dark mysteries" of life and had "wrestled with them. "3 This 
was quite a momentous admission for one who only nine years pre-
viously had written, "I have always found it hard to understand 
why the barbarically cruel theologies of St. Augustine, Calvin, 
and Jonathan Edwards should be cons ide red orthodox. n4 
Thus, Horton's realistic doctrine of man was based on an 
honest; facing of the "dark mysteries" that continually thwart 
mankind. He denied that it was melancholy or pessimistic, but 
insisted that he was simply determined not to be taken in by 
ideali.stio illusions. 11 In this," he asserted, "the realists 
resemble old fashioned orthodox Christians more than they re-
semble the liberals of' yesterday."S Horton was ready to admit 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. norton, Theism and the Modern Mood, p. 50. 
5. Horton, ~ealist~TheOlogy, p.~ 
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"that the human raee is caught in a serious predicament of some 
sort 1 "
1 
and he believed that the orthodox interpretation of the 
human problem recognized this. 2 
b. Deficiencies in the Orthodox View 
Though his doctrine of man had shifted quite markedly to-
ward the orthodox end of the scale, Horton retained enough ob-
jectivity to point to what he believed were important flaws in 
the orthodox view. "It laid such stress upon sin in general, 
as a universal human condition that it failed to grapple realis-
tically with the cause of particular sins."3 This same criti-
cism, which Horton had made three years earlier in his Psycho-
logical Approach to Theology,4 was typically liberal and can be 
traced back as least as far as Mathews' own similar criticism. 
"We Diberaly talk," he wrote, ''more about sins, degeneracy, 
poverty, lust, economic oppression~ war and other concrete 
evils."5 In addition to this primary failing, Horton believed 
that orthodoxy lacked social vision. That is, it failed to 
understand that man has a legitimate struggle with nature and 
society in which he is continually striving to produce enough 
of the necessities of life for all and then see that they are 
equitably distributed.6 This, of course, had been recognized 
1. Ibid.; p. 41. 
2. !DIQ.; pp. 1-%-x. 
3· !'Eita~, · p. 56. 
4· 'i!'O'rton, · A Psycholog1calApPr6ach !£ ·Theolog:, p. 68. 
5~ Mathews, The Faith of Modernlsm·, .. pp. 96-97. 
6. Horton, Reilistlc TEiology, p. 56. 
by the liberalsl and was voiced by Horton in his more liberal 
period.2 
1bough the neo-orthodox doctrine of man had gone far 
toward eliminating these particular targets of Horton's criti .. 
cism, it still exuded a deep pessimism of which he was sus-
picious. He was glad that the sometimes carelessly optimistic 
liberal spirit had been tempered, but he believed that the nee-
orthodox theologians should be reminded of the hopeful side of 
God's dealings with men. In 1939, toward the end of his period 
of rather strong anti-liberal reaction, Horton wrote: "I can-
not consider that the truth in 4ugustin1anism is more than a 
forgo t ten segment of Christian truth, needing to be powerfully 
asserted in just such times as these, but still only a seg-
ment. v•3 Even in those days before World War II, he was seeing 
ahead to a new era of reconstruction in which the work of Augus-
tine and Barth will have been finished and the call will be for 
an Origen , an aquinas,and a Schleiemmacher.4 
2. Weaknesses in the Liberal Position 
Horton explained that the old liberal hope that man could 
gradually come to control his own destiny by means of hiw own 
intelligence and the help of science and machinery5 was simply 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
See Rauschenbusch, A Theology !££ ~ Social Gospel. 
Horton, A Psychological Approach to Theology, pp. 126-129. 
Horton, WBetween Liberalism and the New Orthodoxy," The 
Christian Century, LXVII (May, 1939), p. 638. -
I bid. 
HOrton, Realistic Theologl, p. 6. 
an extension and expression of "the Baconian dream of endless 
material progress through scientific discovery and invention." 1 
In stern judgment he wrote: "It is the chief distinguishing 
characteristic of liberal Christianity that it has adopted the 
Bacon! an dream as part of . the Christian hope, and thus come to 
regard ignorance instead of sin as the root of all evil." 2 
While this charge was put very strongly and ,eertainly did not 
accurately describe all the liberals, it did have much truth 
in i·t. Mathews' view of sin as ''a conscious yielding • • • to 
the backward pull of outgrown goods"3 seemed to suggest that 
education might, in time, eliminate the "yielding." Certainly, 
Coe's extreme view, that nthe old-fash~o~ed experience of the 
sense of sin was largely a factitious product of the ruling 
theory of sin,"4 proclaimed quite plainly the belief that proper 
religious education would remove the ignorant sin-theories that 
produced the erroneous impressions. However, Horton's indict-
ment did not do justice to Clarke's keen sensitivity to the 
reality of human sin. Clarke had pointed out that ''sin is an 
observed fact. Theology encounters it not as an element in some 
theory, but as a vast and terrible reality."5 Rausehenbusch 
was another liber~l who continually made reference to the preva-
lence and seriousness of sin.6 
1. Ibid., P• ·56• 
2. !'bEL, pp. 56-S7. 
3. Mi"tiiews, The Faith of Modern! sm, p -. 97 ~ . 
·4~ Coe, '!he Reli~lon iJ:a Mature Mind, pp. 372-73· 
5. Clarke, An Oa line ~ Christian Theplogt' pp. 230-31. 
6. Rausehenousen, A Theology for the Socia Gospel, pp. 51-58. 
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Horton believed that the chief defect in the liberal view 
of man was its inability to grasp the faet that it is man's 
will that is perverted. He had come to see that 11 the human 
race somehow is paralyzed or bewitched, and cannot reach out 
its hands to take what is so plainly within its grasp. !! ~­
not will~ _2!!! ' Plain g.ood." 1 Only the grace of God, and not 
human reason or science can save man from destroying himself. 
He did not want to be unjust toward the old liberalism, and he 
admitted that 11 it has had almost as much to say about sin (at 
least in its textbooks of theology) as has orthodox Christianity 
itself." Horton cited Rauschenbusch 1 s A Theology~ the Social 
Gosp~ as a good example. 2 Nevertheless, he charged that the 
over·-all mood was one that inclined to treat the problem of sin 
in a rather superficial fashion~ Horton believed that the great 
liberal word was "understanding." The thesis was that if enough 
time and effort were devoted to examining the human problem, it 
would soon give way to understanding even as the mysteries of 
nature had been dispelled by science. He believed, however, 
that scientific analysis had revealed that the human predica-
ment "contains stubborn factors which do not automatically dis-
appear before the light of 1understanding•."3 
1. Horton, Realistic Theology, p. 62. 
2. Ibid.; P• 63. 
3· Ibid., P• 64. 
3· The Nature and Cure of Sin 
a. The Nature of Sin 
The degree to which Horton's doctrine of man had become 
influenced ~y the neo-ort~odox _ movement was clearly seen in a 
rather startling statement that_ he made in his book Realistic 
Theology. "I believe," he wrote, ''that orthodox Christianity 
repr,esents a profound _ insight lnto the whole human predicament. 
I believe that the basic human difficulty is that perversion of 
the will, that betrayal of divine trust, which is called sin; 
and I believe that sin is in a sense a racial disease, trans-
- - -
missible from generation to generation." 1 This was a complete 
reversal from what he had proclaimed just three years earlier 
in his book Psychological Approach !£ Theology. Therein he had 
written just as forcefully that "theology would be a far less 
dismal science today if it were not for the influence of per-
sons like St. Augustine and John Bunyan 'sick souls,' as 
William James rightly called them -- whose meticulously accu-
rate observation concerning their own uncontrollable obses-
sions had been erected into a general theory of the bondage and 
depravity of the human will. " 2 To make his position crystal 
clear Horton had added that "there is no single stream of 
Original Sin, f~owing on like a hereditary curse from generation 
to generation."3 Horton had done an about-face on both counts. 
1. Ibid., · P• 56. 
2. Horton, A Psychological ApproaCh to Theology, p. 73· 
3· Ibid., p-; 1$: -
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(1) He had come to believe that sin is a matter of the perverse 
will or heart. "Let the sinful human heart be changed, and all 
other evils will take care of themselves."! (2) He had come to 
appreciate the truth in the orthodox thesis of Original Sin 
which identified sin as "something more than a momentary mis-
demeanor, committed by an individual; it is a collective 
disease with which all humanity is affected, and with which 
every individual is infected from the moment of his birth, or 
rather from the moment of his conception."2 
Horton conceived of sin as existing in three major areas: 
the cosmic, social, and personal. The cosmic predicament is 
the result of human ignorance and finitude, and though this can 
be continually ameliorated through scientific successes in the 
realm of nature, it will probably never be completely eliminated, 
and thus a certain degree of resignation will always be appro-
priate.3 The social predicament centers in the "self-reproducing 
power of unJu!! institutions.~4 Horton accepted the Marxian 
diagnosis that the economic system determines the social system 
and wrote that what is necessary "is an actual transfer of power, 
property, and privilege,"5 which social science alone is inade-
quate to produce. Horton's analysis of this area of sin and 
his zeal for social reform matched, but certainly did not 
1. Horton, Realistic Theology, pp. 55-56. 
2. n,id., p. 55. 
3. IO!d., p. 75. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid., p. 76. 
surpass the older liberal hope for a community of social jus-
tice.1 The personal predicament is due to sin which Horton 
defined as "that weakness, division, and perversion of the 
. will. " 2 In this he had not only revised his own earler esti-
mate of the situation, but had gone beyond the prevailing lib-
eral attitude which Brown summed up when he e~plained that by 
depravity, liberals meant not a state, but a tendency. 3 Horton 
concluded that the only way that man can hope to be delivered 
from this last and most serious predicament is by giving him-
self over to the ndeep and pow.erf'ul forces" of God.4 
b. Release from Sin 
Man can be released from sin, Horton explained, only as he 
comes into a saving relationship with God. This means that man 
must come to possess the Spirit of Christ in his own heart by 
entering "into a relation of intimate fellowship, in worship 
and in work, with those who already possess the Spirit -- or 
who, as they would prefer to say, are possessed by it."5 Now 
it is ' true that some of the earlier liberals had underplayed 
the activity of the Holy Spirit in this connection. Mathews 
had written that "salvation results from new adjustments with 
God, the nature of which, thanks to science, we are understand-
6 ing better"; and Coe had developed a system of "salvation by 
1. See Bowne, Studies in Christianity, p. 322, and Rauschenbusch, 
A Theology for tne ~cia! Gospel 
2~ Horton, ReaiiStrc-Theoiogy~ p. 77. · · 
3~ Brown, · christian Theology ~- outline, p. 280. 
·4. Horton, - Realistic · TheologY, p. 78. 
5. Ibid., PP• 176-71. . 
6. Mathews, ~Faith of Modernism, P• 97. 
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1 
education"; but most of the liberals had been just as forth-
right as was Horton in their recognition of the primary role 
played by God. Indeed, Mathews, for all of his emphasis upon 
the value of science, plainly confessed his belief that only 
God can forgive sins and redeem fallen man, 2 and Fosdick sharply 
rejected the idea that men can by ''pulling on ftheiv own boot-
straps, set out to lift Cthemselvey."3 
Horton had, however, made a substantial advance beyond his 
own earlier liberal position as developed in A Psychological ~­
;eroach !2 Theology, where he had proclaimed that "love working 
through psychological technique is ~ way of salvation for the 
individual."4 In Realistic Theology~ he wrote: "I should like 
to make it plainer than I did, perhaps, in that book that an 
objective source of power, beyond the needy person and beyond 
the 'case worker' or pastor who is trying to help him, . is as 
necessary and important as it ever was. There is no such thing 
as salvation by pure technique. There is only salvation by the 
power of the Spirit."5 
1. Coe, ·!h! Religion .2f .! Mature Mind, pp • . 294-95. 
2. Mathews, The Faith of Modernism, p. 180. 
~ Fosdick, The Modern-use of the Bible, p. 270~ · • Horton; A Ps;tchologj.cal Approach to · 'lheology, p. . . : Horton, Realistic Tfieologz, p.l73. 127 • 
4· The Nature and Destiny of Man 
a. Human Nature 
One of the most striking things to come from Horton's pen 
during this period was his very orthodox characterization of 
man. In Realistic 'lh.eology he wrote that ITfallen mankind • 
• • 
forms a vast mass of corruption and perdition that darkens 
heaven and earth, and will inevitably be consigned to hell in 
the final great setting-to-rights, unless God's grace inter-
venes to create a fundamental change of' nature in e.ach. heart. ttl 
How great was Horton's transition in just three y.ears is seen 
when his "realistic" doctrine of human nature is compared with 
his "liberal" view which violently condemned orthodox theology 
for its disparagement of human nature. Darwinian biology, he 
had earlier proclaimed, had demolished that old pessimistic 
view. "Instead of a fallen creature, we now see in man a 
slowly rising creature."2 He had come to believe that human 
depravity was so terrible that our 11 lesser self" -- which hates 
God most violently -- "would sometimes rather destroy us than 
have us admit the great Intruder1"3 He accepted Tillieh's in-
version of Tertullian's dictum. "Realism differs from Tertul-
lian in his famous opinion that 'the soul is naturally Chris-
tian'; it thinks the soul is not naturally Christian but na-
turally pagan. u4 
1. Ibid. , -p. 55 • 
2. Horton; ! Psychological Approach to Theology, P• 41. 
3.· Horton; God, p. 57. 4 Horton, Re'ilistic Theology, P• 156. 
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Horton's pessimism was _not unrelieved, however. In his 
appreciation for nee-orthodoxy's rediscovery of "the dimension 
of depth in the soul of man,"1 he included the Russian Orthodox 
concept of "Divine Humanity" which emphasized the potential 
greatness of man as well as his depravity. 2 One of the most im-
portant factors in the divine sphere of man's nature, he ex-
. . 
plained, is "the gift of freedom, which can equally well lead 
men to fraternize with demons or with angels."3 This assertion 
of human freedom had been made by the liberals and emphasized 
rather strongly.4 It should be noted, however, that most of 
these liberal defenses of human freedom also contain admissions 
of very real restrictions upon that freedom. 
Horton's continuity with his liberal heritage was further 
proclaimed by his admission that man is naturally guided by an 
"inner light."5 "Say if you will," he argued, "that the 'na-
tural man' has no inner light to guide him, because he is a 
fallen creature, but then the 'natural man' becomes a pure 
abstraction, an. · artificial medium which remains when the presence 
of God's grace and power have been completely thought away from 
1. Clarke, An ·outline of Christian Theology, P• 22. 
2. See his eva!uat!on 01 Dostoevsky and Berdyaev in Contemporary 
Continental Theology, P:P• - 221-22. . ..- _ · · 
3·.· Horton, ContemporTE! Continental Theology, P• 222. 
4 Brown, Christian . eoiosz .!!!- Outline, P• 249; Clarke, An Out-
line of Christian Theology, . P• 2!3; Rauschenbusch, A Tneo!O"g:y 
~tne ·social Gosfel,. p;. 59; McConnell, ~ Diviner Immanence, PP: bb=67; and Mac ntosh, Theology ~ ~ Empirical Science, P• 165. . . .. . . - . .. . . 
5. Horton; "Revelati-on," Revelation, ed. John Baillie and Hugh 
Martin, pp. 265-66. 
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human life.nl Horton rejected such an idea on the gr0unds that 
man was constantly the recipient of divine grace and that it is 
an empirical fact that this grace provides the "inner light" 
which makes man able to respond to God. This· idea of an "inner 
light" in every man had been expressed by the older liberals in 
their concept of the divine-human kinship.2 
b. Human Immortality 
Horton retained his belief in human immortality, though he 
did not expound it in the great detail which he employed in his 
earlier book, ! Psychological !EProaeh !2 Theology.3 He admitted 
that he had abandoned the older type of liberalism for what he 
believed was a more realistic type of theology, but he made it 
equally plain that he differed with certain of the "realists" 
at crucial points, and the matter of immortality was just such 
a point. He believed that realists in the style of Reinhold 
Niebuhr tended to reject belief in personal immortality because 
they were sympathetic to the Marxist view that such a doctrine 
acts as "an opiate that dulls the revolutionary ardor of the 
masses."4 On the other hand, realists in the mood of Wieman 
generally believed that it was "a form of unregenerate self-
assertion and wishful thinking. 11 5 Hortcm retained his earlier 
1. Ibid., p. 226. 
2. see-Brown, Christian Theology in Outline, p. 239; Clarke, An 
Outline of Christian Theology; McConnell, The Diviner I~­
nence, p:-135; Fosdick, ~Modern Use of the Bible, p. 267; 
Coe, The Religion of a Mature Mind, P• 313. 
3. Horton;-A Psycholoifeal Approa~o Theology, PP• 243-71. 
4. Horton, Realistic Theology, p. 155. 
5. Ibid. 
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view and thus remained in the liberal tradition. However, he 
chose to describe his trust in life beyond the grave in 
Tillich's phrase, "belief-ful realism." "Belief-ful realists," 
wrote Horton, "are bound to consider the question to what ex-
tent mundane reality points beyond itself to a transcendent 
realm of reality."l 
D. REALISTIC DOCTRINE OF CHRIST 
1. The Person of Christ 
Though some very significant changes occurred in Horton's 
Christology during his realistic period, he did not devote as 
much space to its development as he had done in his more 
liberal writing.2 
Horton introduced his realistic approach to Christology 
by noting, "Any honest appraisal of the Work of Christ must 
start with a grateful recognition of the service which liberal 
Christianity has done in recovering the portrai-t of the his-
torical person, Jesus of Nazareth.n3 He went on to explain, 
however, that the liberals substituted the idea of an infallible 
Jesus for the concept of an infallible Bible. Indeed, everything 
in the Bible and everything religious outside of the Bible was 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Ibid. 
See his A Psycholo~ical Approach to Theolo~y, pp. 133-81. 
Horton, Healistic heologt' p. 130. See a so Clarke, An 
outline of Christian Theo ogy, p. 260; Fosdick, The Moaern 
Use of the 1Hble, P• ~lO; and Coe, The Religion of a Mature 
Mind-;-pp:-"4I0-4ll. ----
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evaluated by the liberals ~n the light of the supposedly in-
fallible teachings of Jesus. 1 This position was made unten-
able, he contin~ed, when modern Biblical criticism, notably 
Schweitzer's Quest for ~ Historical Jesus, began to challeng·e 
the infallibility of the teachings of Jesus. It began to be 
apparent that either the gospel records were seriously unre-
liable or Jesus was a mistaken apocalyptic who held to a most 
urt-liberal theology. 2· This painful theological crisis resulted 
in the production of a new portrait of Jesus that was clearly 
not liberal. 
The realistic view of Jesus recognized the limitations of 
Jesus' intellect, and thus repudiated the earlier liberal no-
tion that Jesus was the Master Teacher in the sense that into 
his words ''must somehow be read the sum of all wisdom. "3 More-
over, the realistic view denied that Jesus is the Great Example 
in the sense that he must be imitated in all things and at all 
times.4 Horton admitted Jesus was, indeed, the greatest reli-
gious teacher and a mighty doer of good, but realistic theology 
saw him first of all as Savior.5 
A careful review of the earlier liberal Christology seems 
to indicate that Horton's charge against the leading liberals 
might have been over-severe. No less a liberal than Mathews 
1. See Mathews, The Faith of :Modernism; p. 123; Fosdick, The 
Modern Use of the Bib1e7 pp. 222, 304; and Coe, ~ Relii!On 
of a MatureJMind; pp. 419~11. · · . · --
2. Horton, RealiStic Theology, PP• 130-32. 
3 • I bid. i p ~ lJ3 . 
k: ~:; p: 134: 
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wrote, "the world is not saved by the carpenter of Nazareth, by 
the author of incomparably beautiful ideas, by the most repre-
sentative of martyrs. The Christian salvation centers about God 
in ~ ~, ~ in!.~ made ,!nto ! ~· This is the Modernist's 
position. nl Macintosh, one of the more rad leal liberals pro .. 
claimed: "For it is not simply to him as an individual that we 
are won, but to him as the divine man, the revealer of the di-
vine in human life •••• Thus, he saves, not simply by moral 
and religious teaching and example, but by revealing God.n2 
One would be hard put to argue that these liberals did not also 
see Jesus as Savior, first of all. 
Horton continued to adhere to the liberal view of the 
Incarnation, i.e., the notion that Jesus was a normal human being 
in whose will dwelt the Spirit of God.3 This was revealed when 
Horton referred to the "surrendered will and God-possessed per-
son of Jesus. 114 In the same connection, he also wrote, "The 
remark has sometimes been made that the world has yet to see 
what God can do with a man wholly surrendered to His Will. The 
world has seen; Jesus was that man."5 
However, Horton's realistic mood inclined him to a des-
cription of the Incarnate Spirit of God which contained a degree 
of intensity, and a ring of authority, that set it somewhat apart 
from the earlier liberal view. He denied that Jesus was just 
1. Mathews, The Faith of Modernism, p. 124. 
2. Macintosh~heolo~y as !n Empirical Science, p. 131. 
3. Ibid., p. 120; an Rauschenbusch, 1 Theology £2.!: ~ 
SOCial GOspel, pp. 150-51. -
4. Horton, Realistic Theology, p. 134. 
5. Ibid., p. 133. 
a prophet interpreting a divine act, insisting rather that he 
was in himself the act of God. In that act, continued Horton, 
God uttered Himself so decisively "that all other Words of God 
must be measured by the standard.nl Moreover, man cannot 
measure the divinity of Christ by comparing it with Old Testa-
ment prophecy or the divine revelation in nature. That would 
be to 11 judge the mountain by the foothills." 2 Horton underlined 
his point with the assertion that !'the forgiving love of God 
in Christ constitutes a species by itself, with only one typi-
cal instance."3 The above quotes from liberals make it clear 
that they also regarded the revelation of Jesus Christ as the 
supreme revelation o:£ God, but ~hey most certainly would have 
objected to the chasm whichHorton claimed existed between the 
special revelation in Christ and the general revelation in other 
men in nature. "Incarnation is vastly more than an event that 
occurred two thousand years ago; it is the central principle, 
or shall we say fact, of every Christian life.n4 
2. The Work of Christ 
Even during his earlier liberal period, Horton had expressed 
1. Horton; "Revelation," Revelation, ed. John Baillie and Hugh 
Martin; p. 258. - · -
2. Horton; Realistic Theolosz, p. -258. 
3. Horton) "Revelation," .2E• cit., ed. John Baillie and Hugh 
Martin, P• 258~ 4. Coe, The 'Religion£! a Mature .Mind, -p. 168; see also, Clarke, 
An Outrfne of Christian Theoios:y, pp. -290-91; ·Bowne, Studies 
rn cbrlstlan!ty, P• 92; and McConnell, The Diviner Immanence, pp. 91-93. -
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dissatisfaction with the liberal view of the Atonement. 1 He 
wrote that the moral theory depicted Christ as bearing man's 
sins "by sympathy, and the effect of his death was not in any 
wise to change the eternal relationship between God and man, 
but only to exemplify God's suffering love in such a way as to 
win man to repentance."2 But Horton was not able to accept 
this subjective view as final, and in 1931 he wrote, "it is 
not enough to say that Jesus bore the sins of his contem-
poraries by 'sympathy'. tt3 He was convinced that there was an 
objective factor involved which the earlier liberals had over-
looked, and several years later he developed an objective in-
terpretation of the Atonement in his books, Realistic Theology 
and Contemporary Continental Theology. 
Without depreciating the degree of truth inherent in the 
old liberal view, Horton proceeded to add to it an objective 
dimension. He was particularly influenced by the thinking of 
the continental theologians and proclaimed that they had redis-
covered 11 the cosmic dimensions of depth in the _!ork of Christ."4 
/ He regarded Aulen's thesis concerning the reality of the demonic 
1. For examples of the liberal view see Brown, Christian Theology 
in Outline, pp. 358-59; Mathews, The Faith of Modernism, 
pp. 160-62; Clarke, An Outline of-christian~heology, pP. 343-
47; Bowne, Studies in Christianit~, pp. 122, 141-48; Rauschen-
busch, A Theology for the Social ospel, p. 265; McConnell, 
The Diviner Immanence,-p7 111; Macintosh, Theology~~ 
Empirical Science, pp. 129-30; and Coe, The Religion ~f ~ 
Mature Mind, p. 413. 
2. Horton,~sychological Approach !2 Theology, p. 150. 
3. Ibid. 
4. ~on, Contemporary Continental Theology, p. 223. 
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world as highly significant. "So soon as these dark realities 
begin to take on cosmic proportion," he wrote, "it becomes evi-
dent that the problem of world deliverance is a three-cornered 
affair, involving the rescue of man from the cosmic powers of 
darkness as well as from the darkness in his own nature and the 
~ . - - -. 
resulting alien.ation. ~om God. nl 
/ Horton supplemented ~ulen's view with ·that of Heim which 
proclaimed that "it was the mission of Jesus not merely to save 
individual souls but to break the power of Satan in the world, 
with all the evils that it entails. It was with this cosmic 
power that he was_ silently grappling, like a wrestler mutely 
- .. ~ . 
laboring for a final decisive grip, when he stood speechless 
2 before Caiaphas and Pilate." In his enthusiastic interpreta-
tion of Helm's theory, Horton seemed almost a convert as he de-
scribed the mechanics of the Atonement. "So by allowing the 
storm of Satan's unholy wrath against God, and God's wrath 
.. .. . - ··-- -. .. 
against Satan, to burst unhindered over his bowed, defenseless, 
sinless head, he made the arch-fiend overreach himself, and 
knock a great breach in the wall of guil~ _ ".'hich had cut men off 
from the power as well as the favor of God.'.'-3 Horton agreed 
with Aul&'n that in both the "satisfaction" and the "moral" 
theories of the _ A~onement, God stands at a distance waiting for 
man either to "pa)!" or "change his attitude," _but in the "classic" 
1;. Ibid~; P• 224. 
2 ~ !Did. ,·-p. 136 . 
3· Horton, ·contemporary· Continental Theology·, · p. 137, from Jesus 
.s!!!: Weltvollender, by Karl Helm, pp. 48, 63. 
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theory God comes to the side of man and battles the demons on 
man' s behalf. 1 
Horton had been convinced even in his earlier period that 
there was an objective dimension to the Atonement, but it was 
. . 
not until his realistic period that he was able to present his 
convictions systematically. There was a changed relationship 
between God and the world after Jesus' death, which Horton sum-
marized in the following manner: 
"(1) A permanent change ~ook place in the relation 
between God and man. God got inside humanity as 
never before. 
"(2) A power was permanently released and henceforth 
available, whereby individual human souls might con-
quer their sinful propensities and rise above the fear 
of suffering and death. 
leased be fore. 
This power simply was not re-
---
"(3) A new social organism, the Church, was created, 
through which God's Spirit and Power have ever since 
been mediated to human souls in a definitely new way • 
• • • This social organism!!! not~ before."2 
·Horton dared to say that after the Atonement, God was ac-
tually less transcendent and more immanent in the world, because 
He drew ne~::er "in mercy and in power, to those who followed in 
Jesus' train, than he had ever drawn to mortal men before." 3 The 
1. Horton, Contemporary Continental Theology, p. 162, from 
Christus Victor by Gustav Allen, · p. 171. 
2~ Horton, Realistic Theology, p. 137· 
3· !ill·, p. 140. 
older liberals would probably all have agreed with Horton's 
. . 
summary, but most likely they would have explained the "objec-
tive" changes in the divine-human society on the basis of ''sub-
jective" changes in the human heart. 
Horton's realistic understanding of the Atonement bears a 
~arked resemblance to the more recent view of DeWolf who was 
. . 
identified, tentatiyely, as a _neo-liberal in the introductory 
survey. DeWolf wrote of his own view that 
If anyone -should -say that what is proposed is 
a 'mere subjective·' doctrine, that charge must 
be vigorously denied. The term ,-subjective' 
suggests -that the sinner has only come to feel 
different about his sin and his relation to---
God .. ... But that is far ·· removed from the 
truth as· ·we have interpreted it. · The -recon-
ciled siririer not only . feels different; he is 
different. His attitude toward his own sin:fs 
new. The dominant purpose of his life is new. 
Above all his relationship -to God is new ••• 
reconciliation is a glorious objective reality.l 
E. REALISTIC DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH AND 
THE KINGDOM OF GOD 
1. The Church 
a. The Liberal Neglect of the Church 
Horton was sharply critical of the liberal doctrine of the 
, 
Church, or rather t~e _ liberals lack of anything that could really 
be identified as such. 2 The root of the problem, he thought, was 
1. L. Harold DeWolf, · -A" Th.Eroloe;y -of the Living Church (New York: 
Harper · and Brothers, 19$3); pp: ~-69. 
2. Horton, Realistic Theology, p. 117. 
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to be found in the false liberal belief that nreligion is a 
. - ·-
'private affair', concerning only the individual and his Maker."1 
Horton believed that the creeds of the Church should be "fight-
ing slogans, rallying points for common loyalty and collective 
. . - - . -· '· - ·- . - . 
' 2 
action, n but in the liberal churches they .. had become matters 
... - . - -
of private opl.nion. Those churches, he continued, had no eom-
mon _oonsc~ous~ess or _ eorpo~~te life. In fact, "they are collec-
tions of religio~s _individuals, ... each _ c~rrying on his private 
and peculiar t~e of commerce with God,_ but ?ccasionally gather-
ing for worshi~ in the same ~l~ce, where they may listen to some 
exceptionally gifted ~reacher air h~s private religious opinion 
after which they go their separate ways as before."3 
The free-handed way in which the liberals dealt with the 
- . -· 
orthodox creeds and their disregard for the Church was clearly 
seen in Bowne's reformulation of the creeds which. resulted in 
a statement that did not even mention the Chureh.4 Some lib-
erals were quite critical of the Church.5 It is perfectly true 
that these liberals were directing their criticism at the "or-
6 ganized church." The important thing ~s that they did not bal-
ance their criticism with a doctrine of the "spiritual church." 
Insofar as _ they did it implicitly, _they substituted the doctrine 
of the Kingdom of God for that of the Chureh.7 tt should be 
1~ Ibid., p. 119. 
2. rora., P· 120. 
,3. IO!d. ~ 
4~ BO'iiie, Studies in -christianity, PP.• 372-7~· 
5,. Ibid., P• 36$, and PP• 357-58. 
6. 'SieDeWolf, A Theology of the Living Church, pp. · 318 
7. See Rauschen'busch, A Theol'OQ for t e Social Gospel, ff. PP• 129-30. 
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noted that though Horton had a somewhat greater appreciation 
1 for the Church, particularly in regard to the sacraments, he 
also had been sharply critical of the Church during his lib-
eral period and accused it of burying the figure of its Founder 
--· . 
under a constantly increasing weight of legend and supersti-
tion.2 
In his period of realism, he had come to see the need for 
loyalty to a corporate, deeply social entity.3 The problem, as 
he saw it, was to discover 13. loyalty '!hich is 1'as soul-stirring 
as Fascism," yet free from the cruelty and hatred.4 There was 
just one answer for Horton: Jesus Christ and his Churcht For 
him, the Church was the "one Cause that stands clearly above 
nation and class, and comprehends all the grand departments of 
human need."5 He wrote this even though he was quite aware that, 
in its existing form, the Church was "a clumsy, divided, dis-
oriented, and appallingly tepid-tempered instituti~, which 
rarely looks the contemporary squarely in the eye."6 Yet, he 
charged that recent history has shown that the Church stood up 
to Naziism in a most remarkable manner and in doing so aroused 
hopes that, perhaps, she is not as impotent as she often appears 
to be. 7 
1. Horton, A Ps~chological Approach to Theology, pp. 164-65. 
2. Ibid., · p: 14v. . . .. . - -
3· IrOr!on, ·Realistic Theology, p. 123. 
4~ Ibid., P• 124. 5. Ib!a., p~ 128~ 
6. Ibid., P• 129. 
b. The Evangelical Catholic Church 
Horton admitted that he had become quite sympathetic 
toward the Catholic understanding of the Church. His view, he 
allewed, was closer to Catholic realism than to Protestant in-
dividualism. He had come to see the Church "as a real meta-
physical entity, something over and above the sum of its indi-
vidual members, something whose life spans the centuries."l The 
Church, then, was a social organism whose soul was the Spirit 
of Jesus Ghrist. The Church is, in fact, the continuing life 
of Jesus Ghrist on earth and it continues his ministry.2 
Horton adopted some of the views of D. A. McGregor, an 
Episcopalian, who had described the Church as a "new emergent" 
in the evolutionary process that is as distinct and stable as 
a biological species. Horton declared that "a new strain of 
life, a new pattern of society has been established which will 
breed true to type for long periods, and revert to type when 
apparently lost."3 Horton compared the reality of the spirit 
of the Church to the reality of the spirit of the nation or of 
science and denied that it was superstition to possess a realis-
tic view of the Church. "It is, tt he argued, "simply good 
social psychology.n4 
He asserted that the Roman Catholic Church was emerging 
from a "long period of exile and disfavor • • • clothed with 
1. Ibid., P• 143. 
2. Ibid., p. 142. 
3. Horton, Realistic Theology, p. 144 from McGregor, The Sacred 
Humanity, p. io, ~ Tracts for the Times, No. 3, MIIwaukee, 
Morehouse, 1934. 
4. Horton, Realistic Theology, p. 146. 
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new authority." 1 As a Protestant, he still believed that Rome 
was mistaken in making matters of reason matters of faith, e.g., 
the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. 2 Nevertheless, he ad-
mired Catholicism because "it knows where it stands, . and why, 
.!.!!£ !!:?. holds steady in !: wor1.~ that!! being shaken 12 ll! founda-
tions."3 So interested in Catholicism had Horton become, that 
he proclaimed that the Church form most relevant for the future 
is 11 Evangelical Catholicism." Horton borrowed this term from 
John Frederick Oberlin. 
Not only was any particular denomination utterly unfit to 
assume the role of leader of Christianity, but even Protestant-
ism as a whole or Catholicism, by itself, was unequal to the 
task. The new Church which HOrton envisioned, would partake of 
the virtues of both Protestantism and Catholicism while escap-
ing their vices. He saw the beginning of the fulfillment of his 
dream in the "ecumenical movement" in which Catholic Christian-
ity (high Episcopalian and Eastern Orthodox) were learning to 
~ . . - ~ -
live in creative peace with Protestantism.4 In the new Church, 
he envisioned that the faith principle of Protestantism will be 
married to the work principle of Catholicism.5 
None of the older liberals had gone as far as Horton in 
. . 
this respect, though Horton himself, in his more liberal period, 
1. Horton, Contemporary Continental Theology, p. 4. 
2. Ibid~; P• 83~ 
3· YbuL, · p. 84. -4. Horton, The .Significance .2! Swedenborg ~Contemporary The-
~~ p~ 1· ' 5. ~~ p. 16. 
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had seen the need to go beyond any particular existing reli-
gious form. 1 However, he then seemed to be drifting in the 
direction of a higher syncretism which embraced all the reli-
2 gions of the world. In his realistic period he limited his 
speculation to the various forms of the Christian faith and 
evidenced a decided bias in favor of the Catholic type of church 
organization. It should be noted that this period marked the 
coming to consciousness of Horton's ecumenical interest. This 
. . . 
ecumenical interest was one of the more important ideas that 
were associated with the nee-liberal movement in the introduc-
tory survey.3 
c. The Church and Culture 
Horton continued to be very much aware that the Church es-
ists in a cultural milieu~4 and that there is a continual inter-
change between the two. Thus, when the Gospel encountered Greek 
culture both a new form of Christianity and a new Western cul-
ture emerged. This has ever been so, through the Christian en-
counter with the north European peoples and also in the struggle 
of Christianity with the spirit of modern science.5 
Though the Church is intimately related to culture, it must 
never be identified with culture. If the identification is 
complete then the Church will decay along with the prevailing 
1. Horton, UA Patehc;:>logical Approach to Theology, pp. 171-74· 
2. Ibid., ·p. 17 -75· . . . . 
3· :JOh!i'· c. Bennett, Christian Realism· (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1941), pp. 154-55'. ~nd DeWolf, A Theology 2f the Living 
Church, p. 376. · · · · 
4. He had expressed this -conviction in his earlier and more lib-
eral writing, A Psychological ·AI4r6ach to Theology, p. 175. 5. Horton, Realistic Theology, p. 7. 
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society. 1 Horton credited Reinhold Niebuhr with helping him 
to see that the Protestant C}?.urch is too closely al~ied with 
Western nationalism, industrialism, and the middle class. He 
firmly believed th~t it is in real danger of declining along 
with the rest of Western culture. 2 This attempt to see the 
Church as related to and yet distinct from culture marked a 
departure from the general_ liberal point of view which tended 
to regard the Church a~ irrelevant and s~rove for a closer 
identification with contemporary culture. 3 Fosdick alone 
among the liberals seemed to _ sen~e the future realistic mood 
when he warned, 111Je are going out into a difficult, and it may 
be desperate generation. Western civilization may go to pieces 
under us." 4 Horton's faith had f~und _ a _ footing so secure that 
he could boldly proclaim that ev~n though ~11 civilization and 
formal religion should crash into oblivion, the true Church 
would remain because the Holy Spirit cannot be quenched.5 
2. The Kingdom of God 
a. Man in Time and God in Eternity 
Horton's liberal pedigree was evident when he wrote that 
the Kingdom of God is "the most stirring battle-cry that Christian 
1. Ibid.; pp~J.4147-48. 
2. Ibid., p. 8. 
3· Bowne, Studies .f!! Christianity~ pp. ·358-58; and Rauschenbusch, 
! Theology for · the Social Gospel, p. · 145. · · 
4~ Fosdick, The Modern Use of· the Bible, P• 250. 5. Horton, Reilistic Theo!ogy,-p: 149. 
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lips can raise. rtl But he criticized the older liberal inter-
pretation, first for its relegation of God to the role of a kind 
of "silent partner," and second for its almost exclusive empha-
sis upon the this-worldly, social aspect of the Kingdom to the 
neglect of the heavenly and individual dimension.2 
The liberal belief in steady progress coupled with faith 
in the goodness and ability of man tended to create a picture 
of the "democracy of God instead of the Kingdom of God. • • • 
All in all, it might have been better to speak of the 'Kingdom 
of Man' instead of the 'Kingdom of God'."3 It has been pointed 
out before that the liberals did not hold the idea of in-
evitable progress, 4 but the anthropomorphic theme was quite 
evident as Bowne revealed when he forthrightly equated the 
Kingdom of God with the Kingdom of Man. 5 While Horton had not 
been so candid in his earlier and more liberal writings, his dis• 
cussion of the coming "world civilization" revolved around human 
consensus more than divine activity.6 Horton put it plainly when 
he declared, "Realistic theology reacts against liberalism (and 
its offspring humanism) •••• It tends to regard it as God's 
Kingdom, not man's."7 
1. Ibid., p. 153; Cf. Brown, Christian Theology !B Outline, p. 37; 
Rauschenbusch, ! Theology ~ the Social Gospel, p. 53; and 
Coe, The Religion of a Mature Mind, p. 168. 
2. Horton;-Realistic Theology, p. 154. 
3. Ibid. 
4. See Raus chenbusch, A The olosY for the Social Gospel, p. 139. 
5. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, p.-sf7. 
6. Horton, A Psychological Approach ~ Theology, p. 169. 
7. Horton, Realistic Theology, pp. 154-55. 
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He made it clear that realistic theology also rejected the 
emphasis of liberalism, i.e., the earthly realization of the 
1 Kingdom. "Neither for the individual nor for :!lociety," he 
wrote, "does realism expect perfectionism on this planet."2 
Horton expressed the belief that Christians can experience 
"foretastes of divine perfection" in moments of the individual 
and collective life •3 These "fore tastes" of the Kingdom of 
God have generally occurred in the Christian Chur .ch, home and 
community. 4 
He credited the orthodox revival with rediscovering "th~ 
dimension .2£ depth in the mystery of~ future."5 He had moved 
beyond the facile liberal view of progress in time " t o a fresh 
appreciation of the truth in New Testament eschatology. rr6 Heim' s 
view of "realistic eschatology" is essentially correct, he 
asserted, provided it is viewed symbolically and not literally.7 
Eternity touches man at every moment in time, but it also awaits 
man at the end of time and approaches him through successive 
eras.8 Horton approved of Althaus• statement that the Kingdom 
will not be gradually and completely achieved, but that the 
1. See Mathews, The Faith of Modernism, pp. 167, 180; Bowne, 
Studies in ChriStianiti;-pp. 32l-22; Fosdick, The Modern Use 
of the Bible, pp. 248- 9; and Coe, ~Religion of ~Mature­
Mind, pp. 28, 29. 
2. Horton, Realistic Theology, p. 156. 
3. Ibid., p. l57. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Horton, Contemporary Continental Theology, p. 225. 
6. Ibid., p. 225. . 
7. 1"bbd. 
8. Horton, Contemporary Continental Theology, p. 137, from Helm's 
Jesus ~ Welt vollender, p. 175. 
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Church will con8tantly be in combat with the !nti-Christ until 
the Kingdom in all its perfection is bequeathed to man at the 
end of time which is both the fulfillment and death of this 
world .1 
A realistic doctrine of the Kingdom, he concluded, must 
combine the activistic heritage of liberalism with the escha-
tological heritage of the New Testament by looking "upward to 
eternity and ahead in time -- this must be the double direction 
of our religious aspiration if we are to have the tempered 
optimism, the patient activism, which our hard times require. tt2 
..... 
The Church vis-~-vis the Kingdom of God 
Horton made it plain that he did not identify the Church 
with the Kingdom of God. The Kingdom will be "a cluster of 
glorified institutions -- States, Families, Trade Guilds, Reli-
gious Orders, and the like-- of which the Churchwould be 
simply the vitalizing center and organizing entelechy."3 In 
addition to being the soul of the Kingdom, the Church must con-
tinue the ministry of Jesus Christ by announcing and helping to 
prepare for the coming of the divine society.4 The difficulty 
which faces the Church in this task has to do with maintaining 
her purity while becoming involved in worldly affairs.5 He 
believed that the problem could be solved, ~ to which end he 
., 
advocated the following three-point program. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Horton, Contemnorart Continental Theology, p. 142, from 
Grundriss der ogma ik, II, 177-81. 
Ibid., p. 226. ~ . 
HOrton, Realistic Theolo~, p. 151; cf. Rauschenbusch, A 
Theology for the Social ospel, p. 145. -
Cf. Rauschenbusch, A Theology for~ Social Gospel, p. 143. 
Horton, Realistic Theology, p. 174. 
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(1) Obviously, the Church as a whole cannot declare its 
independence of the present economic and political society, but 
there is no reason why portions of the Church cannot do it. 
- . 
Modern religious orders, some living in voluntary poverty, would 
possess the right to speak out against the unjust conditions of 
society. He cited the Fellowshi;e of Reconciliation and the Fel-
- --·· ~-- .. . -
lowshi;e of Socialist _Christians as organizations which tend to-
ward what he had in mind. 1 
(2) The Church should e?cour~ge her members to train for 
positions of political leadership. This could be done, Horton 
believed, without having the Church dictate the political 
opinions of her members, but by encouraging the discussion of 
public questions in a spirit of tolerance and good will. Such 
discussions would, of course, stress the prime importance of 
pure ideals, but would also face realistically the existence 
of the selfish motives which dominate most people, and the fact 
that though Christian ideals are workable in a small group they 
will not work in a modern political state. The Church should 
meet this dilemma by teaching the Christian statesman "to esti-
mate shrewdly the relative force of the various selfish interests 
which converge about him, and b~ playing them off skillfully 
against e~ch other secure the ~ghest degree of justice that is 
2 possible under the __ circu~stances." This somewhat wor!ldly atti-
tude marked a departure from much of the earlier liberal thinking 
1~ Ibid.~ pp; 182-83. 
2. !Did., pp. 184-85. 
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about Kingdom building,l and Horton admitted that he had 
acquired much of it from the thought of Reinhold Niebuhr.2 
(3) Finally, the Church must c0ntinually strive to 
change the mind and will of the public so that, ultimately, 
public policy itself will be changed. Horton admitted that 
it is not the business of the Church to devise economic mechanisms 
that will solve the dile~ of business cycles (that is a job 
for social scientists), but she can inspire them to formulate 
schemes which meet the demands of social justice. Nor, con-
tinued Horton, can the Church translate the plans into action 
(that is the task of the political parties), but abe can create 
a public passion for reforn1 and a spirit of self-sacrifice for 
the greater good.3 
By some such scheme as this Horton believed that the Church 
could become creatively involved in the problems of society 
while remaining true to her loftiest ideals, and thus continue 
the ministry of Jesus Christ with respect to the Kingdom of God. 
1. See Mathews, The Faith of Modernism, p. 116; Bowne, Studies 
in Christianitl; pp. 321-22; Knudson, Present Tendencies in 
Religious Thought, pp. 52-54; and Coe, The Religion of a --
Mature Mind, p. 399. 
2. Horton,~listic Theology, p. 176, n. 7. 
3. Ibid., pp. l87-88. 
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F. SUMMARY OF THE SIGNIFICANT IDEAS EXPRESSED IN 
HORTON'S REALISTIC PERIOD 
1. Method 
Horton proclaimed that liberalism as a system was dead, 
but he continued to employ the liberal spirit of fearless in-
vestigation, which he combined with and, indeed, subordinated 
to, acceptance of data derived from the Biblical revelation. 
The impact of neo-orthodox theologians, particularly Reinhold 
Niebu_hn1 inclined him to interpret the :Scriptures symbolically 
as well as historically. 
2. God 
The liberal emphasis upon God as love and personality was 
continued, but supplemented with a realistic view of the divine 
holiness and wrath. Horton rejected the liberal view of Provi-
dence which he believed was erroneously equated with progress. 
His own view was two-sided, combining faith in the mercy and 
grace of God with the often severe and condemnatory views of 
the prophets. 
3· Man 
Horton criticized the liberals for their allegedly super-
ficial analysis of human sinfulness. He credited Augustinian 
- . 
theology with recognizing the true and terrible dimensions of 
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sin. But though he claimed that man was suffering from a ter-
rible nracial disease," he adhered to the liberal contention 
that man possesses a divine "inner light" and is destined for 
immortality. 
4· Christ 
While he praised the liberals for their efforts to recover 
the historical Jesus he rejected the portrait of Jesus which he 
associated with them. Hi·s realistic view emphasized the Savior-
hood of Jesus Christ beyond his vocation as Teacher and Example. 
Horton recognized important values in the subjective liberal 
view of the Atonement, .but supple~ented that view with the more 
/ 
objective interpretation which he had learned from Aulen and 
Heim. 
5. Church and Kingdom 
He was very critical of the liberal doctrine of the Church 
which, he maintained, was seriously deficient because of lib-
eral preoccupation with individualism. He found truth in the 
Catholic view of the Church which is both realistic and highly 
social. Horton also criticized the liberals for neglecting the 
place of God in their doctrine of the Kingdom of God and for 
focusing their attention exclusively upon a this-worldly con-
summation. His growing ecumenical consciousness was increas-
ingly evident, and he called himself an "Evangelical Catholic" 
as well as a nrealist." 
CHAPTER V 
1939 - HORTON'S NEO-LIBERAL PERIOD 
A. NEO-LIBERAL METHOD 
1. The Neo-liberal Concept 
a. Values and Disvalues in Nee-orthodoxy 
The lessons that Horton had learned during his realistic 
period were both important and lasting. In the midst of an 
emerging neo-liberal attitude, which he expressed in his most 
recent book,l he could proclaim that nee-orthodoxy remained 
powerful and aggressive. He characterized nee-orthodoxy a~ 
emphasizing "the insufficiency of human reason, the depravity of 
human nature, the inexorability of divine judgment, and the 
absolute need of divine grace if man is to be saved."2 Neo-
orthodoxy, he continued, was particularly critical of that in 
the older liberalism which tended to become so relevant that it 
copied its cultural environment and lost its own independent 
message. Nevertheless, he believed that the new orthodoxy was 
1. Walter M. Horton, Christi~ Theologys An Ecumenical Approach 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955). 
2. Ibid., p. 32 • 
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so securely anchored in God's Word that it often succeeded in 
speaking to the condition of twentieth-century man as though it 
were a personal canmunication.l Earlier in this neo-liberal 
period, he had referred to Niebuhr as "our leading American 
theologian."2 
Horton's appreciation for neo-orthodoxy was not unmitigated. 
One of his chief disagreements with the neo-orthodox position 
centered around the place of reason in theological method. He 
/ 
singled out the thought of Aulen and Barth with respect to the 
problem and vented strong criticism upon the neo-orthodox posi-
tion. "The point is," he explained, "that Christian theology, 
/ for Barth and Aulen, is exclusively based upon faith in divinely 
given revelation, which is to be understood and expounded, but 
under no circumstances to be rationally argued for or defended, 
lest we commit the blasphemy of measuring God by human standards. tt3 
Horton completely rejected this phase of neo-orthodoxy. He was 
not ready to be so completely cut off from philosophical thought 
about religious problems. 4 He was deeply concerned with the 
widespread condition of "perplexed belief" and believed that 
Christian theology has a solemn obligation to face it with rea-
son as well as with faith.5 "I am really distressed," he wrote, 
"by the apparent implication of Aule'n•s method, that to reason 
about the Christian faith with perplexed inquiries is to commit 
1. Ibid., p. 32. 
2. wart"er M. Horton, "Report of American to European Churches," 
Christendom, XI (1946), p. 144. 
3. Horton, Christian Theology, p. 5. 
4. Ibid. 
5. ~., p. 6. 
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high treason against the faith."l He readily admitted that 
there is real danger in trying to adapt the Gospel to modern 
needs and problems, but to refuse the task and not even try to 
communi cate with many earnest seekers is to renounce the world 
"for which Christ died, and into which he sent and sends his 
apostles. 112 
b. The Need for a Neo-liberal Theology 
In 1952 Horton delivered an address at Sweet Briar College 
in which he proclaimed both the older liberalism and contem-
porary nee-orthodoxy to be inadequate theological systems. "I 
hold no brief," he declared, "for the continuance, unaltered, 
of the older type of liberalism that prevailed at the turn or 
the century. tt3 Turning next to neo-orthodoxy, he said that one 
of its main weaknesses lies in the fact that it employs a lan-
guage which has little meaning for the contemporary mind.4 More-
over, nee-orthodoxy seems to be powerless to deliver humanity 
from the mood of pessimism and futility which envelopes our age.5 
In this lecture Horton suggested that the best way out of 
this unsatisfactory situation was to develop "a !!!!! liberalism, 
relevant to the new situation, which would continue the old 
liberalism somewhat as the butterfly continues the caterpillar, 
1. Ibid. 
2 • "'5''d. ' p • 33 • 
3. Walter M. Horton, Liberalism .Q!.2 and ~ (Sweet Briar, Va.: 
Sweet Briar College, 1952). 
4 • Ibid • ' p. 6. 
5. Ibid., p. 4. 
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sloughing off its old dried-up skin but perpetuating its vital 
principle. nl He believed that only a new liberal theology could 
break the mood of despair and restate the Gospel message in 
terms the secular mind could grasp.2 He cautioned that the 
new liberalism must build upon the recent past and incorporate 
a sincere respect for the classic Christian orthodoxy, "but let 
it be unmercifully critical of all merely arc~ic and irrele-
vant elements in the Christian tradition, and eagerly sensitive 
to all genuine points of contact between the Gospel and the con-
temporary mind. n3 
Prior to this very significant address, Horton had made 
mention of the growing neo-liberal trend in America and had 
specifically cited John Bennett as a good representative of the 
type.4 He believed that Bennett had succeeded in developing a 
doctrine of man that took account of man's divine potential as 
well as his propensity towards sin. In the Sweet Briar lecture, 
Horton singled out DeWolf as another neo-liberal. Horton was 
especially anxious that the new liberalism make a prominent place 
for reason in theological method. He had been much impressed 
1. Ibid. 
2. 'Ybid., p. 7. 
3. I'5Td. 
4. Horton, "Report of American to European Churches," Chris tend om, XI 
{1.94?),1 49 ; "Systematic Theology," .Arnold s. Nasr (ed. ), Protestant 
Thought in the Twentieth Century: Whence and Whither? (New 
York: The Macmillan Co., l95l), p. ll9. Horton referred to 
Bennett's chapter in the symposium called Liberal Theology: An 
Appraisal (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, l942). 
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with DeWolf's attempts in this same areal and declared that 
DeWolf's theology "seems to me to prefigure most clearly the 
position that the new liberalism needs to take."2 
c. Ecumenicism Dimension 
Probably the most noticeable element in Horton's own 
approach to the development of a nee-liberalism is his acumen-
ism. He traced this interest to a trip around the world whiCh 
he took in 1939. In particular, the Madras missionary con-
ference gave him "a vision of the world Christian community as 
a growing force in a crumbling world order."3 The convictions that 
resulted from that trip were expressed in his book, ~ Chris-
tianity~ Civilization74 That this marked the beginning of 
his neo-liberal period is supported by his following statement. 
"To a large extent my thought and teaching throughout this past 
decade have simply tried to clarify and state the insights which 
came to me on this trip.n5 
The ecumenical dimension of Horton's nee-liberalism was 
revealed very clearly in his recent book, Christian Theology: 
An Ecumenical Approach.s Therein he stated that he had been 
long convinced that "sectarian theology is something just as 
absurd as 'Baptist astronomy'. n7 Because God is one, he 
1. L. Harold DeWolf, The Religious Revolt Against Reason (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 1949). 
2. Horton, Liberalism Old and New, p. 12. 
3. Horton, "Between Liberalism-and the New Orthodoxy," The 
Christian Century, LXVII (May, 1939), p. 490. ---
4. Walter M. Horton, Can Christianity Save Civilization? (New 
York: Harper and BrOthers, 1940}. ----
5. Horton, "Ten Revolutionary Years," The Christian Century, 
LXVI (April 20, 1949), p. 490. 
6. Horton, Christian Theology, 1955. 
7. ~., p. ix. 
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continued, theology must be one, i.e., it must be ecumenical.l 
True ecumenism, he believed, must include Catholic as well 
as Protestant Christianity, and for this task Horton was well 
prepared. His Ph.D. dissertation was a careful study of the 
Roman Catholic Abb' Bautain2 and during his realistic period 
he had declared himself to be an "Evangelical Catholic."3 It 
was his dream that the modern ecumenical movement would unite 
the Catholic ideal of Christian unity with the Protestant ideal 
of Christian liberty and thus "break the tragic deadlock be-
tween those opposite but equally essential trends in Christian 
life and thought. n4 
In pursuing the task of building an ecumenical theology, 
Horton explained that it would be necessary to discriminate be-
tween the elements in various theologies which are grounded in 
the common Christian faith and those which are the heritage of 
a denomination or school of thought.5 Because he anticipated 
an adverse reaction to such a proposal, he made it plain "that 
the ecumenical approach to theology does not promise to reduce 
Christian doctrine to flat uniformity, by eliminating every 
last shade of difference."6 Rather, it seeks to harmonize the 
various theological interpretations about a common ground or 
consensus. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Ibid. 
Walter M •. Horton, Philosophy of Abb' Bautain (New York: New 
University Press, 1926). · 
Horton, Contemlorary Continental Theology, p. 228. 
Horton, Christ an Theology, p. 2 • . 
.Ibid • , p • 3 • 
Ibid., p. x. 
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2. Revelation and Reason 
a. Revelation as a Criterion of Truth 
Horton was aware of the importance of establishing a 
criterion of truth for use in his new liberal methodology. In 
his earlier liberal period he had stressed the empirical tests 
of the natural sciencesl though he had recognized the value of 
"contemplative objectivity."2 His nee-liberal view retained 
the respect for reason but seemed to incline more to the position 
he held during his period of realism.3 He stated that the ecu-
menical consensus regarding the test of religious truth was that 
revelation was the most reliable criterion, and he admitted that 
he shared that view. However, he immediately qualified that 
confession by indicating that he did not thereby surrender to 
subjective feelings and mystical experiences. Revelation most 
certainly distinguishes religious knowledge from the more ordi-
nary forms of knowledge but it also relates it to them.4 
/ He appreciated Aulen's figure of the lighted transparency 
which discloses what was beheld before being illuminated plus 
the added dimension of light and contrast. "This admirably con~ 
veys the mixture of ordinary perception and extraordinary 
intuition in every religious revelation."5 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Horton, "Objective Elements in the Experience of God," 
Journal of Reli~ion, VII (October, 1927), p. 540. 
Ibid.; PP7 554- 5. 
~on, "Revelation," Revelation, ed. John Baillie and Hugh 
Martin, p. 254. 
Horton, Christian Theology, p. 41. 
Ibid., p. 42. 
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The necessary corollary for revelation is faith, since, as 
Horton put it, only faith can light up the transparency. Faith 
"is a form of illumination, a form of knowledge, never wholly 
divorced from commonsense knowledge, but piercing deeper into 
the heart of things. ttl 
Horton re-emphasized a point that he had made during his 
realistic period 2 when he stressed the necessity of distinguish-
ing special from general revelation. He criticized the older 
liberals for tending to reduce all revelation to general reve-
lation. This, he explained, was a natural consequence of their 
purely scientific method which concentrated on "reproducible 
experience."3 But special revelation is a very real phenomenon, 
he argued, for God acts in "non-reproducible fashion on great 
historic oecasions.n4 Thus, he contended that the method of the 
new liberalism must take special revelation into account to a 
greater degree than the older liberalism had done, for God is 
known primarily through special historical events and personages 
rather than through general revelation.5 
Perhaps Horton's charge was a bit too sweeping, for certainly 
1. Ibid. 
2. IIOrton, "Revelation," Revelation, ed. John Baillie and Hugh 
Martin, pp. 245, 254. 
3. Walter M. Horton, "Contemporary Protestant Theology and the 
Bible," The Journal of Religious Thought, XIII (Autumn-Winter 
1955-56), p. 35. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Horton, Christian Theology, p. 46. 
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Bowne and McConnell had stressed the reality and even primacy 
1 
of special revelation. However, Horton did stress the actual, 
objective difference between the two types of revelation2 while 
the older liberalism reg.arded the difference as a subjective 
one. In this respect, Horton's neo-liberalism differs from that 
of DeWolf, for the latter continues the older liberal distinc-
tion. 3 
b. Avoiding Irrationalism 
The neo-orthodox theologians had taught Horton to appreciate 
the value of divine revelation but he had not forsaken his lib-
eral heritage which stressed the need for reason in theological 
method. He believed that Barth raised the most acute issue in 
contemporary theology when he challenged the right or ability 
of reason to make a significant contribution to theology.4 Hor-
ton left no doubt as to his position in this matter. He had 
previously stated his belief that special revelation must sup-
plement, indeed, lead, general experience if decisive guidance 
for life is to be secured, 5 but he affirmed with equal forcefUl-
ness that "without~ reference to general experience, without 
1. Bowne, Studies in· Christianity, pp. 23-24'; and McConnell, The 
Diviner Immanence; p. 22. -- - · 
2. Horton1 "Revelation'" Revelation, ed. John Baillie and Hugh 
Martin, pp. 245, 254. 
3· See DeWolf, A Theologr £f the Living Church, pp. 64-67,where 
he -denies that special revelation is more direct that general 
nevelation. Horton's point did not center- on the question of 
directness but on the degree of personal freedom and initiative 
expressed in the revelation. · , 
4~ Horton, Christian Theology, p. 72. 
5. Ibid., P• 78. 
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some resort to the rational criterion of 'comprehensive 
coherence,' a revelational theology become~ mere authoritative 
table thumping."l He made it clear that though the new liberalism 
will give a central place to Biblical revelation 
in its theory of religious knowledge ••• LI!l 
will continue to maintain a place for reason as a 
confirmatory approach to faith, as a principle of 
harmony among religious ideas, and as a most 
necessary check upon the fanatical dogmatism 
of rival religious revelations -- whose probable 
recourse is to violence and oppression, if reason 
refuses to judge between them.2 
Again, he cited DeWolf as the chief nee-liberal spokesman in this 
matter; one who had rightfully remained adamant on the place of 
reason in theology.3 
In developing his own solution to the faith-reason problem, 
Horton found much merit in Tillich's method of correlation, "which 
brings out the 'correlation' at every point between modern man's 
philosophical 'questions' and the Christian faith's •answers' to 
,I 
those very que stions. 114 While Barth and Aulen confined them-
selves to the purely "kerygmatic" task of clarifying the Chris-
tian message, Tillich incorporated the "apologetic" task of 
relating the Gospel message to modern problems and secular knowl-
edge.5 Horton approved of this combining of philosophical and 
revelational theology and developed his own system along those 
same lines. He opened each section of his ecumenical theology 
1. Horton, Christian Theologz, p. 77. 
2. Horton, Liberalism bid and New, p. 12. 
3. Horton, Christian Theolo~,-p: 74. 
4. Ibid., p. 6. 
5. 'I'SI'O., p. 7. 
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with a statement of the issue as it concerns !!! people (the 
philosophic approach) and he followed this with the universal 
Christian answer (the revelational approach). This he followed 
with a rational analysis of the remaining unresolved issues.l 
He believed that this method enabled him to help fulfill hi·s 
own prophecy regarding nee-liberal method, i.e., that the new 
liberalism would g:i.ve a central place to Biblical revelation 
but would use reason as a check on the excesses of faith, and 
as a tool for relating it to the modern mind.2 
B. NEO-LIBERAL DOCTRINE OF GOD 
1. The Existence of God 
a. Identifying the Most 'l·orthful Value 
Durlng his period of realism, Horton had written a book 
entitled, Q££,3 and during his neo-liberal period this same 
book was reprinted in a symposium entitled, God, Jesus, and Man.4 
- --
The doctrine of God expressed therein, though written prior to 
his neo-liberal period, is essentially the same as that which 
he presented in his more recent book, Christi~n Theology: An 
Ecumenical Approach.5 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Ibid. 
~on, Liberalism Old and New, pp. 7, 12. 
Horton, God {New York: AssOC:ration Press, 1937). 
Walter M:-Horton, Mary Ely Lyman, and Robert L. Calhoun, 
Jesu~, and !!g (New York: Association Press, 1953). 
Horton, Christian Theology, 1955. 
God _, 
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Since Horton consented to the publication of this earlier 
work without making any explanation, it appears that he did not 
believe that he had made any significant changes in his doctrine 
of God during his period of neo-liberal thought. This does not 
mean that his doctrine of God remains more closely allied with 
the nee-orthodox position than his other doctrines, but that he 
never really surrendered many of his liberal beliefs during the 
realistic period. This is particularly clear in the section 
where he dealt with the "proofs" for the existence of God. Then 
he cited and defended the cosmological-teleological, moral and 
experiential arguments for the existence of God.l 
In Christian Theology: An Ecumenical Approach, he did not 
repeat these arguments (though he did not repudiate them either), 
because he believed that the problem confronting theology was no 
longer to convince people of the existence of God but, rather, 
to help them sort out "the infinite variety of candidates .for 
deity that manifest themselves in the wide realm of existence 
~and determine which_7 is most genuinely worthy of trust and 
worship! n2 
He suggested that the .first step in the sorting process 
involves facing the atheist-pantheist dilemma; nothing is wor-
shipfUl versus everything is worshipful. He pointed out, as 
he had done in his earlier book,3 that because neither of these 
positions can be held for long, they tend to cancel one another 
1. Horton, God, pp. 38-49. 
2. Horton, Christian Theology, p. 80. 
3. Horton, ~· cit., pp. 10:15. 
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out. 1 The really live options lie between these extremes. If 
the values of human relations appear to be supreme then the 
. -
deity is humanistic; if the values in natural processes are 
regarded as supreme then the deity is naturalistic. While Hor-
ton continued to believe that there are real values in both of 
these eonceptions2 he made it plain that he did not believe that 
ultimate trust and adoration could ever be rightfully rendered 
to a purely immanental-humanistie or naturalistic concept of 
deity. 
He added a vertical scale whichrepresented the transcend-
ent element in deity because "the God of monotheism is not a 
visible object in our world, alongside man and the cosmos, but 
rather an invisible depth in our world, more enduring than the 
human and natural events that half-veil and half-reveal this 
depth. 11 3 Thus, by a process of elimination, Horton identified 
God as that supreme value that is "!n man and nature as their 
creative ~ou~ce, ~epth, and Ground, above and beyond the world, 
yet not apart from it. "4 
b. Basic Concepts of Monotheism 
Horton believed that the attributes ofholiness, goodness, 
and greatness are fundamental to the Christian concept of God. 
Holiness refers not to moral per:f"ection but to the awesome mys-
tery that surrounds deity. Goodness must be inherent in God or 
1. Horton, Christian· Theology, p. 81. 
2. Horton, God, pp. 5-8, and Christian Theology, pp. 81-82. 
3. Horton, Christian Theology, P• 82. 
4· Ibid., PP• 82-83. 
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man could never be expected to trust Him. Power, while not the 
most fundamental attribute, is so determinative that other things 
1 being equal, the more powerful a deity_ is, the more divine he is. 
In Horton's opinion, the most significant single datum in 
the Chris.tian consensus concerning God is the belief that God 
the Creator and God the Redeemer are really one God. 2 This sug-
gests a dilemma in which God is both ''divine Other and divine 
Friend." Horton sharply rejected the nee-orthodox resort to 
paradox; " -- as though the truth about God were best expressed 
in a series of crashing discords, where every Yes was immedi-
ately contradicted by an equal and opposite No."3 In seeking 
to resolve this perplexing problem of divine immanence and tran-
scendence, he appealed to the formula of Jesus, who considered 
God's immanentalism in terms of human attributes and balanced 
this with a recognition of th~ divine transcendence as expressed 
in his phrase, 11 how much more."4 This insistence upon the na-
tural relationship between divine· immanence and transcendence 
as opposed to the sharp disjunction proclaimed by nee-orthodoxy 
revealed that Horton still retained much of the old liberal 
manner of thinking.5 
1. Ibid•;pp. 83-84. 
2. Ibld.; P• 89. 
3· '!bid., P• 91. 
4· Matt. 7: · 11. 5. Mathews, The Faith of Modernism, pp. · 113-114; and Clarke, An 
Outline of Christian-Theology, P• 130. 
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2. The Nature of God 
a. Greek and Hebrew Concepts 
In his realistic period, Horton wrote that the Christian 
idea of God is a legacy from the religious quest of the Greeks 
and the Hebrews. It was in the mingling of these two tradi-
tions that the full Christian idea of God was born. 1 In his 
neo-liberal period he had come to perceive that there was a 
serious tension between the two traditions. He saw in Tillich 
/ 
and Ferre an excellent contemporary expression of the conflict. 
Tillich began with the Greek philosophical emphasis upon the 
ontological element of God as Being, and then added the Biblical 
attributes of holiness, love, and power. / Ferre, on the other 
hand, began with the Biblical doctrines of God's love and then 
gave it metaphysical grounding. 2 Horton was critical of both 
extremes, for Tillich's method seems likely to swallow Chris-
/ tian theology while Ferre's approach runs the risk of drawing 
the Infinite down to the level of the finite. While thoroughly 
/ 
rejecting Aulen 1 s charges that metaphysical concepts are ir-
relevant, he accepted Brunner's thesis that such concepts are 
dangerous until they have been "converted'' by being brought 
into vital interaction with the Christian revelat1on.3 
Within the Hebrew or Biblical concept of God there exists 
the dichotomy of love and wrath. Horton continued to express 
1. Horton; God, pp. 16-17. 
2. Horton, -- "Christian Theology, PP • 97-99. 
3· Ibid., p. 166. 
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the liberal conviction that the love of God is more deter-
minative than His wrathl but he added that "however secondary 
it may be, LI~7 is frightfully real, and ca~not be set aside 
without tragic suffering."2 While the older liberals had not 
discarded the fact of divine wrath3 neither had they emphasized 
its ''frightfully real" quality. This emphasis in Horton's nee-
liberal doctrine of God was definitely a legacy from his 
realistic period.4 
He defined the wrath of God as "the necessary opposition 
which develops between God and His creatures whenever they try 
to live as though He did not exist, or as though some other 
will than His were finally authoritative."5 It makes no dif-
ference if the offense is unconsciously committed or even if 
the motives are good; still "the result is disastrous and God 
Himself with all His infinite love and might cannot make it 
otherwise."6 Along with such a stern evaluation, Horton was 
able to proclaim that divine love is the motivating power be-
hind it all. God loves man and it is for man's own good that 
God opposes him whenever he deviates from the moral law. Apart 
from such severe opposition, man could never find his highest 
good. 7 
1. See Clarke, An Outline of Christian Theology, p. 72; and 
McConnell, The Diviner Immanence, pp. 134-135. 
2. Walter M. Horton, Our Eternal Contemporary (New York~ Harper 
and Brothers, 1942~p. 69. 
3. See Brown, Christian ~heology !E. Outline, p. 111; and Macintosh, 
Theology~~ Empirical Science, p. 163. 
4. See Horton, God, pp. 32-34. 
5. Horton, Our Eternal Contemporary, p. 70. 
6. Ibid. 
7. ~· 
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b. The Personality of God 
Horton pointed out that the dispute over the use of the 
term "personality" with reference to the nature of God cut 
across the schools of thought. Thus Bertoeei, a liberal, and 
Brunner, a nee-orthodox, ean both agree that the category of 
personality is applicable to Godland Til!ich, a nee-naturalist 
and Berdyaev, an Eastern Orthodox, ca~ agree that it is not. 1 
Horton reduced the issue to the problem of an ethical-rational 
versus a mystical-metaphysical interpretation of the Christian 
faith. 
This formulation of the matter marked a step beyond his 
earlier view. In his liberal period he had referred to the 
2 personality of God and during his period of realism he stressed 
' ' . 
the fact of God's supe~~persona~Lty3 as, indeed, many of the 
older liberals had done#But not until his nee-liberal period 
did he make clear the intimate relationship between the ethical 
imperative of the Gospel and a personalistic view of deity. 
Horton concluded that the idea of God's personality must 
be retained if the ethical-social element in the Gospel is not 
to be lost. He saw no problem here since authentic Christian 
mysticism has always recognized this need. However, Christian 
personalism must never deny "the organic, vine-and-branches 
1. Horton; ~istian Theology, -PP• 103~105. 
2. Horton, 'Reasons · :ror · Believing in God," Journal of Religion, 
III (Novemoer, · 1923), 612. 
3· Horton, God~, pp. 27-28. · 
4· Brown,ChriStian Theology in Outline, pp. 105-106; Mathews, The 
Faith of· Modernism, p. 119T · c1arke; An Outline of Christian 
Theology, pp. 67-68; and Macintosh, Theology ~ ~ Empirical 
Science, P• 190. 
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relationship between God and man, and the indirect, more 
impersonal relationship between God and man.nl 
3. God and the World 
a. Cosmology 
The German distinction between Weltbild (world picture) and 
Weltanschauung (world view) appeared to Horton to a f ford the key 
to clarifying the problem of cosmology. He believed that it is 
the place of the natural sciences to construct the "world picture" 
which would be relevant for all the faiths. Thus, that area of 
cosmology is non-religious.2 However, religion is very much 
concerned with the "world view" since it involves the question 
of God's ultimate relationship to the world. Therefore, when 
a world view, such as materialism, is propounded,it must be 
opposed because it is c ompletely incompatible with theism. Hor-
ton believed that the most effective way to disprove materialism 
is to point out that in elevating matter above rational purpose 
"it not only destroys religion but destroys all meaning in life 
all goodness, all beauty, all objectively valid truth -- and 
so incidentally destroys its own claim to be true. 113 
Horton cited Brown as a Christian thinker who had correctly 
interpreted the Christian world view. Brown had stressed "real 
existence, dependence, and adaptation to the Christian 
1. Horton, Christian Theolog::r, p. 110. 
2. Ibid., p. 112. 
3. Ibid., p. 114. 
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end." 1 For Horton, the phrase ''real existence" emphasized the 
distinction that is made in the Christian faith between God and 
His creation. "To this extent," he added, ''the Christian view 
of God's relationship to the world is 'dualistic': God and na-
ture are not one and the same {Deus siv.e natura) but two." 2 He 
quickly explained that the dualism is not ultimate since God is 
. . - - ,___.-. . 
"the Lord and Source of the ordered universe."3 In emphasizing 
the rr otherness" of God with respect to creation, Horton was 
continuing the trend that had first appeared during his realis-
tic period. In his early liberal period he had stressed the 
divine immanence,4 but in his realistic writings he confessed 
he had come to appreciate the orthodox emphasis upon the tran-
scendence of God.5 
b. The Problem of Evil 
Throughout his writing Horton revealed his continuing in-
terest in the problem of natural evil. He never claimed to have 
found a solution that was intellectually satisfying. In his 
realistic period he wrote, "God does not so much give us the 
power to understand evil as to face it."6 This note of humility 
he continued to express in his nee-liberal thought. "No uni-
versally satisfactory solution of it has ever been offered."? 
1. Horton, Christian TheoloS!; ~· 118, from Brown, Christian 
Theology In Outline, PP• 98 ff. 
2 ~ Horton, dhristlan Theology, p. 118. 3· Ibid., P• 119~ . - . . · .. .  . .. 
4. See Theism and 'the . Modern Mood, pp. 107-121, ·where Horton 
developed .hlS"provislonal""'1rei'inition of God~" 
5~ Horton; Contem;Po:ra;i:y Continental 'lheolog,y:, p. 200. 
6. Horton; God, p. 52. .. · ·· · · · · · · 
7. Horton, Christian Theology, P• 139. 
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He tended to agree with DeWolf that Brightman's solution which 
postulated the "non-rational Given" only pushes the problem 
back into the very nature of God, where it remains unexplained.l 
Horton had rejected Brightman's solution in his early liberal as 
well as in his nee-liberal writings.2 
However, the dualistic solution in a modified form was 
attractive to Horton. He could see truth in Aul'n's view of the 
cosmic conflict between God and the Prince of Darkness, but he 
insisted that the Evil Power is not co-eternal with God.3 This 
is clearly a continuation of his early liberal view of the mat-
ter which followed LeRoy's explanation that both man and ~ 
world are relatively free and independent of God and thus able 
to resist His will.4 
Horton supplemented this partial explanation with the sug-
gestion that there are "two aspects of God's dealing with the 
world LWhich7 must be sharply distinguished, and so related that 
they can be simultaneously true."5 He mentioned specifically 
Weatherhead's distinction between the primary and secondary will 
of God and Tillich's distinction between God as Ground of Being 
and Abyss of Being.6 He had developed this view of the dual 
nature of God's activity i n his realistic doctrine of Providence.7 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Horton, Christian Theology, from DeWolf's A !heology of~ 
Living Church, p. 134. 
See Horton, Theism and the Modern Mood, p. 5; and Horton, 
Theism and the Scientif~Spirit, p. 197, n. 41. 
Horton,-cbriStian Theology, p. l36. . 
Horton, Theism and the Scientific Spirit, p. 197. 
Horton, Christian-TneolQBY; p. l38. 
Ibid. 
Horton, Realistic Theology, p. 113. 
319 
C. NEO-LIBERAL DOCTRINE OF MAN 
1. The Nature of Man 
a. The Image of God 
Horton retained the liberal belief that, in some sense, 
God has put His own image in man. 1 This was in direct contrast 
to the neo-orthodox view that the divine image can only be re-
flected by man, but never actually dwell within him. Horton 
described the actual presence of the imago ~ in a three-fold 
manner. (1) It can be seen in human reason. The category of 
thought enables man to transcend nature, animals, and even him-
self. This last is most important for when man sees himself 
trom above he is able to pass judgment upon his own life, and 
judgment is a divine prerogative. (2) It is evident when the 
total human personality is taken into account. Man possesses 
a character growth potential that includes the development of 
the same ethical and spiritual qualities which are associated 
with the life of God. (3) It is evident in the place of near 
supremacy which man occupies in the universe, that is so drama-
tically proclaimed in the Eighth Psalm. Horton summarized his 
view in the following words. "In any event, it means that man 
has an inward kinship with his Creator, which if developed • • • 
brings happiness and fulfillment; but which if denied and 
1. Walter M. Horton, Our Christian Faith (Boston: The Pilgrim 
Press, 1945), p. 13:-
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repressed brings restless, insatiable longing and endless 
1 
misery." 
Horton's neo-liberal interpretation of man as a child of 
God was .thoroughly in the liberal tradition. 2 This belief that 
the image of God dwells within man was never wholly lost from 
his thought even when he was in the midst of his realistic 
period. During that phase of his thought he had set forth his 
belief that the "natural man" possesses the ''inner light" within 
his sou1. 3 
b. Human Freedom 
Horton was aware of the difficulty involved in relating 
the idea of divine sovereignty to that of human freedom. '' But 
every time we trust him and are not put to shame, we help to 
prove that divine power, human freedom, and divine justice are 
all real factors in every concrete event."4 With all the fervor 
of an old liberal5 he asserted that God gives man the freedom 
to do evil, and does not .haul him 11 by the scruff of the neck 
6 into the divine presence." 
1. Ibid., P• 13. . 
2. see- Brown, Christian Theology ~ Outline, P• 237; Clarke, An 
Outline E.f Christian Theolog~ p. 191; McConnell, The Diviner 
Immanence, p. 134; Fosdick, e Modern Use of the Bible, p. 267; 
Coe, The Reli~16n of a Maturellind, P• m.- -
3· Horton;-"Reve~atfo'ii';"-Revelati'Oii';-ed. John Baillie and Hugh 
Martini PP• 265-266. 
4 ~ trorton, Our Christian Faith, p. 13 ~ -5. See McConnell, The ·nfviner ·Immanence, pp. 66-67; and Macintosh, 
Theology~ anmiij)irlcal '!cience, p. 71. 
6. Horton, Our cnristian Faith, P• 14. 
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Nevertheless, he did not hold that human freedom is abso-
lute. Of the early liberals, Clarke and Brown had been most 
explicit about the limits of human freedom. 1 The lessons he 
had learned from nee-orthodoxy had become a permanent part of 
his thought.2 He believed that there is truth in both the 
deterministic and freedomistic interpretations and he traced 
the development of that controversy in an attempt to show how 
the chief values in each theory were being brought into an 
ever closer relationship. 
At the beginning of the great debate Augustine's deter-
ministic views were sharply contested by Pelagius, who noted 
that if sinful acts are necessary they are not truly sinful, for 
guilt cannot result from an involuntary act. Horton claimed that 
the chasm between the two positions was narrowed during the 
second round when Galvin substituted the idea of the federal head-
ship of Adam for the older concept of the biological transmission 
of sin, and Arminius admitted to man's deep dependence upon divine 
grace before human freedom could exist. In the third round of 
the controversy he believed that Niebuhr and DeWolf had brought 
their respective sides into such close agreement that the war was 
almost over.3 Niebuhr had eliminated all literalism from the 
story of the Fall and interpreted it as a continuing psychologi-
cal event in the life of every person and he had described sin as 
"inevitable but not necessary." DeWolf still insisted that man 
1. 
2. 
3. 
See Clarke, An Outline of Christian Theologx, pp. 213-214; and 
Brown, Christian Theology 1£ OUtline, P• 249. 
Horton, Realistic Theology, P• 62. 
Horton, Christian Theology, pp. 155-165. 
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must possess sufficient freedom to make him really responsible 
but is deeply appreciative of the truth in the Augustinian posi-
tion, i.e., the empirical fact of sin, its grip upon mankind, 
ita rootage in past sins, and its "material" as well as "f'ormal" 
character.l 
Horton expressed appreciation for this neo-liberal 
position which he characterized as a correction and supplementation 
o~ the neo-orthodox view.2 He summed up his view of the matter 
in the ~ollowing words. "Positively, enough genuine f'reedom 
must be attributed to man to enable him to respond affirmatively 
to the divine grace •••• On the other hand, divine sovereignty 
implies that man possesses only a strictly limited freedom, sub-
ject to God's final control."3 
2. The Problem of Man 
a. Sin and Virtue 
Horton's view of' the condition of man continued to be very 
similar to the view he had expressed in his realistic writings.4 
In the Sweet Briar lecture he denounced the older liberal view. 
"Their optimism about human nature, this conf'idence that man 
is moving toward his true destiny through the steady unfolding 
of' the God within him, has certainly not been justified by the 
events of the twentieth century."5 In his recent systematic 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Ibid • , p • 16 7 • 
I'6Id., P• 165. 
Ibid., PP• 150-51. 
Horton, Realistic Theolog~, pp. 
Horton, Liberalism Old ~ ~~ 
39-40. 
p. 17. 
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theology he began his doctrine of man with the remark that , 
"man is always and everywhere a problem to himself •• . . Not 
.. -
only does his na~ur~ appear to be c~iously compounded of star-
dust and common clay, but his b~havior is distressingly con-
tradictory. He sets up great goals, pursues them with incred-
. -
ible skil and amazing energy -- and then turns traitor to his 
1 
own high purposes." "As long as possible," he wrote, "we set 
ourselves, our pleasures, our interests, our friends, our busi-
ness, our race, our country · in the cente.r of the picture. " 2 
In his realistic period, _Horton began to be suspicious of 
the extreme pessimism ofneo-orthodoxy3 and in his neo-liberal 
writings he included the essence of the older liberal belief 
in the goodness 6t ma~4 along with the mo~e _ sober estimate of 
man which he had accepted from the nee-orthodox school. He made 
it clear that he had come to believe that nee-orthodoxy had gone 
too far in representing the dark side of human nature. "Some-
times the depravity and lostness of man's state of corruption 
have been described in terms which so~d as though God's origi-
n~l good creation in h~m h~d been utterly destroyed; but this 
idea would have shocked St~ Augustine himself."5 Among the 
virtues which man poss:esses, Horton li .. s.ted the capaei ty for 
6 gratitude and disinterested affection. 
1~ Horton; Christian·:·_ Theolof{"' · p~ · 141~ 
2~ Horton; Our Chi'Isti8h Fa h, · p. 16. · 
3· Horton, "Between Liberalism · ·and ~ the New Orthodoxy," The Chris-
tian Century, · LXVIr· (May, - 1939")~ 638. 
~·.· Horton; A Psycholo~caiA:pproa<?h · to Theology:, PP• 65-66. 
:;;; Horton; Christian eoloft' · p. 149. 
6. Horton, Our Christian Fa h, p. 16. 
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Nevertheless, man's sin remains a fact and requires that 
man submit to the judgment of God. Horton believed that this 
is an immanental judgment that is built into the world and the 
very fibre of the individual soul. "When we go against our 
physiological structure we ruin our health; when we go against 
the laws of morals and psycholog~, we ruin our_ happiness; when 
we commit crime or o~ganize a movement _to dominate the world we 
create a crashing social reaction against us, which eventually 
stops us in our tracks if it does not destroy us." 1 Horton 
recognized the existence _of the divine image in man and held 
an optimistic view of man's ultimate destiny2 but he balanced 
this with the view that man "needs deliverance above all from 
moral and religious wrongness (sin) and cannot meet this need 
without turning to God for forgiveness and renewal."3 
b. Titanism versus Nihilism 
Horton saw in the liberal-neo-orthodox contrast an excel-
lent expression of the basic dilemma which confronts every the-
ologian when he begins to construct a doctrine of man. At one 
end of the dilemma is "nihilism" which proclaims that man is a 
helpless nonentity, and at the other end is "titanism" which 
emphasizes the unique intellectual powers of man and, in ex-
treme cases, "assimilates man to the divine Mind, and elevates 
him to membership in the Godhead."4 
1~ Ibid., -p. 17. 
2. Horton, · christian Theology, p. 148. 
3~ Ibid.; p~ 1$2. 
4· IE!d., P• 143· 
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It was obvious to Horton that both of these extremes were 
mistaken. Against the "titanism" which followed in the wake of 
the older liberalism, Horton opposed the Christian conviction 
"that man is only a finite creature, who derives his being from 
a Source and his meaning from a Chief End above and beyond 
himself • 111 Against the "nihilism" which began to flourish with 
the opening of the atomic age, he opposed the Christian con-
viction "that man is not merely a child of nature but also a 
child of God, made in the divine image and destined to rule over 
nature."2 He believed that a true doctrine of man must con-
serve the truth in both the liberal and nee-orthodox positions 
and concluded that "man is no mere mote on a minor planet, and 
no immortal god either, but some sort of 'middle term' between 
these two."3 
His nee-liberal doctrine of man was summarized in what he 
called the four-fold state · of man.4 (1) Man, though mortal, 
bears the image of God within him, which makes him a morally 
responsible being able to have fellowship with God. {2) Man is 
deeply involved in sin for which he is responsible, and stands 
under the condemnation of God. (3) Man is redeemed through 
God in Christ and enters into a state of grace. (4) Man looks 
to eternity wherein is his final condition of glory.5 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Ibid.; pp. 153-54. 
'I'E'I'O. , p. 154. 
Ibid 0' p. 144. 
iOia., p. 148. Horton admitted that these ideas were largely 
derived from a preparatory volume for the 1937 Oxford Con-
ference. It was a symposium entitled The Christian Understand-
!.!!g of Man. 
IETd:; pp. 147-48. 
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D. NEO-LIBERAL DOCTRINE OF CHRIST 
1. The Person of Christ 
a. Preliminary Observation 
Horton accepted Baillie's contentionl that liberal 
Christology was inadequate and led to a sentimental Jeaus-
worship.2 He believed that the emphasis that the liberals had 
placed on immanentalism blurred the distinction between Christ 
and the rest of the human race.3 However, McConnell had anti-
cipated this criticism and replied that the doctrine of divine 
immanence does not deny unique metaphysical rela tiona. "The 
metaphysical relation of any soul to God has its own peculiarities. 
We speak of persons as having differences of endowment or of 
constitution."4 Nevertheless, Horton believed that the neo-
orthodox emphasis upon Christ 11 as one who comes from above, from 
a transcendent world, and whose divine-humanity is not merely a 
slight heightening of average humanity, but the amazing Miracle 
and 'Absolute Paradox' LKirkegaard's expressioB7 of heaven come 
down to earth,"5 must be incorporated into the new liberal 
Christology. His desire was to strike a balance, not to eliminate 
the idea of divine immanence,or "the saviorhood of Christ may be 
denied again just as it is being reaffirmed. 116 
1. Donald M. Baillie, God Was In Christ: An Essay on Incarnation 
and Atonement (Charles Scribner's Sons,~ew York-,-1948). 
2. Horton, Christian Theology, p. 181. 
3. Horton, Idberalism Old and New, p. 16. 
4. McConnell, The Divi'ner lniiiianence, p. 92. 
5. Horton, ~· ~., p. 17. 
6. Ibid., p. 18. 
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He agreed with the nee-orthodox contention that no merely 
historical approach was enough and that faith is needed to 
recognize him as Savior. "But," protested Horton, "how can 
faith see God's Wisdom and Power in Jesus, if the story of his 
life and the history of his influence are as utterly mystify-
ing, as darkly opaque as Kierkegaard says?" The liberal redis-
covery of the historical Jesus was a permanent value to theology 
and must not be cast aside because of the current nee-orthodox 
reaction against liberalism. 1 He proclaimed that "it is one of 
the duties of the new liberalism to see that the man Jesus, 
through whose human lips the first apostles were called, is not 
carelessly by-passed by the new orthodoxy. Only a transcendent 
and immanent Christ can be the way to the transcendent and 
immanent God. "2 
b. The Incarnation 
Horton grounded his theory of the Incarnation in the nature 
of God, which is outgoing love. The love of God would have re-
mained frustrated without the Incarnation. "Always, everywhere, 
it is His nature to come forth into His creation, humbly and 
lovingly, to sustain and to heal, if His creatures will but open 
the door to the august Guest who comes as a beggar and knocks."3 
This emphasis upon divine love as contrasted with divine wrath 
reveals that Horton continued to operate on the most basic pre-
mise of the older liberalism. 
1. Horton, Liberalism Old and New, p. 18. 
2. Ibid.' p. l9. - ---
3. Horton, ~Eternal Contemporary, p. 128. 
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Concerning the relationship of the divine to the human in 
Jesus, Horton rejected the Johannine view which represents Jesus 
as wearing a garment of manhood over his divine omniscience. 
This, he wrote, is no incarnation but a theophan~. He preferred 
the Pauline view which stresses the true humanity of Jesus. 
Nevertheless, Horton made it clear that "the only fully Christian 
idea of the Incarnation is that in Jesus ~Himself (as the 
prologue to the Fourth Gospel says) became fully human (as Paul 
says) and so entered irrevocably into the time process, while 
nevertheless remaining 'God ~,ill, blessed forever'."l 
In describing the manner of the Incarnation in greater 
detail, he explained that in Jesus, the will to power was com-
pletely supplanted by the will to serve.2 The essentially 
liberal quality of his nee-liberal Christology becomes apparent 
in his statement that "the initiative in this mystery must surely 
be ascribed to God; but without willing response on the part of 
the Man Jesus, no meeting could conceivably have taken place. 
In and through a true and willing human servant, God accomplished 
His eternal design."3 The emphasis upon the indwelling of the 
divine will as the key to understanding the Incarnation was 
again pointed up by the following statement. "In this Man, a 
selfless humility makes room for the divine Will to live at 
peace with his human will."4 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Ibid., p. 133. 
"I'6"'I. ' p. 136. 
~i~: cr. Rauschenbusch, A Theology!££ the Social Gospel, 
p. 151; and Macintosh, Theology ~ !E Empirical Science, P• 120. 
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Horton adopted Baillie's explanation1 that the parallel 
to the Incarnation could be found in those moments when the 
divine grace is incarnate in the life of the Christian. 2 How-
ever, six years before Baillie's book was published, Horton 
had written that "the issue of the relationship of the two na-
tures in Christ is far from being an academic is~ue. In its 
practical meaning, it is essentially the issue as to the kind 
of relationship between God and !!B _which obtains in the ~ 
redeemed society of~.!£!!! of _God."3 Just as in the Chris-
tian life there must be communion with God both "in terms of 
ethical oneness with God's wil~" and "mystical oneness, that 
transforms our very being, n4 so with Jesus there was the two-
fold communion with God. Though the parallel seemed valid to 
Horton, he cautioned that it is not complete, because Jesus 
alone was sinless.5 Thus, Horton supplemented the liberal em-
phasis upon the harmony of will between God and Jesus with the 
concept that there existed a mystical union of grace between 
Father and Son. 
c. The Paraclete 
Horton continued to emphasize the importance of the liv-
6 ing Christ which he had done since his liberal period. 
1. Baillie, God !.!!. in Christ : !g Essay .2!! Incarnation and 
Atonement. -
2. Horton; Christian Theology; p. ·183. -
3· Horton, Our Eternal Contemporarz, p. 137. 
4· Ibid.; P• 137 ~ 5. IO!d., P• 139. 
6. See his first published article: 11 Shall We Discard the 
Living Christ1" Biblical World, LIII ( 1919). 
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"Nothing," he wrote, "has done more to keep the Church alive 
than the conviction that her Lord still lives, still guides, 
still intercedes, still works and fights in and through her 
for the enlargement of the new humanity." 1 
In his early liberal period, Horton had explained that 
by "living Christ'' he meant the life of the historical Jesus 
plus the Spirit in the Church. He further stated that the ex-
perience of the "living ChristTT is no subjective illusion, but 
the experience of the Spirit of God. 2 In his neo-liberal 
period he reatfirmed this. "It is not necessary to distinguish 
too sharply between the idea of the living Christ and the idea 
of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit was felt by the Early 
Church to be both the abiding presence of the Risen Lord, and 
the abiding presence of that divine power which had raised him 
from the dead." 3 Whether the term Holy Spirit or living Christ 
is used depends upon the point of reference. When the idea of 
the inwardness of the experience is paramount, the believer 
speaks of the Holy Spirit, but if he _relates the experience to 
its most dramatic historical manifestation, he may properly 
refer to the Living Christ. n4 
The one note which Horton incorporated from his realistic 
period was the idea of wrath. The Spirit of the Living Christ 
is not Comforter alone," he wrote, ''but also Judge and Vindi-
cator even as John encountered him on the island of Patmos."5 
1. Horton; Our Eternal Contempora~, p. 143· · 
2. Hortori; A Ps~cholo~ical Approa'C · tc>Theology, pp. 161-62. 
3~ Horton, · our · terna Contemporary, p. 143. 
4. Ibid., p:-143· 
5. Ibid., P• 145. 
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d. The Parousia 
The most enigmatic thing about Horton's Cbristology is 
his doctrine of the Parousia. In his nee-liberal period he 
re.ferred to "Jesus ~ ~ ~ :!!!£. shall come again. nl He recog-
nized the fact that liberals tend to regard adventism with 
suspicion and declared that such skepticism is unfortunate. 
The Christian faith, rightly interpreted, demands that all 
Christians be adventists, he argued, for it proclaims that 
Christ came once, abides with men now, and will come again. 
Horton believed that the forces of evil are threatening God's 
Kingdom and unless God acts decisively again, as He did in the 
Incarnation, all that has been achieved during the Christian 
era may be lost. Indeed, he believed that faith in the First 
Coming rests upon faith in the Second Coming.2 
In this area of Christology, Horton took issue with DeWolf 
who chose to subordinate the apocalyptic to the immanental 
strain in the New Testament.3 Horton believed that such "a 
major operation upon our closely interwoven New Testament 
sources" is both unwarranted and dangerous. In his opinion, 
the two strains appeared contradictory to DeWolf because he 
viewed the apocalyptic hope too literally. "Could it be," he 
asked, "that a less literal interpretation of apocalyptic imagery 
would lead to a view of Christ's Second Coming less crassly 
l. Ibid., p. 146. 
2. Ibid., p. 147. 
3. DeWolf, A Theology of the Living Church, pp. 306 ff. 
332 
coercive, less flatly op~osed to the strategy and method of 
his First Coming and the promptings of his present Spirit? 11 1 
Horton did not expand his view of the matter. However, 
it does seem quite clear that he was not $atisfied with the 
general liberal view which accepts the Johannine identification 
of the Parousia with the Paraclete, for concerning the liberal 
interpretation he wrote, "It does reject the whole idea of the 
Second Coming of Christ -- except ~ the descent of the Spirit 
was in a sense a Second Coming. 11 2 It would seem that Horton 
believed the Second Coming would involve more than the opera-
tion of the Holy Spirit as Christians have experienced it thus 
far. His phrase, "less flatly opposed to the strategy and 
method of his First Coming, 11 3 even seems to suggest the pos-
sibility of a Second Incarnation. However, the phrase immew 
diately following the one quoted above, "and the promptings 
of his present Spirit, n4 seems to refer to a possible heighten-
ing or intensifying of the power of the Holy Spirit among 
Christians. That he had this second interpretation in mind 
is also suppor$ed by the following statement. "Whenever we are 
ready to live by Him and die for Him as Paul and Francis and 
Luther were prepar ed to do, He will indeed return with power."5 
If the former possibility is what Horton meant, then his new 
1. Horton, Christian Theology, p. 265. 
2. Ibid., p. 264. (Italics mine). 
3. !Did., p. 265. 
4. 'IOI'O. 
5. Horton, Our Eternal Contemporarx, p. 151. 
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Christology differs sharply from the old liberalism at this 
point. Even if he meant the latter, as seems most plausible, 
he regarded the problem of the Parousia more seriously than 
had the older liberals. 
He summarized his view in the following words. 
The -doctrine of the Second Coming of Christ 
means essentially that the !.2!:! of God begun 
in Jesus if -Nazareth is not~ comprete,~ 
needs ftirtner divine actiOn to complete it --
action which, when ,g · takes P!ace, will be 
recognized as tn'econclusion of the sameai-
vine drama Whi~started with the Ba~f 
i3e'thlehem in his Manger.l----
Though he warned against the kind of adventism that the 
Millerites demonstrated a century ago, 2 he nevertheless found 
himself in essential agreement with Minear and Fison, and af-
- -
firmed that the Second Coming will complete 11 the same course 
of events which began with Jesus and continues under his Spirit's 
- -
guidance -- events which have always been full of surprising, 
dramatic turns, and will be, to and at the End."3 
2. The Work of Christ 
a. Objective and Subjective Dimensions 
Even in his early liberal writing, Horton was aware that 
a wholly subjectiv~ view of the Atonement, i.e., the "moral ·. 
theory, was inadequate.4 During his period of realism, he was 
1. Ibid., PP• 146-47· 
2. Ibid. ' -p • 148 ; -
3.~ Horton; Christian TheoloQ; P• 2·68. 
4 Horton, A Psychological Approach to Theology, pp. 150-51. 
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attracted by the theories of Heim and Aul~nl and amplified 
his own objective view of the ~tonement.2 He continued to 
hold substantially the same p0int of view in his neo-liberal 
period. The truth in the moral theory must not be discarded, 
but it must be supplemented with the •objective" theories.3 
He desired to make it clear, however, that his "objective" 
theory did not posit the kind of a dualism which demanded that 
a merciful Christ should die to propitiate an angry God. God's 
love i s deeper than His wr ath. In Horton's view, "th e God of 
love takes this suffering upon Himself through the Savior who 
represents Him; while the Savior in turn participates in the 
wrath of God who sends him. n4 In the Cross-experience, he 
continued, God stands in our place and a "mystic sharing" 
occurs ~'whereby His infinite goodness passes over to us, while 
the weight of our guilt and terror passes over to His strong 
shoulders. tt5 This interprets ti on is very similar to the view 
expressed by DeWolf6 whom Horton had. identified as a nee-
liberal theologian.? 
Horton insisted that the relationship between God and man 
is different because of Calvary. This is true not only because 
men "feel" different toward God, but because God's love is "newly 
accessible" to men. 8 God's will has always been that His love 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
s. 
Horton, Contemporary Continental Theology, p. 224. 
Horton, Realistic Theology, pp. 137-40. 
Horton, Our Eternal Contemporary, pp. 100-101. 
Ibid., p:--70. 
Ibid., p. 75. 
DeWolf, A Theology of the Living Church, pp. 267 ff. 
Horton, Liberalism Old and New, p. 12. 
Horton, ~ Eternal-contemporary, p. 76. 
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should be accessible but only in the Cross did He finally suc-
ceed in establishing a "historic nucleus of right relationship 
between God and man." 1 Again Horton's insistence upon the ob-
jective quality of reconciliation bears a marked resemblance to 
DeWolf's view. 2 
b. A Multiple Theory of the Atonement 
Horton believed that a multiple theory was needed to ex-
press the various facets of the truth of the Atonement.3 He 
found himself in agreement with the conclusions of Dr. Oliver 
Quick, whose views, he believed, best summarized the ecumeni-
cal consensus.4 Horton's interpretation was as follows: 
(l} The "moral" theory explains that it was the vivid rev-
elation of God's love that stirs human hearts to repentance, 
but it does not tell how God revealed His love. (2) The "clas-
sic" or "dramatic" theory explains that God did this by fight-
ing evil to the death at the cost of the life of his beloved 
Son, but the nature of the victory is left in doubt. (3) The 
"judicial" theory explains that God's forgiveness has tran-
scended His wrath, while at the same time retaining the moral 
law and its consequences, but it does not make it clear whether 
Jesus'death was a legal penalty or a voluntary sacrifice. 
(4) The "sacrificial"' theory indicated that the latter is true, 
l. Ibid., · p. 77. 
2. DeWolf, A Theology of the Living Church, pp. 268-69. 
3· He expressed interest ~s. P. Schilling's attempt to con-
struct a multiple ' theory. See · Schilling's · article -nHow Does 
Jesus Save?" Religion in ' Life~ XVIII (1949), 1-12. 4. Horton, Christian TheolOgy, p. ~85. 
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not in the sense that God had to be placated, but in the sense 
that perfect life of the Son was given to the believer so that 
man might draw near to God in a state of intentional righteous-
ness. Thus, Horton concluded, the multiple theory of the Atone-
ment explains how God in Christ revealed His love to work an 
inward change in man, broke the cosmic power of evil to free 
man from external bondage, bore the consequences of sin to up-
hold the moral law, and provided a new way and new pawer to 
salvation whereby man might be reconciled with His holiness. 1 
E. NED-LIBERAL DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH 
AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD 
1. The Church 
a. The Three-fold Nature of the Church 
In Horton's opinion every religion needs something 
analogous to the Christian Church to meet the .need for fellow-
ship and inspiration. Apart from some such organization, a 
religion is truncated; it is really a philosophy or a theosophy. 2 
In view of the very great importance of the Church, it ap-
peared strange to Horton that the doctrine of the Church had 
never been as carefully formulated as the other doctrines. He 
noted that certain of the nee-orthodox thinkers were as remiss 
in this respect as the older liberals had been,3 and suggested 
1. Ibid., pp. 187-88. 
2. Ibid., p. 204. 
3. Ibid., p. 205. 
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that perhaps the reconstruction of the doctrine of the Church 
may very well be the chief theological task of the present 
age. Certainly "the Ecumenical Movement h~d addressed itself 
specifically to this task in recent years." 1 
Horton's doctrine of the Church appeared in a three-fold 
guise. (1) The Church is --~ people ofGod in a sense that 
refers to the Old Testament background of the New Testament 
Church. (2) The church is the bodz of Christ, because the 
ministry of Christ was decisive in forming the Church and the 
Church continues that ministry in history. (3) The Church is 
the colony of heaven because it is actually a piece of the 
coming Kingdom of God. 2 
In expanding the last point, Horton carefully distin-
guished his own nee-liberal view from that of the older lib-
erals. The older liberals had criticized the churches3 with-
out bothering to disting~ish between the churches and the 
Church. In place of a fully developed doctrine of the Church, 
they had substituted the doctrine of the Kingdom of God.4 Hor-
ton stated that while the ChUrch is positively related to the 
Kingdom of God, it is not the Kingdom of God. The Church is a 
partial realization of the Kingdom in the present but it is 
not the completed Kingdom of God.5 
1. Horton, Christian Theology, p. 209. 
2. Walter M. Horton; "New Testament Doctrine of the Church," En-
counter, XVII (1956), 115-21, and Horton, Christian The- --
ology:, pp. 209-211. · - ·· · · 
3· Bowne, Studies in Christianitl, pp. 357•57; and Rauschen-
busch, A Theology for the Soc al Gospel, pp. 133-38. 
4. Rausehenbuscm;· ·A · Theology for n the Social Gospel, pp. 129-30. 
5. Horton, Christian Theology, pp:-213-14. 
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Horton was aware that a distinction must be made between 
"churches" and "Church." He referred to the divine-human 
character of the Church and described it as "a communi on of 
saints in the making, not yet perfected in holiness and often 
needing forgiveness."l The churches, then, with all their 
human and organizational limitations are gathered up in the 
concept of the Church through which the Holy Spirit is con-
tinually moving in its task of purifying the dross in the 
churches. Though Horton's view was not nearly so fully developed, 
it bears a close resemblance to DeWolf's distinction between the 
"spiritual" and the "organized" church.2 
Horton's doctrine of the Church paralleled DeWolf's in 
another important respect. Horton believed that "the early 
church's deep inward fellowship, the koinonia," must be the 
center of any adequate doctrine of the Church. He was convinced 
that Uthe reverence for individual persons in deep fellowship 
with one another that one sees in the Christian koinonia at 
its best is a great treasure to be preserved and reproduced 
and f'reshly realized in our modern environment."3 DeWolf 
made an outright identification between the koinonia and the 
spiritual church.4 
1. Ibid., p. 213. See also p. 212. 
2. See DeWolf, A Theology of the Living Church, pp. 318-26. 
3. Horton, "New Testament Doctrine of the Church," Encounter, 
XVII (1956), 131. 
4. DeWolf, £2• cit., p. 318. 
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b. The Present Condition of the Church 
Horton agreed with the consensus of the Amsterdam Assem-
bly that the greatest single division in the Church centered 
1 
on the Catholic-protestant issue. Catholics stress historical 
continuity while Protestants stress continuity with the Spirit 
of Christ. Neither of these extremes should be elevated to an 
absolute position. Horton believed that "'Catholic'concern 
for the continuity of the church in history, and 'protestant' 
concern for its continual reformation, under~ guidance of 
the living ~ and the living Spirit, ~ both leg~ate con-
2 
earns." Christians must continue to work for an organization 
or a series of cooperating organizations which will conserve 
both Catholic and Protestant values. "We must pray," he con-
tinued, "that the growth and influence of the Ecumenical Move-
ment may steadily make more room in all of our churches for 
the values represented by our divided brethren.") 
Horton did not believe that the outlook for the older 
churches was encouraging. Protestantism has become too closely 
identified with Western national and economic policy. The 
Protestant churches must disentangle themselves from this al-
liance before they can be considered fit to lead men into the 
Kingdom. The Church must stop merely reflecting its environ-
ment and begin trying to change 1t.4 Even in the midst of 
1. Horton, Christian Theology, p. 221. · 
2. Walter M. Horton, "continuity and Reform," Ecumenical Review, 
I ( 19 49 ) , 3 7 4 • 
3· Horton:; £E.~ cit., p. 243. 
4· Horton, Can Gnristianity Save Civilization? pp. 217-24. 
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the decline of the older churches, Horton saw signs of renewal 
among them. He cited as examples: the rise of cell groups, 
movements dealing with social reform, and the growing acumeni-
- 1 
cal movement. 
He believed that some of the most encouraging signs are 
to be seen among the younger churches. These younger churches 
of the East are beginning to meet with the older churches of 
the West on the basis of equality. This was particularly no-
ticeable at the Madras meeting. It was a natural and healthy 
thing for these churches to refuse to be bound by the confines 
of Western culture. ''It is conceivable," he concluded, "that 
the younger churches with their apostolic zeal may first help 
to repristinate the older churches and then together with 
the older churches -- hold our shaken world together as the 
Early Church held the Roman world together in its hour of 
trial."2 
c. The Ecumenical Movement 
Perhaps Horton's most distinctive single contrib:t,J.tion has 
been his attempt to construct an ecumenical theology.3 For 
many years he has been active in the Ecumenical Movement and 
it was in part because of this that he was asked to be the 
second lecturer in the William Henry Hooves Lectureship on 
1. Ibid., PP• 224-33· 
2~ Ibid., P• 209. 
3. see-his book, Christian Theology. 
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1 Christian Unity. It was during this lecture that Horton ex-
plained that '' the Ecumenical Movement is a movement toward 
~universal Christian Church throughout the _whole inhabited 
world!'2 In his doctrine of the Church, developed during his 
. . - . 
period of neo-liberal thought, this ecumenical perspective be-
came most apparent. 
He believed that there are three definite ways in which 
Christians may work for Church unity and that these ways were 
illustrated by the first three conferences of the ~cumenical 
movement! 11 (1) t he Edinburgh method of cooperation in evange-
lism and missions; (2) the Stockholm method of federation for 
Christian service and social action; and (3) the Lausanne · 
method of rethinking diverse church tradi-tions with a view to 
organic church union."3 Horton suggested that in each method 
. . 
lies a vital ingredient that must be utilized, but that maxi-
mum efficiency can only be achieved by combining all three 
approaches. 
He prophesied that the final outcome of the ecumenical 
movement would be a new type of Christianity which has not 
been seen before, 
It may well be that not only Protestantism, 
but also catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and 
even Judaism -- to say nothing of oriental 
1. This was established by the Disciples Divinity House at the 
University of Chicago in 1945. -· 
2. Walter M. Horton; · Toward ·a Reborn Church (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1949), P• 97 
3. Ibid., P• 12. 
influ&nces -- will all contribute to the 
creation of this new type. Whatever its name 
or genealogy, it must at least be no provin-
cial type, relative to a particular sort of 
Western culture, but a strictly universal re-
ligion, the first the world has ever seen.l 
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His reference to the possibility of "oriental influences" and 
his insistence upon the necessity to avoid Western provin-
cialism point up the fact that Horton's nee-liberal thought 
maintained a point of contact with his earlier liberal thought 
in this matter of a world religion. 2 
2. The Kingdom of God 
a. A Christian World Civilization 
In his early liberal period, Horton had written enthusi-
astically about the coming Christian world civilization.3 · 
Indeed, that concept seemed to incorporate all of the religious 
and social values that the liberals had included in their doc-
trine of the Kingdom of God. 4 In his nee-liberal period he 
recovered this interest which had been eclipsed during his 
period of realism, and proclaimed his belief that the growing 
Ecumenical Church was the nucleus of the coming world 
civilization.5 
1. Horton, Can Christianity Save Civilization? p. 220. 
2. See Horton, A Psychological Approach to Theology, pp. 133, 
175; also the Appendix on Christianity and other religions 
in the 2nd ed. of Christian Theology. 
3. Ibid., pp. 165,169. 
4. Bowne, Studies in Christianitt' p. 322; Rauschenbuseh, A 
Theology for £he-social Gospe , p. 224; and Mathews, The 
Faith of Modernism, p. 167. 
5. Horton:-can Christianity Save Civilization? p. 245. 
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However, he no longer was able to identify any temporal 
manifestations of the Kingdom with the perfected Kingdom. "This 
new Christian civilization, 11 he wrote, "must not be identified 
with the Millennium, but it is the proximate goal of Christian 
hopes and prayers and labors!'1 His tempered view of the 
realization: of th~ Kingdom of God on earth had its origin in 
his realistic period. 2 In his systematic theology, he ex-
pressed his belief that there will never be a time on earth 
. . . 
when evil has been completely eliminated, though in each gen-
eration God will deliver His people from ·"seemingly hopeless 
predicaments."3 Though Horton believed that the new liberals 
must drop the older libe~al hope ~f realizing the Kingdom of 
God fully within history, they "have a right to ask the ortho-
dox ••• not to gaze perpetually at the far heavenly horizon, 
but to lend a hand in that portion of the task of realizing 
the Kingdom on earth which God assigns to this generation.4 
b. Truth in the Apocalyptic Message 
Hortonts neo-liberal thinking about the Church and the 
Kingdom was influenced by his newly found appreciation for the 
apocalyptic messages in the Bible. ui have begun to see, " he 
wrote, "that in certain periods of' history apocalyptic think-
ing is true thinking."5 
1. Ibid., P• 209. . 
2. Horton; Realistic Theology; p. 156. 
3. Horton; Christian Theology, p. ~ 27 : 4· Horton; Liberalism Old and New, p. 22. 
5. Horton, 11 New Testament Doctrine of the Church," Encounter, 
XVII ( 1956 }, 129. 
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By this he meant that no matter how carefully Christians 
plan and work for the Kingdom there will be recurring 
periods when their best efforts will end in failure. At such 
times they will be driven back to apocalyptic moods of thought. 
They are quite correct in seeking solace in that manner because 
the Kingdom is being built by God Himself, "through the in-
1 
strumentality of men," but not by the steady and progressive 
efforts of man alone. It would be incorrect to assume that the 
older liberals believed that man alone was building the King-
2 dom, but there was a different emphasis. Mathews granted that 
nGod will have a share in the building of this new social or-
der,"3 and Bowne had referred to the 1' kingdom of man."4 
The apocalyptic str~ins in the Bible emphasize an impor-
tant aspect of eschatology. Horton believed that it is neces-
sary to balance Dodd's view of .11 realized eschatology" with 
the New Testament passages which emphasize futuristic expecta-
tions. "Whether we consider the personal, social or cosmic 
aspects of the Kingdom of God in the New Testament," he wrote, 
"in every case it means something yet to come, as well as 
#Jomething presently realized.'' 5 This idea, however, was not 
entirely foreign to the older liberals, for Rausch~nbusch had 
noted that the Kingdom is both present and future. 6 
1. Horton, ~ Christianitt Save Civilization? p. 211. 
2. Rauschenbusch, A TheolosY for . the ·socfal Gospel, p. 139. 
3. Mathews, The Faith of Moderii'Ism,-p. 166. 
4· Bowne, - Stuafes in Christianity, p. 317. 
5. Horton, Christian · Theology, p. d255. · 
6. Rauschenbusch, £E· cit., PP• 140-41. 
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Finally, Horton appreciated the apocalyptic emphasis upon 
the Last Judgment. In human experience as in Scripture the 
parables of the mustard seed and the leaven are balanced by 
the parable of the wheat and the tares. "Evil and good," he 
wrote, "progress side by side in every age, and no harvest 
until the Last Judgment will ever finally gather the sifted 
good wheat into the barn. nl Horton admitted that he had 
gained insight from Brunner's book Eternal Hope.2 
F. SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT IDEAS EXPRESSED IN 
HORTON'S NEG-LIBERAL PERIOD 
1. Method 
Horton rejected nee-orthodoxy (even as he had previously 
rejected liberalism), because he regarded its irrational 
tendencies and pessimistic mood as futile and even dangerous. 
Such deficiencies, he believed, could be corrected only by a 
vigorous neo-liberal theology which would combine the values 
of the two older systems. Following his own advice, he 
retained the regard for revelation that he had gained during 
his period of realism and he related it to his rational method 
which was similar to DeWolf's method of comprehensive coherence 
as well as Tillich' s method "correlation." In this way Horton 
believed that philosophical and revelational data could be 
related in a single theological system. 
1. 
2. 
Horton, Christian Theology, p. 273. 
Heinrich Emil Brunner, Eternal Hope (Philadelphia : 
Westminster Press, 1954), pp. 74-76. 
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2. God 
Horton's doctrine remained essentially unchanged. He 
continued to insist upon both the ideas of divine immanence 
and divine transcendence. He retained his liberal belief in 
the personality of God but carried over into this concept the 
orthodox emphasis upon the reality of God's wrath. He had 
learned to appreciate the mystic's intuition of the non-
personal element in God's nature and suggested that both per-
sonal and non-personal concepts are vital and must be held in 
balance. He considered the problem of evil in the light of a 
limited dualism (which he had done in his early liberal period) 
and supplemented this with the idea of God's "intentional" 
and "consequential'' will for man. 
3. Man 
Horton retained much of the nee-orthodox mood regarding 
the seriousness of human sin but he spent less time considering 
it than he had during his period of realism. He recovered much 
of the belief in human goodness that had marked his earlier 
liberal period, and attempted to balance the ideas of 
"nihilism" and "ti tanism." He concluded that man exists in 
a four-rold state of integrity, depravity, grace and glory. 
4. Christ 
Horton's view of the Incarnation remained liberal. That 
is, he believed that the divinity of Jesus consisted in the 
correspondence of Jesus' will and purpose with that of the 
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Father. His doctrine of the Atonement reflected much that he 
had acquired in his realistic period. Most noticeable was hds 
incorporation of the 11 classical" or ''object! ve view 11 recovered 
/ by Aulen. He developed a multiple view of the Atonement which 
included the moral, classical, penal , and sacrificial theories. 
- " 
He had come to appreciate the value in the doctrine of the 
Parousia though his views were not precisely developed. 
5. Church and Kingdom 
Horton developed a three-fold doctrine of the Church, 
viz., People of God, Body of Christ, and Colony of Heaven, 
and distinguished between the Church and the churches. During 
this period his great interest in the ·Ecumenical Movement 
blossomed and he suggested that the Church was moving toward 
unity along ~he pat~ of _ mis~ionary endeavor, cooperation for 
social action, and joint investigation of the problems of 
tradition and doctrine. He distinguished between the Church 
and the Kingdom of God and declared that the final consumma-
. . " 
tion of God's Kingdom lies beyond earthly history but rejected 
the nee-orthodox mood of futility. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUN~ARY AND CONCLUSI ONS 
The purpose of this dissertation is to contr ibute t o the 
draf t ing of a more precise definition of the term "nee-
liberalism." The method employed has been to investigate the 
thought of Walter M. Horton, a self-announced nee-liberal, 
and to compare and contrast his thought with that of liberals 
before him and also with tha t of Bennett and DeWolf whom 
Horton i dentifies as nee-liberals. 
The following questions must be answered in the process 
of formulating the definition. 
(1) V~at elements of the older liberalism does Horton 
retain in his mature thought? 
(2) What non-liberal elements does Horton incorpor ate 
into his theology? 
(3 .) What are the main characteristics of Horton's 
thought and how do they compare with those in the 
thought of Bennett and DeWolf? 
(4) Are the unique elements in Horton's thought "new" 
only to him or are they "new" to theological thought ·? 
(5) What is the definition of nee-liberalism·? 
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A. SUMMARY OF HORTON'S THOUGHT 
1. Elements of the Older Liberalism 
a. Horton continues to have a high regard for the place of 
reason in theological method. 
b. He believes in a personal God whose love and mercy are 
more determinative than His wrath, and who is immanent 
in His world. 
c. He believes that man is called to a high destiny as a 
child of God. 
d. He believes that da t a regarding Jesus' life are suffi-
ciently reliable to enable scholars to sketch the life 
of the historical Jesus and that such a task is basic in 
all attempts to formulate a Christology. His view of the 
Incarnation emphasizes the true humanity of Jesus' per-
sonality and his doctrine of the Atonement centers around 
the moral theory. 
e. He believes that men must assume an active role in 
bringing society into closer harmony with the ideal of 
the Kingdom of God. 
2. Non-liberal Elements 
a. Horton emphasizes the need to use revelation in theological 
method and believes that it is the standard of religious 
truth. 
350 
b. He emphasizes the fact of God's wrath, the non-personal 
aspects of His nature, and His transcendent relationship 
to creation. 
c. He stresses the seriousness of the human predicament and 
regards sin as a condition of the will rather than as an 
immoral act. 
d. His Christology emphasizes the transcendent nature of Christ, 
His continuing presence, the truth in the objective theories 
of the Atonement, and the importance of the doctrine of Uhe 
Parousia. 
e. He admits that the perfect realization of the Kingdom lies 
beyond history and values the truth in apocalypse. 
3· General Characteristics 
a. He employs faith, reason, and the data of revelation in 
his theological method. 
b. His doctrine of God combines the ideasof transcendence and 
immanence, personality and non-personality, and love and 
wrath. 
c. His doctrine of man balances the concepts of nihilism and 
titanism. 
d. His doctrine of the Person of Christ stresses the humanity 
of Jesus and his doctrine of the Work of Christ points up 
the objective nature of the Atonement. The concepts of the 
living Christ and the Parousia are also important elements 
in his Christology. 
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e. His doctrine of the Church is developed with regard to the 
Ecumenical Movement and reveals an appreciation for Catho-
lie Christianity. In his doctrine of the Kingdom, he in-
corporates both activistic and eternalistic views. 
f. In all of these areas except two, Horton's thought bears 
great resemblance to that of Bennett and DeWolf. In the 
. . 
matter of the Parousia his thought is closer to neo-ortho-
doxy than is that of Bennett and DeWolf, and in the matter 
of the Church, he reveals a greater appreciation for Cath-
olic Christianity than they do. 
4. The Most Unique Elements 
a. He exhibits the genuine liberal attitude which welcomes 
new truth from any quarter. 
b. His irenic spirit enables him to discover harmonious re-
lationships, but he has retained a critical attitude and 
complete intellectual integrity. 
- . ·-
c. He has pointed up the values of Catholic Christianity. 
d. His knowledge of and active participation in the Ecumenical 
Movement has enabled him to write an ecumenical theology. 
e. He has emphasized the importance of Christology, developed 
- . 
a multiple theory of the Atonement, and raised important 
questions about the apocalyptic strain in the New Testa-
ment. 
f. He has developed an ecumenical doctrine of the Church, and 
distinguished it from the churches and the Kingdom of God. 
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g. In the matter of liberal attitude he is one with Bennett 
and DelS'olf, though perhaps his tendency to make peace with 
other schools of thought is more noticeable than theirs. 
This is particularly true with regard to the Catholic-
Protestant issue. His Christology is very similar to 
theirs, though his view of the apocalyptic strains in the 
New Testament differs sharply from that of DeWolf. His 
doctrine of the Church and the Kingdom is more weighted 
with ecumenical data but is substantially the same, though 
DeWolf makes a more precise distinction between the Church 
and the churches. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Concerning Originality 
a. Aspects New to Horton 
(1) The non-liberal emphases, with the exception of 
the living Christ, are new to Horton and did not 
begin to make their appearance in his thought 
until 1934. 
(2) The ecumenical dimension in Horton's thought 
including his interest in Catholic Christianity 
was present, in incipient form, since his graduate 
studies in Europe, but did not appear in dominant 
form until 1940. 
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b. Aspects New to Theology 
Though there is nothing in Horton's thought that is 
original in the sense that it has never been previously 
conceived or advocated, there is much in it that is 
"new" in the following two-fold sense. 
(l) The inclusion of the elements of the older liberalism 
in Horton's mature thought justifies the use of the 
adjective "new" only in the sense that liberalism 
has made a re-appearance or, at least, a resurgence. 
In this sense, certain portions of his thought are 
not original but they are "new" to much of con-
temporary theology. 
(2 ) The major characteristic of Horton's mature thought 
ia the tendency to balance liberal concepts with 
nee-orthodox and Catholic concepts. This re-stating 
and modifying of the liberal ideas within an 
ecumenical framework justifies the us& of the word 
"new" in the sense that liberalism is appearing in 
a new guise. This aspect of Horton's thought is new 
in the sense tha t it is original. 
2. Examples of Nee-liberalism 
Since Horton's thought, though basically liberal in both 
content and temper, has been greatly enriched by ideas which 
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originated outside of the liberal consensus, so that 
many areas of his thought have been sharply altered, it 
is proper to conclude that his appropriation of the term 
nee-liberal is ju~tifiable. Moreover, since Horton's 
thought very closely resembles that of Bennett ana DeWolf 
in all major respects, it appears that the term nee-liberal 
can be used as a common lable for their systems. 
3. Definition of Nee-liberalism as it 
Appears in the Thought of Walter M. Horton 
Nee-liberalism is ~ theological system which retains ~ 
characteristic features~ the older liberalism, e.g., respect 
for human reason ana concern that men respond actively to the 
ideal of the Kingdom, but ~ ~ enriched £I emphases derived 
~ ~-orthed~ theology, e.g., regard for the seriousness of 
the human predicament and recognition of the eternal dimensions 
of the Kingdom that transcends history, and Catholic theology, 
e.g., recognition of the importance of the Church and insistence 
upon its essential unity, ~ is especially marked £1 !B 
ecumenical g£ality, e.g., appreciation for the contributions 
which all branches of the Church can make to the continuing 
world-wide conversation between the churches. 
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NEO-LIBERAL THEOLOGY IN THE THOUGHT OF 
WALTER MARSHALL HORTON 
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The problem of this dissertation is to contribute to the 
drafting of a more precise definition of the term "nee-
liberalism." It centers in the thought of Walter Marshall 
Horton, who is an outstanding contributor to the development 
of such a theology. 
The following method is employed: 
(1} Horton's theological biography is presented. 
{2) A working criterion of nee-liberalism is established 
on the basis of the thought of John c. Bennett and 
L. Harold DeWolf whom Horton cites as examples of 
nee-liberals. 
(3) A criterion of liberalism is established on the 
basis of the thought of the important American 
liberal theologians of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. 
(4) An intensive study of Horton's thought (1919 to 1958) 
is made and all liberal, non-liberal, and post-
liberal elements are identified. 
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(5) His thought is related to the liberal and nee-
liberal criteria in order to determine its relation 
to the old and new liberalism. 
(6) Horton's thought is summarized with regard to the. 
liberal and non-liberal elements and evaluated as 
to originality. The dissertation concludes with a 
definition of nee-liberalism. 
The chronological analysis of Horton's thought shows 
how his mature thought combines liberal, non-liberal, and post-
liberal elements. His method combines the use of reason with 
an emphasis upon the importance of Biblical revelation. His 
doctrine of God recognizes both the personal love and the holy 
wrath of God. In his doctrine of man he balances 11 t1tanism" 
and "nihilism." His Christology is liberal with regard to the 
Incarnation but tends toward nee-orthodoxy in ita emphasis upon 
the objective factor in the Atonement and the doctrine of the 
Parousia. His doctrine of the Church draws heavily on data from 
the ecumenical movement and reveals a high regard for Catholic 
concepts. His doctrine of the Kingdom of God includes both 
liberal activism and orthodox eternalism. The manner in which 
Horton has drawn these various elements into one comprehensive 
theology closely parallels the efform of Bennett and DeWolf. 
The conclusion is that Horton's thought is predominantly 
liberal but merits the prefix "neo" for two reasons. {1) The 
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incorporation of many of the elements of the older liberalism 
into his mature thought witnesses to the fact that liberalism 
is making a "new" appearance, i.e., appearing again. In this 
sense, Horton's thought is not original but "new 11 to much 
contemporary thought. (2) The outstanding characteristic of 
Horton's mature thought is the balancing of liberal, nee-
orthodox, and Catholic concepts. This re-stating and modifying 
of liberal ideas within an ecumenical framework witnesses to 
the fact that liberalism is appearing in a new guise. 
The fact that Horton's thought, though basically liberal, 
has been greatly enriched by ideas from non-liberal sources, 
justifies his appropriation c£ the term nee-liberal. The 
similarity of his thought to that of Bennett and DeWolf suggests 
that the term can serve as a common label for their systems. 
Nee-liberalism ~ ~ theological system which retains the 
characteristic features of the older liberalism, e.g., respect 
for human reason and concern that men respond actively td the 
ideal of the Kingdom, but has been enriched £1 emphases derived 
from ~-orthodox thought, e.g., regard for the seriousness of 
human sin and recognition of the eternal dimensions of the 
Kingdom that transcends history, and Catholic theology, e.g., 
recognition of the importance of the Church and insistence upon 
its essential unity, ~ is especially marked £z !E ecumenical 
quality, e.g., appreciation for the contributicns which all the 
branches of the Church can make to the continuing world-wide 
conversation between the churches. 
363 
William W. Mountcastle, Jr., was born in Hanover, 
New Hampshire, in 1925. His childhood was spent in Cleveland, 
Ohio, but during his high school years he lived in Miami, 
Florida. After serving with the Air Force in Japan, he 
attended college in California and then moved to New England 
for graduate work. He was married in 1950 to Ila M. Warner 
of Vlhittier, California, and they now have three children: 
Christine 7, Susan 3, and Gregory 1. 
Education 
He received the A.B. degree from Whittier College, 
Whittier, California, in 1951; the S.T.B. degree from Boston 
University, School of Theology, in 1954; and the Ph.D. degree 
from Boston University Graduate School in 1958. 
Military Service 
He entered the United States Air Force as an Aviation 
Cadet in 1943 and was graduated as a commissioned pilot in 
364 
1945. He went overseas in 1946 and served as a pilot and 
communications officer in the Philippine Islands, Guam, 
Okinawa, and Japan. In 1948 he returned to the United States 
and was honorably discharged from the Air Force with the 
rank of 1st. Lieutenant. 
Professional Experience 
He is a fully ordained Methodist minister and a member 
of the Southern California-Arizona Conference. From 1953 to 
1958 he was teacher of the Adult Bible Class at St. Mark's 
Methodist Church, Brookline, Massachusetts. From 1954 to 1958 
he was Teaching Fellow in the Department of Systematic Theology 
at Boston University, School of Theology. During this period 
he assisted Dr. L. Harold DeWolf and Dr. S. Paul Schilling. 
